AT&T protests that the agency failed to adequately raise the concerns it had regarding AT&T’s staffing plan during the discussions held with the offeror. AT&T also contends that the agency’s discussions were misleading, because SSA identified one narrow area of the offeror’s staffing plan as lacking sufficient detail and failed to inform AT&T of the true nature and breadth of the evaluated weaknesses here. The protester argues that the lack of meaningful discussions was prejudicial to it, since the perceived weaknesses in AT&T’s staffing plan became a major factor in the agency’s subsequent best value tradeoff determination. Protest, Sept. 20, 2007, at 44-51.

When discussions are conducted, they must at a minimum identify deficiencies and significant weaknesses in each competitive-range offeror’s proposal. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 15.306(d)(3); Multimax, Inc., et al., B-298249.6 et al., Oct. 24, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 165 at 12; PAI Corp., B-298349, Aug. 18, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 124 at 8. Discussions must be “meaningful,” that is, sufficiently detailed so as to lead an offeror into the areas of its proposal requiring amplification or revision. Smiths Detection, Inc., B-298838, B-298838.2, Dec. 22, 2006, 2007 CPD para. 5 at 12; Symplicity Corp., B-297060, Nov. 8, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 203 at 8. For example, discussions are not meaningful where the agency fails to apprise an offeror that its staffing levels are viewed as unreasonably low. Professional Servs. Group, Inc., B-274289.2, Dec. 19, 1996, 97-1 CPD para. 54 at 4. Further, an agency may not mislead an offeror--through the framing of a discussion question or a response to a question--into responding in a manner that does not address the agency’s concerns, or misinform the offeror concerning a problem with its proposal or about the government’s requirements. Multimax, Inc., et al., supra; Metro Mach. Corp., B-281872 et al., Apr. 22, 1999, 99-1 CPD para. 101 at 6.

(sections deleted)

In its report to our Office, SSA argues that its actions here were proper for the following reasons: (1) the weaknesses found by the agency in AT&T’s staffing plan were not significant ones, so no discussions were in fact required here; (2) the agency nevertheless conducted meaningful discussions with AT&T regarding its staffing plan; and (3) the agency was not required to re-open discussions with AT&T simply because AT&T’s staffing plan subsequently became a discriminator for source selection purposes. AR, Oct. 1, 2007, at 1-5, AR, Nov. 2, 2007, at 1-6.  As discussed in detail below, we conclude that the agency’s actions were improper because: (1) the agency’s initial technical evaluation regarded AT&T’s staffing plan as a significant weakness; (2) the agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions with AT&T regarding this significant weakness; and (3) the agency’s substantial reliance on AT&T’s staffing plan in its best value tradeoff determination clearly demonstrates that the lack of meaningful discussions here was prejudicial to AT&T.


As set forth above, the record reflects that the TET’s initial evaluation of proposals identified two separate concerns with AT&T’s proposed staffing plan. First, the evaluators found that AT&T’s staffing appeared to be at minimal levels in relation to the RFP’s requirements. Second, the TET also believed that AT&T’s entire staffing plan lacked sufficient detail, as exemplified by the offeror’s staffing for the VNOC and help-desk personnel at the Durham and NCC locations. Moreover, the agency evaluators considered AT&T’s staffing plan to be a significant weakness, as evidenced by the initial evaluation report. Specifically, in addition to stating that “[t]he proposed staffing at current levels would be considered inconsistent with the proposal implementation schedule without a clear understanding of the support personnel,” the TET expressly found that “[t]he risk of implementing a minimal staffing plan as [AT&T] presented could jeopardize the success of the project.” AR, Tab 13, Initial Technical Evaluation Report, app. 5, Evaluation of Proposed Project Lifecycle Staffing Plans, at 7. We think that when an agency finds, as it did here, that the risk associated with a given aspect of an offeror’s proposal may jeopardize the overall success of the project, this represents a significant weakness. See FAR sect. 15.001 (a “significant weakness” in an offeror’s proposal is a flaw that appreciably increases the risk of unsuccessful contract performance). Given this finding regarding the risk associated with AT&T’s staffing plan, the fact that SSA did not expressly characterize the staffing plan as a significant weakness is not controlling. See Alliant Techsystems, Inc.; Olin Corp., B-260215.4, B-260215.5, Aug. 4, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 79 at 7-8. Accordingly, we conclude that the agency was required to conduct discussions with AT&T regarding its staffing plan.  Further, while the record shows that SSA did conduct discussions with AT&T regarding its staffing plan, we think that these discussions were not meaningful. As set forth above, the agency provided AT&T with one discussion item regarding its staffing plan. This item informed AT&T only of SSA’s concern that the staffing plan lacked sufficient detail (“the personnel staffing charts do not provide sufficient information to determine that the staffing levels are consistent with AT&T’s proposed programmatic methods,” AR, Tab 15, Discussions with AT&T, at 13-14), and completely failed to mention the agency’s equal, if not greater, independent concern that AT&T’s staffing levels were considered too low. An agency’s belief that an offeror’s staffing levels are too low is materially different from a concern that a staffing plan lacks sufficient detail; the fact that both involve staffing is not sufficient to conclude that the agency here provided meaningful notice to AT&T as to the total scope of its concern. See Andrew M. Slovak, B-253275.2, Nov. 2, 1993, 93-2 CPD para. 263 at 4 (discussions limited to a food menu’s item cycle did not put offeror on notice of the agency’s separate concern that the menu also failed to provide for healthy food items).  Moreover, the discussion item here specified only one particular area of AT&T’s staffing plan as lacking sufficient detail (“[s]pecifically, staffing levels for VNOC and Help Desk problem intake,” id. at 14), when the agency’s real concern was that AT&T’s entire staffing plan lacked sufficient information. See Spherix, Inc., B-294572, B-294572.2, Dec. 1, 2004, 2005 CPD para. 3 at 14 (agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions when it determined that offeror’s entire quality control plan was a significant weakness, but identified only two specific aspects of the quality control plan in discussions). In our view, not only was AT&T inadequately advised of other areas of its staffing plan that lacked sufficient detail, but the agency’s failure to identify the scope of its concern may have misled the offeror into believing that those areas did not require further adjustment.[18] Also, unlike other identified management approach weaknesses, the discussions here did not characterize AT&T’s staffing plan as a significant weakness, or inform the offeror of the agency’s belief that the risk associated with AT&T’s minimal staffing plan could jeopardize the success of the project. See AR, Tab 15, Agency Discussions with AT&T, at 8, 13-14. Under the circumstances here, we cannot conclude that AT&T, reviewing the agency’s discussions in conjunction with the material that it had submitted with its proposal, reasonably could have recognized the total scope of the agency’s concerns regarding both the staffing levels and the lack of detail in AT&T’s entire staffing plan.  The record also reflects that AT&T was prejudiced by the lack of meaningful discussions regarding its staffing plan. In its final evaluation report, the TET found that AT&T’s staffing levels, while higher than those proposed originally, were still “minimal and conservative,” and the lack of detail in AT&T’s staffing plan (in areas other than VNOC and Help desk, which AT&T’s FPR specifically addressed) represented potential performance risks if AT&T was unable to staff appropriately. Id., Tab 33, Final Technical Evaluation Report, at 9, app. II, Evaluation of Proposal Project Lifecycle Staffing Plans, at 6. The agency’s subsequent best value tradeoff determination then went further, and characterized AT&T’s staffing levels as the offeror’s “principal weakness and area of risk,” since its staffing levels were “so low as to potentially threaten the ability of the vendor to successfully deliver the proposed solution in accordance with the Government’s delivery schedule and to support the TSRP user community across the contract term in a fully satisfactory manner.” Id., Tab 35, Best Value Tradeoff Memorandum, at 22. Quite simply, AT&T’s staffing plan, which the agency considered to be a significant weakness from the time of the initial evaluation, was a material factor in the agency’s source selection determination.  (AT&T Corp., B-299542.3; B-299542.4, November 16, 2007) (pdf)

DRS maintains that the agency engaged in unequal discussions, specifically, that it was given more exacting questions and was required to provide far more detail in its responses than Onan. In effect, DRS is arguing that it was given a greater level of detail in its discussions than was given to Onan. We fail to see how providing more detailed discussions to DRS was improper or prejudicial to DRS. Discussions need not be identical; rather, discussions are to be tailored to each offeror’s proposal. Federal Acquisition Regulation sect. 15.306(d)(1), (e)(1); PharmChem, Inc., B-291725.3 et al., July 22, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 148 at 6. We find no impropriety here.  DRS also asserts that its discussions were misleading. As noted, the agency relaxed the solicitation’s requirements relating to the fuel efficiency standards for the generator sets. The agency advised both offerors of its intention to relax the specifications, and requested comments relating to the revisions, by e-mail dated October 18, 2006. AR, exh. 30. DRS commented by letter dated October 23, stating that, in its view, the changes were unnecessary because it could meet the original, more stringent, standards. AR, exh. 31. Notwithstanding DRS’s position, the agency revised the specifications on November 1. AR, exh. 32. Thereafter, by letter of November 2, DRS requested that the Army engage in discussions relating to the deficiencies identified in its original phase II and III proposal. In response, the agency provided DRS with two rounds of discussion questions, first by letter dated November 3, and subsequently by letter dated January 16, 2007. In both letters, the agency provided DRS with detailed questions that had been developed by the evaluators after their review of DRS’s initial proposal, including questions relating to DRS’s ability to meet the original, more stringent, fuel efficiency standards. (Engineered Electric Company d/b/a/ DRS Fermont, B-295126.5; B-295126.6,  December 7, 2007) (pdf)

Discussions, when conducted, must be meaningful, that is, they may not be misleading and must identify proposal deficiencies and significant weaknesses that could reasonably be addressed in a manner to materially enhance the offeror’s potential for receiving award. PAI Corp., B‑298349, Aug. 18, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 124 at 8. However, agencies are not required to “spoon feed” an offeror during discussions; they need only lead offerors into the areas of their proposal that require amplification. LaBarge Elecs., B‑266210, Feb. 9, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 58 at 6.  The discussions here were unobjectionable. As noted above, the discussion letter specifically advised Blane that its delivery plan was difficult to read and follow. In this regard, Blane’s initial delivery plan consisted of a chart containing various item descriptions (down the left hand side of the chart), amounts (throughout the chart, including various blank spaces), and country names (down the right hand side of the chart), formatted in such a manner that the columns contained no headings--thus making it unclear to what the columns referred--and the rows contained amounts that were not clearly on the same line, making it unclear which amount referred to which item description.[2] Since the nature of the agency’s difficulty with the chart was, simply, that it was difficult to read and follow, the discussion letter was sufficient to lead Blane into the area of its proposal that required improvement or further clarification. Blane asserts that the agency should have reviewed its entire proposal, including the quantities contained in a “transportation matrix,” and then brought any discrepancies to its attention during discussions. Protester’s Comments at 3. However, while the protester may believe that it would have been better able to address the deficiencies in its delivery plan if the agency had approached discussions as it suggests, the agency was not required to do so; again, the agency was only required to lead the protester into the area of concern. Moreover, given the lack of clarity in the chart, and the agency’s resultant inability to determine precisely what Blane intended, we think the agency was not in a position to provide more information in its discussion letter; certainly, it was not required to provide more detailed questions based on its speculation as to what Blane may have intended.  (Blane International Group, Inc., B-310329, December 13, 2007) (pdf)

Cornell next argues that, because the agency had “serious concerns about the location offered by Cornell from the time that the site visit was performed,” Comments at 7, the agency was required by the FAR to raise those concerns in discussions. When discussions are held they must at least address deficiencies and significant weaknesses in the proposals. FAR sect. 15.306(d)(3). However, the agency is not required to discuss every area where a proposal could be improved, and the scope and extent of discussions is a matter within the contracting officer’s discretion. Id. In this regard, we review the adequacy of discussions to ensure that agencies point out weaknesses that, unless corrected, would prevent an offeror from having a reasonable chance of award. Brown & Root, Inc. and Perini Corp., a joint venture, B-270505.2, B-270505.3, Sept. 12, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 143 at 6.  As discussed above, the record demonstrates that Cornell’s site location was never considered to be a significant weakness or deficiency, and never prevented Cornell from having a reasonable chance for award. Nowhere in the SSEB working papers, the SSEB consensus papers, the technical/management evaluation memorandum, or the SSD was the weakness of Cornell’s site location characterized as significant or as a deficiency. [2] Further, Cornell’s proposed site location was found to meet the requirements of the solicitation at every stage of the evaluation. Because there is no evidence to suggest that Cornell’s site location ever kept its proposal from being rated acceptable under the site location or technical/management factor, or otherwise prevented Cornell from having a reasonable chance of receiving award, the agency was not required to raise the issue in discussions. See Northrop Grumman Info. Tech. Inc., B-290080 et. al., June 10, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 136 at 6; Brown & Root, Inc. and Perini Corp., a joint venture, supra.  (Cornell Companies, Inc., B-310548, December 3, 2007)  (pdf)

We recognize, as PADCO points out, that the TEC did in fact describe the level of effort feature of its proposal as a “weakness.” Contrary to PADCO’s argument, however, discussions are not inadequate simply because a weakness, which was not addressed during discussions, subsequently becomes a determinative factor in choosing between two closely ranked proposals, as was the case here. See, e.g., Gracon Corp., B-293009 et al., Jan. 14, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 58 at 3; Hines Chicago Inv., LLC, B‑292984, Dec. 17, 2003, 2004 CPD para. 5 at 3-4. Further, regarding PADCO’s contention that the weakness must have been significant because its final ratings were decreased, the agency reports, and the record confirms, that this weakness was not viewed by the agency as significant. At PADCO’s debriefing, USAID expressly stated that it did not consider the above weakness to be significant. Consistent with this statement, the evaluation documents show that none of the evaluation comments characterize PADCO’s distribution of its level of effort as a “significant weakness,” a term the agency had used to describe other weaknesses it identified in its evaluation. See, e.g., AR, Tab 55, Competitive Range Determination, at 9 (discussing a “significant weakness” in the initial proposal submitted by The Services Group). While the distribution of PADCO’s level of effort presented a “risk,” as indicated by the TEC, there is nothing to suggest that it created an unacceptable level of risk or “appreciably” increased the risk of PADCO’s proposal. See FAR sect. 15.001 (defining a “weakness” as “a flaw . . . that increases the risk of unsuccessful contract performance” and a “significant weakness” as “a flaw that appreciably increases the risk of unsuccessful contract performance”). Ultimately, under both the management and staffing plan subfactor and the overall technical approach factor, PADCO’s proposal received a rating of “acceptable,” which, as noted above, was defined by the RFP as a proposal which meets all solicitation requirements, is “complete” and “comprehensive,” and exemplifies an understanding of the tasks required. RFP at M-2. (Planning And Development Collaborative International, B-299041, January 24, 2007) (pdf)

It is a fundamental precept of negotiated procurements that discussions, when conducted, must be meaningful; that is, discussions must identify deficiencies and significant weaknesses in each offeror’s proposal that could reasonably be addressed so as to materially enhance the offeror’s potential for receiving award. PAI Corp., B‑298349, Aug. 18, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 124 at 8; Spherix, Inc., B-294572, B-294572.2, Dec. 1, 2004, 2005 CPD para. 3 at 13. An agency fails to conduct meaningful discussions where it fails to apprise an offeror that its prices were viewed as unreasonably high. Price Waterhouse, B-220049, Jan. 16, 1986, 86-1 CPD para. 54 at 6-7. Further, an agency may not mislead an offeror--through the framing of a discussion question or a response to a question--into responding in a manner that does not address the agency’s concerns; misinform the offeror concerning a problem with its proposal; or misinform the offeror about the government’s requirements. Metro Mach. Corp., B‑281872 et al., Apr. 22, 1999, 99-1 CPD para. 101 at 6. In conducting exchanges with offerors, agency personnel also may not “engage in conduct that . . . favors one offeror over another,” FAR sect. 15.306(e)(1); in particular, agencies may not engage in what amounts to disparate treatment of the competing offerors. Front Line Apparel Group, B-295989, June 1, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 116 at 3-4. Here, in the discussions questions issued to NGI and Multimax (as well as to other offerors such as BAE) questioning the proposed rates for particular labor categories as significantly overstated, the agency advised as follows: “Your proposed labor rates are significantly higher than the Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE) rates for the following labor categories . . . . The offeror should consider revising the price proposal. If you do not revise the identified rates, please provide an explanation for the basis of the rate.” See IFN¹ to NGI no. 51, Nov. 3, 2005; IFN to NGI no. 298, Jan. 6, 2006; IFN to BAE no. 50, Nov. 3, 2005; IFN to BAE no. 297, Jan. 6, 2006; IFN to Multimax no. 49, Nov. 11, 2006. Thus, there was no reference in the IFNs to the agency’s reliance on the two-standard-deviation calculation, but instead only to the proposed labor rate being “significantly higher than” the IGCE as the basis for the IFN. The Army’s price discussions with NGI and Multimax (as well as with BAE) were inadequate because, due to the agency’s reliance on the two-standard-deviation formula to identify “outlier” rates--and the broad range of acceptable prices resulting from the formula--it failed to bring to the protesters’ attention numerous rates that reasonably should have been considered significantly overstated. In this regard, the record shows that proposed rates that were not questioned in the IFNs could actually exceed the IGCE rates by a greater percentage than the rates that were identified. Thus, for example, although NGI’s rate for [REDACTED] at the contractor site was [REDACTED] percent higher than the IGCE rate, this rate was not identified in an IFN because it was within the wide range of acceptable prices established under the formula. At the same time, although NGI’s proposed rate for [REDACTED] at the contractor site was only [REDACTED] percent higher than the IGCE rate, because it fell outside the range established by the two-standard-deviation test, NGI was advised that its rate was “significantly higher” than the IGCE. There simply is no reasonable basis for bringing the former rate to the offeror’s attention, but not the latter. The above example is not an isolated one. NGI calculates that [REDACTED] of its proposed labor rates that were not identified during price discussions were similar to this example--they exceeded the corresponding IGCE rate by a higher percentage than one or more of the rates identified in its price IFNs. NGI notes further that [REDACTED] of its unquestioned rates exceeded the IGCE rates by a greater percentage than did some rates that were questioned in other offerors’ IFNs. Likewise, the record indicates that Multimax was not advised that its proposed rates for a significant number of labor categories were higher than the corresponding IGCE rates, despite the fact that these proposed rates deviated from the IGCE by a greater percentage than rates that were identified in discussions with Multimax or other offerors. Multimax calculates that [REDACTED] of its unquestioned rates (only [REDACTED] of its rates were identified in IFNs) exceeded the IGCE rates by a greater percentage than the rates that were questioned in other offerors’ IFNs (during initial price discussions). We conclude that not only were offerors not adequately advised of all of their significantly overstated rates, but the agency’s failure to identify the additional rates actually misled the offerors into believing that those rates did not require further adjustment. In these circumstances, we conclude that the agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions with the protesters.  (Multimax, Inc.; NCI Information Systems, Inc.; BAE Systems, B-298249.6, B-298249.7, B-298249.8, B-298249.9, B-298249.10,October 24, 2006) (pdf)

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¹ Items for negotiation (IFN)

Where contracting agencies conduct discussions with offerors whose proposals are within the competitive range, the discussions must be meaningful. Professional Servs. Group, Inc., B-274289.2, Dec. 19, 1996, 97-1 CPD para. 54 at 3. Discussions cannot be meaningful if an offeror is not advised of the weaknesses, deficiencies, or excesses in its proposal that must be addressed in order for the offeror to be in line for award. Mechanical Contractors, S.A., B-277916.2, Mar. 4, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 68 at 4. Here, we think that the agency’s failure to raise its concerns regarding the achievability of ALF’s proposed delivery schedule constituted a failure to conduct meaningful discussions because the protester might well have been determined to be in line for award if it had been able to validate its proposed schedule. Further, we do not think that the agency was relieved of its obligation to conduct discussions due to the circumstance that it did not learn of the information giving rise to its concerns until after discussions had concluded. If, after discussions are completed, the agency identifies concerns pertaining to the proposal as it was prior to discussions that would have had to be raised if they had been identified before discussions were held, the agency is required to reopen discussions in order to raise the concerns with the offerors. See DevTech Sys., Inc., B-284860.2, Dec. 20, 2000, 2001 CPD para. 11 at 4. The key fact is that the concerns (while identified after discussions have been closed) relate to the proposal as it was prior to discussions. Id. (Al Long Ford, B-297807, April 12, 2006) (pdf)

IAP also complains that the Navy improperly failed to inform IAP that its proposed price was too high. In this regard, IAP notes that its proposed price was substantially higher than both the government estimate (by 34 percent) and EJB’s price (by 21 percent) for the definite-quantity elements of the RFP, and 39 percent higher than EJB’s price for the ID/IQ elements.  Where an offeror’s price is high in comparison to competitors’ prices or the government estimate, the agency may, but is not required to, address the matter during discussions. Grove Resource Solutions, Inc., B-296228, B-296228.2, July 1, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 133 at 5 n.5. Thus, if an offeror’s price is not so high as to be unreasonable and unacceptable for contract award, the agency reasonably may conduct discussions without advising the offeror that its prices are not competitive. Id.; cf. Creative Info. Tech., Inc., B-293073.10, Mar. 16, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 110 at 7 (price nearly 7 times the government estimate and 4.6 and 9 times competitors’ prices is unreasonable on its face). Here, the agency determined that IAP’s overall price was reasonable for the work to be performed and for what IAP proposed, SSB Report at 19, and the price difference, even as calculated by IAP, is not of a magnitude that suggests that IAP’s price was unreasonable on its face. See Grove Resource Solutions, Inc., supra (agency not required to discuss protester’s high price where awardee’s price was about 40 percent lower). Under these circumstances, the Navy was not required to raise the matter of IAP’s higher price during discussions. (IAP World Services, Inc., B-297084, November 1, 2005) (pdf)

We find that the record does not establish a reasonable basis for the agency’s assessment of a significant weakness with respect to Cogent’s proposed scanner. First, as the record shows and the Army now admits (see Agency’s Hearing Comments at 13-14), the evaluators failed to recognize that Cogent had proposed a different scanner in its revised proposals to satisfy the solicitation requirements--this failure itself renders unreasonable the agency’s evaluation judgment concerning Cogent’s proposed scanner. Despite the error, the Army’s evaluator nevertheless asserted that the weakness was based upon Cogent’s failure to explain how it could offer a compliant scanner when the firm had asserted in its initial proposal and earlier protest that no such scanner existed. TR at 122-24. However, even assuming this latter evaluation judgment was reasonable, the Army failed to provide Cogent with meaningful discussions with respect to this scanner. The FAR requires at a minimum that contracting officers discuss with each firm being considered for award “deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse past performance information to which the offeror has not yet had an opportunity to respond.” FAR sect. 15.306(d)(3). Here, the Army twice provided Cogent with written discussions after it proposed the Epson Perfection 4870 scanner as a compliant product, but never identified its concern that Cogent had not explained how it was now able to offer a compliant product, even though the evaluators regarded this as a significant weakness. In short, we find no reasonable basis in the record for the agency’s judgment that Cogent’s proposed scanner was a significant proposal weakness. We also find that, in any event, the Army failed to conduct meaningful discussions with Cogent with respect to this aspect of the agency’s evaluation. (Cogent Systems, Inc., B-295990.4; B-295990.5, October 6, 2005) (pdf)

When contracting agencies conduct discussions with offerors in the competitive range, such discussions must be meaningful. Kaneohe Gen. Servs., Inc., B-293097.2, Feb. 2, 2004, 2004 CPD paragraph 50 at 3. In order for discussions to be meaningful, agencies must advise an offeror of weaknesses, excesses, or deficiencies in its proposal, correction of which would be necessary for the offeror to have a reasonable chance of being selected for award. In this regard, the actual content and extent of discussions are matters of judgment primarily for determination by the agency involved, and we generally limit our review of the agency's judgments to a determination of whether they are reasonable. J.G. Van Dyke & Assocs. , B-248981, B-248981.2, Oct. 14, 1992, 92-2 CPD paragraph 245 at 4. Specifically, with regard to the adequacy of discussions of price, an agency generally does not have an obligation to tell an offeror that its price is high, relative to other offers, unless the government believes the price is unreasonable. State Mgmt. Servs., Inc.; Madison Servs., Inc., B-255528.6 et al. , Jan. 18, 1995, 95-1 CPD paragraph 25 at 5-6; Marwais Steel Co., B-254242.2, B-254242.3, May 3, 1994, 94-1 CPD paragraph 291 at 6. The issue here is whether the Army's discussions with CITI were meaningful where the Army advised CITI merely that its total price appeared "overstated," given the unique circumstances of this case--specifically, the extraordinary disparity between CITI's proposed level of effort and price as compared to the government estimate as well as the level of effort and prices of the other offerors in the competitive range. We conclude that they were not. In addressing this issue, we recognize that it is within the agency's discretion to decide whether to inform an offeror that its price is considered too high and to reveal the results of the analysis supporting that conclusion or to indicate to all offerors the cost or price that the government's price analysis, market research, and other reviews have identified as reasonable. See FAR 15.306(e). The question is whether the agency's judgment in this instance was reasonable. While an agency is not required to "spoon-feed" an offeror during discussions as to each and every item that could be revised to improve its proposal, see ITT Fed. Sys. Int'l Corp. , B-285176.4, B-285176.5, Jan. 9, 2001, 2001 CPD paragraph 45 at 6, agencies must impart sufficient information to afford offerors a fair and reasonable opportunity to identify and correct deficiencies, excesses or mistakes in their proposals. Matrix Int'l Logistics, Inc. , B-272388.2, Dec. 9, 1996, 97-2 CPD paragraph 89 at 9. In this case, we conclude that CITI could not be reasonably expected to have understood the true nature and magnitude of the agency's concern with its proposal based upon the information provided by the Army during its discussions with CITI, thus rendering those discussions essentially meaningless.  (Creative Information Technology, Inc., B-293073.10, March 16, 2005) (pdf)

In order for discussions to be meaningful, agencies must, at a minimum, point out to competing firms deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse past performance information to which the firm has not previously had an opportunity to respond. FAR 15.306(d)(3). The FAR also encourages contracting officers to discuss other aspects of a firm's proposal that could, in the opinion of the contracting officer, be altered or explained to enhance materially the proposal's potential for award. Id. Discussions must be meaningful, equitable and not misleading; discussions cannot be meaningful unless a firm is led into those weaknesses, excesses or deficiencies that must be addressed in order for it to have a reasonable chance for award. TDS, Inc., supra, at 6-7. LMC asserts that the agency identified 11 weaknesses in its proposal that were based on language from the earlier, pre-corrective action, version of its proposal. LMC maintains that the agency was required to discuss these 11 weaknesses with the firm pursuant to our decision in DevTech Sys., Inc. , B-284860.2, Dec. 20, 2000, 2001 CPD 11 in which we held that, where an agency identifies new weaknesses in a proposal during a reevaluation of that proposal in an acquisition where discussions have previously occurred, it is required to discuss those new weaknesses with the offeror. The agency responds that, with respect to 6 of the 11 alleged weaknesses arising from proposal language that predated the current FPRs, the agency did not assign a weakness to the LMC proposal during its evaluation, and thus was not required to raise the matter in discussions. Agency Legal Memorandum, Sept. 30, 2004, at 11833. While the agency is correct that the six weaknesses to which LMC refers were not identified as weaknesses in the technical evaluation report on LMC's proposal, all six are specifically identified in the agency's final evaluation and tradeoff analysis report as weaknesses and as bases for distinguishing between the LMC and EDS proposals. AR, exh. 116, atviix,xiv. Given that they ultimately were listed in the best value analysis--they related to 6 of the agency's 10 identified best value items--and that they contributed in some manner to the proposal's receiving an overall marginal/high risk rating, we do not think the fact that they were captured in the best value determination, rather than the technical evaluation report, provided a basis for concluding that these issues were not significant weaknesses. Further, while it is not clear how significant they were, given that they played a large part in the best value determination--and therefore presumably were among the most important reasons for downgrading LMC's proposal--absent some clear showing by the agency that they were not significant, since they were based on information in LMC's original proposal, and the agency had not previously discussed the issues with LMC, it was obliged to do so. DevTech Sys., Inc. , supra , at 4-5. (Lockheed Martin Simulation, Training & Support, B-292836.8; B-292836.9; B-292836.10, November 24, 2004) (pdf) 

We do not agree with CHS that the agency's referring to staffing and labor hours interchangeably was misleading. Rather, we think the agency's references to "labor hours for full time employees" (oral discussions) and the adequacy of CHS's proposed EAP staff (written discussions) both reasonably could be interpreted in only one way: the agency was concerned that CHS had not proposed enough staff to perform adequately. The agency's questions were adequate to bring this concern to CHS's attention, and therefore were meaningful.  (Comprehensive Health Services, Inc., B-294608, December 1, 2004) (pdf)

As described above, the SSET identified Spherix's marketing approach, including a lack of projected growth, to be a "significant weakness." See AR, Supplemental Documents, Source Selection Briefing Slides, at 2985. Spherix's approach to the marketing plan requirement was not discussed with the protester, and therefore we conclude that the agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions with the firm in this respect. We also find that the agency did not conduct meaningful discussions with Spherix with respect to its proposed quality control plan, which was also determined to be a significant weakness. The RFP provided for the evaluation of offerors' draft comprehensive quality control plan "to include a Performance Work Summary (PRS) with Standards, Acceptable Quality Level (AQL), and Incentives." RFP M, at 333. Spherix's initial proposal described its proposed quality control plan, see AR, Tab103, Spherix Initial Proposal, at 2139-214, which the SSET evaluated to be a weakness, stating that Spherix's "overall quality control plan . . . is not a complete approach . . . Vendor must amplify a more thorough approach to quality control ensuring that [DELETED] are addressed." See AR, Supplemental Documents, Final SSET Evaluation Worksheets for Spherix, at 2997. The SSET also evaluated Spherix's proposed approach to the PRS and AQL requirements to be weaknesses. Id. In its discussions with Spherix, the agency addressed only the firm's proposed approach to the PRS and AQL requirements, and Spherix's proposal revisions sufficiently addressed those aspects of its proposal such that the agency no longer identified them as proposal weaknesses. Id. The agency did not otherwise address Spherix's quality control plan during discussions. Id. In its final evaluation, the SSET noted that Spherix had not changed its proposal with respect to its proposed quality control plan, and stated that discussions were not conducted on this weakness because Spherix "had a plan[; the] plan was simply weak." Id. Ultimately, this aspect of Spherix's proposal was identified by the SSET identified to be a "significant weakness." See AR, Supplemental Documents, Source Selection Briefing Slides, at2985. We therefore find that the agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions with Spherix with respect to its proposed quality control plan. We also find that Spherix did not receive meaningful discussions with respect to its proposed transition period staffing, which was evaluated as a part of the proposed project implementation plan under the management approach factor. See RFP M, at 333. Spherix's response to this requirement was evaluated as a weakness, because the SSET found that Spherix did not provide detailed information; SSET did not conduct discussions on the matter with Spherix because it concluded that Spherix's proposal "spoke to staffing but weak in identification." See AR, Supplemental Documents, Final SSET Consensus Evaluation Worksheets for Spherix, at 2999. This aspect of Spherix's proposal, which was identified by the SSET as a "significant weakness," see AR, Supplemental Documents, Source Selection Briefing Slides, at2985, also should have been raised with Spherix during discussions, but was not.  (Spherix, Inc., B-294572; B-294572.2, December 1, 2004) (pdf)

PDMG asserts that the agency improperly failed to conduct adequate discussions for the Area 5 and 6 awards and, as a result, treated offerors unequally. Specifically, PDMG maintains that, after the initial rounds of discussions--during which the agency asked PDMG about its experience as it related to performing the RFP's mortgagee compliance requirements--the agency continued to have a concern in the area, but did not again raise it with PDMG. The protester contrasts this with the agency's actions in conducting discussions with SAAM; in both the first and second rounds of discussions, the agency pointed out to SAAM that its prices for certain line items appeared low. PDMG asserts that the agency's repeated discussions with SAAM in the area of price, compared to the single round of technical discussions with PDMG covering the agency's experience concern, evidence disparate treatment. This argument is without merit. PDMG's proposals received good ratings in the area of experience following the agency's discussions in the area. AR, exhs. 9 at 80, 10 at 57. Agencies are not required to discuss every element of a technically acceptable proposal that receives less than the maximum possible score, nor are they required to afford an offeror multiple opportunities to cure a weakness remaining in a proposal that previously was the subject of discussions. Bioqual, Inc. , B-259732.2., B259732.3, May 15, 1995, 95-1 CPD 243 at 45. In any case, the record shows that the two firms were given the same opportunity to revise their proposals as to both technical matters and price during the first round of discussions, AR, exhs. 5, 6, 7, 8, and that revisions for both firms were limited to the pricing proposals during the second round. Id. Thus, contrary to PDMG's assertion, both firms received virtually identical discussions, albeit in different proposal areas depending on the particulars of their offers.  (Portfolio Disposition Management Group, LLC, B-293105.7, November 12, 2004) (pdf)

Chapman also argues that HUD misled it into believing that its responses to the discussion questions had satisfied HUD's concerns. Specifically, Chapman asserts that, during each round of discussions, HUD required Chapman to address only those issues currently raised and informed it that all prior issues had been resolved. Chapman's assertions are belied by the record. While HUD's discussion letters included the statement Your written responses to the written negotiations/ discussions should address only the areas set forth above. . . . (emphasis in original), the letters nowhere stated that prior issues had been resolved, and (other than the initial letter, which did not request FPRs) specifically advised that offerors may address any area in their FPR. Discussion Letters dated Apr. 27, 2004, May 21, 2004, and June 8, 2004.  (Chapman Law Firm, LPA, B-293105.6, B-293105.10, B-293105.12, November 15, 2004) (pdf)

NIH's discussions with Cygnus did not comply with the requirement that discussions be meaningful. As noted above, in explaining why THG's proposal was superior to Cygnus's proposal such that, notwithstanding the significantly lower cost of Cygnus's proposal, THG's proposal represented the best value to the government, the source selection authority cited a number of weaknesses in Cygnus's proposal (as well as strengths in THG's proposal). NIH, however, failed to raise several of these weaknesses during the discussions with Cygnus. Thus, the agency failed to advise Cygnus that the agency viewed as a major weakness (under the single most important technical evaluation subcriterion) the evaluated limited [DELETED]; had assigned a weakness to Cygnus's proposal on the basis that [DELETED]; and had concluded that Cygnus, although displaying an understanding of the scope of work, had not presented a [DELETED]. At the least, in conducting discussions with Cygnus, the agency was required to discuss the first of these concerns, since the agency indisputably viewed it as major weakness. Moreover, while NIH did raise other matters of concern during discussions, the record indicates that the agency misled the protester as to the results of those discussions, advising Cygnus that it had successfully addressed the agency's concerns when this in fact does not appear to have been the case. In this regard, NIH advised Cygnus during discussions of its concern that the proposed leader of Cygnus's team of meeting planners would [DELETED]. Further, NIH viewed Cygnus's failure to furnish samples of its graphics designers' work to be a major weakness, and the agency therefore requested that Cygnus submit such samples. NIH Discussions Letter to Cygnus, Oct.9, 2002. In response, Cygnus sought to explain its rationale for the specified level of effort for [DELETED]. In addition, Cygnus furnished [DELETED]. Cygnus Discussions Response, Oct. 24, 2002. NIH also requested and received from Cygnus additional information regarding, and verification of, several elements of Cygnus's proposed costs, and the agency specifically negotiated [DELETED]. See , e.g. , NIH Discussion Letters to Cygnus, Oct.9, 2002, Dec. 2, 2002, and Jan. 28, 2003. NIH did not find Cygnus's response with respect to the team [DELETED] to be satisfactory, and, according to the agency, it [DELETED]. Further, as noted above, the agency considered the costs negotiated with Cygnus to be [DELETED]. Nevertheless, notwithstanding its continuing concerns with Cygnus's proposal, the agency advised Cygnus in the March 26 request for an FPR that as a result of the oral discussions with it, "in which we negotiated cost issues concerning your proposal," including the [DELETED], a "total estimated cost of[DELETED] . . . is considered to be fair and reasonable." NIH Request to Cygnus for FPR, Mar. 26, 2003. NIH further advised Cygnus on March 27 that "[d]iscussions concerning Cygnus Corporation's proposal have concluded... . It is understood that these discussions have resulted in agreement of all technical and cost issues raised during negotiations." NIH Request to Cygnus for FPR, Mar. 27, 2003. Likewise, when the agency afforded Cygnus and the other offerors on April30 an opportunity to submit a second FPR, it advised Cygnus in its letter that "discussions held on March 26, 2003, resulted in agreement of all technical and cost issues raised during negotiations." NIH Request to Cygnus for FPR, Apr. 30, 2003. (Cygnus Corporation, Inc., B-292649.3; B-292649.4, December 30, 2003)  (pdf)

Here, ASUS admits that, “[d]uring discussions . . . the Navy expressed concerns about [the subcontractor’s] size and its capability to perform the subcontracted work if it were to experience rapid growth as a result of this project.” ASUS Comments at 7. However, ASUS notes that, in response to these expressed concerns, it provided financial records regarding the subcontractor’s viability, a corporate guarantee from ASUS’s parent company, and an explanation of the subcontractor’s plans to hire the workers from the existing government workforce necessary to operate the wastewater systems. ASUS argues that the agency’s apparent “acceptance” of the information and “failure to point out any continuing perceived weaknesses” was misleading and denied ASUS the opportunity to revise it proposal. Id. at 8. We disagree.  Nothing in the record suggests that the agency misled ASUS regarding its concerns. ASUS has pointed to no affirmative statements by the Navy indicating that the agency viewed the concerns it had raised regarding the proposed subcontractor as having been resolved. Further, since the agency was not required to reiterate concerns that were not alleviated after reviewing the protester’s response to the initial discussions, OMV Med., Inc. , supra , the mere fact that the Navy remained silent after the protester’s response could not reasonably be understood here as an indication that the agency found ASUS’s response to be satisfactory. (American States Utilities Services, Inc., B-291307.3, June 30, 2004) (pdf)

Here, as discussed above, despite Lockheed’s inclusion in its initial proposal of “contractor-specific” savings, including the savings associated with the [deleted], the agency declined during discussions to indicate in any way that such savings would be excluded from the agency’s calculation of AUPC.[13] The agency asserts that Lockheed should have known that “contractor-specific” savings would be excluded from the agency’s AUPC calculation due to the RFP’s statements that an “independent Government estimate” of AUPC would be conducted and that various estimating tools would be used to “either validate contractors’ cost estimates or to develop Government cost estimates.” RFP § M.3.1.1.1. We disagree. Neither the language of the solicitation, nor the information provided by the agency during discussions, reasonably placed the offerors on notice that “contractor-specific” savings would have no effect on the agency’s calculation of AUPC. Although we agree that, if the agency actually intends to compete the follow-on production contract, there is nothing inherently unreasonable in evaluating only “design-specific” costs,[14] the offerors were not clearly advised of this. As noted above, the RFP stated that the agency would evaluate the AUPC of “the offeror’s proposed munition” and that such evaluation would be based on an assessment of “the bidders’ production cost estimates.” RFP § M.3.1.1.1. Further, the agency clearly knew, or should have known, that Lockheed’s initially proposed AUPC was based on “contractor-specific” costs, including the costs associated with the proposed [deleted]; yet the agency failed to advise Lockheed during discussions that such costs would be replaced with “industry rates” in calculating the evaluated AUPC. Consistent with the terms of the solicitation, and the information provided during discussions, Lockheed reasonably believed that it could reduce its evaluated AUPC by increasing its proposed “contractor-specific” savings. On this record, the agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions because it failed to advise Lockheed that “contractor-specific” savings would not be reflected in the agency’s calculation of AUPC. (Lockheed Martin Corporation, B-293679; B-293679.2; B-293679.3, May 27, 2004) (pdf)

USF does not protest the evaluation of its proposed price. Rather, USF maintains that the agency failed to engage in meaningful discussions with it by failing to provide adequate notice that its price exceeded the government estimate, and by failing to adequately discuss the implications of its “all or none” proposal. With respect to the former point, the record shows that the agency did apprise USF in the second negotiation message that its proposed price exceeded the government estimate. USF maintains, however, that when it thereafter submitted pricing that continued to exceed the government estimate, the agency was required to again raise the matter with the firm. With respect to the latter point, the record shows that, in its request for FPRs, the agency asked USF to clarify whether its offer was still “all or none.” AR, exh. 12, at 1. USF maintains that the agency was required to apprise it of the fact that unbundling the proposal could have made it eligible for award of the wastewater system. We have no basis to object to the adequacy of discussions here. Discussions are legally adequate where offerors are advised of the weaknesses, excesses and deficiencies in their proposals. Professional Performance Dev. Group, Inc., B‑279561.2 et al., July 6, 1998, 99-2 CPD ¶ 29 at 5. While discussions should be as specific as practicable, there is no requirement that they be all-encompassing or extremely specific in describing the agency's concerns; rather, the legal requirement is that they generally lead offerors into the areas of their proposals that require amplification or correction, without being misleading. Id. Where an agency has advised an offeror of an area of concern, there is no legal requirement that it raise the issue again in a subsequent round of discussions, even where the issue continues to be of concern to the agency. Id. at 5 n.3. (USFilter Operating Services, Inc., B-293215, February 10, 2004) (pdf)

An agency is not required to afford offerors all encompassing discussions, or to discuss every aspect of a proposal that receives lower than the maximum score, and is not required to advise an offeror of a minor weakness that is not considered significant, even where the weakness subsequently becomes a determinative factor in choosing between two closely ranked proposals. Northrop Grumman Info. Tech., Inc., B‑290080 et al., June 10, 2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 136 at 6. Here, none of the identified weaknesses prevented AO’s proposal from being considered fully acceptable or otherwise from having a reasonable chance of receiving the award. Rather, the weaknesses merely resulted in AO’s proposal being rated good rather than excellent under the factors in question, and the award ultimately was made to AMTEC, not because AO’s proposal was deficient, but because AMTEC’s was superior. Development Alternatives, Inc., B-279920, Aug. 6, 1998, 98-2 CPD ¶ 54 at 7. Under these circumstances, the agency was not required to discuss these weaknesses with AO.  (American Ordnance, LLC, B-292847; B-292847.2; B-292847.3, December 5, 2003)  (pdf)

Although discussions must address at least deficiencies and significant weaknesses identified in proposals, the scope and extent of discussions are largely a matter of the contracting officer’s judgment. In this regard, we review the adequacy of discussions to ensure that agencies point out weaknesses that, unless corrected, would prevent an offeror from having a reasonable chance for award. For discussions to be meaningful, they must lead offerors into the areas of their proposals requiring amplification or revision. The Communities Group, B‑283147, Oct. 12, 1999, 99-2 CPD ¶ 101 at 4. The agency provided MacB with meaningful discussions. Specifically, it issued several evaluation notices (EN), two of which requested clarification of MacB’s plans to use incumbent personnel. The first sought clarification of the “commitment of individuals listed as key technical personnel . . . and . . . who they propose to fill key . . . positions if incumbents are not interested.” AR 14 at 1. A second EN sought clarification of an apparent contradiction in MacB’s proposal relating to its plan to offer the right of first refusal to incumbent personnel while at the same time proposing to have 30 percent of the effort staffed by subcontractor personnel. Id. While these ENs did not specifically refer to “risk,” they clearly were sufficient to communicate the agency’s concerns about MacB’s ability to successfully acquire the incumbent workforce, upon which the moderate risk rating ultimately was based. This satisfied the requirement for meaningful discussions in this area. (MacAulay-Brown, Inc., B-292515; B-292515.2, September 30, 2003)  (pdf)

The agency's initial evaluation under this sub-criterion downgraded M&S Farms' proposal for not identifying what each individual would do, and downgraded Carr's proposal to the same degree because its resumes did not list references. Agency Report, Tab 7, Initial Rating Sheets for M&S Farms' Proposal, at 51, 109; Tab 8, Initial Rating Sheets for Carr's Proposal, at 22, 51. Discussions with M&S Farms did not include a question regarding this sub-criterion, or otherwise identify the concern for which M&S Farms' proposal was downgraded, Agency Report, Tab 11, Discussions with M&S Farms, but discussions with Carr did include a question that disclosed the agency's concern under this sub-criterion. Agency Report, Tab 12, Discussions with Carr (Feb. 14, 2002), at 2. Carr then provided the requested references and the agency increased Carr's score to the maximum points available under the sub-criterion, which accounts for the majority of the difference in technical scores between these proposals. Agency Report, Tab 14, Carr's Response to Discussions, at 34; Tab 17, Revised Rating Sheets for Carr's Proposal, at 3. The agency thus treated the offerors unequally on this point, with the awardee receiving a prejudicial competitive advantage as a result.  (M&S Farms, Inc., B-290599, September 5, 2002)  (pdf)

However, as the agency points out, this was just one of several noted weaknesses in Northrop's approach to performing the contract, with no indication that it was considered significant. COR at 23-24. This being the case, and since there is no evidence that the weakness prevented the proposal from being rated acceptable under the systems management/program management subfactor, or otherwise prevented Northrop from having a reasonable chance of receiving the award, the agency was not required to discuss this issue with Northrop. See Brown & Root, Inc. and Perini Corp., a joint venture, supra.  (Northrop Grumman Information Technology, Inc., B-290080; B-290080.2; B-290080.3, June 10, 2002)  (pdf)

While agencies generally are required to conduct meaningful discussions by leading offerors into the areas of their proposals requiring amplification, this does not mean that an agency must "spoon-feed" an offeror as to each and every item that could be revised or otherwise addressed to improve its proposal. LaBarge Elecs., B-266210, Feb. 9, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 58 at 6.  (DeLeon Technical Services, Inc.; TekStar, Inc., B-288811; B-288811.2; B-288811.3, December 12, 2001)

Where agency knew or should have known that the protester interpreted the solicitation as limiting technical proposals to 100 pages, discussions with the protester were not meaningful when the agency did not advise protester that the solicitation permitted 200 page proposals, declined to advise the protester of the agency's repeatedly expressed concerns that the protester's proposal lacked detail, and advised the protester there were no technical weaknesses in its proposal.  (Bank of America, B-287608; B-287608.2, July 26, 2001)

Under Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 15.306(e)(3), "the [CO] may inform an offeror that its price is considered by the Government to be too high, or too low, and reveal the results of the analysis supporting that conclusion." This language clearly gives the CO discretion to inform the offeror that its price is too high, but does not require that the CO do so, especially where, as here, the agency does not consider the price a significant weakness or deficiency that the offeror could alter or explain to enhance the proposal's potential for award. National Projects, Inc., B-283887, Jan. 19, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 16 at 5; see also KBM Group, Inc., B-281919, B-281919.2, May 3, 1999, 99-1 CPD ¶ 118 at 8-9 (agency did not mislead protester during discussions, even though award was ultimately made based on price and agency did not inform protester that its price was higher than awardee's price, where agency did not believe that protester's price was too high for the approach taken).  (SOS Interpreting, Ltd., B-287477.2, May 16, 2001)

The agency's discussions with IRRI specifically identified the individual CLINs for which the agency considered IRRI's proposed prices too low, which constituted half of the CLINs, as well as that IRRI's overall price was too low. It then afforded IRRI an unrestricted opportunity to submit final proposal revisions. The record thus shows that the Air Force conducted meaningful discussions on the issue.  (International Resources Recovery, Inc., B-287160, March 30, 2001)

We will not find that an agency improperly failed to advise an offeror of a weakness reasonably viewed during the evaluation as minor merely because, as the competition played out, the weakness could have been a determinative factor in choosing between two closely ranked proposals. Brown & Root, Inc. and Perini Corp., a joint venture, B-270505.2, B-270505.3, Sept. 12, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 143 at 6.  (Millar Elevator Service Company, B-284870.4, December 27, 2000)

This case highlights the challenge that an agency may face when, for whatever reason, it reevaluates initial proposals after discussions are complete. If during the reevaluation of proposals the agency identifies concerns that would have had to be raised had they been identified before discussions were held, the agency is required to reopen discussions in order to raise the concerns with the offerors. Mechanical Contractors, S.A., supra, at 5-6; CitiWest Properties, Inc., supra, at 5. The key fact is that the concerns (while identified relatively late) relate to the proposals as they were prior to discussions.  (DevTech Systems, Inc., B-284860.2, December 20, 2000)

Contracting agencies are not obligated to afford all-encompassing discussions that "spoon-feed" an offeror each item that must be addressed to improve a proposal; agencies are only required to lead offerors into the areas of their proposals considered deficient and requiring amplification.  (SDS International, B-285821, September 21, 2000)

Contracting agencies are not obligated to afford all-encompassing discussions that "spoon-feed" an offeror each item that must be addressed to improve a proposal; agency reasonably led protester into the areas of its proposal with shortcomings that warranted amplification or clarification.  (Arctic Slope World Services, Inc., B-284481; B-284481.2, April 27, 2000)

Allegation that discussions with protester were not meaningful is sustained where the record shows that the evaluators were concerned over the protester's pricing methodology and the source selection official shared that concern, but the protester was not afforded an opportunity during discussions to explain its pricing strategy.  (ACS Government Solutions Group, Inc., B-282098; B-282098.2; B-282098.3, June 2, 1999)

For discussions to be meaningful, they must lead offerors into the areas of their proposals requiring amplification or revision; the agency is not required to "spoon-feed" an offeror as to each and every item that could be revised so as to improve its proposal, however. Du and Assocs., Inc., supra, at 7-8; Applied Cos., B-279811, July 24, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 52 at 8.  (LB&B Associates, Inc., B-281706, March 24, 1999)

Protest that discussions were not meaningful because agency failed to point out excesses in protester's technical proposal is denied where claimed beneficial features in fact were not excesses, but rather (1) were considered by the agency to be desirable, (2) were simply protester's approach to complying with the solicitation requirements, or (3) did not render the proposal unacceptable, result in a significant reduction in score, or result in an unreasonable, grossly excessive price.  (Consolidated Engineering Services, Inc, B-279565.5, March 19, 1999)

Written discussion questions generated by a contracting agency should reasonably apprise offerors of the areas that the agency considers deficient such that the offerors will understand the agency's concerns.  (Stratus Systems, Inc., B-281645, February 24, 1999)