New
Turning then to the protester's complaints
regarding the evaluation of Privasoft's quotation, AINS's chief
argument is that it was improper for the agency to enter into a
BPA with Privasoft Corp. because it was Privasoft, Inc. that
submitted the original quotation. AINS contends that permitting
Privasoft Corp. to step into the shoes of Privasoft, Inc.
constitutes an improper substitution of offerors. DOJ argues in
response that it is clear from the documentation submitted by
Privasoft that Privasoft Corp. submitted the original quotation,
that Privasoft Corp. will function as the contractor, and that
Privasoft Corp. merely used Privasoft, Inc. as its instrument
for submission of the quotation.
The record clearly establishes that Privasoft, Inc. submitted
the original quotation and that it was the entity seeking to
enter into a BPA with the agency. The original BPA (i.e., the
BPA that was the subject of AINS's first protest) was between
DOJ and Privasoft, Inc. AR, Tab 17. In addition, Privasoft
responded to the agency's first request for clarification by
explaining that since Privasoft Corp.'s FSS contract indicated
that orders were to be placed with Privasoft, Inc., it was
reasonable for the quotation to have been submitted by, and the
BPA to be established with, Privasoft, Inc. Also, Privasoft
posed the following question in response to the agency's request
for revised quotations: "Does DOJ have any concern regarding the
administrative structure of our bid and of the contract, with
Privasoft Corp. as the holder of the GSA Schedule 70 contract,
and Privasoft, Inc. as the holder of the BPA?" AR, Tab 10,
Privasoft Email, Dec. 11, 2008.
Although Privasoft, Inc. submitted the original quotation, under
the facts here we see no basis to object to the establishment of
a BPA with Privasoft Corp., the vendor holding the FSS contract.
A BPA is not a contract, and orders placed against an FSS BPA
are placed against the underlying FSS contract. Canon USA, Inc.,
B-311254.2, June 10, 2008, 2008 CPD para. 113 at 3. That is the
situation here: the quotation submitted by Privasoft, Inc. was
for the establishment of a BPA under Privasoft Corp.'s FSS
contract. As noted above, Privasoft Corp.'s FSS contract
identified Privasoft, Inc. as the entity through which ordering
and payment transactions would be effected. Under these
circumstances, we do not think that the roles of the two
different corporate entitities are a basis for us to sustain the
protest. (AINS,
Inc., B-400760.2; B-400760.3, June 12, 2009) (pdf)
In February 2004, pursuant to Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) sect. 8.405-3, the Army established blanket
purchase agreements (BPA) with eight contractors holding Group
36 General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule
(FSS) contracts for photocopiers. Canon was one of the eight
contractors, and was issued a BPA on February 23. The BPA had a
5-year term. In September 2007, Canon and GSA began to negotiate
the renewal of Canon’s FSS contract, which was set to expire on
October 31. These negotiations ultimately failed. On September
27, concerned about the effect that the expiration of the FSS
contract would have on its BPA, Canon contacted the Army to
determine whether any action was required to maintain its BPA as
a viable ordering vehicle. In response, the Army’s contract
specialist advised Canon by email that “[a]ccording to our
contract . . . the Term of the BPA is 5 years from date of
award. This would make your BPA W911SE-04-A-0005 valid until 22
FEB 09 and any extension is unnecessary.” Opposition to Motion
to Dismiss, Mar. 17, 2008, Tab 1, Email, at 1. Canon therefore
took no further action with respect to the BPA or the expiration
of the FSS contract, and on December 1, Canon’s FSS contract was
modified to prohibit the placement of new orders.
On December 13, the Army issued the RFQ to the eight BPA
holders. Canon submitted a timely offer under the RFQ, as did at
least one other BPA holder, Sharp Electronics Corporation. On
January 31, 2008, the Army announced that the order would be
issued to Canon, the lowest-priced offeror. On February 15,
Sharp filed a protest with our Office alleging that issuance of
the order to Canon was improper because Canon’s FSS contract
prohibited the placement of new orders. In response, the Army
took corrective action by canceling the order. Our Office
dismissed Sharp’s protest as academic on February 26.
On March 3, Canon filed this protest with our Office, alleging
that cancellation of the order was improper because its BPA
remained a valid ordering vehicle through the time the order was
issued. Shortly thereafter, the agency filed a motion to dismiss
the protest, arguing that Canon was not an interested party to
protest the decision because Canon was not eligible to receive
an order under its BPA due to the expiration of its FSS
contract. Because the issue raised involves the FSS program, our
Office solicited GSA’s views on the issue of the BPA’s validity.
Consistent with the position taken by the Army, GSA’s view is
that, when a BPA holder’s FSS contract expires, the BPA is no
longer viable as there is no longer an active contract against
which orders may be placed. Thus, in this case, when Canon’s FSS
contract expired, its BPA, established pursuant to that FSS
contract, also expired as a valid ordering vehicle for new
photocopier service leases.
In response, Canon asserts that GSA fails to address the central
issue in the protest, whether the BPA was established pursuant
to, and is wholly dependent on, the FSS contract. On this issue
Canon essentially contends that its BPA was not dependent on its
FSS contract, but was a separate agreement against which orders
could be placed and which was not made coterminous with Canon’s
FSS contract by its own terms or by the FAR. We agree with Canon
that an FSS BPA is a separate agreement from its associated FSS
contract. Nevertheless, we conclude that when Canon’s FSS
contract expired, Canon’s BPA ceased to be a valid procurement
vehicle for the placement of new orders because, as explained
below, an FSS BPA is in effect solely a pass-through to the BPA
holder’s FSS contract and does not provide an independent
foundation for issuing orders.
In order for any procurement to be valid, it must be conducted
in accordance with the competition requirements set forth in the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), 10 U.S.C. sect.
2304(a)(1)(A) (2000), and FAR part 6. Under 10 U.S.C. sect.
2303(2)(c), contracts awarded under the FSS program pursuant to
FAR part 8 satisfy the requirements for full and open
competition. As relevant here, FAR sect. 8.405-3(a)(1)
authorizes the establishment of BPAs under FSS contracts as a
means to fill “repetitive needs for supplies or services.” It is
well-settled, however, that a BPA itself is not a contract;
rather, a contract is formed by the subsequent placement of a
valid order against the BPA, or by the incorporation of the
basic agreement into a new contract. See Envirosolve LLC,
B-294974.4, June 8, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 106 at 3 n.3, citing
Modern Sys. Tech. Corp. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 360, 363
(1991). As with any contract, orders placed under an FSS BPA
must satisfy the applicable statutory requirements for
competition.
In this case, the record shows that the BPA was issued pursuant
to Canon’s FSS contract, the plain language of Canon’s BPA
states that it is established “[p]ursuant to GSA Federal Supply
Schedule (FSS) Contract Number GS-25F-0023M,” Motion to Dismiss,
Tab 1, Canon BPA, at 1, and Canon itself does not dispute that
the BPAs here were all “initially awarded to vendors based on
their then current GSA copier schedule contracts.” Protest at 5.
It is therefore clear that Canon’s BPA is an FSS BPA,
established under FAR part 8.4. Because use of the FSS
procedures constitutes full and open competition under 10 U.S.C.
sect. 2303(2)(c), orders placed under a valid FSS contract,
whether directly or via a BPA, meet the CICA competition
requirements. Conversely, in the absence of a valid FSS
contract, any order placed under a BPA must independently
satisfy the statutory competition requirements; that is, to be a
valid ordering vehicle independent from an FSS contract, the BPA
itself would have to have been established using procedures that
satisfy the statutory requirements for competition. That clearly
is not the case here, or in any FSS BPA of this type, given that
the pool of vendors that could receive a BPA was limited to FSS
contract holders, as directed by FAR sect. 8.404(a) (“ordering
activities shall not seek competition outside of the Federal
Supply Schedules”). Consistent with this interpretation, we have
stated that an FSS BPA is not established with the contractor
directly, but rather is established under the contractor’s FSS
contract, such that FSS BPA orders “ultimately are to be placed
against the successful vendor’s FSS contract.” Panacea
Consulting, Inc., B-299307.4, B-299308.4, July 27, 2007, 2007
CPD para. 141 at 1-2 n.1; see also CMS Info. Servs., Inc.,
B-290541, Aug. 7, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 132 at 4 n.7. Thus, in
our view, when, as in this case, an agency intends to place an
order under an FSS BPA, the vendor must have a valid FSS
contract in place because that contract is the means by which
the agency satisfies the competition requirements of CICA in
connection with any orders issued under the BPA.
Applying this analysis to the facts here, any order placed under
Canon’s BPA must necessarily be placed through Canon’s FSS
contract. On December 1, 2007, Canon’s FSS contract was modified
to prohibit the placement of new orders. As of that date,
Canon’s BPA was no longer a valid procurement vehicle for the
placement of new orders, because new orders could not be placed
through Canon’s FSS contract and because Canon’s BPA was not
established pursuant to competitive procedures required to
create a valid foundation for orders to be issued directly from
the agency to Canon. Therefore, both on the date the RFQ was
issued and on the date the order was issued, Canon was
ineligible to receive the order. As a result, the agency’s
decision to cancel the order to Canon was proper. (Canon
USA, Inc., B-311254.2, June 10, 2008) (pdf) |