New FAR sect. 8.405-6
(FAC 2005-50), May 16, 2011 (emphasis added). The information
required for inclusion in a limited source justification, now
set forth in FAR sect. 8.405-6(c), is nearly identical to that
required in the prior FAR provision.
In its protest, XTec argued that the limited source
justification was unreasonable for various reasons, and quoted
the language in the justification citing the older FAR provision
GSA relied on. GSA asked us to dismiss the allegation as lacking
a valid basis because XTec did not dispute that the task order
was a logical follow-on to the prior FSS order or challenge
GSA's legal authority under this FAR provision. In its motion,
GSA cited to and quoted the now-effective FAR provision, which
includes the "in the interest of economy and efficiency" clause.
GSA Motion to Dismiss, Aug. 24, 2011, at 2. In response, XTec
seized upon this clause and argued that the justification was
unreasonable in light of that language. XTec Opposition to
Motion, Aug. 31, 2011, at 1-3. GSA replied by arguing that XTec
was relying on the wrong FAR provision, although this was the
one that GSA itself had cited in its motion to dismiss. GSA
asserted that the controlling provision was the one in effect
when the justification was signed in 2010. GSA Reply to XTec
Opposition to Motion, Sept. 1, 2011, at 1-2. XTec countered that
the current FAR provision is controlling because the
justification was published after its effective date. XTec Sur-Reply
in Opposition to GSA Motion, Sept. 6, 2011, at 1-3.
The Federal Register notice publishing the interim rule stated
that the effective date for the rule was May 16, 2011. 76 Fed.
Reg. 14,548, supra. As relevant here, the notice further stated
that the changes in the rule applied to (1) solicitations issued
and contracts awarded on or after May 16, 2011, and (2) orders
issued on or after the effective date of this regulation,
without regard to whether the underlying contracts were awarded
before May 16, 2011. Id. Here, GSA issued its task order to [HP
Enterprise Services, LLC] HPES on July 25, 2011. Since the order
was issued after the effective date of the regulation, the
current FAR provision applies.
Reasonableness of Limited Source Determination
XTec challenges the reasonableness of the limited source
justification, and argues that it has not been shown to be "in
the interest of economy and efficiency." GSA responds that,
whichever FAR provision applies, the agency fully documented its
justification considering economy and efficiency.
We will review an agency's use of a limited source justification
under FAR Part 8.4 for reasonableness. See STG, Inc., B‑405082,
B-405082.2, July 27, 2011, 2011 CPD para. 155 at 3; Systems
Integration & Mgmt., Inc., B‑402785.2, Aug. 10, 2010, 2010 CPD
para. 207 at 2-3. We agree with GSA that the justification was
reasonable and in the interest of economy and efficiency.
After explaining the history of GSA's acquisition of these
services and its plans for the future, the limited source
justification stated:
This acquisition is suited to a logical follow-on in
accordance with [FAR sect.] 8.405-6(b)(2) as the new work is
for the continued development or production of a major system,
USAccess, and the original order was awarded competitively and
placed in accordance with applicable FSS ordering procedures.
Award to another source is likely to result in disruption of
GSA customer agencies' Logical/Physical access deployments,
substantial duplication of costs to the Government not
expected to be recovered through competition, and unacceptable
delays in the transition of this service. Any new end-to-end
solution would require a similar process of development and
deployment that would unavoidably increase cost. The MSO has
chosen to minimize its risk by keeping the core service intact
and migrating the system in an orderly way, in accordance with
the developing IT Strategic Plan.
[HPES] developed and deployed the USAccess system and has
operated it for the past 3 years. The present system took more
than a year to develop and two more to deploy. The incumbent
contractor is the most familiar with the customer population,
operational considerations, and technical challenges. The
primary reason for pursuing this strategy is to reduce risk.
The largest risk identified by the MSO is that the 500,000
current cardholders will not have working cards upon the close
of the current contract. Over 90 customer agencies,
commissions, and boards who are issuing PIV [personal identity
verification] cards for logical and physical access are in
varying stages of completion, ranging from less than 5% to
over 90% of government and contract employees having been
issued and activated cards. Changing contractors when at least
the majority of customer agency employees have either not been
badged or are in the process of being badged would create
substantial disruptions of their missions.
AR, exh. 24, Justification para. IV.b.2. The justification went
on to explain that GSA's market research had shown that even
using government furnished facilities or equipment would still
require a different contractor to integrate its own offering
with the existing data and customer base, and thereby greatly
increase the risk to the MSO and its customers. Id. para. VI.
Using a logical follow-on to continue the core services while
separating and competing the external services, along with
developing a longer-term strategy for using a fully-competed
contract or contracts, represented the highest likelihood of
success with the lowest program risk. This transition strategy
would enable GSA to achieve a more flexible and
competition-friendly HSPD-12 service. Id.
XTec argues that no evidence supports GSA's assertion that a
transition to a new contractor would entail substantial
duplication of costs or new development expenses. The protester
contends that it already has a system ready to deliver; the
protester acknowledges that certain equipment might need new
software patches to interface with XTec's solution, or
replacements, but contends that these would be minor in scope
and less expensive than recreating the entire infrastructure.
XTec Comments, Sept. 23, 2011, at 9-11.
That XTec has a system to provide these services is not in
dispute. Instead, the agency's concern is that any other
vendor's system would have to be integrated into the system
already provided by HPES, and that this integration process
would result in disruption, transition delays, duplication of
costs, and new costs.
The contracting officer explains that GSA did not acquire a
system under the prior task order, but used the services HPES
offered. CO's Declaration para. 14. The core service is built
around a proprietary set of technologies that combine databases
and middleware to provide a managed service for the MSO to
provide its customer agencies and, apart from a few items, GSA
does not own any of the hardware. Id. Not only is a major data
migration involved, but also a substantial hardware
infrastructure, multiple interfaces, and countless service
considerations. Id. para. 15. The hardware, software, and
communications infrastructure that supports the solution, as
well as an infrastructure upgrade, was procured and implemented
by HPES, with the costs recovered through the service-based
pricing. Id. para. 18.
The contracting officer also states that more than 200 HPES-procured
and implemented shared fixed credentialing center configurations
are integrated into the application and infrastructure, and many
of these would have to be replaced if an alternate solution were
implemented. Id. para. 19. As HPES notes, this hardware
replacement would likely result in a duplication of costs. HPES
Comments, Sept. 23, 2011, at 18. In addition, the contracting
officer states that most customers have slightly different
requirements for interface with their internal systems, each of
which required HPES to develop and deploy a custom interface, so
any contractor attempting to provide the core services would
have to provide not only the basic hardware necessary for the
service but also the interfaces to each customer's computer
systems. CO's Declaration para. 15. This would, as HPES asserts,
likely involve a significant investment of time--and thus
transition delay and potential disruption--and money. HPES
Comments at 18-19.
XTec's assertions that it could provide a seamless transition,
notwithstanding these issues, is not sufficient to find GSA's
justification, which is in substance based on concerns about
economy and efficiency, unreasonable.
The contracting officer also explains that GSA and its customers
have invested significantly into customer-directed enhancements
to HPES's proprietary application, totaling $6,973,624 in
enhancements through 366 chargeable change requests, which
required 57,127 hours of customization work. She states that all
of this work and investment would have to be replicated and
duplicated if an alternate solution were implemented. CO's
Declaration paras. 21, 22.
XTec asserts that it is "far from clear" how much of this would
need to be duplicated, speculating that, for example, some
change orders might have installed functionality that XTec's
solution already possesses. XTec Comments, Sept. 23, 2011, at
11. However, this speculation does not provide a basis to find
that the agency's concern about duplication of costs and
disruption—in other words, economy and efficiency—was
unreasonable.
XTec challenges the justification's statement that there was a
risk that the 500,000 current cardholders would not have working
cards upon the close of the initial task order, arguing that the
cards are interoperable regardless of the system used to issue
them. XTec also disputes the agency's characterization of the
progress made toward card issuance. Id. at 7-9
As HPES notes, however, while the cards once produced and
activated may be interoperable, the systems that produce,
manage, and maintain the cards are not. That is the reason XTec
would have to duplicate the software customization efforts
already taken by HPES. HPES Comments, Sept. 23, 2011, at 15-17.
The contracting officer explains that each of GSA's customers
was on-boarded using agency-specific configuration data. She
states that agency cards cannot be printed and subsequently
activated without this unique configuration data and would have
to be re-initialized if an alternate solution were implemented.
CO's Declaration para. 20. While XTec disagrees, here, too, it
has not shown the agency's concerns are not valid.
In sum, we find that the agency's limited source justification
to extend the HPES task order based was reasonable and was made
in the interest of economy and efficiency, as required by the
now-applicable FAR provision. (XTec,
Inc., B-405505, November 8, 2011) (pdf)
The protester
argues that the agency improperly issued the short-term order to
MANCON on a sole-source basis. SIM contends in this connection
that MANCON is not the only firm capable of furnishing the
needed services.
The 3-month task order, which has a value of $71,920, was placed
against MANCON's Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contract. Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 8.405-6 exempts orders placed
under Federal Supply Schedules from the competition requirements
of FAR Part 6, but requires that an ordering activity "justify
its action when restricting consideration of . . . schedule
contractors to fewer than required in 8.405-1 or 8.405-2." FAR
sect. 8.405-6(a)(1). Circumstances justifying such a restriction
include where an urgent and compelling need exists and following
the ordering procedures would result in unacceptable delays. FAR
sect. 8.405-6(b)(3). Where an ordering activity restricts
competition on the basis of urgent and compelling need, the
contracting officer is required to document the circumstances in
writing. FAR sect. 8.405-6(c), (f).
Here, the contracting officer determined that the maintenance
services were urgently required, and that MANCON, which had been
providing the services for the preceding 2 months, had the
required personnel in place. The contracting officer noted that
conducting a competition for the interim services would require
the Marine Corps to prepare and publish an RFQ, wait a
reasonable time for vendors to respond, and evaluate the
responses, which would take a period of weeks. Agency Report,
Tab 9, Limited Sources Justification, at 1. According to the
contracting officer, "the only reasonable solution to avoid an
interruption in the services [was] to award a short-term (90
days) bridge contract to the current incumbent, MANCON, without
competition, until a properly competed contract [could] be
awarded." Id.
The protester disputes the agency's finding, arguing that
issuance of a task order to MANCON was not the only means by
which the agency could have avoided an interruption in services.
SIM contends that it too could have begun performance
immediately. The protester points out in this connection that it
was performing the services prior to issuance of the
now-terminated task order to MANCON, and that all of the MANCON
employees were previously SIM employees.
We agree with the protester that the record does not demonstrate
that MANCON is the only firm capable of performing the services
without interruption; we nonetheless think that issuance of the
order to MANCON was unobjectionable given the agency's findings
that the services were needed immediately and that conducting a
competition for them would take a period of weeks. As noted
above, FAR sect. 8.405-6(b)(3) specifically authorizes
restricting competition where, as here, an urgent and compelling
need exists and following the FSS ordering procedures would
result in unacceptable delays. To the extent that the protester
is disputing the agency's judgment as to the time period
required to conduct a competition for the interim services, a
protester's mere disagreement does not show that the agency's
judgment was unreasonable. Richard Bowers & Co., B‑400276, Sept.
12, 2008, 2008 CPD para. 171 at 2. Further, to the extent that
SIM is arguing that it, not MANCON, should have been considered
the incumbent contractor given that the task order issued to
MANCON was terminated--and that, as the incumbent, it should
have received the sole-source order for interim services--even
assuming that the agency might reasonably have issued an order
for the interim services to the protester, this does not
demonstrate that it was unreasonable for it to issue an order to
MANCON instead.
SIM also argues that the urgency here was the result of a lack
of advance planning on the part of agency officials in that
there would have been no need for the agency to terminate the
task order issued under the RFQ and resolicit the
requirement--and thus no need for the 3-month order for services
during the interim period while the resolicitation is
conducted‑-had the agency engaged in adequate planning prior to
issuing the RFQ. We are not persuaded by the protester's
argument; we do not consider an immediate need for services that
arises as a result of an agency's implementation of corrective
action in response to a protest to be the result of a lack of
advance planning. See Chapman Law Firm Co., LPA, B-296847, Sept.
28, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 175 at 3; Computers Universal, Inc.,
B-296536, Aug. 18, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 160 at 3.
Finally, the protester points out that the limited sources
justification document was not executed until June 7, 2010,
approximately a week after it filed its protest with our Office
(and more than 2 weeks after the bridge task order was issued to
MANCON). FAR sect. 8.405-6 requires that the agency document in
writing the basis for its decision to limit competition, but it
does not require that the justification be executed prior to
award. Moreover, where circumstances sufficient to support a
justification are present, the lack of a contemporaneous written
justification is not a sufficient reason for sustaining a
protest. See General Elec. Med. Sys., B-231342, Aug. 26, 1988,
88-2 CPD para. 185 at 3. (Systems
Integration & Management, Inc., B-402785.2, August 10, 2010)
(pdf)
While the requirements of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA),
10 U.S.C. sect. 2304(c)(1) (2000), which limits obtaining goods
or services noncompetitively unless supported by a written
justification, does not apply to orders placed against FSS
contracts, Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc., B-271222 et
al., June 27, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 290 at 3 n.1, Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 8.405-6 provides that
sole-source orders from FSS contracts be supported by
sole-source justifications that contain much of the same
information required to be contained in justifications for
sole-source contracts subject to CICA. Based on the record here,
in particular the very limited duration of the contract
extension, we think the agency has established a reasonable
basis for this latest noncompetitive extension of abcISP’s
purchase order under its FSS contract until CUI’s currently
pending protest of the competitive procurement is resolved and
award made under the protested solicitation. CUI has not shown
that it is practicable for the agency to obtain a different
contractor for these bridge contract services for this limited
period of time. Unlike the situation in VSE Corp.; Johnson
Controls World Services, Inc., B‑290452.3 et al., May 23, 2005,
2005 CPD para. 103 (cited by the protester), where the agency
noncompetitively extended a contract that had been
noncompetitively awarded 4 years earlier for another 18 months
with no justification and approval for this action and the
extension was result of a lack of advanced procurement planning,
the protested extension here is of a purchase order under the
FSS to which the CICA requirements (applied in the VSE case) do
not apply, and, in any case, the extension was not the result of
a lack of advanced procurement planning, but was caused by a
series of protests, and the agency has supported this latest
extension with an approved justification. (Computers
Universal, Inc., B-296536, August 18, 2005) (pdf) |