(Sections Deleted)

We have reviewed each of Eisenhower’s challenges to the cost-benefit analysis and find that none of them provides a basis to conclude the cost-benefit analysis lacks a reasonable basis. For instance, Eisenhower initially alleges that its rental rate is [deleted] per RSF lower than the rate paid by GSA under the incumbent’s current lease; the protester estimates that this difference gives it an almost [deleted] million advantage in terms of cost savings to the government. The agency reports, however, that Eisenhower’s initial rental rate of [deleted] is in fact higher than the rates paid under the incumbent’s lease, and that the subsequent rate information provided by the two firms showed their properties are indeed comparable in terms of rent. The record supports the agency’s position. The protester next argues that since its expression of interest noted that the firm would like to discuss paying for the [deleted] costs, it should have received credit against the [deleted] costs amount in the cost-benefit analysis. The record supports the reasonableness of the evaluation, however, since, despite the firm’s failure to quantify its claimed credit for such costs, or confirm that it would pay all such costs rather than just a portion, the agency applied an industry standard amount for such costs [deleted]; the protester has not shown that the standard amount is unreasonable. Moreover, Eisenhower has not shown in any way that, given the substantial relocation and duplication costs assessed against it in the cost-benefit analysis, even if the full amount of the [deleted] costs calculated here (approximately [deleted] million) had been credited to the firm in the analysis, it would have made any material change to the outcome of the analysis. 

Eisenhower also claims that its lease location should be viewed as presenting additional benefits exceeding the agency’s stated minimum requirements, thus warranting cost credits in the comparison of the expressions of interest; examples include the ability to provide [deleted]; providing space in a newly refurbished building capable of supporting state-of-the-art equipment the agency may choose to purchase for its new space; providing a convenient location, accessible by highways and Metrorail, with more generous setback distances; and the ability to design the layout of the space to consolidate office space or accommodate growth. As a preliminary matter, to the extent that the protester asserts that the value of the additional intangible benefits its location allegedly offers was not quantified by the agency, the protester itself has provided no support for the dollar value associated with the claimed benefits. Further, to the extent Eisenhower suggests that the alleged benefits were ignored by the agency, as the agency reports, these elements, while not quantified, were considered in the cost-benefit analysis. For instance, while the agency noted that Eisenhower could provide additional [deleted], it considered the current amount [deleted] at the incumbent location acceptable as it met the agency’s actual needs. While Eisenhower asserts that the incumbent’s parking presents a greater security risk because of its below-building location, Eisenhower is essentially disagreeing with the agency’s judgment that there is sufficient security at the incumbent site. Similarly, while the protester’s location offers newly refurbished space, the record shows that the agency’s space and equipment needs are met at its current upgraded location. Regarding the claimed convenience associated with the protester’s location, the agency points out that the incumbent’s location is also accessible by highways and Metrorail. As to the additional setback distance for the protester’s property, since the incumbent’s property has been government-approved for setbacks and apparently otherwise meets the agency’s security requirements, we do not find persuasive the protester’s general contention that the shorter setback distance at DEA’s current location presents a security risk, or one that has not been resolved through other effective security measures. In short, there is no showing in the record that the cost-benefit analysis challenged by the protester was unreasonable.  (Eisenhower Real Estate Holdings, LLC, B-310941, March 18, 2008) (pdf)

Brinkmann objects to the proposed sole-source award to Mettler principally on the ground that its own autotitrator, the Metohm 809 Titrando, which it claims is less expensive than the Mettler autotitrator, is also technically and functionally equivalent or superior to the Mettler unit. Accordingly, Brinkmann contends that the Navy is required to compete the autotitrator requirement.  As a general matter, CICA mandates “full and open competition” in government procurements obtained through the use of competitive procedures. 10 U.S.C. sect. 2304(a)(1)(A). CICA, however, provides several exceptions to this requirement, including when an agency’s requirements can only be satisfied by one responsible source. 10 U.S.C. sect. 2304(c)(1). When, as here, an agency invokes this exception, it is required to execute a written J&A with sufficient facts and rationale to support the use of the cited authority. Our review of an agency’s decision to conduct a sole-source procurement focuses on the adequacy of the rationale and conclusions set forth in the J&A; where the J&A sets forth a reasonable justification for the agency’s actions, we will not object to the award. Chapman Law Firm, B-296847, Sept. 28, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 175 at 3. In this regard, our Office has held that an agency’s legitimate need to standardize the equipment it uses may provide a reasonable basis for imposing restrictions on competition. See, e.g., Advanced Med. Sys., Inc., B-259010, Jan. 17, 1995 (agency’s need to standardize fetal monitors in order to maximize patient care was reasonable); Sperry Marine, Inc., B-245654, Jan. 27, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 111 (sole-source acquisition of particular radar system was reasonable where agency needed to utilize the same radar system it had already deployed at training school). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the Navy had a reasonable basis for the sole-source award to Mettler. The record shows that the ability of the Brinkmann autotitrator to meet the Navy’s onboard technical requirements was not an issue. Rather, the Navy’s justification for the sole-source award to Mettler is based upon, among other things, a reasonable need for standardization. As explained by the Navy, the accuracy and reliability of the chemical analyses by the autotitrators is essential for the safe operation of a submarine’s nuclear reactor plant and having a standard unit allows Navy personnel to operate the autotitrator equipment without regard to the specific submarine to which they are assigned. AR, Tab E, J&A at 2. Maintaining the operational continuity of the autotitrators across submarines is especially important since Navy personnel operating the units are not professional chemists and there is “constant turnover” of personnel between submarines. AR, Tab A, Declaration of Director, Fleet Readiness Division, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, Aug. 28, 2007, at 1. Because no other autotitrator is “directly interchangeable in form fit and function” with the currently fielded Mettler unit, AR, Tab E, J&A at 2, introducing a different unit would undermine the advantage of having Navy personnel operate a single standard unit, thereby “increas[ing] the risk of incorrect chemical analyses,” and in turn increasing the risk to the safety of Navy personnel and equipment. AR, Tab A, Declaration of Director, Fleet Readiness Division, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, Aug. 28, 2007, at 1. (Brinkmann Instruments, Inc., B-309946; B-309946.2, October 15, 2007) (pdf)

As noted, this exception only allows an agency to “limit the number of sources,” so that an agency may not simply ignore the potential for competition. See Worldwide Language Res., Inc.; SOS Int’l Ltd., B‑296984 et. al., Nov. 14, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 206 at 11. The mandate for agencies to effect some modicum of competition is reiterated in 41 U.S.C. sect. 253(e), which provides that when an agency utilizes other than competitive procedures based on unusual and compelling urgency, the agency “shall request offers from as many potential sources as is practicable under the circumstance.” See also FAR sect. 6.302‑2(c)(2). In addition, CICA provides that under no circumstances may noncompetitive procedures be used due to a lack of advance planning by contracting officials or concerns related to the amount of funds available to the agency. 41 U.S.C. sect. 253(f)(5)(A); see also FAR sect. 6.301(c). The agency has not demonstrated that it had a reasonable basis to make the sole‑source orders here. While at least with respect to the VAMC Albany facility, the agency has demonstrated that it had an urgent need to replace the equipment due to the fact that patients were getting eye infections as a result of the use of the faulty medical equipment,[3] the agency has not reasonably demonstrated why it could not have opened the requirement up to an expedited limited competition among those firms that had expressed interest in the acquisition. There is no evidence in the record that the agency ever considered whether the cataract medical equipment proposed by B&L, or any other firm, would meet its urgent requirements. Moreover, B&L has responded in detail to the agency’s sole-source justification by noting that its Millennium equipment is “state of the art” cataract surgery equipment and enjoys a significant market share, and by providing many technical details as to why its equipment is the best equipment available to meet VA’s requirements. While VA was invited to respond to B&L’s comments, it has provided no response to B&L’s detailed comments as to why its equipment would satisfy VA’s requirements. (Bausch & Lomb, Inc., B-298444, September 21, 2006) (pdf)

Generally, our Office will not question an agency’s implementation of a statutory procurement requirement unless the record shows that the implementation was unreasonable or inconsistent with congressional intent--a matter best determined by the words of the statute itself, or by the statute’s legislative history. See Harris Corp. Broadcast Div., B-255302, Feb. 10, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 107 at 6. With respect to statutory procurement preferences, we have held that where a statute does not specify a particular way to give a provided preference to a class of potential contractors, agency acquisition officials have broad discretion in selecting the way to effectuate the statutory mandate. American Multi Media, Inc.--Recon., B-293782.2, Aug. 25, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 158 at 5 (preference for nonprofit institutions concerned with the blind and other physically handicapped persons); HAP Constr., Inc., B‑280044.2, Sept. 21, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 76 at 4 (preference for firms doing business in a disaster area under the Stafford Act); Appalachian Research Council, B-256179, May 20, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 319 at 15-16 (preference for agencies with demonstrated experience with the needs of youth in outreach contracts under the Job Training Partnership Act); and U.S. Def. Sys., Inc., B-251544 et al., Mar. 20, 1993, 93-1 CPD para. 279 at 4-5 (preference for U.S. firms in the award of contracts for guard services at overseas embassies). As we noted in our decision in HAP Constr., and as we have seen again here, neither the language of the statute, nor the legislative history of the Stafford Act, defines the terms “preference,” “feasible,” or “practicable.” HAP Constr., Inc., supra, at 5. Without specific definitions to guide our review, we look to whether the agency’s interpretation is contradicted by the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. In our view, it is not. The primary meaning of the word “preference” in Black’s Law Dictionary 1217 (8th Ed. 2004) is “[t]he act of favoring one person or thing over another….” Our review of the bid protest decisions above, and other materials, shows that agencies have used a continuum of possible preferences to implement statutes that provide one class of contractor a preference over others. For example, in the U.S. Def. Sys., Inc. decision, cited above, the agency provided a preference in the form of five evaluation points to be added to an offeror’s technical evaluation. In contrast, FEMA has opted to implement the provision of the Stafford Act under review here by providing a 30 percent price preference. 48 C.F.R. sect. 4452.217-70. While we have not previously seen a protest involving an agency decision to implement a preference using a set-aside, we think a set-aside can be viewed as, in effect, an absolute preference, located at one end of the continuum of possible preferences an agency might adopt. In our view, we have no basis for questioning the broader definition of “preference” inherent in the agency’s position in this case. Moreover, we think AshBritt misses the point when it argues that some form of preference short of a set-aside also implements the Stafford Act’s preference for using local businesses to clean up disaster-related debris. The question here is not whether some lesser form of preference might have satisfied the Act’s intent, but whether the preference chosen was an abuse of agency discretion. Since the language in the statute does not specifically restrict the application of the preference, and since the use of a set‑aside is consistent with the statutory goal of assisting firms in the affected area, we do not view the Corps’s decision to implement the Stafford Act preference with a set‑aside as an abuse of the agency’s discretion to implement this statutory scheme. See id. at 6; Appalachian Research Council, supra, at 16. We turn next to AshBritt’s contention that the Stafford Act does not envision providing a preference (in this case, a set-aside) only to firms doing business in a particular state, to the exclusion of firms located in other states affected by the same natural disaster. As an initial matter, it is fair to note that AshBritt’s interpretation of the geographic reach of 42 U.S.C. sect. 5150 appears to be supported by the portion of the statute that requires this preference be provided to firms “residing or doing business primarily in the area affected by such major disaster or emergency.” To conclude, however, that the Corps abused its discretion by limiting the competition here to firms within a single state would require us to ignore the overall scheme of the Stafford Act, the legislative history of the Act explaining what Congress was trying to accomplish with this provision, and the simultaneously enacted title of the preference provision in the Act (which is now reflected in the U.S. Code). While we think an agency reasonably might elect not to adopt the kind of restriction used in this procurement, see, e.g., HAP Constr., Inc., supra, we do not agree that the Corps acted improperly here by limiting this competition to Mississippi firms. The entire scheme of the Stafford Act contemplates a process by which states interact with, and seek assistance from, the federal government; this interaction does not cross state lines. For example, federal assistance under the Stafford Act is triggered by a governor’s finding that a major disaster has overwhelmed the state’s ability to provide aid, assistance, and emergency services, and to reconstruct and rehabilitate devastated areas. 42 U.S.C. sections 5121, 5170. When a governor presents such a finding to the President, and the President agrees, the President declares that a major disaster exists. 42 U.S.C. sect. 5170. This declaration identifies the specific areas within the state eligible for disaster relief, and specifies the type of relief available. 44 C.F.R. sect. 206.40; see also AR, Tabs 5a, 6a, 7a, and 8a. In addition, the statute, on its face, identifies the limits of federal cost-sharing available to the state for different types of relief activities. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. sections 5170b(b), 5170c(a), 5173(d). Moreover, as shown by the record in this protest, there are separate Presidential declarations for each state, see AR, Tabs 5a (Florida), 6a (Louisiana), 7a (Mississippi), and 8a (Alabama); there is no unified disaster declaration addressing all damage done by Hurricane Katrina, which would be more along the lines of the scheme AshBritt posits. (AshBritt Inc., B-297889; B-297889.2, March 20, 2006) (pdf)

The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), 10 U.S.C. sect. 2304(c)(2), permits an agency to use other than competitive procedures in acquiring goods or services where the agency’s requirement is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the government would be seriously injured unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits proposals. Moreover, while CICA requires that agencies solicit offers from as many potential sources as is practicable when using the unusual and compelling urgency exception to limit competition, 10 U.S.C. sect. 2304(e), an agency nonetheless may limit a procurement to the only firm it reasonably believes can properly perform the work in the time available. McGregor Mfg. Corp., B-285341, Aug. 18, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 151 at 6. In this regard, a military agency’s assertion that there is a critical need that is related to human safety and affects military operations carries considerable weight. Id. at 7. The reasonableness of the contracting activity’s judgments must be considered in the context of the time when they were made and the information that was available at that time. Equa Indus., Inc., B-257197, Sept. 6, 1994, 94-2 CPD para. 96 at 3 n.1. Meggitt asserts that the agency improperly failed to engage in adequate advance planning. In this regard, Meggitt asserts that, after obtaining the responses to the RFI, the agency essentially did nothing for a period of approximately 6 months before eventually making its sole-source award to KDS. Meggitt maintains that, among other things, the agency declined its offer, included in its response to the RFI, to perform testing of its product at the firm’s own expense, AR, exh. 8, at 5, and also unreasonably declined its offer, in an April 28 e-mail, to update its RFI response in April. AR, exh. 35, at 1. Although the record shows that the agency did not respond to Meggitt’s April 28 e‑mail, the agency’s Chief of the Marine Corps Program Division testified that this was because, due to the lack of funding at that time, the agency did not think it was appropriate to cause any of the respondents to expend further effort in preparing materials or information. Tr. at 63. In a similar vein, he testified that he never specifically declined Meggitt’s offer to perform testing at its own expense, but that, again, the agency was reluctant to encourage additional expenditures by Meggitt or other concerns in the absence of program funding. Tr. at 109-11. We find nothing unreasonable in the agency’s actions. Simply stated, the agency acted in a manner that was prudent under the circumstances, since there were no funds available and no firm basis for the agency to conclude that it would be able to perform the upgrade. As noted, the question for our Office is whether the contracting activity’s judgments, considered in the context of the time when they were made and the information that was available at that time, appear reasonable. Equa Indus., Inc., supra. Further, regarding Meggitt’s offer to perform testing at its own expense, in the absence of agency direction not to perform such testing, there is no basis to find that the agency somehow unreasonably precluded Meggitt from conducting such testing. Meggitt has not shown why it could not have performed such testing at its own expense (and provided the agency with its results), and thereby possibly positioned itself differently with respect to the agency’s urgent requirement. In effect, Meggitt’s decision to refrain from such testing was a matter of its own business judgment, not improper agency action. We note that the agency’s witness testified that he would have at least considered the results of such testing. Tr. at 116‑17. (Meggitt Safety Systems, Inc., B-297378; B-297378.2, January 12, 2006) (pdf)

Based on the factual context presented with regard to the December 2004 award to OSS, it is evident that the agency’s efforts--as described and explained by the agency itself--were so fundamentally flawed as to indicate an unreasonable level of advance planning, which directly resulted in the sole-source award to OSS. In responding to the protesters’ challenges to the December sole-source award, the Air Force suggests that its actions and the justification underpinning the sole-source determination should be evaluated based on the circumstances faced by the contracting activity in November 2004 when it received the requirement and took steps to expeditiously procure the required BBE-SME services. For example, the Air Force highlights the fact that when the J&A was prepared in support of the award to OSS, the government was faced with the dilemma of needing BBA-SME services in place to support the January 2005 elections in Iraq--then only 2 months away--and it did not have a contractor to provide the services. AR, Tab 13, Supplemental Legal Memorandum at 15; AR, Tab 1.b.2, J&A para. 3. We recognize the abbreviated contracting schedule faced by the contracting activity in its efforts to obtain a contract vehicle for the BBA-SME requirement--a schedule driven by expectations and mandates from higher echelons within the Department of Defense. The record, however, clearly reflects the fact that this narrow procurement window was the direct result of unreasonable actions and acquisition planning by the Air Force and the Department of Defense, to the extent these entities engaged in any acquisition planning at all. Specifically, 2-3 months were lost as a result of the initial plan to place the BBA-SME requirement under the GEITA contract--even though the requirement was clearly outside the scope of the GEITA contract. As noted above, the GEITA contract was for advisory and assistance services in support of AFCEE’s “continued excellence in the world environmental stewardship market,” including support for AFCEE’s programs involving environmental restoration, compliance, pollution prevention, conservation and planning, fuel facility engineering, base realignment and closure activities, and military family housing initiatives, to include privatization and outsourcing activities. AR, Tab 17, GEITA Contract, Statement of Work, at 3, 4-5. The BBA-SME requirement, however, was for Western-oriented individuals of Iraqi background, who were committed to a democratic Iraq, and who would provide services in Iraq such as advising government ministers, planning for and implementing elections, drafting constitutional documents, advising neighborhood, municipal, and national councils, and training security forces and details. The plan to use the GEITA contract was unreasonable on its face, given how widely it diverged from the BBA-SME requirement. In fact, as indicated above, a senior member within the Air Force, responsible for acquisition, characterized the plan as requiring a “sanity check” and indicated that it was the result of individuals “leaning way forward in the saddle” in an effort to support a customer because they were “not in the habit of saying no to anyone.” AR, Tab 16.ss., E-mail, Subject: RE: GEITA Services for Bilingual-Bicultural Support to Iraq, Nov. 10, 2004. It was this gross error that directly resulted in the Air Force’s determination to pursue a sole-source award for the BBA-SME requirement. After the Air Force cancelled the GEITA plan, it initiated discussions with OSD regarding the option of making a sole-source award based on urgency. See AR, Tab 16.kk., E-mail, Subject: Iraqi Contracting Debacle, Nov. 12, 2004 (stating “[the Air Force] has assured me that [it] should have a contracting solution by COB today or Monday . . . specifically mentioned ‘sole-sourcing’ and ‘urgent and compelling’ as options on any new contract”). (WorldWide Language Resources, Inc.; SOS International Ltd., B-296984; B-296984.2; B-296984.3; B-296984.4; B-296993; B-296993.2; November 14, 2005) (pdf)
 

Although the overriding mandate of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) is for full and open competition in government procurements obtained through the use of competitive procedures, 10 U.S.C. sect. 2304(a)(1)(A) (2000), CICA permits noncompetitive acquisitions in certain circumstances, such as when the services needed are available from only one responsible source or when the agency’s need for the services is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the agency would be seriously injured unless permitted to limit the number of sources solicited. 41 U.S.C. sections 253(c)(1), (c)(2) (2000). When an agency uses noncompetitive procedures under sect. 253(c)(1) or (c)(2), it is required to execute a written J & A with sufficient facts and rationale to support the use of the cited authority. See 41 U.S.C. sect. 253(f)(1)(A), (B); Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sections 6.302-1(d)(1), 6.302‑2(c)(2), 6.303, 6.304. Our review of an agency’s decision to conduct a sole‑source procurement focuses on the adequacy of the rationale and conclusions set forth in the J & A; where the J & A sets forth a reasonable justification for the agency’s actions, we will not object to the award. Global Solutions Network, Inc., B‑290107, June 11, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 98 at 6. However, noncompetitive procedures are not justifiable where the agency created the need for the sole-source award through a lack of advance planning. 41 U.S.C. sect. 253(f)(5)(A). The justification for the sole-source award here is reasonable, and there is no basis for finding a lack of advance planning. As described in the facts above, and as referenced in the J & A, Chapman’s protest of the award led to the stay of contract performance. This stay prevented Greenleaf from transitioning into contract performance as MCB’s contract approached the end of its transition period, as had been reasonably contemplated under the procurement scheme. Consequently, the agency would shortly have no contractor performing the M & M services. These circumstances together with the agency’s determination that Chapman lacked the readiness to perform the services, and not a lack of advance planning, led to the agency’s decision to award the sole-source bridge contract. (Chapman Law Firm Company, LPA, B-296847, September 28, 2005) (pdf)

Total protests that the agency's award of the four contracts on a noncompetitive basis for sandbags was improper. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) provides for the use of noncompetitive procedures where an agency's need for the property or services is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the United States would be seriously injured unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits proposals. 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(2) (2000). Although CICA requires that the agency request offers from as many potential sources as is practicable under the circumstances, 10U.S.C. 2304(e); see Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.302(c)(2), an agency may still limit the procurement to the only firm it reasonably believes can properly perform the work in the available time. McGregor Mfg. Corp. , B-285341, Aug. 18, 2000, 2000 CPD 151 at 6; Hercules Aerospace Co. , B-254677, Jan. 10, 1994, 94-1 CPD 7 at 3. We will object to the agency's determination only where the decision lacks a reasonable basis. Signals & Sys., Inc. , B-288107, Sept. 21, 2001, 2001 CPD 168 at 12. In this regard, a military agencys assertion that there is a critical need related to human safety and which affects military operations carries considerable weight. McGregor Mfg. Corp. , supra , at 7. The reasonableness of the contracting officers judgments must be considered in the context of the time when they were made and the information that was available at that time. Equa Indus., Inc. , B-257197, Sept. 6, 1994, 94-2 CPD 96 at 3 n.1. We find the contracting officer had a reasonable basis for the noncompetitive awards. The basic undisputed facts known to the contracting officer at the time he decided that it would be necessary to make noncompetitive awards, providing for delivery of the sandbags in March 2005, were: (1) the demand for sandbags had increased over the past year in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, (2) sandbags that were being used in Iraq were deteriorating at an unexpectedly fast rate, (3) the contractor that had received the largest share of the award under the previous contract for sandbags--that is, Total--was delinquent in its deliveries and its performance had been suspended because of concerns about the compliance with the contracts HUBZone and domestic manufacturing requirements, and (4) prior awards for this item were set aside 100 percent for HUBZone firms by the SBA. In view of the fact that the sandbags were reasonably found critical to successful military operations, the contracting officer reasonably determined that the requirement was urgent and that the procurement process must be expedited through the multiple noncompetitive awards. Total claims that the urgency-based noncompetitive contracts were caused by a lack of advance procurement planning and by the agency's decision to obtain these sandbags only from HUBZone manufacturers. The record does not establish that a lack of advance procurement planning was the cause of this urgent requirement; instead, the record shows that the urgency of the requirement was caused by the unexpected rapid deterioration of sandbags, increased demand for sandbags in Iraq, and the performance problems on Totals current contract. The record also does not show that the urgency here was caused by the agency's determination that the sandbag requirement should be set aside for certified HUBZone firms, given that four HUBZone firms have been found that are able to satisfy the agencys urgent delivery requirements. In any case, FAR 19.1306 provides express authority to make noncompetitive awards to HUBZone concerns. (Total Industrial & Packaging Corporation, B-295434, February 22, 2005) (pdf)

Our review of the agency's decision to conduct a sole-source procurement focuses on the adequacy of the rationale and conclusions set forth in the J&A. When the J&A sets forth a reasonable justification for the agency's actions, we will not object to the award. Global Solutions Network, Inc., supra, at 6; Diversified Tech. and Servs. of Virginia, Inc., B-282497, July 19, 1999, 99-2 CPD P: 16 at 3. Our review of the record shows that several of the agency's reasons for concluding that only IA's system can meet its needs constitute a reasonable justification for the agency's decision to procure this system on a sole-source basis.  (McKesson Automation Systems, Inc., B-290969.2; B-290969.3, January 14, 2003)  (txt version)

The agency’s actions here were reasonable. First, there is no evidence of a general lack of advance planning. As noted, the agency initiated this procurement 18 months ago, and anticipated acquiring the halfway-house services before the end of 2001.  This planning was thwarted by delays in the evaluation, the filing of two protests, and the termination of the awarded contract due to irregularities in the procurement.  Thus, while the agency’s planning ultimately was unsuccessful, this was due to unanticipated events, not a lack of planning.  (Bannum, Inc., B-289707, March 14, 2002; (pdf); (Exception 2))

Protest that agency improperly awarded requirement on a sole-source basis because it determined that only one firm could meet its requirements is sustained where record shows that another potential vendor was given an incorrect understanding of the agency's requirements; agencies are required to provide potential sources an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to meet the agency's requirements based on an accurate portrayal of the agency's needs.  (Lockheed Martin Systems Integration--Owego, B-287190.2; B-287190.3, May 25, 2001)

In this regard, a military agency's assertion that there is a critical need related to human safety and which impacts military operations carries considerable weight. Id. at 3; see also BlueStar Battery Sys. Corp., B-270111.2, B-270111.3, Feb. 12, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 67 at 3. Here, the Army reasonably determined that it had an urgent need for 273 deswirl ducts and reasonably limited the procurement to GE, the only firm the Army believed could fulfill the requirement within the available time.  (McGregor Manufacturing Corporation, B-285341, August 18, 2000)

Protest that agency purchase order was, in effect, an improper sole-source award is sustained where the record shows that the Federal Supply Schedule contract against which the agency attempted to place its order had expired, and no replacement contract was in place at the time of the order.  (DRS Precision Echo, Inc., B-284080; B-284080.2, February 14, 2000)

In our view, the J&A provides an adequate rationale and conclusions to support the 3-month contract extension with six 1-month options at issue. Although Diversified argues that the agency has been moving too slowly and that its current situation was caused by a lack of advance planning, the record demonstrates that the delays have, in fact, been caused in part by the agency's efforts to plan for the long term rather than to opt for a short-term "fix."  (Diversified Technology & Services of Virginia, Inc., B-282497, July 19, 1999)