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FAR 52.219-14:  Limitations on Subcontracting

Comptroller General - Key Excerpts

The protester argues that the agency improperly relied upon an unstated evaluation factor in rejecting its proposal for failure to comply with the limitation on subcontracting clause. Addx further argues that until the agency issues technical instructions definitively determining the required level of effort under the task order, it lacks a basis for concluding that the protester will not comply with the limitation.

The protester's first argument is without merit. Where a proposal, on its face, demonstrates that an offeror is taking exception to the subcontracting limitation clause, the proposal is technically unacceptable. TYBRIN Corp., B‑298364.6, B‑298364.7, Mar. 13, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 51 at 5. This is so because the limitation on subcontracting is a material term of the solicitation, and a proposal that fails to conform to a material term or condition of a solicitation is unacceptable and may not form the basis for an award. Id. To the extent that the protester is arguing that the [task order proposal request] TOPR did not notify offerors that it incorporated the limitation on subcontracting clause, as previously noted, the protester's underlying Seaport-E contract provided it with notice that the limitation on subcontracting clause would be incorporated into any TOPR set aside for small business. AR, Tab 10, at 24. In addition, the TOPR itself advised offerors of the clause's incorporation. TOPR, amend. 2, at 27.

Turning to the protester's second argument--i.e., that until the agency definitively decides the required level of effort under the task order, it lacks a basis for concluding that the protester will not comply with the limitation--we think the agency reasonably concluded that Addx had not agreed to comply with the limitation on subcontracting clause. While it is true that the precise level of effort under the task order is to be defined at the task order kick-off meeting and throughout the life of the task order (making it impossible for the agency to determine the precise percentage of work to be performed by Addx's subcontractors), this does not render meaningless, as Addx suggests, the information concerning Addx's proposed staffing mix (prime vs. subcontractor) set forth in Addx's technical and cost proposals. The protester's proposal was based on the "best estimate" of the government's labor hour requirements, TOPR, amend. 2, at 37; in addition, the protester's cost proposal indicated that it would perform the estimated requirements using largely a subcontractor work force (78 percent of its labor costs were for subcontractor employees). Given the information Addx provided in its proposal, the agency had a reasonable basis to conclude that Addx was not agreeing to expend at least 50 percent of personnel costs for its own employees in performance of the contract.

The protest is denied.  (Addx Corporation, B-404888, May 4, 2011)  (pdf)

Chant argues that Clover's quotation should have been found unacceptable because, on its face, it did not comply with the RFQ's LOS clause, FAR sect. 52.219-14(b)(2) (the so-called "50% rule"). Specifically, Chant contends that the breakdown of work to be performed by Clover and Oilgear shows that Clover will perform less than 50% of the contract value.

As a general rule, an agency's judgment as to whether a small business concern will comply with the LOS clause is a matter of responsibility, and the contractor's actual compliance with the provisions is a matter of contract administration. However, where a quotation, on its face, should have led the agency to conclude that the concern could not and would not comply with the subcontracting limitation, this is a matter of technical acceptability. A submission that fails to conform to a material term or condition of the solicitation, such as the LOS clause, is unacceptable and may not form the basis for an order. KIRA, Inc., B-287573.4, B-287573.5, Aug. 29, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 153 at 3.

We find nothing on the face of Clover's quotation indicating an intent not to comply with the LOS clause. Chant points to nothing, and we find nothing, in Clover's quotation or in the solicitation that establishes that Clover's method of performance does not comply with the LOS clause. In contrast, the agency states that its analysis of the quotation shows that Clover will supply and fabricate a number of unique, one-of-a-kind components and assume total project responsibility, while Oilgear is to supply other components that are readily available in its supply chain and require only modest fabrication to meet the solicitation specifications. AR, Tab E, Engineers' Statement, at 3-4. Additionally, the agency states that, after analyzing Clover's proposal, it determined that Clover will incur far more than 50% of the cost to manufacture the entire hydraulic power system (not including the cost of materials). Id. at 3. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for us to conclude that Clover's quotation, on its face, should have led the agency to conclude that Clover could not and would not comply with the LOS clause.

Chant argues that Clover's quotation should have been found unacceptable because it showed that Clover would not incur at least 50% of the personnel costs, as required under the LOS clause. Protest at 5. However, either subparagraph (1) or subparagraph (2) of the LOS clause applies, but not both, depending upon whether the contract is one for services or supplies. The contract here is for the construction, fabrication, assembly, and testing of a hydraulic system, components and new operating machinery, and thus falls under the supplies requirement at subparagraph (2) (as reflected in the agency's analysis above which we have no basis to question). Accordingly, subparagraph (1), establishing the 50% of personnel costs requirement, does not apply. See TFab Mfg., LLC, B-401190, June 18, 2009, 2009 CPD para. 127 at 3-4.  (Chant Engineering Company, Inc., B-402054, December 29, 2009) (pdf)
 


The RFP, issued on July 9, 2008 as a total small business set-aside, provided for the award of an indefinite-delivery, indefinite quantity contract. Contracting Officer’s Statement (COS) at 3. The RFP called for both hardware requirements and engineering services requirements. COS at 2‑3. The RFP incorporated FAR sect. 52.219‑14, the LOS clause, as follows:

LIMITATIONS ON SUBCONTRACTING (DEC 1996)
(a) This clause does not apply to the unrestricted portion of a partial set-aside.
(b) By submission of an offer and execution of a contract, the Offeror/Contractor agrees that in performance of the contract in the case of a contract for--
(1) Services (except construction). At least 50 percent of the cost of contract performance incurred for personnel shall be expended for employees of the concern.
(2) Supplies (other than procurement from a nonmanufacturer of such supplies). The concern shall perform work for at least 50 percent of the cost of manufacturing the supplies, not including the cost of materials.
(3) General construction..…
(4) Construction by special trade contractors..…

Proposals were received from several small businesses, including TFab. COS at 3. The contracting officer questioned TFab regarding its compliance with the LOS clause, since TFab’s proposal specifically indicated “an approximately 95 percent exemption” from the 50% subcontracting rule for the required services. Id. at 3-4. The contracting officer was concerned “that the protester’s proposal for how the services CLINS were to be performed amounted to a significant pass through to a large business.” Id. at 4. On February 12, the contracting officer issued RFP amendment No. 17, which clarified the manner in which the Army intended to apply the LOS clause, as follows:

V. Offerors are cautioned that this acquisition is a Small Business Set‑Aside and is subject to the requirements of FAR clause 52.219-14, Limitations on Subcontracting. This acquisition contains both Supply and Service contract line items, both of which are separately subject to FAR clause 52-219-14, Limitations on Subcontracting. Offerors are cautioned that CLINs described as Cost Plus Fixed Fee CLINs are considered to be an important part of this procurement and not incidental to the production/fixed fee CLINs. Accordingly, offerors must meet the requirements for Small Business Set-Aside with regard to these CLINS.

RFP, Amend. No. 17, sect. A-16.V. All offerors, including the protester, submitted revised proposals by the March 17 closing time. COS at 4. This protest was filed prior to the closing time.

(sections deleted)

ANALYSIS

We agree with the protester that the LOS clause does not provide for dual application of the 50% requirement. The clause, on its face, establishes separate subcontracting limitations “in the case of a contract for” four distinct types of work. Paragraph (b)(1) establishes subcontracting limitations, not with regard to services generally, but with regard to “a contract … for Services.” Similarly, paragraph (b)(2) establishes subcontracting limitations, not with regard to supplies generally, but with regard to “a contract … for Supplies.” There is no language in the clause that contemplates a hybrid services/supply contract; more specifically, there is no language that provides for applying both paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) in a single acquisition to require small business firms to agree to perform at least 50% of both services and supply work under a single contract. We read the language of the clause as indicating that the applicable LOS clause paragraph is to be applied to entire contracts, rather than portions of contracts, and that the clause contemplates that the contracting agency must choose among the paragraphs.

In AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 582 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d, 757 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the court reached a similar conclusion in interpreting applicability of the Service Contract Act (SCA), 41 U.S.C. sections 351-358 (applicable to contracts “the principal purpose of which is to furnish services”) and the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (WHA), 41 U.S.C. sections 35-45 (applicable to contracts “for the manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, and equipment”), statutes in para materia with subsection 15(o) and the LOS clause. Specifically, in interpreting the relevant provisions of the SCA, the court found that text that “refers to ‘the contract’ without any reference to line item specifications” indicated that the SCA “was intended to apply to entire contracts, not to individual line items.” Agencies’ implementation of the SCA and WHA is consistent with this interpretation; the contracting agency must make a determination whether a requirement is for services or supplies in order to determine which of the two statutes is applicable to an acquisition. See Information Handling Servs., 70 Comp. Gen. 35 (1990), 90-2 CPD para. 306 at 3 (regulations implementing the SCA and WHA contemplate an initial determination by the procuring agency as to which statute applies to a particular procurement); Tenavision, Inc., B-231453, Aug. 4, 1988, 88‑2 CPD para. 114 at 2 (regulatory scheme implementing these statutes envisions an initial determination by the contracting agency as to which statute applies to a particular procurement). This determination requires identification of the principal purpose of the contract. See AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, supra, at 345 (SCA applies only when principal purpose of contract is for services); Southern Packaging & Storage Co. v. U.S., 458 F. Supp. 726, 734 (D.S.C. 1978), aff’d, 618 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir. 1980) (acquisition of field rations would be exempt from coverage under SCA if found to be subject to provisions of WHA); Department of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. sect. 4.117 (2009).

We find the courts’ interpretation regarding the manner in which the SCA and WHA are to be applied to contracts supportive of our conclusion here, where we are interpreting an acquisition statute and associated regulations the provisions of which, like those of the SCA and WHA, apply to “contracts” rather than to particular services or supplies within a contract, and which, to be implemented, require an initial agency determination regarding applicability.

Our interpretation also is consistent with SBA’s position regarding this issue. In response to our request for its views, SBA agrees that the Army’s application of the LOS clause to the services and supply portions of the requirement here is improper. SBA points out that the FAR LOS clause requirements parallel those under subsection 125.6(a) of its own regulations, 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.6(a), which also implement subsection 15(o) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. sect. 644(o).[2] Consistent with our interpretation, it is SBA’s position that these provisions “established one performance requirement that applies to a ‘contract for the procurement of supplies’ and a different performance requirement that applies to a ‘contract for services.’” SBA Comments at 3. SBA concludes that the Army’s attempt to apply both the services and supply provisions of the LOS clause is inconsistent with the act. Id. at 4. We generally will give deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own regulations. See Blue Rock Structures, Inc., B-293134, Feb. 6, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 63 at 8 (SBA’s interpretation of statute that it is responsible for implementing entitled to substantial deference and, if reasonable, should be upheld).

Further, we agree with SBA that the Army’s implementation of the LOS clause will have the practical effect of restricting competition. In this regard, while, as discussed, the Army is motivated to preclude a small business awardee from subcontracting with a large business to perform all of the service work or all of the supply work under the contract, applying the LOS clause to both the services and supply portions of the contract clearly will limit the small businesses that will be able to compete. Specifically, small business firms that can only perform either a majority of the services work or a majority of the supply work will not be able to compete; the pool of potential competitors will be limited to small businesses that can satisfy the requirements of both paragraph (b)(1) (“50 percent of the cost of contract performance incurred for personnel”) and paragraph (b)(2) (“50 percent of the cost of manufacturing the supplies”).

Accordingly, we sustain the protest.  (TFab Manufacturing, LLC, B-401190, June 18, 2009)  (pdf)


As a general matter, an agency’s judgment as to whether a small business offeror will be able to comply with a subcontracting limitation presents a question of responsibility for review by the SBA. See 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.6(f); Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc., B-297320.2; B-297320.3, Dec. 29, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 227 at 6. However, our Office has consistently held that where a proposal, on its face, should lead an agency to the conclusion that an offeror has not agreed to comply with the subcontracting limitation, the matter is one of the proposal’s acceptability. Continental Staffing, Inc., B-299054, Jan. 29, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 18 at 6; KIRA Inc., B-287573.4; B‑287573.5, Aug. 29, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 153 at 3; National Med. Staffing, Inc.; PRS Consultants, Inc., B-238694; B-238694.2, June 4, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 530 at 4. Our Office has also long held that a proposal that fails to conform to a material term or condition of the solicitation, including the subcontracting limitation, is unacceptable and may not form the basis for an award. KIRA Inc., supra; National Med. Staffing, Inc.; PRS Consultants, Inc., supra, at 3-4 (sustaining protest that the award of a contract was improper where the awardee’s proposal evidenced noncompliance with the subcontracting limitation); see Vanderbilt Shirt Co., B-236016, Oct. 10, 1989, 89‑2 CPD para. 333 at 2 (agency properly rejected the protester’s bid as nonresponsive where the bid provided that the protester would not comply with the subcontracting limitation). As set forth above, the record establishes that it was clear to the Air Force that CENTECH’s proposal as submitted and as evaluated provided that 43.2 percent of the cost of contract performance incurred for personnel would be expended for CENTECH employees and, accordingly, that “the CENTECH GROUP did not meet the subcontracting limitation requirements set forth in statute and regulation.” AR (B-298364.6), Tab 9, Determination of Non-Responsibility; see Tab 10, Memorandum from the Contracting Officer to CENTECH, Rescission of Contract (Sept. 8, 2006); Tab 12, Request for COC (Sept. 15, 2006); AR (B-298364.2) at 2; Contacting Officer’s Statement (B-298364.2) at 4. Given the Air Force’s determination that CENTECH’s proposal failed to comply with a material term of the solicitation (the subcontracting limitation) and, accordingly, that the proposal could not form the basis for award under the RFP, the agency should have found CENTECH’s proposal to be unacceptable, rather than finding CENTECH nonresponsible and forwarding the matter to the SBA for its consideration. See Continental Staffing, Inc., supra; National Med. Staffing, Inc.; PRS Consultants, Inc., supra. The fact that the SBA has now determined CENTECH to be a responsible contractor does not alter our view here. Although the SBA’s determinations of responsibility and its issuance of COCs are generally not for review by our Office, Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.5(b)(2) (2006), the issues of a proposal’s acceptability and the award of a contract to an offeror based upon a proposal that fails to comply with a material term of a solicitation are matters initially within the purview of the contracting agency and subject to review by our Office. See, e.g., L-3 Communications Westwood Corp., B‑295126, Jan. 19, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 30 at 5; CACI Techs., Inc., B-296946, Oct. 27, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 198 at 5. The SBA disagrees with our Office’s view that where a proposal, on its face, should lead the contracting agency to the conclusion that an offeror has not agreed to comply with the subcontracting limitation, the matter is one of the proposal’s acceptability, rather than the offeror’s responsibility. SBA Submission (Jan. 23, 2007) at 4. Specifically, the SBA points out here that “[w]ith respect to whether or not a [small business concern] will meet its subcontracting limitation requirement, the SBA’s regulations provide that ‘[c]ompliance will be considered an element of responsibility.’” Id.; see 13 C.F.R. 125.6(f). Again, as set forth above, the issue here does not concern whether a bidder or offeror can or will comply with the subcontracting limitation requirement during performance of the contract (where we recognize that the matter is one of responsibility (or in certain cases, contract administration, see, e.g., Raloid Corp., B‑297176, Nov. 10, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 205 at 4)), but rather, whether the bidder or offeror has specifically taken exception to the subcontracting limitation requirement on the face of its bid or proposal. Given that the determination in this latter, limited circumstance involves the evaluation of a bid or proposal for compliance with a material term of the solicitation, the determination is one of responsiveness or acceptability, rather than responsibility. Continental Staffing, Inc., supra; KIRA Inc., supra; National Med. Staffing, Inc.; PRS Consultants, Inc., supra; Vanderbilt Shirt Co., supra.

Accordingly, we sustain the protest on this basis. While we find that CENTECH’s proposal could not form the basis for award under this RFP, the record reflects that CENTECH submitted its proposal with the understanding that it would be found to meet or exceed the subcontracting limitation requirement, given the AFMC memorandum that allowed for the performance of work requirement imposed by the Limitation on Subcontracting clause to be met by the “cooperative efforts” of CENTECH and its small business subcontractors. Additionally, although discussions were held with the four offerors that had submitted proposals, the matter of CENTECH’s proposal’s compliance with the requirements of the Limitation on Subcontracting clause was never raised with CENTECH during discussions because of the Air Force’s reliance on the AFMC memorandum. Accordingly, CENTECH was deprived of meaningful discussions regarding its proposal’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Limitation on Subcontracting clause. See FAR sect. 15.306(d)(3); Lockheed Martin Corp., B-293679 et al., May 27, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 115 at 7; see Special Operations Group, Inc., B-287013; B-287103.2, Mar. 30, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 73 at 7 (awardee whose proposal should have been rejected for failing to comply with a material term of the solicitation was deprived of meaningful discussions where this issue was not raised by the agency during its conduct of discussions). (TYBRIN Corporation, B-298364.6; B-298364.7, March 13, 2007) (pdf)


Raloid also questions whether DET will comply with the limitations on subcontracting provision at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 52.219-14 contained in the RFP because, in its view, DET does not have adequate facilities, equipment, or employees to manufacture the adapters. The FAR limitations on subcontracting provision requires that a prime contractor perform at least 50 percent of the cost of the contract incurred for personnel with its own employees. An agency’s judgment as to whether a small business offeror will comply with the limitations on subcontracting provision is a matter of responsibility and the contractor’s actual compliance with the provision is a matter of contract administration. Coffman Specialties, Inc., B-284546, B-284546.2, May 10, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 77 at 5. However, where a proposal, on its face, should lead an agency to the conclusion that an offeror could not and would not comply with the subcontracting limitation, the proposal may not form the basis for an award. KIRA, Inc., B-287573.4, B‑287573.5, Aug. 29, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 153 at 3. There is nothing on the face of DET’s proposal evidencing that the firm cannot and will not comply with the RFP’s subcontracting limitation provision. Accordingly, we have no basis to question the agency’s reliance on DET’s representations in concluding that DET agreed to perform as required.  (Raloid Corporation, B-297176, November 10, 2005) (pdf)


The Limitations on Subcontracting clause applies only to solicitations (or portions thereof) that are set aside for small business competition or the 8(a) program. See FAR 19.508(e) ("The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.219-14, Limitations on Subcontracting, in solicitations and contracts for supplies, services, and construction, if any portion of the requirement is to be set aside for small business and the contract amount is expected to exceed100,000"). See also FAR 19.811-3(e) ("The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.219-14, Limitations on Subcontracting, in any solicitation and contract resulting from this subpart [ i.e. , subpart 19.8 (The 8(a) Program)]"). Accordingly, since the solicitation at issue here was unrestricted, the clause has no application to it (despite the fact that it was incorrectly incorporated by reference). With regard to FAR 52.203-6, the protesters have furnished no argument in support of their allegation that B&R's stated intention to subcontract with [deleted] would violate the clause, and we see no basis for such an argument. Section 52.203-6 prohibits a contractor from entering into an agreement with an actual or prospective subcontractor, or otherwise acting in a manner, "which has or may have the effect of restricting sales by such subcontractors directly to the Government of any item or process (. . .) made or furnished by the subcontractor under this contract or under any follow-on production contract." There is no evidence in the record here that B&R has entered into an agreement with [deleted], or otherwise acted in a manner, that violates the above provision. (Superior Optical Labs, Inc.; Diversified Ophthalmics, Inc., B-294662; B-294662.2, December 9, 2004) (pdf)


It is undisputed that accepting IBM's proposal and using IBM to perform maintenance for all computers and laser printers (other than the few IBM 4028 laser printers) would place COMTek in violation of the limitation in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) on subcontracting where a solicitation is set aside for small business and the contract amount is expected to exceed $100,000. In this regard, under FAR § 52.219‑14(b)(1), which was included in the solicitation, in the case of a contract for services, “[a]t least 50 percent of the cost of contract performance incurred for personnel shall be expended for employees of the concern.”  (Integration Technologies Group, Inc., B-291657, February 13, 2003)  (txt version)


However, where a proposal, on its face, should lead an agency to the conclusion that an offeror could not and would not comply with the subcontracting limitation, we have considered this to be a matter of the proposal's technical acceptability; a proposal that fails to conform to a material term or condition of the solicitation such as the subcontracting limitation is unacceptable and may not form the basis for an award. Coffman Specialties, Inc., B-284546, B-284546.2, May 10, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 77 at 5.  (KIRA Inc., B-287573.4; B-287573.5, August 29, 2001)


In any event, the record shows that the evaluators noted that this issue was not entirely verifiable prior to award, and that NASA will ensure Infinity's compliance with the subcontracting limitation provision. Further, based on our review of Infinity's proposal, there is nothing to suggest that the firm took exception to the subcontracting limitation provision. Given that an agency is permitted wide discretion in this area, and in light of the agency's explanation in response to this allegation, we see no basis to conclude that NASA abused its discretion in selecting Infinity's proposal for award.  (Symtech Corporation, B-285358, August 21, 2000)


We have held that an agency need not consider subcontractor experience where the solicitation contemplates award of a service contract to a section 8(a) firm, and includes the provision at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 52.219-14, which imposes a limitation on subcontracting to an amount less than 50 percent of the cost of contract performance. USATREX Int'l, Inc. supra at 4. In such cases, the agency properly may determine that only the offeror's own capabilities are relevant for purposes of discriminating among the proposals. Since the RFP here provided for award of a service contract and contained the cited FAR provision, we think it properly could limit its evaluation to the prime contractor?s capabilities.  (North State Resources, Inc., B-282140, June 7, 1999)

Comptroller General - Listing of Decisions

For the Government For the Protester
Addx Corporation, B-404888, May 4, 2011  (pdf) TFab Manufacturing, LLC, B-401190, June 18, 2009  (pdf)
Chant Engineering Company, Inc., B-402054, December 29, 2009 (pdf) Integration Technologies Group, Inc., B-291657, February 13, 2003)  (txt version)
TYBRIN Corporation, B-298364.6; B-298364.7, March 13, 2007 (pdf)  
Raloid Corporation, B-297176, November 10, 2005 (pdf)  
Superior Optical Labs, Inc.; Diversified Ophthalmics, Inc., B-294662; B-294662.2, December 9, 2004 (pdf)  
KIRA Inc., B-287573.4; B-287573.5, August 29, 2001  
Symtech Corporation, B-285358, August 21, 2000  
Coffman Specialties, Inc., B-284546; B-284546.2, May 10, 2000  
EAA Capital Company, LLC, B-282377.2, June 23, 1999 (non-appropriated funds)  
North State Resources, Inc., B-282140, June 7, 1999  (experience evaluation)  

U. S. Court of Federal Claims - Key Excerpts

Section 2305(b)(1) of the CICA states that "[t]he head of an agency shall evaluate . . . competitive proposals and make an award based solely on the factors specified in the solicitation." 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(1). The March 31, 2006 Solicitation states that the master, officers, and crew of the vessel be appointed or hired by the owner, and the crew "shall be deemed to be the servants and agents of the Owner at all times." AR 1509. The FAR requires that: "[b]y submission of an offer and execution of a contract, the Offeror/Contractor agrees that in performance of the contract . . . at least 50 percent of the cost of contract performance incurred for personnel shall be expended for employees of the concern." 48 C.F.R. § 52.219-14(b)(1). In addition, a contractor awarded a small business set-aside contract for services must show that at least 50 percent of the labor costs incurred will be performed by the company’s own employees.

See 48 C.F.R. § 19.508(e) (requiring that contracting officers include FAR 52.219-14, Limitations on Subcontracting, "in solicitations and contracts for supplies, services and construction, if any portion of the requirement is to be set aside for small business and the contract amount is expected to exceed $100,000.").

Here, the issue is whether a “subcontractor” includes employees hired through an agent. The FAR does not define “subcontractor.” See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (Definitions). The Small Business Subcontracting Plan, however, defines a “subcontract” as “any agreement (other than one involving an employer-employee relationship) entered into by a Federal Government prime Contractor or subcontractor calling for supplies or services required for performance of the contract or subcontract.” 48 C.F.R. § 252.219-7004(a) (emphasis added); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1464 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a “subcontractor” as “[o]ne who is awarded a portion of an existing contract by a contractor . . . . For example, a contractor who builds houses typically retains subcontractors to perform specialty work such as installing plumbing, laying carpet, making cabinetry, and landscaping”). Therefore, if an employer-employee relationship existed between TAL and the Bonito’s crew, there was no violation of the Limitation on Subcontracting. See 48 C.F.R. § 2.219-14(b).

The FAR also does not define “employee” or “employer-employee” relationship. See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (Definitions). The Internal Revenue Service, however, uses the common law test to determine if an employer-employee relationship exists. See 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(1) (“Every individual is an employee if under the usual common law rules the relationship between him and the person for whom he performs services is the legal relationship of employer and employee.”). An employer-employee relationship exists under the common law when:

the person for whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. . . . The right to discharge is also an important factor indicating that the person possessing that right is an employer. Other factors characteristic of an employer, but not necessarily present in every case, are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to work, to the individual who performs the services. In general, if an individual is subject to the control or direction of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and not as to the means and methods for accomplishing the result, he is an independent contractor. An individual performing services as an independent contractor is not as to such services an employee under the usual common law rules.

26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “employee” as “A person who works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control the details of work performance.”).

In this case, TAL’s crewing agency appeared to operate as a headhunter or an employment agency. See AR 1921; see also AR 1940-41. In either event, Sealift failed to establish that the crewing agent had the “right to control and direct” the Bonito’s crew. See 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2). Instead, the record indicates that TAL controlled the members of the crew. See AR 1921 (“We utilize the services of a manning company . . . to find crew for our vessels.”) (emphasis added). The record also contains no evidence that the crewing agency had the “right to discharge” Bonito crew members after they were hired. See AR 1921; see also 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2). In addition, TAL furnished the crew members with “tools” and “a place to work.” See AR 1921. Therefore, Sealift failed to establish that the crewing agent was “awarded a portion of an existing contract” by TAL. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1464 (8th ed. 2004) (“Subcontractor”).

For these reasons, the court has determined that TAL’s use of a crewing agent did not establish a subcontract relationship, and TAL’s proposal properly complied with the March 31, 2006 Solicitation. See 48 C.F.R. § 252.219-7004(a) (defining a subcontract as “any agreement . . . other than one involving an employer-employee relationship”) (emphasis added); see also AR 1860.  (Sealift, Inc., v. U. S., No. 07-627C, July 11, 2008) (pdf)


In deciding whether an agency was justified in following a GAO recommendation, this Court determines whether GAO's decision was rational. The Court's review is not de novo. Honeywell, 870 F.2d at 648. In this procurement, the Air Force has taken corrective action based upon GAO’s determination that Centech’s proposal was unacceptable because it failed to meet the LOS clause. GAO recognized that the Air Force had erroneously informed offerors that they could meet the LOS clause on a collective basis and that the Air Force’s mistaken guidance had led Centech and another offeror to submit proposals which did not comply with the clause. As a result, GAO recommended reopening discussions to permit all offerors to submit revised proposals based upon a correct interpretation of the LOS clause. In addition, because over two years had passed since the original RFP was issued, the Air Force invited updates to proposals and endeavored to revise its evaluation procedures to meet other allegations in Tybrin’s GAO protest.

The LOS clause incorporated into the solicitation required an offeror to perform at least 50 percent of the contract costs with its own personnel. Plaintiff contends that GAO’s conclusion that its proposal was unacceptable was wrong because compliance with the LOS clause was not required to be evaluated as a condition for award, but instead should have been examined after award, once the Air Force’s actual requirements were defined and the costs of performance of the labor by the prime and subcontractors could be ascertained. Under Plaintiff’s theory, its representation in its proposal that it would perform only 43.2 percent of the labor costs itself did not render its proposal unacceptable because its failure to meet that clause was not a failure to meet a mandatory, material requirement of the solicitation, but was a matter of post-award contract administration. Thus, in Plaintiff’s view, its original contract award should be reinstated.

Plaintiff’s theory cannot succeed here for two reasons. First, the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 644(o), provides that a concern may not be awarded a contract as a small business unless it agrees that at least 50 percent of the cost of contract performance incurred for personnel shall be expended for employees of the concern. The Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 644(o), plainly requires the small business prime contractor to agree to perform at least 50 percent of the cost of personnel with its own personnel. It is undisputed that Centech’s proposal, on its face, did not do that. As such, Centech’s proposal violated the mandate of the Small Business Act, which makes the prime contractor’s agreement to perform 50 percent of the labor costs itself a prerequisite to obtaining the award. See Transatlantic Lines LLC v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 48, 52 (2005) (“a contractor awarded a small business set-aside contract for services must show that it will incur at least fifty percent of its labor costs on the contract from its own employees”).

Secondly, GAO correctly determined that Centech’s proposal was unacceptable because it failed to comply with the LOS clause -- a mandatory, material solicitation requirement. Plaintiff contends that because compliance with the LOS clause was not expressly stated in Section M as an evaluation factor for award, it was not a mandatory requirement, and the clause could be satisfied post award as a matter of contract administration. However, under the terms of the solicitation, the percentage of labor costs performed by a prime versus a subcontractor impacted an offeror’s proposed bottom-line costs, and costs were to be evaluated based upon the model in the RFP. Because the mix of prime-subcontractor labor here affected the cost evaluation, compliance with the LOS clause had to be evidenced in offerors’ proposals. As such, the LOS clause was implicated in the evaluation and was not simply a matter of post-award contract administration. As the Court in Blount, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 221, 228 (1990) recognized:

In requiring the contractor to self-perform 20 percent of the work under the contract, the clause directly impacted bid price. The selfperformance requirement limited the amount of work which could be subcontracted under the contract. A contractor can generally achieve considerable savings by subcontracting work to firms with lower cost structures who are capable of performing the project with less expense. As such, a contractor may gain a sizeable bid pricing advantage by subcontracting more work than its competitors . . . Since compliance with the “Performance of Work” clause invariably affected bid price, the “Performance of Work” clause constitutes a material term of the IFB. Vanderbilt Shirt Co., 69 Comp. Gen. 20 (1989).

Because Centech’s proposal did not comply with both a mandatory statutory requisite for award and a material solicitation provision which impacted offerors’ evaluated costs, the proposal, as GAO held, was technically unacceptable and ineligible for award. Chapman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 527 (stating that “a proposal that fails to conform to a material term and condition of the solicitation, such as the subcontracting limitation, is unacceptable and may not form the basis for an award”).

Centech further contends that it deserves its original award because it could and would actually meet the LOS clause post-award -- as determined by the SBA’s responsibility assessment, which used different prime-sub labor mixes and costs than those evaluated. The problem with this argument is that Centech would not in fact be receiving award based upon its original proposal or the original solicitation. The original solicitation, evaluation and award were premised on legal error -- that a small business could meet the LOS clause collectively with its subcontractors. As such, that original award is illegal, void ab initio and a nullity, and cannot be reinstated by the Court. Nor can Centech with a wink and a nod alter its proposal after the evaluation during a responsibility assessment to change a material proposal term, recognizing that it had to meet the 50 percent requirement itself. FAR 15.305(a); see also Prestex Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367, 372 (Ct. Cl. 1963).

To allow Centech alone to alter its offer by changing the proposed labor mix and percentage of costs it would incur for its own personnel to be above 50 percent would change the ground rules for Centech but not other offerors. This would violate fundamental tenets of procurement law requiring that offerors submit proposals to the same requirements and be evaluated against those same requirements.

In sum, Centech has not demonstrated that the Air Force’s corrective action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. As such, Centech cannot meet the first requisite for injunctive relief. Because Centech has not demonstrated success on the merits, the Court need not examine the other factors for injunctive relief. Forest City, No. 07-546C (Fed. Cl. Nov. 19, 2007), slip op. at 43; Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 340, 357 n.32 (2001), aff’d, 316 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Absent success on the merits, the other factors are irrelevant.”). Nonetheless, it is clear on this record that Centech is not entitled to the injunctive relief it seeks -- reinstatement of its erroneous original award -- relief which would merely reinstate and perpetuate an illegality.  (The Centech Group, Inc., v. U. S. and Tybrin, Inc., 07-513C, Filed December 7, 2007, Refiled December 13, 2007) (pdf)

U. S. Court of Federal Claims - Listing of Decisions

For the Government

For the Protester

Sealift, Inc., v. U. S., No. 07-627C, July 11, 2008 (pdf)

 

The Centech Group, Inc., v. U. S. and Tybrin, Inc., 07-513C, Filed December 7, 2007, Refiled December 13, 2007 (pdf)  

U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - Key Excerpts

We have stated that “a procurement agency’s decision to follow [GAO’s] recommendation even though that recommendation differed from the contracting officer’s initial decision was proper unless [GAO’s] decision itself was irrational.” Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In this case, we agree with the Court of Federal Claims that the Air Force acted properly when it followed GAO’s recommendation to solicit revised proposals for the ARDTEAS contract. Centech submitted a proposal that, on its face, showed that Centech was not agreeing to incur by itself “[a]t least 50 percent of the cost of contract performance . . . for personnel,” as required by the LOS clause.

Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3554(b)(1), GAO is required to recommend that an agency take specific corrective action if an award does not comply with a statute or regulation, including terminating the contract and awarding a contract consistent with the requirements of the statute and regulations. See Honeywell, 870 F.2d at 648. In Orincon, GAO noted that, “[a]s a general matter, an agency’s judgment as to whether a small business offeror will comply with the subcontracting limitation is a matter of responsibility, and the contractor’s actual compliance with the provision is a matter of contract administration.” 97-2 Comp. Gen. (West) at 4. GAO further stated: “However, where a proposal, on its face, should lead an agency to the conclusion that an offeror could not and would not comply with the subcontracting limitation, we have considered this to be a matter of the proposal’s technical acceptability.” Id. Since Centech’s proposal did not offer to provide what the RFP requested, it was not responsive to the RFP. It therefore was unacceptable and could not serve as the basis for contract award. Under these circumstances, GAO’s recommendation to solicit revised proposals for the contract plainly was rational. It therefore was proper for the Air Force to follow GAO’s recommendation.

Our conclusion is not changed by the fact that, in structuring its proposal, Centech apparently relied upon the later-retracted Policy Memorandum. The Air Force Material Command could not, through the Policy Memorandum, alter the requirements of the LOS clause, which was mandated by statute and regulation. See United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 392–93 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Administrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect.”); cf. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986) (noting that “not all agency publications are of binding force” and that “an agency’s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress”). In short, the Policy Memorandum could not override the LOS clause. We thus reject Centech’s argument that the presence of the Policy Memorandum (prior to its retraction) meant that Centech submitted a proposal which reflected agreement to comply with the LOS clause.

We take due notice of the procurement regulation at 48 C.F.R. § 19.601(d) and the SBA regulation at 13 C.F.R. § 125.6(f). The former provides that “[w]hen a solicitation requires a small business to adhere to the limitations on subcontracting, a contracting officer’s finding that a small business cannot comply with the limitation shall be treated as an element of responsibility and shall be subject to the COC process.” 48 C.F.R. § 19.601(d). The latter provides that “[c]ompliance [with the LOS clause is] considered an element of responsibility and not a component of size eligibility.” 13 C.F.R. § 125.6(f). Centech cites these regulations in making its argument that GAO and the Air Force should have deferred to the SBA’s determination that Centech would comply with the LOS clause. These two regulations do not change the result in this case, however. The reason is that, as GAO stated in its decision, the issue was not whether Centech could comply with the requirements of the LOS clause—the matter to which § 19.601(d) is directed. See 19 C.F.R. § 19.601(d) (referring to “a contracting officer’s finding that a small business cannot comply with the [subcontracting] limitation” (emphasis added)). Rather, the issue was whether, in its proposal, Centech agreed that it would comply with the requirements of the LOS clause.5 The record fully supports GAO’s determination that, in its proposal, Centech did not agree to comply with the clause. The Air Force acted rationally in following GAO’s recommendation based upon that determination.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of Federal Claims denying Centech’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief.  (The Centech Group, Inc., v. U. S. and Tybrin Corporation, No. 08-5031, February 3, 2009.)  (pdf)  Also see The Centech Group, Inc., v. U. S. and Tybrin, Inc., 07-513C, Filed December 7, 2007, Refiled December 13, 2007 (pdf) and TYBRIN Corporation, B-298364.6; B-298364.7, March 13, 2007 (pdf)

U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - Listing of Decisions

For the Government For the Protester
The Centech Group, Inc., v. U. S. and Tybrin Corporation, No. 08-5031, February 3, 2009. 

Also see The Centech Group, Inc., v. U. S. and Tybrin, Inc., 07-513C, Filed December 7, 2007, Refiled December 13, 2007 (pdf) and TYBRIN Corporation, B-298364.6; B-298364.7, March 13, 2007 (pdf)

 
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