|
FAR
52.219-14: Limitations on Subcontracting |
|
Comptroller
General - Key Excerpts |
The protester argues that the agency improperly relied upon an
unstated evaluation factor in rejecting its proposal for failure
to comply with the limitation on subcontracting clause. Addx
further argues that until the agency issues technical
instructions definitively determining the required level of
effort under the task order, it lacks a basis for concluding
that the protester will not comply with the limitation.
The protester's first argument is without merit. Where a
proposal, on its face, demonstrates that an offeror is taking
exception to the subcontracting limitation clause, the proposal
is technically unacceptable. TYBRIN Corp., B‑298364.6,
B‑298364.7, Mar. 13, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 51 at 5. This is so
because the limitation on subcontracting is a material term of
the solicitation, and a proposal that fails to conform to a
material term or condition of a solicitation is unacceptable and
may not form the basis for an award. Id. To the extent that the
protester is arguing that the [task order proposal request] TOPR
did not notify offerors that it incorporated the limitation on
subcontracting clause, as previously noted, the protester's
underlying Seaport-E contract provided it with notice that the
limitation on subcontracting clause would be incorporated into
any TOPR set aside for small business. AR, Tab 10, at 24. In
addition, the TOPR itself advised offerors of the clause's
incorporation. TOPR, amend. 2, at 27.
Turning to the protester's second argument--i.e., that until the
agency definitively decides the required level of effort under
the task order, it lacks a basis for concluding that the
protester will not comply with the limitation--we think the
agency reasonably concluded that Addx had not agreed to comply
with the limitation on subcontracting clause. While it is true
that the precise level of effort under the task order is to be
defined at the task order kick-off meeting and throughout the
life of the task order (making it impossible for the agency to
determine the precise percentage of work to be performed by
Addx's subcontractors), this does not render meaningless, as
Addx suggests, the information concerning Addx's proposed
staffing mix (prime vs. subcontractor) set forth in Addx's
technical and cost proposals. The protester's proposal was based
on the "best estimate" of the government's labor hour
requirements, TOPR, amend. 2, at 37; in addition, the
protester's cost proposal indicated that it would perform the
estimated requirements using largely a subcontractor work force
(78 percent of its labor costs were for subcontractor
employees). Given the information Addx provided in its proposal,
the agency had a reasonable basis to conclude that Addx was not
agreeing to expend at least 50 percent of personnel costs for
its own employees in performance of the contract.
The protest is denied. (Addx
Corporation, B-404888, May 4, 2011) (pdf)
Chant argues that Clover's quotation should have been found
unacceptable because, on its face, it did not comply with the
RFQ's LOS clause, FAR sect. 52.219-14(b)(2) (the so-called "50%
rule"). Specifically, Chant contends that the breakdown of work
to be performed by Clover and Oilgear shows that Clover will
perform less than 50% of the contract value.
As a general rule, an agency's judgment as to whether a small
business concern will comply with the LOS clause is a matter of
responsibility, and the contractor's actual compliance with the
provisions is a matter of contract administration. However,
where a quotation, on its face, should have led the agency to
conclude that the concern could not and would not comply with
the subcontracting limitation, this is a matter of technical
acceptability. A submission that fails to conform to a material
term or condition of the solicitation, such as the LOS clause,
is unacceptable and may not form the basis for an order. KIRA,
Inc., B-287573.4, B-287573.5, Aug. 29, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 153
at 3.
We find nothing on the face of Clover's quotation indicating an
intent not to comply with the LOS clause. Chant points to
nothing, and we find nothing, in Clover's quotation or in the
solicitation that establishes that Clover's method of
performance does not comply with the LOS clause. In contrast,
the agency states that its analysis of the quotation shows that
Clover will supply and fabricate a number of unique,
one-of-a-kind components and assume total project
responsibility, while Oilgear is to supply other components that
are readily available in its supply chain and require only
modest fabrication to meet the solicitation specifications. AR,
Tab E, Engineers' Statement, at 3-4. Additionally, the agency
states that, after analyzing Clover's proposal, it determined
that Clover will incur far more than 50% of the cost to
manufacture the entire hydraulic power system (not including the
cost of materials). Id. at 3. Under these circumstances, there
is no basis for us to conclude that Clover's quotation, on its
face, should have led the agency to conclude that Clover could
not and would not comply with the LOS clause.
Chant argues that Clover's quotation should have been found
unacceptable because it showed that Clover would not incur at
least 50% of the personnel costs, as required under the LOS
clause. Protest at 5. However, either subparagraph (1) or
subparagraph (2) of the LOS clause applies, but not both,
depending upon whether the contract is one for services or
supplies. The contract here is for the construction,
fabrication, assembly, and testing of a hydraulic system,
components and new operating machinery, and thus falls under the
supplies requirement at subparagraph (2) (as reflected in the
agency's analysis above which we have no basis to question).
Accordingly, subparagraph (1), establishing the 50% of personnel
costs requirement, does not apply. See TFab Mfg., LLC, B-401190,
June 18, 2009, 2009 CPD para. 127 at 3-4. (Chant
Engineering Company, Inc., B-402054, December 29, 2009) (pdf)
The RFP, issued on July 9, 2008 as a total small business
set-aside, provided for the award of an indefinite-delivery,
indefinite quantity contract. Contracting Officer’s Statement
(COS) at 3. The RFP called for both hardware requirements and
engineering services requirements. COS at 2‑3. The RFP
incorporated FAR sect. 52.219‑14, the LOS clause, as follows:
LIMITATIONS ON SUBCONTRACTING
(DEC 1996)
(a) This clause does not apply to the unrestricted portion of
a partial set-aside.
(b) By submission of an offer and execution of a contract, the
Offeror/Contractor agrees that in performance of the contract
in the case of a contract for--
(1) Services (except construction). At least 50 percent of the
cost of contract performance incurred for personnel shall be
expended for employees of the concern.
(2) Supplies (other than procurement from a nonmanufacturer of
such supplies). The concern shall perform work for at least 50
percent of the cost of manufacturing the supplies, not
including the cost of materials.
(3) General construction..…
(4) Construction by special trade contractors..…
Proposals were received from
several small businesses, including TFab. COS at 3. The
contracting officer questioned TFab regarding its compliance
with the LOS clause, since TFab’s proposal specifically
indicated “an approximately 95 percent exemption” from the 50%
subcontracting rule for the required services. Id. at 3-4. The
contracting officer was concerned “that the protester’s proposal
for how the services CLINS were to be performed amounted to a
significant pass through to a large business.” Id. at 4. On
February 12, the contracting officer issued RFP amendment No.
17, which clarified the manner in which the Army intended to
apply the LOS clause, as follows:
V. Offerors are cautioned that
this acquisition is a Small Business Set‑Aside and is subject
to the requirements of FAR clause 52.219-14, Limitations on
Subcontracting. This acquisition contains both Supply and
Service contract line items, both of which are separately
subject to FAR clause 52-219-14, Limitations on
Subcontracting. Offerors are cautioned that CLINs described as
Cost Plus Fixed Fee CLINs are considered to be an important
part of this procurement and not incidental to the
production/fixed fee CLINs. Accordingly, offerors must meet
the requirements for Small Business Set-Aside with regard to
these CLINS.
RFP, Amend. No. 17, sect. A-16.V.
All offerors, including the protester, submitted revised
proposals by the March 17 closing time. COS at 4. This protest
was filed prior to the closing time.
(sections deleted)
ANALYSIS
We agree with the protester that the LOS clause does not provide
for dual application of the 50% requirement. The clause, on its
face, establishes separate subcontracting limitations “in the
case of a contract for” four distinct types of work. Paragraph
(b)(1) establishes subcontracting limitations, not with regard
to services generally, but with regard to “a contract … for
Services.” Similarly, paragraph (b)(2) establishes
subcontracting limitations, not with regard to supplies
generally, but with regard to “a contract … for Supplies.” There
is no language in the clause that contemplates a hybrid
services/supply contract; more specifically, there is no
language that provides for applying both paragraphs (b)(1) and
(b)(2) in a single acquisition to require small business firms
to agree to perform at least 50% of both services and supply
work under a single contract. We read the language of the clause
as indicating that the applicable LOS clause paragraph is to be
applied to entire contracts, rather than portions of contracts,
and that the clause contemplates that the contracting agency
must choose among the paragraphs.
In AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 582 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (D.D.C. 1984),
aff’d, 757 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the court reached a
similar conclusion in interpreting applicability of the Service
Contract Act (SCA), 41 U.S.C. sections 351-358 (applicable to
contracts “the principal purpose of which is to furnish
services”) and the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (WHA), 41
U.S.C. sections 35-45 (applicable to contracts “for the
manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, and
equipment”), statutes in para materia with subsection 15(o) and
the LOS clause. Specifically, in interpreting the relevant
provisions of the SCA, the court found that text that “refers to
‘the contract’ without any reference to line item
specifications” indicated that the SCA “was intended to apply to
entire contracts, not to individual line items.” Agencies’
implementation of the SCA and WHA is consistent with this
interpretation; the contracting agency must make a determination
whether a requirement is for services or supplies in order to
determine which of the two statutes is applicable to an
acquisition. See Information Handling Servs., 70 Comp. Gen. 35
(1990), 90-2 CPD para. 306 at 3 (regulations implementing the
SCA and WHA contemplate an initial determination by the
procuring agency as to which statute applies to a particular
procurement); Tenavision, Inc., B-231453, Aug. 4, 1988, 88‑2 CPD
para. 114 at 2 (regulatory scheme implementing these statutes
envisions an initial determination by the contracting agency as
to which statute applies to a particular procurement). This
determination requires identification of the principal purpose
of the contract. See AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, supra, at
345 (SCA applies only when principal purpose of contract is for
services); Southern Packaging & Storage Co. v. U.S., 458 F.
Supp. 726, 734 (D.S.C. 1978), aff’d, 618 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th
Cir. 1980) (acquisition of field rations would be exempt from
coverage under SCA if found to be subject to provisions of WHA);
Department of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. sect. 4.117 (2009).
We find the courts’ interpretation regarding the manner in which
the SCA and WHA are to be applied to contracts supportive of our
conclusion here, where we are interpreting an acquisition
statute and associated regulations the provisions of which, like
those of the SCA and WHA, apply to “contracts” rather than to
particular services or supplies within a contract, and which, to
be implemented, require an initial agency determination
regarding applicability.
Our interpretation also is consistent with SBA’s position
regarding this issue. In response to our request for its views,
SBA agrees that the Army’s application of the LOS clause to the
services and supply portions of the requirement here is
improper. SBA points out that the FAR LOS clause requirements
parallel those under subsection 125.6(a) of its own regulations,
13 C.F.R. sect. 125.6(a), which also implement subsection 15(o)
of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. sect. 644(o).[2] Consistent
with our interpretation, it is SBA’s position that these
provisions “established one performance requirement that applies
to a ‘contract for the procurement of supplies’ and a different
performance requirement that applies to a ‘contract for
services.’” SBA Comments at 3. SBA concludes that the Army’s
attempt to apply both the services and supply provisions of the
LOS clause is inconsistent with the act. Id. at 4. We generally
will give deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
its own regulations. See Blue Rock Structures, Inc., B-293134,
Feb. 6, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 63 at 8 (SBA’s interpretation of
statute that it is responsible for implementing entitled to
substantial deference and, if reasonable, should be upheld).
Further, we agree with SBA that the Army’s implementation of the
LOS clause will have the practical effect of restricting
competition. In this regard, while, as discussed, the Army is
motivated to preclude a small business awardee from
subcontracting with a large business to perform all of the
service work or all of the supply work under the contract,
applying the LOS clause to both the services and supply portions
of the contract clearly will limit the small businesses that
will be able to compete. Specifically, small business firms that
can only perform either a majority of the services work or a
majority of the supply work will not be able to compete; the
pool of potential competitors will be limited to small
businesses that can satisfy the requirements of both paragraph
(b)(1) (“50 percent of the cost of contract performance incurred
for personnel”) and paragraph (b)(2) (“50 percent of the cost of
manufacturing the supplies”).
Accordingly, we sustain the protest. (TFab
Manufacturing, LLC, B-401190, June 18, 2009) (pdf)
As a
general matter, an agency’s judgment as to whether a small
business offeror will be able to comply with a subcontracting
limitation presents a question of responsibility for review by
the SBA. See 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.6(f); Spectrum Sec. Servs.,
Inc., B-297320.2; B-297320.3, Dec. 29, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 227
at 6. However, our Office has consistently held that where a
proposal, on its face, should lead an agency to the conclusion
that an offeror has not agreed to comply with the subcontracting
limitation, the matter is one of the proposal’s acceptability.
Continental Staffing, Inc., B-299054, Jan. 29, 2007, 2007 CPD
para. 18 at 6; KIRA Inc., B-287573.4; B‑287573.5, Aug. 29, 2001,
2001 CPD para. 153 at 3; National Med. Staffing, Inc.; PRS
Consultants, Inc., B-238694; B-238694.2, June 4, 1990, 90-1 CPD
para. 530 at 4. Our Office has also long held that a proposal
that fails to conform to a material term or condition of the
solicitation, including the subcontracting limitation, is
unacceptable and may not form the basis for an award. KIRA Inc.,
supra; National Med. Staffing, Inc.; PRS Consultants, Inc.,
supra, at 3-4 (sustaining protest that the award of a contract
was improper where the awardee’s proposal evidenced
noncompliance with the subcontracting limitation); see
Vanderbilt Shirt Co., B-236016, Oct. 10, 1989, 89‑2 CPD para.
333 at 2 (agency properly rejected the protester’s bid as
nonresponsive where the bid provided that the protester would
not comply with the subcontracting limitation). As set forth
above, the record establishes that it was clear to the Air Force
that CENTECH’s proposal as submitted and as evaluated provided
that 43.2 percent of the cost of contract performance incurred
for personnel would be expended for CENTECH employees and,
accordingly, that “the CENTECH GROUP did not meet the
subcontracting limitation requirements set forth in statute and
regulation.” AR (B-298364.6), Tab 9, Determination of
Non-Responsibility; see Tab 10, Memorandum from the Contracting
Officer to CENTECH, Rescission of Contract (Sept. 8, 2006); Tab
12, Request for COC (Sept. 15, 2006); AR (B-298364.2) at 2;
Contacting Officer’s Statement (B-298364.2) at 4. Given the Air
Force’s determination that CENTECH’s proposal failed to comply
with a material term of the solicitation (the subcontracting
limitation) and, accordingly, that the proposal could not form
the basis for award under the RFP, the agency should have found
CENTECH’s proposal to be unacceptable, rather than finding
CENTECH nonresponsible and forwarding the matter to the SBA for
its consideration. See Continental Staffing, Inc., supra;
National Med. Staffing, Inc.; PRS Consultants, Inc., supra. The
fact that the SBA has now determined CENTECH to be a responsible
contractor does not alter our view here. Although the SBA’s
determinations of responsibility and its issuance of COCs are
generally not for review by our Office, Bid Protest Regulations,
4 C.F.R. sect. 21.5(b)(2) (2006), the issues of a proposal’s
acceptability and the award of a contract to an offeror based
upon a proposal that fails to comply with a material term of a
solicitation are matters initially within the purview of the
contracting agency and subject to review by our Office. See,
e.g., L-3 Communications Westwood Corp., B‑295126, Jan. 19,
2005, 2005 CPD para. 30 at 5; CACI Techs., Inc., B-296946, Oct.
27, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 198 at 5. The SBA disagrees with our
Office’s view that where a proposal, on its face, should lead
the contracting agency to the conclusion that an offeror has not
agreed to comply with the subcontracting limitation, the matter
is one of the proposal’s acceptability, rather than the
offeror’s responsibility. SBA Submission (Jan. 23, 2007) at 4.
Specifically, the SBA points out here that “[w]ith respect to
whether or not a [small business concern] will meet its
subcontracting limitation requirement, the SBA’s regulations
provide that ‘[c]ompliance will be considered an element of
responsibility.’” Id.; see 13 C.F.R. 125.6(f). Again, as set
forth above, the issue here does not concern whether a bidder or
offeror can or will comply with the subcontracting limitation
requirement during performance of the contract (where we
recognize that the matter is one of responsibility (or in
certain cases, contract administration, see, e.g., Raloid Corp.,
B‑297176, Nov. 10, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 205 at 4)), but rather,
whether the bidder or offeror has specifically taken exception
to the subcontracting limitation requirement on the face of its
bid or proposal. Given that the determination in this latter,
limited circumstance involves the evaluation of a bid or
proposal for compliance with a material term of the
solicitation, the determination is one of responsiveness or
acceptability, rather than responsibility. Continental Staffing,
Inc., supra; KIRA Inc., supra; National Med. Staffing, Inc.; PRS
Consultants, Inc., supra; Vanderbilt Shirt Co., supra.
Accordingly, we sustain the protest on this basis. While we find
that CENTECH’s proposal could not form the basis for award under
this RFP, the record reflects that CENTECH submitted its
proposal with the understanding that it would be found to meet
or exceed the subcontracting limitation requirement, given the
AFMC memorandum that allowed for the performance of work
requirement imposed by the Limitation on Subcontracting clause
to be met by the “cooperative efforts” of CENTECH and its small
business subcontractors. Additionally, although discussions were
held with the four offerors that had submitted proposals, the
matter of CENTECH’s proposal’s compliance with the requirements
of the Limitation on Subcontracting clause was never raised with
CENTECH during discussions because of the Air Force’s reliance
on the AFMC memorandum. Accordingly, CENTECH was deprived of
meaningful discussions regarding its proposal’s failure to
comply with the requirements of the Limitation on Subcontracting
clause. See FAR sect. 15.306(d)(3); Lockheed Martin Corp.,
B-293679 et al., May 27, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 115 at 7; see
Special Operations Group, Inc., B-287013; B-287103.2, Mar. 30,
2001, 2001 CPD para. 73 at 7 (awardee whose proposal should have
been rejected for failing to comply with a material term of the
solicitation was deprived of meaningful discussions where this
issue was not raised by the agency during its conduct of
discussions). (TYBRIN Corporation,
B-298364.6; B-298364.7, March 13, 2007) (pdf)
Raloid also questions whether DET will comply with the
limitations on subcontracting provision at Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) sect. 52.219-14 contained in the RFP because,
in its view, DET does not have adequate facilities, equipment,
or employees to manufacture the adapters. The FAR limitations on
subcontracting provision requires that a prime contractor
perform at least 50 percent of the cost of the contract incurred
for personnel with its own employees. An agency’s judgment as to
whether a small business offeror will comply with the
limitations on subcontracting provision is a matter of
responsibility and the contractor’s actual compliance with the
provision is a matter of contract administration. Coffman
Specialties, Inc., B-284546, B-284546.2, May 10, 2000, 2000 CPD
para. 77 at 5. However, where a proposal, on its face, should
lead an agency to the conclusion that an offeror could not and
would not comply with the subcontracting limitation, the
proposal may not form the basis for an award. KIRA, Inc.,
B-287573.4, B‑287573.5, Aug. 29, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 153 at 3.
There is nothing on the face of DET’s proposal evidencing that
the firm cannot and will not comply with the RFP’s
subcontracting limitation provision. Accordingly, we have no
basis to question the agency’s reliance on DET’s representations
in concluding that DET agreed to perform as required. (Raloid
Corporation, B-297176, November 10, 2005) (pdf)
The Limitations on Subcontracting clause applies only to
solicitations (or portions thereof) that are set aside for small
business competition or the 8(a) program. See FAR 19.508(e)
("The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.219-14,
Limitations on Subcontracting, in solicitations and contracts
for supplies, services, and construction, if any portion of the
requirement is to be set aside for small business and the
contract amount is expected to exceed100,000"). See also FAR
19.811-3(e) ("The contracting officer shall insert the clause at
52.219-14, Limitations on Subcontracting, in any solicitation
and contract resulting from this subpart [ i.e. , subpart 19.8
(The 8(a) Program)]"). Accordingly, since the solicitation at
issue here was unrestricted, the clause has no application to it
(despite the fact that it was incorrectly incorporated by
reference). With regard to FAR 52.203-6, the protesters have
furnished no argument in support of their allegation that B&R's
stated intention to subcontract with [deleted] would violate the
clause, and we see no basis for such an argument. Section
52.203-6 prohibits a contractor from entering into an agreement
with an actual or prospective subcontractor, or otherwise acting
in a manner, "which has or may have the effect of restricting
sales by such subcontractors directly to the Government of any
item or process (. . .) made or furnished by the subcontractor
under this contract or under any follow-on production contract."
There is no evidence in the record here that B&R has entered
into an agreement with [deleted], or otherwise acted in a
manner, that violates the above provision. (Superior
Optical Labs, Inc.; Diversified Ophthalmics, Inc., B-294662;
B-294662.2, December 9, 2004) (pdf)
It is undisputed that accepting
IBM's proposal and using IBM to perform maintenance for all
computers and laser printers (other than the few IBM 4028 laser
printers) would place COMTek in violation of the limitation in
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) on subcontracting where
a solicitation is set aside for small business and the contract
amount is expected to exceed $100,000. In this regard, under FAR
§ 52.219‑14(b)(1), which was included in the solicitation, in
the case of a contract for services, “[a]t least 50 percent of
the cost of contract performance incurred for personnel shall be
expended for employees of the concern.” (Integration
Technologies Group, Inc., B-291657, February 13, 2003)
(txt
version)
However, where a proposal, on its
face, should lead an agency to the conclusion that an offeror
could not and would not comply with the subcontracting
limitation, we have considered this to be a matter of the
proposal's technical acceptability; a proposal that fails to
conform to a material term or condition of the solicitation such
as the subcontracting limitation is unacceptable and may not
form the basis for an award. Coffman Specialties, Inc.,
B-284546, B-284546.2, May 10, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 77 at 5.
(KIRA
Inc., B-287573.4; B-287573.5, August 29, 2001)
In any event, the record shows that
the evaluators noted that this issue was not entirely verifiable
prior to award, and that NASA will ensure Infinity's compliance
with the subcontracting limitation provision. Further, based on
our review of Infinity's proposal, there is nothing to suggest
that the firm took exception to the subcontracting limitation
provision. Given that an agency is permitted wide discretion in
this area, and in light of the agency's explanation in response
to this allegation, we see no basis to conclude that NASA abused
its discretion in selecting Infinity's proposal for award.
(Symtech
Corporation, B-285358, August 21, 2000)
We have held that an agency need
not consider subcontractor experience where the solicitation
contemplates award of a service contract to a section 8(a) firm,
and includes the provision at Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) sect. 52.219-14, which imposes a limitation on
subcontracting to an amount less than 50 percent of the cost of
contract performance. USATREX Int'l, Inc. supra at 4. In such
cases, the agency properly may determine that only the offeror's
own capabilities are relevant for purposes of discriminating
among the proposals. Since the RFP here provided for award of a
service contract and contained the cited FAR provision, we think
it properly could limit its evaluation to the prime contractor?s
capabilities. (North
State Resources, Inc., B-282140, June 7, 1999) |
|
|
Comptroller
General - Listing of Decisions |
|
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
|
Addx Corporation, B-404888, May 4,
2011 (pdf) |
TFab Manufacturing, LLC, B-401190,
June 18, 2009 (pdf) |
|
Chant Engineering Company, Inc.,
B-402054, December 29, 2009 (pdf) |
Integration
Technologies Group, Inc., B-291657, February 13, 2003)
(txt
version) |
|
TYBRIN Corporation, B-298364.6;
B-298364.7, March 13, 2007 (pdf) |
|
|
Raloid Corporation, B-297176,
November 10, 2005 (pdf) |
|
|
Superior Optical Labs, Inc.; Diversified
Ophthalmics, Inc., B-294662; B-294662.2, December 9, 2004 (pdf) |
|
|
KIRA
Inc., B-287573.4; B-287573.5, August 29, 2001 |
|
|
Symtech
Corporation, B-285358, August 21, 2000 |
|
|
Coffman
Specialties, Inc., B-284546; B-284546.2, May 10, 2000 |
|
|
EAA
Capital Company, LLC, B-282377.2, June 23, 1999
(non-appropriated funds) |
|
|
North
State Resources, Inc., B-282140, June 7, 1999
(experience evaluation) |
|
|
U.
S. Court of Federal Claims - Key Excerpts |
|
Section
2305(b)(1) of the CICA states that "[t]he head of an agency shall
evaluate . . . competitive proposals and make an award based solely on the
factors specified in
the solicitation." 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(1). The March 31, 2006 Solicitation
states that the master,
officers, and crew of the vessel be appointed or hired by the owner, and the
crew "shall be
deemed to be the servants and agents of the Owner at all times." AR 1509. The
FAR requires
that: "[b]y submission of an offer and execution of a contract, the Offeror/Contractor
agrees that
in performance of the contract . . . at least 50 percent of the cost of contract
performance incurred
for personnel shall be expended for employees of the concern." 48 C.F.R. §
52.219-14(b)(1). In
addition, a contractor awarded a small business set-aside contract for services
must show that at
least 50 percent of the labor costs incurred will be performed by the company’s
own employees. See 48 C.F.R. § 19.508(e)
(requiring that contracting officers include FAR 52.219-14, Limitations
on Subcontracting, "in solicitations and contracts for supplies, services and
construction, if any
portion of the requirement is to be set aside for small business and the
contract amount is
expected to exceed $100,000.").
Here, the issue is whether a “subcontractor” includes employees hired through an
agent.
The FAR does not define “subcontractor.” See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (Definitions).
The Small
Business Subcontracting Plan, however, defines a “subcontract” as “any agreement
(other than
one involving an employer-employee relationship) entered into by a Federal
Government prime
Contractor or subcontractor calling for supplies or services required for
performance of the
contract or subcontract.” 48 C.F.R. § 252.219-7004(a) (emphasis added); see also
BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1464 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a “subcontractor” as “[o]ne who is
awarded a portion
of an existing contract by a contractor . . . . For example, a contractor who
builds houses typically
retains subcontractors to perform specialty work such as installing plumbing,
laying carpet,
making cabinetry, and landscaping”). Therefore, if an employer-employee
relationship existed
between TAL and the Bonito’s crew, there was no violation of the Limitation on
Subcontracting.
See 48 C.F.R. § 2.219-14(b).
The FAR also does not define “employee” or “employer-employee” relationship. See
48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (Definitions). The Internal Revenue Service, however, uses the
common law test
to determine if an employer-employee relationship exists. See 26 C.F.R. §
31.3121(d)-1(c)(1)
(“Every individual is an employee if under the usual common law rules the
relationship between him and the person for whom he performs services is the legal relationship of
employer and
employee.”). An employer-employee relationship exists under the common law when:
the person for whom services are performed has the right to control and direct
the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be
accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is
accomplished. . . . The right to discharge is also an important factor
indicating that the person possessing that right is an employer. Other factors characteristic of
an employer, but not necessarily present in every case, are the furnishing of tools
and the furnishing of a place to work, to the individual who performs the services.
In general, if an individual is subject to the control or direction of another
merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and not as to the means and methods
for accomplishing the result, he is an independent contractor. An individual
performing services as an independent contractor is not as to such services an
employee under the usual common law rules.
26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (8th ed.
2004) (defining “employee” as “A person who works in the service of another person (the
employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to
control the details of work performance.”).
In this case, TAL’s crewing agency appeared to operate
as a headhunter or an employment
agency. See AR 1921; see also AR 1940-41. In either event, Sealift failed to
establish that the
crewing agent had the “right to control and direct” the Bonito’s crew. See 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2). Instead, the record indicates that TAL controlled the
members of the crew.
See AR 1921 (“We utilize the services of a manning company . . . to find crew
for our vessels.”)
(emphasis added). The record also contains no evidence that the crewing agency
had the “right
to discharge” Bonito crew members after they were hired. See AR 1921; see also
26 C.F.R. §
31.3121(d)-1(c)(2). In addition, TAL furnished the crew members with “tools” and
“a place to
work.” See AR 1921. Therefore, Sealift failed to establish that the crewing
agent was “awarded
a portion of an existing contract” by TAL. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1464 (8th
ed. 2004)
(“Subcontractor”).
For these reasons, the court has determined that TAL’s use of a crewing agent
did not
establish a subcontract relationship, and TAL’s proposal properly complied with
the March 31,
2006 Solicitation. See 48 C.F.R. § 252.219-7004(a) (defining a subcontract as
“any agreement
. . . other than one involving an employer-employee relationship”) (emphasis
added); see also AR
1860.
(Sealift, Inc., v. U.
S., No. 07-627C, July 11, 2008) (pdf)
In deciding whether an agency was justified in following
a GAO recommendation, this Court
determines whether GAO's decision was rational. The Court's review is not de
novo. Honeywell, 870
F.2d at 648. In this procurement, the Air Force has taken corrective action
based upon GAO’s
determination that Centech’s proposal was unacceptable because it failed to meet
the LOS clause.
GAO recognized that the Air Force had erroneously informed offerors that they
could meet the LOS
clause on a collective basis and that the Air Force’s mistaken guidance had led
Centech and another
offeror to submit proposals which did not comply with the clause. As a result,
GAO recommended
reopening discussions to permit all offerors to submit revised proposals based
upon a correct
interpretation of the LOS clause. In addition, because over two years had passed
since the original
RFP was issued, the Air Force invited updates to proposals and endeavored to
revise its evaluation
procedures to meet other allegations in Tybrin’s GAO protest. The LOS clause incorporated into the solicitation required an offeror to perform
at least 50 percent of the contract costs with its own personnel. Plaintiff
contends that GAO’s conclusion that
its proposal was unacceptable was wrong because compliance with the LOS clause
was not required
to be evaluated as a condition for award, but instead should have been examined
after award, once
the Air Force’s actual requirements were defined and the costs of performance of
the labor by the
prime and subcontractors could be ascertained. Under Plaintiff’s theory, its
representation in its
proposal that it would perform only 43.2 percent of the labor costs itself did
not render its proposal
unacceptable because its failure to meet that clause was not a failure to meet a
mandatory, material
requirement of the solicitation, but was a matter of post-award contract
administration. Thus, in
Plaintiff’s view, its original contract award should be reinstated.
Plaintiff’s theory cannot succeed here for two reasons. First, the Small
Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 644(o), provides that a concern may not be awarded a contract as a
small business unless
it agrees that at least 50 percent of the cost of contract performance incurred
for personnel shall be
expended for employees of the concern. The Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §
644(o), plainly
requires the small business prime contractor to agree to perform at least 50
percent of the cost of
personnel with its own personnel. It is undisputed that Centech’s proposal, on
its face, did not do
that. As such, Centech’s proposal violated the mandate of the Small Business
Act, which makes the
prime contractor’s agreement to perform 50 percent of the labor costs itself a
prerequisite to
obtaining the award. See Transatlantic Lines LLC v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl.
48, 52 (2005) (“a
contractor awarded a small business set-aside contract for services must show
that it will incur at
least fifty percent of its labor costs on the contract from its own employees”).
Secondly, GAO correctly determined that Centech’s proposal was unacceptable
because it
failed to comply with the LOS clause -- a mandatory, material solicitation
requirement. Plaintiff
contends that because compliance with the LOS clause was not expressly stated in
Section M as an
evaluation factor for award, it was not a mandatory requirement, and the clause
could be satisfied
post award as a matter of contract administration. However, under the terms of
the solicitation, the percentage of labor costs performed by a prime versus a
subcontractor impacted an offeror’s
proposed bottom-line costs, and costs were to be evaluated based upon the model
in the RFP.
Because the mix of prime-subcontractor labor here affected the cost evaluation,
compliance with the
LOS clause had to be evidenced in offerors’ proposals. As such, the LOS clause
was implicated in
the evaluation and was not simply a matter of post-award contract
administration. As the Court in
Blount, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 221, 228 (1990) recognized:
In requiring the contractor to self-perform 20 percent of the work
under the contract, the clause directly impacted bid price. The selfperformance
requirement limited the amount of work which could be
subcontracted under the contract. A contractor can generally achieve
considerable savings by subcontracting work to firms with lower cost
structures who are capable of performing the project with less
expense. As such, a contractor may gain a sizeable bid pricing
advantage by subcontracting more work than its competitors . . .
Since compliance with the “Performance of Work” clause invariably
affected bid price, the “Performance of Work” clause constitutes a
material term of the IFB. Vanderbilt Shirt Co., 69 Comp. Gen. 20 (1989).
Because Centech’s proposal did not comply with both a mandatory statutory
requisite for
award and a material solicitation provision which impacted offerors’ evaluated
costs, the proposal,
as GAO held, was technically unacceptable and ineligible for award. Chapman, 63
Fed. Cl. at 527 (stating that “a proposal that fails to conform to a material
term and condition of the solicitation, such as the subcontracting limitation,
is unacceptable and may not form the basis for an award”).
Centech further contends that it deserves its original award because it could
and would
actually meet the LOS clause post-award -- as determined by the SBA’s
responsibility assessment,
which used different prime-sub labor mixes and costs than those evaluated. The
problem with this
argument is that Centech would not in fact be receiving award based upon its
original proposal or
the original solicitation. The original solicitation, evaluation and award
were premised on legal
error -- that a small business could meet the LOS clause collectively with its
subcontractors. As
such, that original award is illegal, void ab initio and a nullity, and cannot
be reinstated by the Court.
Nor can Centech with a wink and a nod alter its proposal after the evaluation
during a responsibility
assessment to change a material proposal term, recognizing that it had to meet
the 50 percent
requirement itself. FAR 15.305(a); see also Prestex Inc. v. United States, 320
F.2d 367, 372 (Ct. Cl.
1963).
To allow Centech alone to alter its offer by changing the proposed labor mix and
percentage
of costs it would incur for its own personnel to be above 50 percent would
change the ground rules
for Centech but not other offerors. This would violate fundamental tenets of
procurement law
requiring that offerors submit proposals to the same requirements and be
evaluated against those
same requirements.
In sum, Centech has not demonstrated that the Air Force’s corrective action was
arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. As such, Centech cannot meet the first
requisite for injunctive
relief. Because Centech has not demonstrated success on the merits, the Court
need not examine the
other factors for injunctive relief. Forest City, No. 07-546C (Fed. Cl. Nov. 19,
2007), slip op. at 43;
Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 340, 357 n.32
(2001), aff’d, 316 F.3d
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Absent success on the merits, the other factors are
irrelevant.”).
Nonetheless, it is clear on this record that Centech is not entitled to the
injunctive relief it seeks --
reinstatement of its erroneous original award -- relief which would merely
reinstate and perpetuate
an illegality. (The Centech Group, Inc., v. U.
S. and Tybrin, Inc., 07-513C, Filed December 7, 2007, Refiled December 13,
2007) (pdf) |
|
|
U.
S. Court of Federal Claims - Listing of Decisions |
|
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
|
Sealift, Inc., v. U. S.,
No. 07-627C, July 11, 2008 (pdf) |
|
|
The Centech
Group, Inc., v. U. S. and Tybrin, Inc., 07-513C, Filed
December 7, 2007, Refiled December 13, 2007 (pdf) |
|
|
U.
S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - Key Excerpts |
|
We have
stated that “a procurement agency’s decision to follow [GAO’s] recommendation
even though that recommendation differed from the contracting officer’s initial
decision was proper unless [GAO’s] decision itself was irrational.” Honeywell,
Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In this case, we
agree with the Court of Federal Claims that the Air Force acted properly when it
followed GAO’s recommendation to solicit revised proposals for the ARDTEAS
contract. Centech submitted a proposal that, on its face, showed that Centech
was not agreeing to incur by itself “[a]t least 50 percent of the cost of
contract performance . . . for personnel,” as required by the LOS clause.
Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3554(b)(1), GAO is required to
recommend that an agency take specific corrective action if an award does not
comply with a statute or regulation, including terminating the contract and
awarding a contract consistent with the requirements of the statute and
regulations. See Honeywell, 870 F.2d at 648. In Orincon, GAO noted that, “[a]s a
general matter, an agency’s judgment as to whether a small business offeror will
comply with the subcontracting limitation is a matter of responsibility, and the
contractor’s actual compliance with the provision is a matter of contract
administration.” 97-2 Comp. Gen. (West) at 4. GAO further stated: “However,
where a proposal, on its face, should lead an agency to the conclusion that an
offeror could not and would not comply with the subcontracting limitation, we
have considered this to be a matter of the proposal’s technical acceptability.”
Id. Since Centech’s proposal did not offer to provide what the RFP requested, it
was not responsive to the RFP. It therefore was unacceptable and could not serve
as the basis for contract award. Under these circumstances, GAO’s recommendation
to solicit revised proposals for the contract plainly was rational. It therefore
was proper for the Air Force to follow GAO’s recommendation.
Our conclusion is not changed by the fact that, in
structuring its proposal, Centech apparently relied upon the later-retracted
Policy Memorandum. The Air Force Material Command could not, through the Policy
Memorandum, alter the requirements of the LOS clause, which was mandated by
statute and regulation. See United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 392–93
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Administrative actions taken in violation of statutory
authorization or requirement are of no effect.”); cf. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S.
926, 937 (1986) (noting that “not all agency publications are of binding force”
and that “an agency’s power is no greater than that delegated to it by
Congress”). In short, the Policy Memorandum could not override the LOS clause.
We thus reject Centech’s argument that the presence of the Policy Memorandum
(prior to its retraction) meant that Centech submitted a proposal which
reflected agreement to comply with the LOS clause.
We take due notice of the procurement regulation at 48
C.F.R. § 19.601(d) and the SBA regulation at 13 C.F.R. § 125.6(f). The former
provides that “[w]hen a solicitation requires a small business to adhere to the
limitations on subcontracting, a contracting officer’s finding that a small
business cannot comply with the limitation shall be treated as an element of
responsibility and shall be subject to the COC process.” 48 C.F.R. § 19.601(d).
The latter provides that “[c]ompliance [with the LOS clause is] considered an
element of responsibility and not a component of size eligibility.” 13 C.F.R. §
125.6(f). Centech cites these regulations in making its argument that GAO and
the Air Force should have deferred to the SBA’s determination that Centech would
comply with the LOS clause. These two regulations do not change the result in
this case, however. The reason is that, as GAO stated in its decision, the issue
was not whether Centech could comply with the requirements of the LOS clause—the
matter to which § 19.601(d) is directed. See 19 C.F.R. § 19.601(d) (referring to
“a contracting officer’s finding that a small business cannot comply with the
[subcontracting] limitation” (emphasis added)). Rather, the issue was whether,
in its proposal, Centech agreed that it would comply with the requirements of
the LOS clause.5 The record fully supports GAO’s determination that, in its
proposal, Centech did not agree to comply with the clause. The Air Force acted
rationally in following GAO’s recommendation based upon that determination.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Federal Claims denying Centech’s request for declaratory and injunctive
relief. (The Centech Group, Inc., v. U. S. and
Tybrin Corporation, No. 08-5031, February 3, 2009.) (pdf)
Also see The Centech
Group, Inc., v. U. S. and Tybrin, Inc., 07-513C, Filed
December 7, 2007, Refiled December 13, 2007 (pdf) and
TYBRIN Corporation,
B-298364.6; B-298364.7, March 13, 2007 (pdf)
|
|
|
U.
S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - Listing of
Decisions
|
| For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
|
The Centech Group, Inc., v. U. S. and
Tybrin Corporation, No. 08-5031, February 3, 2009.
Also see The Centech
Group, Inc., v. U. S. and Tybrin, Inc., 07-513C, Filed
December 7, 2007, Refiled December 13, 2007 (pdf) and
TYBRIN Corporation,
B-298364.6; B-298364.7, March 13, 2007 (pdf) |
|
|
|