East West contends that NIH officials committed a procurement integrity violation by sharing "procurement-related" information with Integrity regarding the contract award prior to making an official award.

The Procurement Integrity Act, 41 U.S.C. sect. 423(a) (2006), prohibits any present or former official of the United States, with respect to a federal agency procurement, from "knowingly" disclosing contractor bid or proposal information or source selection information before the award of a federal agency procurement contract to which the information relates. The statute defines source selection information to include bid and proposal prices, source selection and technical evaluation plans, technical and cost/price evaluations of proposals, competitive range determinations, rankings of bids/proposals, and reports/evaluations of source selection panels, boards, or advisory councils. 41 U.S.C. sect. 423(f)(2).

While, as the agency has acknowledged in notifying our Office that it intended to take corrective action in response to East West's supplemental protest, there were defects in the award process here, the record fails to demonstrate that a prejudicial procurement integrity violation occurred. There is no evidence that any agency official disclosed East West proposal information to Integrity. Further, the only item arguably fitting within the definition of source selection information that was disclosed was that Integrity's proposal had been selected for award, and the protester has not shown that it suffered any prejudice--prejudice being an essential element of every viable protest--as a result of Integrity's having received notification of its selection several weeks prior to other offerors being notified. See Landsing Pacific Fund, B-237495, Feb. 22, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 200 at 5; Theodor Arndt GmbH & Co., B-237180, Jan. 17, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 64 at 6.

The protester further argues that agency officials treated the offerors disparately and demonstrated bias in favor of Integrity by (1) communicating with Integrity, but not the protester, regarding the content of its proposal prior to award, and (2) communicating to Integrity that it was in line for award, while failing to disclose this information to East West. In response to the first allegation, the agency notes that the communications in question took place after Integrity had been selected for award; the agency also argues that the exchanges did not constitute improper discussions because Integrity was not given the opportunity to revise its proposal in response to them. Moreover, even if the exchanges that took place at the May 5 meeting pertaining to Integrity's proposed staffing plan could arguably be viewed as a reopening of discussions, there is no evidence that the protester was prejudiced by the agency's failure to also reopen discussions with it--and, in any event, the corrective action proposed by the agency renders the matter academic. With regard to the protester's allegation that agency officials demonstrated bias in favor of Integrity by notifying it that it was in line for award while representing to East West that they did not know why Integrity representatives were behaving as if they had been notified of award, even to the extent that the agency's representations were misleading, we fail to see that they in any way establish bias on the part of agency officials in the source selection process.

Finally, East West argues that the agency's procurement integrity investigation was inadequate because the contracting officer who conducted it was aware of (despite not being present at) the meeting between NIH officials and Integrity representatives on November 5 and thus was arguably implicated in the alleged wrongdoing. The protester has not demonstrated--and we fail to see--how mere awareness of the meeting demonstrates wrongdoing on the part of the contracting officer.  (East West, Inc., B-400325.7; B-400325.8, August 6, 2010)  (pdf)

DME states that, during the procurement, Aeroflex hired a (now-former) DME employee who had access to DME's proprietary pricing data. DME asserts that, because Aeroflex lowered its proposed price between submission of initial and final revised proposals, the former DME employee must have provided DME's pricing information to Aeroflex. Accordingly, DME maintains that Aeroflex violated the statutory procurement integrity provisions, 41 U.S.C. sect. 423 (2000), which prohibit an offeror's unauthorized acquisition of a competitor's proprietary information. Based on this allegation, DME asserts that award to Aeroflex was improper.

Both our Bid Protest Regulations and the statutory procurement integrity provisions require--as a condition precedent to our consideration of an alleged procurement integrity violation--that a protester have reported the matter to the contracting agency within 14 days of becoming aware of the possible violation. This 14‑day reporting requirement affords procuring agencies an opportunity to timely investigate alleged improprieties before completing a procurement and, in appropriate circumstances, to take remedial action. See 41 U.S.C. sect. 423(e)(3); Honeywell Tech. Solutions, Inc., B-400771, B-400771.2, Jan. 27, 2009, 2009 CPD para. 49 at 9.

Here, DME failed to comply with the statutory and regulatory reporting requirements that constitute a condition precedent to our jurisdiction. Specifically, the record contains a letter from counsel for DME to Aeroflex, dated June 9, 2009, expressly accusing the former DME employee of disclosing DME's proprietary information (including pricing) to Aeroflex, stating:

[The former DME employee] owed DME a duty not to appropriate DME's confidential information. We are concerned, therefore, that while at DME, [the former DME employee] had full access to DME's work on the U.S. Marine Corps System Command for the Ground Radio Maintenance Automatic Test System, or "GRAMATS," a project in which we understand Aeroflex is interested. . . .

[The former DME employee], of course recently left DME's employment and joined Aeroflex. DME has discovered that while employed with DME [the former DME employee] was in communication with Aeroflex about aspects of his forthcoming employment with Aeroflex and, then or later, shared with Aeroflex information about DME's customers, products and pricing. [Emphasis added.]

AR, Tab 21, Letter from Counsel for DME to Aeroflex, June 9, 2009, at 1-2.

Notwithstanding DME's specific assertion in June 2009 that the former DME employee had "shared with Aeroflex information about DME's customers, products and pricing," DME failed to report this matter to the agency until September. That is, DME delayed complying with the reporting requirement until after it learned it had not been selected for award, and more than 3 months after, by its own admission, it "discovered" information leading DME to conclude that its former employee had provided DME's pricing information to Aeroflex.

On this record, DME clearly failed to comply with the 14-day reporting requirement regarding the alleged procurement integrity violation. Accordingly, we will not consider DME's allegations in this regard.  (DME Corporation, B-401924; B-401924.2, December 22, 2009) (pdf)

For the purpose of evaluating the cost and price information contained in Health Net's initial proposal, TMA "TRICARE Management Activity" sought the assistance of the Defense Contract Audit Administration (DCAA). DCAA provided TMA with a report dated September 24, 2008, in which it questioned [DELETED] as it related to Health Net's proposed [DELETED]. Agency Report (AR), Tab 12, Price/Cost Team Report, at 12.

The record reflects that on October 8, 2008, before final proposals were due, DCAA provided a summary of these audit findings to the DOD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for inclusion in a statutorily required report to Congress, referred to as the DOD OIG's Section 845 Annex of Audit Reports with Significant Findings, issued as an attachment to the DOD OIG's Semiannual Report to Congress for the period from April 1 to September 30, 2008.¹ 

(Section deleted)

On December 15, 2008, the DOD OIG SemiAnnual Report to Congress, which included the 845 Annex, as well as a separate classified Annex on Intelligence-Related Oversight, was delivered to various Congressional offices.[5] Two days later, on December 17, the DOD OIG posted the Semiannual Report on its Internet website. Importantly, the record demonstrates, and is undisputed in this regard, that when the Semiannual Report was initially posted, it did not include the 845 Annex; rather, the 845 Annex was later posted on January 6, 2009, the day after final proposals under the RFP here were due. See Declaration of Deputy to the Assistant Inspector General for Communications and Congressional Liaison, DOD OIG, July 31, 2009, and Declaration of DOD OIG Web Team Chief, July 31, 2009.

On June 19, 2009, one day after it allegedly discovered that the 845 Annex, which contained pricing information regarding its initial proposal, had been posted on the DOD OIG website, Health Net sent the contracting officer a letter, reporting the disclosure as a potential violation of 41 U.S.C. sect. 423(a)(1). The 845 Annex was removed from the DOD OIG website that same day.

Thereafter, the contracting officer conducted an investigation of the matter and concluded that any possible violation of the statutory procurement integrity provisions had no impact on the competition. He based his determination in this regard on the fact that the public release of the proposal information on the DOD OIG website occurred on January 6, one day after final proposals were due, thus there was no possibility that competing offerors could have utilized this information for the purposes of the competition. In addition, he noted that to the extent the information had been provided to Congress, it was submitted shortly before final proposals were due; the competing offeror, AGHP, certified that it had no knowledge of Health Net's proposal information; an analysis of AGHP's final proposal revision did not show any evidence that it had made pricing changes based on the information provided to Congress; and [DELETED]. See Contracting Officer's (CO) Memorandum for the Record, June 26, 2009. Upon learning of the contracting officer's decision in this regard, Health Net filed this protest.Discussion

Health Net argues that the integrity of the procurement process has been compromised 1) as a consequence of DOD's violation of the statutory procurement integrity provisions by disclosing, prior to award, Health Net's proprietary pricing and proposal information on a publicly accessible website and 2) because DOD submitted Health Net's proprietary proposal information to Congress, prior to the time final proposals were due, without identifying the information as competitively sensitive and relevant to an ongoing government procurement. In connection with the latter point, Health Net argues that the contracting officer failed to conduct a reasonable investigation regarding potential subsequent disclosures of Health Net's proprietary information.

We recognize that serious errors occurred in connection with DOD's handling of Health Net's price/cost information during the pendency of an active procurement. Simply put, Health Net's pricing information, as contained in the 845 Annex, should not have been posted to a public website prior to contract award, nor should it have been submitted to Congress without any indication that it contained contractor bid or proposal information related to the conduct of a Federal agency procurement and an indication that further disclosure of the information was restricted by the procurement integrity laws. Notwithstanding these errors, however, we find that the contracting officer reasonably concluded that the competition was not compromised.

The disclosure of source selection information, including an offeror's price, during the course of a procurement is improper and the agency may take remedial steps, including canceling the procurement, if it reasonably determines that the disclosure harmed the integrity of the procurement process. Information Ventures, Inc., B-241441.4, B-241441.6, Dec. 27, 1991, 91-2 CPD para. 583 at 4-5. Where an agency decides that no remedial steps are necessary, we will sustain a protest based on the improper disclosure only where the protester demonstrates that it was in some way competitively prejudiced by the disclosure. Kemron Envtl. Servs., Inc., B-299880, Sept. 7, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 176 at 2. Here, the record reflects that Health Net was not competitively prejudiced by DOD's mishandling of its pricing information.

As noted above, the record reflects that the 845 Annex was not posted on the DOD OIG website until 1 day after final proposals were due. Thus, even assuming that AGHP accessed the website and learned the information contained in the Annex, it could not possibly have used it to its advantage in the competition. Health Net suggests that AGHP could have learned the information as a consequence of the disclosure to Congress, which occurred before final proposals were due, and argues that the contracting officer has yet to adequately investigate this possibility. Setting aside the fact that such a disclosure seems improbable given the short period of time from when the information was delivered to Congress and final proposals were due (approximately 3 weeks), and the fact that a period of that time included the Christmas and New Years holidays, the contracting officer reasonably determined that there was no evidence that AGHP's pricing changes were the result of its having known of the information set forth in the 845 Annex. In this regard, the contracting officer obtained an analysis regarding AGHP's pricing revisions in its final proposal which indicated that AGHP explained all of its pricing changes, that the changes were the direct result of discussions or otherwise resulted in price increases, and [DELETED]. See CO's Memorandum for the Record, June 26, 2009.

Moreover, even if we assume that AGHP did in fact learn Health Net's pricing information, as reflected in the section 845 Annex, before final proposals were due--an assertion that AGHP vehemently denies--Health Net has failed to explain how AGHP could have used the information to its advantage given the fact that [DELETED]. While such knowledge might have [DELETED]. In fact, armed with such knowledge, one might reasonably expect AGHP [DELETED], which at most would appear to disadvantage only the government, not Health Net.

In sum, based on the record here, we find that there is no basis for concluding that Health Net was competitively prejudiced as a consequence of DOD's improper handling of its pricing information.  (Health Net Federal Services, LLC, B-401652, October 13, 2009) (pdf)

----------------------------------------------

¹  Section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-81, requires DCAA to provide to the DOD OIG “an annex on final, completed contract audit reports . . . containing significant audit findings” for inclusion in the DOD OIG’s semi-annual report submitted to Congress pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978. As relevant to the protest, it provides that there is no requirement to release information to the public that is exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. sect. 552(b).

Our Office has recognized that, in meeting their responsibility to safeguard the interests of the government in its contractual relationships, contracting officers are granted wide latitude to exercise business judgment, FAR sect. 1.602-2, and may impose a variety of restrictions, not explicitly provided for in the regulations, where the needs of the agency or the nature of the procurement dictates the use of those restrictions. Compliance Corp., B‑239252, Aug. 15, 1990, 90-2 CPD para. 126 at 5, aff'd, B-239252.3, Nov. 28, 1990, 90-2 CPD para. 435 at 4. For example, a contracting officer may protect the integrity of the procurement system by disqualifying an offeror from the competition where the firm may have obtained an unfair competitive advantage, even if no actual impropriety can be shown, so long as the determination is based on facts and not mere innuendo or suspicion. NKF Eng'g, Inc., B‑220007, Dec. 9, 1985, 85-2 CPD para. 638 at 5; NKF Eng'g, Inc. v. United States, 805 F.2d 372, 376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Compliance Corp., supra; Compliance Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 193, 199-204 (1990), aff'd, 960 F.2d 157 (Fed. Cir. 1992). It is our view that, wherever an offeror has improperly obtained proprietary proposal information during the course of a procurement, the integrity of the procurement is at risk, and an agency's decision to disqualify the firm is generally reasonable, absent unusual circumstances. See Compliance Corp., supra (disqualification of offeror reasonable where based on its improperly obtaining or attempting to obtain competitor's proprietary information); NKF Eng'g, Inc., supra, at 6 (disqualification not unreasonable where there was "mere possibility" that offeror did not obtain an advantage from source selection information).

Here, there is no question that the cost/price evaluation summary that was attached to the contacting officer's 6:35 p.m., September 23 e‑mail included information that was source selection sensitive, and information that was proprietary to KBR and its competitors that was relevant to the LOGCAP IV task order competitions. Nor, based on the statement and affidavit of KBR's LOGCAP IV program manager, is there any question that the program manager, at a minimum, knowingly obtained that source selection sensitive and proprietary information by accessing the 6:35 p.m., September 23 e‑mail and attachment; that he did so even though he had been previously advised by the agency that the e‑mail and its attachment should be deleted without being viewed; and that he did so after he had in fact advised the agency that he had complied with the direction to delete the e‑mail and its attachment. Accordingly, in our view, the agency's actions were based on facts, rather than mere innuendo, as is asserted by the protester.

We also reject KBR's assertion that the question of whether KBR's program manager improperly gained access to the sensitive information at issue here can be resolved by reliance on the KBR LOGCAP IV program manager's statement that he merely viewed the first page of the cost/price evaluation summary before closing the document, and the he does not remember or retain any source selection sensitive or proprietary information that would be competitively useful to KBR. Since the KBR program manager is the individual whose actions are in question, and KBR is the firm that has been disqualified from the competition, the program manager's self-serving statement that he did not "read" the cost/price evaluation summary, and KBR's self-serving assertion that the program manager does not have anything more than a "cursory knowledge about the message or its contents," cannot, in our view, be accorded controlling weight without some corroborating evidence, in our consideration of whether the agency's disqualification of KBR from the LOGCAP IV task order competitions in question was reasonable. See Computer Tech. Assocs., Inc., B‑288622, Nov. 7, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 187 at 6; see also AR, Tab 7, KBR LOGCAP IV Program Manager's Statement; KBR LOGCAP IV Contracts Manager's Letter to Contracting Officer (Oct. 6, 2008).

In sum, we find reasonable the agency's determination here that KBR's LOGCAP IV program manager knowingly and improperly obtained access to source selection sensitive and proprietary information, and thus, under the circumstance here, determined that action needed to be taken to protect the integrity of the procurement system. As such, we next turn to KBR's specific assertion that the disqualification of KBR from the Udairi Airfield and TMDE LOGCAP IV task order competitions was unreasonable.

As set forth above, the record reflects that the agency first considered whether any action should be taken with regard to the task order solicitation and competition for which the cost/price evaluation summary was prepared. We note that the agency determined that because proposals had been submitted prior to the cost/price evaluation summary being disclosed to KBR's program manager, and offerors, including KBR, were not provided with an opportunity to revise their proposals, the potential impact on the integrity of that procurement did not merit the disqualification of KBR or the taking of any other action specific to that procurement. Turning to the competitions at issue here, the agency found that since the competitions were open, that is, the Udairi Airfield and TMDE solicitations were issued on September 24 and 30, respectively, with each having the closing date of October 22, the actions of KBR's program manager, which led the agency to conclude that the cost/price evaluation summary either may have been compromised or at least created the appearance that the cost/price evaluation summary was compromised, necessitated that the program manager be isolated from these competitions. Under the circumstances here, we cannot find unreasonable the contracting officer's request that, in order to preserve the integrity of the procurement system, the KBR program manager be isolated from these competitions. Nor can we find the agency's subsequent determination that KBR be disqualified from these competitions to be unreasonable, in light of KBR's refusal to isolate its program manager from these competitions when requested to do so by the agency. That is, although KBR complains that the agency's disqualification of KBR from these competitions was unduly severe, the record reflects that this action was taken by the agency only after KBR refused the agency's request to isolate the program manager. Given the circumstances, which include KBR's initial refusal to isolate its LOGCAP IV program manager from these open LOGCAP IV task order solicitations, we find the agency's elimination of KBR's proposals from these task order competitions to be reasonable and within the discretion granted to the contracting officer.  (Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., B-400787.2; B-400861, February 23, 2009) (pdf)

On March 6, 2007, the agency sent each offeror in the competitive range an e-mail containing discussion items to address. On March 7, WRS advised the agency by telephone that it had received Kemron’s discussion letter. WRS explained that the company treasurer received the e-mail and started scanning it, but noticed that the letter referred to companies that were not named in its proposal. Agency Report (AR) at 2. At that point, the treasurer looked at the top of the letter and found that it was addressed to Kemron. After telephoning the company president for instructions on how to proceed, he sent the e‑mail back to the agency and destroyed all copies. The treasurer advised EPA that he did not recall any specific information from the letter. Subsequently, on March 19, the agency received revised proposals and, on April 5, final proposal revisions (FPR). After evaluating the FPRs, the agency selected the three lowest-priced proposals for award, including WRS’s, which was the second lowest priced proposal. Kemron’s proposal was fourth-low, and the firm complains that it was harmed by the disclosure of its pricing. 

The disclosure of proprietary or source selection information, including an offeror’s price, to an unauthorized person during the course of a procurement is improper. Information Ventures, Inc., B-241441.4, B-241441.6, Dec. 27, 1991, 91-2 CPD para. 583 at 4; Motorola, Inc., B-247937.2, Sept. 9 1992, 92-2 CPD para. 334 at 9. Where an agency inadvertently discloses an offeror’s proprietary information, the agency may choose to cancel the procurement if it reasonably determines that the disclosure harmed the integrity of the procurement process. Information Ventures, Inc., supra, at 4-5; Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., B-247053.5, June 11, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 509 at 4-5. Where an agency chooses not to cancel the procurement after such a disclosure, we will sustain a protest based on the improper disclosure only where the protester demonstrates that the recipient of the information received an unfair advantage, or that it was otherwise competitively prejudiced by the disclosure. Motorola, Inc., supra, at 9; Gentex Corp.--Western Operations, B-291793 et al., Mar. 25, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 66 at 8-9. Here, the record shows that Kemron was not competitively prejudiced by the disclosure. EPA reviewed WRS’s revised proposal and FPR prior to making its award decisions, found that WRS did not use Kemron’s price information, and concluded that cancellation of the RFP thus was not warranted. In this regard, the agency explains that the Kemron discussion letter WRS received included Kemron’s rates for only 1 of 15 labor categories (equipment operator), and for only 7 of 73 pieces of equipment. AR at 4. With respect to the labor category, in its revised proposal WRS reduced all of its labor rates based on instructions EPA had provided in WRS’s own discussion e-mail. AR at 4. Specifically, in its initial proposal WRS included the cost of personal protective equipment in its loaded hourly labor rate before applying profit (calculated as a percentage of the loaded hourly rate). During discussions, the agency informed WRS that the cost of personal protective equipment should be added after applying profit to the hourly rate; WRS changed its labor rates in its revised proposal accordingly. AR at 4. WRS did not then change any labor rates in its FPR. Regarding equipment, WRS’s revised proposal increased the daily rates for two of the seven items for which Kemron’s prices were revealed--a pickup truck and an excavator. WRS explained that it was raising the daily rate for the truck (its rate already had been higher than Kemron’s) from [DELETED] to [DELETED], to correct a miscalculation, and for the excavator from [DELETED] to [DELETED], because its initial price incorrectly had been based on owning the excavator, rather than leasing it from Hertz, as was intended. AR at 4-5. In its FPR, WRS lowered the rates for four pieces of equipment and raised the rate for four. These changes included only one rate--for the excavator--that had been revealed to WRS; WRS raised the excavator rate to [DELETED] because Hertz raised the rental rate. AR at 6. The agency concluded that, given the nature of the changes in WRS’s proposal, there was no basis for finding that Kemron was prejudiced by the disclosure.


Kemron argues that it suffered competitive harm from--and, more generally, that the integrity of the procurement system was harmed by--the disclosure because, despite EPA’s explanation, the information disclosed was sufficient to allow WRS to “reverse engineer” Kemron’s prices, and then adjust its price so that it would be as high as possible without exceeding Kemron’s price. Kemron notes, in this regard, that the price difference between the two proposals decreased from four percent in the initial offers to only one percent in the FPRs. Kemron’s arguments do not persuade us that WRS gained a competitive advantage, that it was otherwise competitively prejudiced, or that the integrity of the procurement system suffered harm as a result of the disclosure of Kemron’s prices. First, Kemron’s total price was not disclosed, and Kemron has not explained, and we fail to see, how WRS would be able to derive Kemron’s total price from only 1 of Kemron’s 15 labor rates, and only 7 of its 73 equipment rates. Kemron’s mere assertion in this regard, without any supporting explanation or evidence, is not sufficient to establish that WRS was able, even theoretically, to ascertain Kemron’s total price from the disclosed information. Moreover, even if we assume that WRS was able to determine Kemron’s initial total price, there is no evidence supporting Kemron’s claim that WRS was then somehow able to target its FPR price to a level just below Kemron’s. In this regard, in order for WRS to accomplish this result, WRS would have had to know how Kemron would revise its price following discussions. Since WRS was not provided any revised proposal or FPR price information, we fail to see, and the protester has not shown, how WRS could have targeted its price in this manner. Further, we note that Kemron’s argument is premised on the idea that WRS knew it would be assured of an award if it targeted its FPR price to a level just below Kemron’s. In fact, there is no reasonable basis for assuming that WRS proceeded in this manner, since it did not know the number, identities, or prices of other offerors in the competition; WRS presumably would have been aware that keying its price to Kemron’s could have left it in an unfavorable competitive position vis‑a‑vis any other offerors. In addition, while the difference in Kemron’s and WRS’s prices was reduced from four to one percent between the initial proposals and FPRs, this difference was not simply the result of WRS’s increased price; rather, it was the result of a combination of WRS’s raising its price and Kemron’s lowering its own. Finally, regarding the alleged harm to the procurement system, it is undisputed that the disclosure of Kemron’s information was inadvertent, and that the agency and WRS proceeded appropriately once the disclosure was discovered. Since, as discussed above, we find that Kemron was not competitively harmed by the disclosure, there is no basis for finding the agency’s actions objectionable based on harm to the procurement system. We conclude here that there is no basis for finding that Kemron was competitively prejudiced by the agency’s inadvertent, limited disclosure of the firm’s pricing information.  (Kemron Environmental Services, Inc., B-299880, September 7, 2007)  (pdf)

We have recognized the right of a firm to protect its proprietary data from improper exposure in a solicitation in the context of a bid protest.  The Source, B-266362, Feb. 7, 1996, 96-1 CPD ¶ 48 at 2; Ingersoll-Rand Co., B-236391, Dec. 5, 1989, 89-2 CPD ¶ 517 at 2.  Where a protester alleges that proprietary information was improperly disclosed, the record must establish that the protester was competitively prejudiced by the release before we will sustain a protest.  Rothe Dev., Inc., B-279839, July 27, 1998, 98-2 CPD ¶ 31 at 2-3; Ursery Cos., Inc., B-258247, Dec. 29, 1994, 94-2 CPD ¶ 264 at 2.  The possibility of competitive prejudice may not be established on the basis of speculation.  Rothe Dev., Inc., supra, at 3; JL Assocs., Inc., B-239790, Oct. 1, 1990, 90-2 CPD ¶ 261 at 4-5. 
 
In the case at hand, even if we assume that production rates are proprietary information, we fail to see how Janico was competitively disadvantaged here.  First, the information in the RFP was not correct.  Second, it did not purport to cover all line items.  Third, DLA took action, both orally and in writing, to neutralize any competitive advantage by advising prospective offerors to disregard the information as being incorrect.  As a result, the effect of the release here on Janico's competitive position is speculative at best and, therefore, provides no basis for sustaining the protest.  Rothe Dev., Inc., supra, at 4; Ursery Cos., Inc., supra, at 3. (Janico Building Services, B-290683, July 1, 2002)

It is our view that, wherever an offeror has improperly obtained proprietary proposal information during the course of a procurement, the integrity of the procurement is at risk, and an agency's decision to disqualify the firm is generally reasonable, absent unusual circumstances. See Compliance Corp., supra (disqualification of offeror reasonable where based on its improperly obtaining or attempting to obtain competitor's proprietary information); NKF Eng'g, Inc., supra, at 6 (disqualification not unreasonable where there was "mere possibility" that offeror did not obtain an advantage from source selection information). This is certainly the case under the facts here, and we find the agency's action reasonable even without reference to the Act.  (Computer Technology Associates, Inc., B-288622, November 7, 2001)