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FAR
19.1405: Service-disabled veteran-owned small business
set-aside procedures |
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Comptroller
General - Key Excerpts |
DAV Prime, Inc., a service-disabled
veteran-owned small business concern (SDVOSBC) protests
the terms of solicitation No. AG-024B-S-07-0005, issued by
the Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, for
portable latrines. DAV argues that this work should have
been reserved for SDVOSB companies. It contends a
set-aside is required because the agency has violated the
Small Business Act, as amended by sect. 36 of the Veterans
Benefits Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-183, 117 Stat. 2651,
2662 (2003), 15 U.S.C. sect. 657f (Supp. IV 2004), by
failing to meet its stated goal of awarding 3 percent of
its annual contracts to SDVOSBCs, and by failing to
conduct a market survey to determine whether an SDVOSBC
set-aside is appropriate. Protest at 2; Response to Motion
to Dismiss at 1. We dismiss the protest because it
does not establish a valid basis for challenging the
agency’s action.
Section 36 of the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 provides:
In accordance with this section, a
contracting officer may award contracts on the basis of
competition restricted to [SDVOSBCs] if the contracting
officer has a reasonable expectation that not less than
2 [SDVOSBCs] will submit offers and that the award can
be made at a fair market price. 15 U.S.C. sect. 657f(b).
In our view, the language of the Act is
clearly discretionary. As such, it permits, but does not
require, a contracting officer to restrict competition to
SDVOSBCs if certain conditions are satisfied. (DAV
Prime, Inc., B-311420, May 1, 2008) (pdf)
As discussed in Singleton Enters. -- GMT
Mech., A Joint Venture, supra, at 4, Federal Acquisition
Regulation sect. 19.307(h) and 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.24(b)
provide for the SBA’s resolution of questions of SDVOSBC
status and for an agency procedure to protest a firm’s
SDVOSBC status to the SBA. Consistent with the SBA’s
regulations, 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.27(g) and 125.28 (2007),
the SBA’s February 20 determination that Singleton-GMT JV
is not an SDVOSBC expressly stated that the determination
was effective “immediately” and was “final” unless
overturned on appeal or unless relief was granted under 13
C.F.R. sect. 125.27(g) (e.g., a change in ownership to
satisfy the SDVOSBC definition), and that because of this
determination the joint venture was ineligible to bid on
or receive any SDVOSBC contract awards. VA Dismissal
Request, exh. 4, SBA’s SDVOSBC Determination. According to
the SBA, given that the OHA has affirmed the SBA’s
determination, before Singleton-GMT JV can bid on or
receive SDVOSBC contracts, the joint venture must request
that SBA grant it relief under 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.27(g),
and prove that it merits such relief by documenting the
actions it has taken to address those problems with its
eligibility that were identified by SBA. If the SBA agrees
that the firm qualifies as an SDVOSBC, then the agency
will grant relief under 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.25(g) and
issue a new determination letter to the firm stating that
it qualifies as an SDVOSBC and that it is eligible to bid
on and receive SDVOSBC contracts. To date Singleton-GMT JV
has not requested, and SBA has not granted, relief from
that decision under 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.27(g).
Singleton-GMT JV also contends that the OHA decision
affirming the SBA’s determination that the joint venture
is not an SDVOSBC was not yet final but, under 13 C.F.R.
sect. 227(a), was only the OHA’s initial decision and
could not be final for 30 days. Thus, the protester
contends, the VA cannot rely upon the SBA’s and OHA’s
determinations to reject Singleton-GMT JV’s bid. However,
as noted by the SBA, OHA’s rulings on appeal are effective
immediately, and are final, unless or until the judge
chooses to reconsider the ruling; in fact the OHA’s
decision states that “[t]his is the final decision of the
Small Business Administration.” VA Submission (Mar. 27,
2007), attach., SBA OHA Decision (Mar. 27, 2007) at 8.
Because the SBA’s February 20 determination that
Singleton-GMT JV was not an SDVOSBC has remained in force
and effect, the VA properly rejected Singleton-GMT JV’s
bid. (Singleton
Enterprises- GMT Mechanical, A Joint Venture,
B-311343, April 23, 2008) (pdf)
The
protester essentially objects to the sole-source award to
VPM primarily because VPM had been previously determined
by the SBA to be other than a small business concern. The
protester argues that the agency erred in contracting with
VPM on a sole-source basis without taking into
consideration the favorable performance it provided on the
incumbent contract. The protester also points to the VA’s
hiring of VPM’s former project manager to assist with the
performance transition from VPM to In and Out, and
maintains that this employee contributed to the
protester’s performance problems and influenced the
agency’s decision to contract with VPM on a sole-source
basis. The agency asserts that it was within its
authority to award the contract to VPM on a sole-source
basis. We agree. The VA’s statutory authority to make
sole-source awards to SDVOSBs is set forth at 38 U.S.C.
sect. 8127, Pub. L. No. 109-461, 120 Stat. 3431, 3432
(2006). This authority allows the VA to award to an SDVOSB
on a sole-source basis when:
(1) such concern is determined to be a responsible
source with respect to performance of such contract
opportunity;
(2) the anticipated award price of the contract
(including options) will exceed the simplified
acquisition threshold (as defined in section 4 of the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403)
but will not exceed $5,000,000; and
(3) in the estimation of the contracting officer, the
contract award can be made at a fair and reasonable
price that offers best value to the United States.
As explained above, VPM was re-certified as a small
business concern by the SBA on October 4, 2007. Agency
Report (AR) Tab 4, SBA Size Determination. In addition,
the agency reports that VPM is currently registered as an
SDVOSB. AR, Tab 8, Sole Source Justification, at 3. In
accordance with the statute, the CO determined that VPM
was a responsible source, that the anticipated award price
plus options was more than the simplified acquisition
threshold but less than $5,000,000, and that award would
be made at a fair and reasonable price. AR, Tab 1, CO’s
Statement at 2 and 3. Moreover, the agency disagrees with
In and Out’s favorable assessment of its past performance;
in fact, the CO’s decision to use this authority was also
based expressly on the fact that the agency was not
satisfied with the protester’s performance. Id.
Based on our review, we think the record shows that in
making her decision to award a sole-source contract to VPM,
the CO’s decision was in accord with the statute
authorizing the award of sole-source contracts to SDVOSBs.
Despite In and Out’s desire to compete for this
contract--given its similar status as an SDVOSB--we see no
requirement, under this statute and under these
circumstances, for even a limited competition. (In
and Out Valet Co., B-311141, April 3, 2008) (pdf)
Under the SDVOSBC procurement program, a
contracting officer may restrict competition to SDVOSBCs
if he or she has a reasonable expectation that not fewer
than two such firms will submit offers and that the award
can be made at a fair market price. 15 U.S.C. sect.
657f(b) (Supp. IV 2004); Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) sect. 19.1405(a), (b). Prior to proceeding with a
small business set-aside, a procuring agency is required
to make reasonable efforts to ascertain whether an SDVOSBC
set-aside is appropriate. MCS Portable Restroom Serv.,
B‑299291, Mar. 28, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 55 at 5. Although
the use of any particular method of assessing the
availability of firms for a set-aside is not required,
measures such as prior procurement history, market
surveys, and advice from the agency’s small business
specialist may all constitute adequate grounds for a
contracting officer’s decision to set aside, or not to set
aside, a procurement. National Linen Serv., B-285458, Aug.
22, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 138 at 2. Generally, our Office
regards such a determination as a matter of business
judgment that we will not disturb absent a clear showing
that it has been abused. Id.
IBV asserts that the contracting
officer did not make a reasonable effort to ascertain
whether an SDVOSBC set-aside was suitable. This argument
is without merit. While the record shows that at least two
SDVOSBC firms were available and interested in competing
on this requirement, this is only the first of two
considerations that go into a set-aside decision. In
addition, the contracting officer must have a reasonable
expectation that award will be made at a fair market
price. 15 U.S.C. sect. 657f(b); FAR sect. 19.1405(a), (b).
Here, as noted above, the contracting officer did not set
the requirement aside because she did not expect to
receive fair market prices from SDVOSBCs, and there is
nothing in the record to demonstrate that her expectations
were unreasonable. In this regard, while IBV disagrees
with her decision, it has not provided any evidence that
it and at least one other SDVOSBC would or could have
provided fair market prices. IBV’s mere disagreement with
the agency’s assessment does not demonstrate that the
agency’s judgment was unreasonable. Bahan Dennis Inc.,
B-249496.3, Mar. 3, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 184 at 5.
Moreover, even if we agreed with IBV that the set-aside
determination was not adequately supported at the time it
was made, we would not object to the determination under
the circumstances here. In this regard, while the agency
received multiple proposals from SDVOSBCs, the contracting
officer’s concern that they would not propose fair market
pricing was confirmed by the pricing of those proposals;
all of the SDVOSBC proposals received were priced at more
than double the independent government estimate, and all
exceeded the RFP’s estimated price range. Further, IBV’s
price was the highest of all proposals received, including
those of the other SDVOSBCs, and was more than double the
prices of the three lowest‑priced non-SDVOSBC small
business proposals. Agency Report at 30. Under these
circumstances, the agency’s set-aside decision was
reasonable. See The Atlantic Co. of Am., Inc., B‑293974,
July 1, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 182 at 2 (GAO will consider
proposals actually received in determining whether
set-aside decision was reasonable (HUBZone set-aside));
York Int’l Corp., B‑244748, Sept. 30, 1991, 91‑2 CPD para.
282 at 7 (small business set-aside); Litton Electron
Devices, B‑225012, Feb. 13, 1987, 87-1 CPD para. 164 at
2-3 (small business set-aside). We reach the same
conclusion with regard to IBV’s assertion that the agency
should have considered awarding it a contract on a
sole-source basis. While an agency may make a sole-source
award to an SDVOSBC, four conditions must be met: only one
SDVOSBC can satisfy the requirement; where, as here, the
requirement falls under a nonmanufacturing NAICS code, the
anticipated award price will not exceed $3 million; the
SDVOSBC has been determined responsible with respect to
performance; and award can be made at a fair and
reasonable price. FAR sect. 19.406. Three of the four
provisions are not met here. The record shows that there
are multiple SDVOSBCs available to compete; the
anticipated award exceeds the $3 million limit; and, as
discussed above, award could not be made to an SDVOSBC at
a fair market price. Accordingly, the contracting officer
reasonably did not consider IBV for a sole-source award.
(IBV,
Ltd., B-311244, February 21, 2008) (pdf) |
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Comptroller General
- Listing of Decisions |
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For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
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DAV Prime, Inc., B-311420, May 1,
2008 (pdf) |
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Singleton Enterprises-
GMT Mechanical, A Joint Venture, B-311343, April 23, 2008 (pdf) |
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In and Out Valet Co., B-311141,
April 3, 2008 (pdf) |
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IBV, Ltd., B-311244, February 21,
2008 (pdf) |
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U. S. Court of Federal Claims - Key Excerpts |
Overall, the amplified record
generated by the remand shows that GSA had a reasoned
basis in experience with other GWACS for its method of
structuring CPP2 in this solicitation.
GSA’s rationale for focusing on broad experience for CPP2 in the
VETS GWAC reflects its
general preference as a matter of policy that GWACs should
address broad requirements, in
contrast to IT 70 Multiple Award Schedules which can be more
specific and targeted to particular
services. Recognizing that this general policy preference runs
counter to OMB’s strategy for
avoiding contract bundling, which can operate to the detriment
of small businesses, including
SDVOSBs, GSA endeavored to ameliorate these potential harms by
encouraging the use by
SDVOSBs of business teams and joint ventures, even ventures with
large businesses. Remand
Determination at 13, 22. The decision by GSA in the face of
these competing policy
considerations belongs to the agency, not the court. “Th[e]
court is acutely aware that it may not
[substitute] its judgment for that of the agency.” OTI America,
Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl.
646, 657 (2005) (citing Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 557-58;
Keeton Corrs., 59 Fed. Cl. at 755)). GSA’s actions were
flawed in one particular respect because the agency structured
the
VETS GWAC solicitation without consulting meaningfully with the
agencies that would be
expected to be the prime users of the GWAC, contrary to GSA’s
representations to OMB in
GSA’s Business Plan. In context, that failing, however, was not
“significant error” on GSA’s
part, that by itself would render GSA’s actions in the VETS GWAC
arbitrary or capricious. See
J.C.N. Constr. Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 400, 412
(2004), aff’d, 122 Fed. Appx. 514 (Fed.
Cir. 2005). Ultimately, the court can not conclude that GSA’s
errors were sufficiently material to
be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law”
because it structured the CPP2 criteria rationally based upon
its prior experience. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A); see RISC Mgmt. Joint Venture v. United States, 69
Fed. Cl. 624, 638 (2006). (Knowledge
Connections, Inc., v. U. S. and Catapult Technology, Ltd.,
No. 06-786C, Reissued December 19, 2007) (pdf) (See
Knowledge Connections, Inc., v. U. S.
and Catapult Techology, Ltd., No. 06-786C, April 3, 2007
below)
1. KCI’s first
claim in support of its motion for judgment on the
administrative record is that
GSA artificially limited awards to 43 offerors. Pl.’s Mot. at
7.25 KCI emphasizes that GSA made
no representation in the Business Case presented to OMB that the
number of VETS GWAC
awards would be limited but that GSA ultimately restricted the
awardees to 43. Id. at 16-18. The
government responds that the number of awards or awardees was
not in fact artificially limited.
Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 37-38.
KCI’s argument in this respect is unavailing. KCI complains that
GSA’s Business Case
“made no mention of any specific limitation on the number of
awards” and that, as a result, GSA
obtained the “executive agent” designation “under false
pretenses.” Pl.’s Mot. at 15-17. After
reviewing the Business Case, however, OMB placed only two
restrictions on its grant of the
“executive agent” designation: (1) that “the most highly
qualified service-disabled veteran owned
small businesses” be chosen and (2) that offerors “not be
excluded . . . based on their lack of
experience as a government contractor.” AR 93 (Letter from
Bolten to Perry, Encl. B (July 5,
2005)). Making a finite number of awards did not violate either
OMB condition.
Neither was GSA’s decision to award 74 VETS GWAC contracts
inconsistent with the
solicitation, which explicitly stated that GSA anticipated
awarding 20 contracts in both
Functional Area 1 and Functional Area 2. AR 182-83, 263
(Solicitation §§ C.11.1-C.11.2, L.9).
In exceeding by 34 the number of total contracts projected in
the solicitation (i.e., 74 contracts,
rather than 40), GSA acted consistently with its representation
that there was “no predetermined
number of awards.” See Awardee List; AR 137 (Frequently Asked
Questions, Question 5). As
provided in the solicitation, GSA made a series of paired
comparisons to evaluate offers’
technical merit and price, cutting off the number awardees at a
“natural break” where “the
remaining proposals offer[ed] significantly decreased technical
capabilities” not warranting a
continuation of the trade-off process. AR 1014 (Solicitation §
M.6.), 2114 (Trade-off Analysis
Documentation, Functional Area 1), 2716 (Trade-off Analysis
Documentation, Functional Area
2). The record thus does not support KCI’s claim that GSA
artificially limited the number of
awards. Instead, the key questions in this case turn on the
criteria GSA used in deciding to make
the awards.
2. KCI also alleges that GSA contravened the
conditions on the authority OMB granted the
agency under its “executive agent” designation by excluding KCI
based on its lack of
government contract experience. Pl.’s Mot. at 7; see AR 93
(Letter from Bolten to Perry, Encl. B
(July 5, 2005)). The government denies KCI’s allegation, citing
the absence of such a restriction
in the solicitation and evidence in the administrative record of
offerors receiving credit for nongovernment
contract experience. Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 32-36.
KCI’s argument in this regard is also unavailing. Both parties
agree that KCI’s scores on
CPP2 – in Functional Areas 1 and 2 – were the primary factor
leading to its non-selection. Pl.’s
Mot. at 16; Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 36. Based on this fact, KCI
concludes that CPP2, under which
GSA evaluated the offeror’s depth of experience in each of the
identified work-scope elements of
a given Functional Area, AR 1009 (Solicitation § L.2.e.), was
“purely a measure of ‘experience
as a government contractor.’” Pl.’s Mot. at 16. This claim finds
no support in the administrative
record.
First, KCI’s proposal included its non-governmental (i.e.,
commercial) experience as a
contractor, and GSA credited that experience. See, e.g., AR 1090
(KCI Proposal) (noting
experience of KCI’s subcontractor in a contract for [***], 1095
(noting experience of KCI’s
subcontractor in a contract for [***], 1103-04 (noting
experience of KCI’s subcontractor on two
contracts for [***], 1169 (noting experience of KCI’s
subcontractor on a contract for [***], 1182
(same), 1211 (noting experience of KCI’s subcontractor on two
contracts for [***], 17177-78
(GSA’s providing credit for aforementioned commercial
contracting experiences), 17187-88
(same). Second, GSA similarly credited other offerors’
commercial contracting experiences.
See, e.g., AR 3466 (noting experience of offeror [***] on a
contract for [***], 3573 (GSA’s
providing credit for [***] work for [***], 3602 (noting
experience of subcontractor of [***] on a
contract for [***], 3715 (GSA’s providing credit for this work).
KCI’s non-selection was not based on its lack of government
contract experience, but
rather on its overall lack of breadth of experience as measured
under CPP2. KCI was not
precluded from citing its experience as a commercial contractor,
and KCI and other offerors in
fact received credit for such experience. Thus, GSA did not
eliminate KCI based on a lack of
government contract experience in contravention of OMB’s grant
of the “executive agent”
designation. AR 93 (Letter from Bolten to Perry, Encl. B (July
5, 2005)).
3. KCI also argues that the monetary
tiering arrangement of CPP2 violated the conditions on
OMB’s grant of the “executive agent” designation. Pl.’s Resp. to
Def.’s Supplemental Br. at 1-2.
KCI alleges that KCI and other offerors were excluded because of
a lack of “experience in Tiers
1 and 2,” the two lower-monetary-value tiers. Id. at 2.
CPP2’s monetary tiers as applied to each of the numerous
work-scope elements raise
questions about whether CPP2’s evaluation scheme was consistent
with Executive Order 13360
and OMB’s “executive agent” designation.26 Executive Order 13360
declared that agencies
“shall more effectively implement” certain statutory provisions
that set a government-wide goal
of three percent for the participation in federal procurement
contracts of service-disabled,
veteran-owned small businesses and permitted certain set-aside
and restricted-competition
procurements for such businesses. 69 Fed. Reg. at 62,549; 15
U.S.C. §§ 644(g)(1), 657f. In
seeking to implement the executive order, OMB’s grant to GSA of
the “executive agent”
designation provided that awardees be “the most highly qualified
service-disabled veteran owned
small businesses.” AR 93 (Letter from Bolten to Perry, Encl. B
(July 5, 2005)). As explained
supra at 7-8, the VETS GWAC solicitation required offerors’
proposals to explain under CPP2
the bidder’s depth of experience in each work-scope element for
a given Functional Area. AR
1009-11 (Solicitation § L.2.e.), 1246 (Executive Summary of VETS
GWAC Source Selection
(undated)). CPP2 limited offerors to providing three examples of
prior contract experience
within each of three monetary tiers: $25,000.00 - $100,000.00
(Tier I), $100,000.01 -
$250,000.00 (Tier II), and $250,000.01 - unlimited (Tier III).
AR 1009 (Solicitation § L.2.e.).
Functional Area 1 had 38 work-scope elements, and Functional
Area 2 had 26. AR 182-84
(Solicitation §§ C.11.1-C.11.2).CPP2’s tiering arrangement coupled with the numerous work-scope
elements operated as
a significant constraint on the solicitation. Offerors that
could have been “the most highly
qualified” in some of the work-scope elements, but not in most
or all of them, fared less well
then those with broad experience. See AR 1009-11 (Solicitation §
L.2.e.), 1246 (Executive
Summary of VETS GWAC Source Selection (undated)). The breadth of
experience CPP2
required suggests that GSA preferred offerors that were a mile
wide and an inch deep in terms of
experience, such that the awardees were simply “qualified” firms
across a broad spectrum of
information technology areas, rather than a pool of “the most
highly qualified” offerors in a
narrower class of work-scope elements, as seemingly contemplated
by OMB. In short, GSA
ostensibly emphasized breadth of experience at the expense of
“the most highly qualified”
criterion that OMB mandated. In addition, the breadth of
experience required by CPP2’s high
number of work-scope elements – and the likely resulting
reduction in the number of awardees –
seems inconsistent with the command of Executive Order 13360
that agencies attempt to meet
the government-wide goal of three percent for the participation
in federal contracts of servicedisabled,
veteran-owned small businesses. 69 Fed. Reg. at 62,549; 15 U.S.C.
§ 644(g)(1).
The limitation to three experiences per tier per work-scope
element also posed an
impediment to specialized offerors. For example, if an offeror
had previously performed ten
contracts under a given work-scope element and had received
$500,000 for each of these
contracts, CPP2 precluded the contractor from receiving credit
for seven of those experiences
because (1) all ten of the contractor’s experiences would fall
under Tier 3 and (2) CPP2 limited
to three the experiences for which the contractor would receive
credit. See AR 1009-11
(Solicitation § L.2.e.), 1246 (Executive Summary of VETS GWAC
Source Selection (undated)).
On the other hand, if a contractor had three experiences in each
monetary tier under a particular
work scope element, the contractor would receive credit for all
nine experiences. See id.
Certain sections of the solicitation stressed that the VETS
GWAC’s objective was to
provide government agencies with the ability to obtain a broad
range of information technology
services. See AR 152 (Solicitation § B.3) (“requirements may
range from simple to highly
complex”), 178 (Solicitation § C.2) (VETS GWAC intended “to
provide civilian agencies and
the Department of Defense (DoD) the ability to obtain a broad
range of [c]omprehensive IT
support services”), 179 (Solicitation § C.4) (“The anticipated
services require a diversity of skills
suitable to a multitude of information technology environments
in support of a variety of IT
support areas.”); see also AR 142 (Frequently Asked Questions,
Question 29) (rigorous
evaluation methodology necessary to ensure well-qualified
awardees who could perform “the
breadth of the work”).27 The government points to these sections
as justification for CPP2’s
criteria. Def.’s Supplemental Br. at 1-2. However, the
solicitation does not tie the objective of
selecting broadly qualified awardees to the overreaching goal of
the VETS GWAC and OMB’s
executive designation. The lack of such linkage in the
administrative record precludes this court
from determining whether CPP2’s focus on experience in multiple
monetary tiers for each of the
numerous work scope elements was consistent with Executive Order
13360 and OMB’s
“executive agent” designation.
In this case, the administrative record contains insufficient
evidence for the court to
determine whether the large number of work-scope elements and
the tiering arrangement GSA
used in CPP2 to focus on breadth of experience was inconsistent
with Executive Order 13360 or
OMB’s “executive agent” designation. As the administrative
record shows and as the
government concedes, GSA’s evaluation under CPP2 was critical to
its selection of awardees
because so many offerors had similar scores in CPP1 and CPP3. AR
1248 (Executive Summary
of VETS GWAC Source Selection (undated)), 2742-49 (Technical
Rankings, Functional Areas 1
and 2); Def.’s Reply at 12; Tr. 78:19-25 (Jan. 26, 2007).
This case accordingly is remanded to GSA to determine whether
the large number of
work-scope elements and the tiering arrangement specified in
CPP2 limited the number of
awardees in a way that was inconsistent with Executive Order
13360 or OMB’s “executive
agent” designation. In making this determination, GSA should
address (1) the requirement in
Executive Order 13360 that agencies “more effectively implement”
Sections 644(g)(1) and 657f
of Title 15, which set a government-wide goal of three percent
for the participation in federal
procurement contracts of service-disabled, veteran-owned small
businesses and permitted
agencies to establish certain set-aside and
restricted-competition procurements for suchbusinesses, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 62,549; 15 U.S.C. §§ 644(g)(1), 657f, and (2) the
condition that
OMB placed on its grant to GSA of the “executive agent”
designation for the VETS GWAC: that
GSA must select “the most highly qualified service-disabled
veteran owned small businesses.”
AR 93 (Letter from Bolten to Perry, Encl. B (July 5, 2005)).
GSA shall proceed expeditiously, making the determinations noted
supra within 120 days
of the entry of this Opinion and Order. See RCFC 52.2(a)(2)(B).
During the remand period,
proceedings in this case shall be stayed. See RCFC
52.2(a)(2)(C). “The results of the
proceedings on remand are subject to this court’s review.”
Diversified Maint. Sys., 74 Fed. Cl. at
128 (quoting Santiago v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 220, 230
n.17 (2006)). (Knowledge
Connections, Inc., v. U. S. and Catapult Techology, Ltd.,
No. 06-786C, April 3, 2007) (pdf) |
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U. S. Court of Federal Claims - Listing of Decisions |
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For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
|
Knowledge Connections, Inc., v. U. S. and Catapult Technology,
Ltd., No. 06-786C, Reissued December 19, 2007) (pdf).
Also, see
Knowledge Connections, Inc., v. U. S.
and Catapult Techology, Ltd., No. 06-786C, April 3, 2007, that
was remanded back to the awarding agency (pdf)
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