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FAR
15.404-1 (g): Unbalanced pricing |
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Comptroller
General - Key Excerpts |
Unbalanced
pricing exists where the prices of one or more line items are
significantly overstated, despite an acceptable total evaluated
price (typically achieved through underpricing of one or more
other line items). See Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
sect. 15.404‑1(g)(1); Legacy Mgmt. Solutions, LLC, B‑299981.2,
B-299981.4, Oct. 10, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 197 at 5; Triple H
Servs., B-298248, B-298248.2, Aug. 1, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 115
at 2.
Here, JND has produced no definitive evidence that CJW's prices
are significantly overstated. While higher than the IGE and
JND's prices, CJW's price for line item No. 3 is lower than that
of bidder Furby Construction Co., Inc. and its line item No. 9
price is lower than that of bidder Cutting Edge Concrete
Services, Inc. See Reece Contracting, Inc., B‑285666, Aug. 21,
2000, 2000 CPD para. 135 at 4 (prices not overstated where they
fall within range of government estimate and other bids).
Similarly, JND has not shown that CJW's $.01 prices for line
item Nos. 4 and 10 are understated. In this regard, the agency
accepted CJW's explanation that its lower prices were based on
its intent to cover its costs through sale of salvaged material.
Agency Report (AR) at 5. Below-cost prices on fixed-price
contracts are not prohibited, see Reece Contracting, Inc.,
supra, at 2 n.1, and whether a bidder can perform at its bid
price is a matter of bidder responsibility, which is not
reviewable by our Office absent circumstances not present here.
See Bid Protest Regulations 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.5(c) (2009);
Ventura Petroleum Servs., Inc., B‑281278, Jan. 21, 1999, 99-1
CPD para. 15 at 6.
In any case, even where a firm's pricing is found to be
unbalanced, an agency need not reject the bid if, after
conducting a risk analysis, it determines that award will not
result in the government's paying an unreasonably high price for
contract performance or otherwise present an unacceptable level
of risk to the government. See FAR sect.15.404-1(g)(2), (3).
The record shows that the agency conducted a risk assessment,
considering information from CJW, its prior experience with the
bidder, and the anticipated order of work. For example, in
response to the agency's inquiries, CJW confirmed its bid and
its intent to perform all work in accordance with the IFB's
specifications. Engineer's Memorandum para. 4. In connection
with its $.01 prices for line item Nos. 4 and 10, CJW explained
that it had a buyer for at least 177,000 CY of material (the
amount identified in the IFB as salvageable and a cost benefit
to bidders); that profit from the sale would cover its cost of
re-handling the material; and that, even if it failed to sell
all of the material, CJW expected that sale of a certain
percentage would produce profits sufficient to cover re-handling
of the remaining material. Id. As to other work, CJW had a
history of good performance on a number of projects with another
Corps district office, including a 2005 dredging job where CJW
demonstrated its knowledge of the sediment market by
successfully marketing all of the excavated sand. Id. para. 7.
While the IFB did not specify the order of work, the agency's
analysis showed that the contractor would have to excavate pond
Nos. 4-7 (line item No. 3) in order to provide the necessary
capacity to "store" the dredge material to be pumped from the
lake (line item No. 9), and thus would have to re‑handle
virtually all of the dry excavated material (line item No. 4)
prior to dredging. AR at 7. Further, payment for dredging (line
item No. 9) would not be made in a lump sum but, rather, would
be based on the percentage of dredging completed, and the agency
anticipated that a portion of the dredged material would have to
be re-handled (line item 10) prior to completion of the dredging
process. Engineer Declaration paras. 4, 6. At the time dredging
is complete, the agency estimates that various aspects of the
work--worth more than $1 million--will remain to be completed
and paid for, including final excavation of pond Nos. 4-7, final
levee construction, and riprap/crushed rock placement. Id. para.
7.
Based on its consideration of the above information, the agency
concluded that CJW's bid did not pose a significant risk of
non-performance or the payment of unreasonably high prices.
Contracting Officer's Statement paras. 17-18; AR at 8. In our
view, the agency's conclusion was reasonable, since CJW's plan
to offset the cost of re-handling excavated and dredged material
represented a plausible explanation for its low prices; its
conclusion was based on prior experience with CJW in which the
firm had successfully performed contracts involving the sale of
salvage material; and the expected order of work will
effectively prevent payment for all of the allegedly overstated
line items prior to performance of much of the understated items
and will include other contract line items providing incentive
to continue performance. (JND
Thomas Company, Inc., B-402240, January 28, 2010) (pdf)
Noting that Wind
River submitted significantly higher prices (than Cherokee’s) on
4 CLINs and significantly lower prices on 18, Cherokee asserts
that Wind River’s proposed CLIN pricing is unbalanced, Protest
at 3-8, and poses “a risk to Tinker Air Force Base which could
cost the government additional funds during the life of this
contract.” Protester’s Comments at 2. Cherokee concludes that
Wind River’s proposal should have been rejected.
Unbalanced pricing exists where, despite a proposal’s low
overall price, individual line item prices are either
understated or overstated. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
sect. 15.404-1(g); Semont Travel, Inc., B-291179, Nov. 20, 2002,
2002 CPD para. 200 at 3. While unbalanced pricing may increase
risk to the government, agencies are not required to reject an
offer solely because it is unbalanced. FAR sect. 15.404-1(g)(1).
Rather, where an unbalanced offer is received, the contracting
officer is required to consider the risks to the government
associated with the unbalanced pricing in making the award
decision, including the risk that the unbalancing will result in
unreasonably high prices for contract performance. FAR sect.
15.404-1(g)(2). In the context of an ID/IQ contract, as here, a
key consideration is the accuracy of the government’s quantity
estimates; if the estimates are reasonably accurate, then
evidence of mathematical unbalancing generally does not present
a risk that the government will pay unreasonably high prices for
contract performance. Accumark, Inc., B-310814, Feb. 13, 2008,
2008 CPD para. 68, at 4.
Cherokee does not challenge the accuracy of the agency’s
estimated quantities. Moreover, we find nothing in the record to
suggest that the agency was concerned about the accuracy of its
estimated quantities. Where a protester does not challenge the
estimated quantities used in the calculation of total item
prices, there is no basis in the record for us to find a risk
that the agency will pay unreasonably high prices for the items;
it follows that, in such cases, there is no basis for us to
object to mathematically unbalanced pricing. See Accumark, Inc.,
supra, at 4.
In any event, even if the estimates were in question, as noted
above, the agency conducted a risk assessment and determined
that the risk associated with Wind River’s pricing strategy was
acceptable. In this regard, the CO analyzed the risk in two
ways: by cost comparisons with recent delivery orders and by
total maximum cost. AR, Tab 1, Memorandum of Law, at 8.
Specifically, the CO compared each CLIN price with the
corresponding IGE price and then conducted an analysis of five
recent delivery orders under the current contract, which showed
that Wind River’s prices would result in a lower cost than the
IGE on four of the five. AR, Tab 12, Final Price Competition
Memorandum, at 15 (not released to the protester). The CO also
assessed the maximum possible liability to the Air Force by
comparing the maximum cost under each IGE price with the maximum
cost under each of Wind River’s CLIN prices. AR, Tab 1,
Memorandum of Law, at 8. Other than asserting generally that
Wind River’s pricing may pose a risk to the agency, Cherokee
does not challenge this risk assessment, and we find no basis
for questioning it. Thus, to the extent that Wind River’s
pricing may be viewed as unbalanced, the agency has satisfied
the FAR requirement by reasonably determining that the risks of
any unbalancing were not significant enough to render its offer
unacceptable. (Cherokee Painting LLC,
B-311020.3, January 14, 2009) (pdf)
PEMCO's prices were not unbalanced, since any overstatement of
its CLIN 0001 price was not significant. PEMCO's CLIN 0001 price
was only 23 percent higher than the government's estimate; this
is not an amount significant enough to require that the offer be
considered unbalanced. Cf. Baxter Healthcare Corp.; Abbott
Labs.--Recon. , B253455.3, B253455.4, May 10, 1994, 941 CPD 301
at 4, n.2 (base year price 44 percent above option year prices
did not constitute impermissible frontloading). In any case, the
agency fully discussed the CLIN 0001 pricing with PEMCO, and
ultimately determined that it was reasonable; this satisfied the
agency's obligation to ensure that the pricing did not pose an
unacceptable risk. See PharmChem, Inc. , B-291725.3 et al., July
22, 2003, 2003 CPD 148 at 8. (Diversified
Capital, Inc., B-293105.4; B-293105.8, November 12, 2004) (pdf)
There is no basis for concluding
that STL’s pricing is unbalanced. PharmChem does
not identify any specific prices that it believes are
significantly overstated and the
record does not indicate that any of STL’s prices are
overstated. In this latter regard,
for example, in the base year, STL’s line item prices exceed the
government estimate
under only 4 of 13 line items. Further, while STL’s proposal of
$0.00 for [deleted]
labor categories could be considered “understated,” such labor
rate proposals alone
do not establish that a bid is unbalanced. See SMC Info. Sys.,
B-224466, Oct. 31,
1986, 86-2 CPD ¶ 505 at 5. In any case, even if STL’s labor rate
pricing evidenced
unbalancing, it is clear that the agency considered the risk
involved; it specifically
inquired about STL’s $0.00 labor rate pricing, and had no
concern that these rates
would result in a higher contract price. Source Selection
Decision at 6-7. (PharmChem, Inc., B-291725.3;
B-291725.4; B-291725.5, July 22, 2003) (pdf)
While the agency here analyzed the unbalancing in terms of an "advance payment," that term
does not appear in the discussion of unbalanced pricing in the revised Part
15 of the FAR, which applies to solicitations issued after January 1, 1998,
such as the subject IFB. We believe, however, that the agency's analysis
remains valid when couched in terms of the risk that IBI's pricing poses to
the government. (Industrial
Builders, Inc., B-283749, December 29, 1999)
The Navy was satisfied, based on
Phillips's response and Phillips's extensive experience
performing housing maintenance contracts, that the rationale
behind Phillips's pricing was sound, and that Phillips was aware
of the risks involved in that strategy. The Navy also concluded
from Phillips's explanation that its pricing was fair and
reasonable. ARLS at 7. While Red River disagrees with the Navy's
conclusions, in our view, the Navy could reasonably conclude
that Phillips's pricing represented a legitimate business
judgement that did not pose an unacceptable risk to the
government, and that it would not pay an unreasonably high price
for performance. Accordingly, the Navy was not required to
reject Phillips's proposal. (Red
River Service Corporation, B-282634; B-282634.2, July 15,
1999) |
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Comptroller
General - Listing of Decisions |
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For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
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JND
Thomas Company, Inc.,
B-402240, January 28, 2010 (pdf) |
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Cherokee Painting LLC,
B-311020.3, January 14, 2009 (pdf) |
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Diversified Capital, Inc.,
B-293105.4; B-293105.8, November 12, 2004) (pdf) |
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PharmChem, Inc., B-291725.3;
B-291725.4; B-291725.5, July 22, 2003 (pdf) |
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Semont
Travel, Inc., B-291179, November 20, 2002 |
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Weber
Cafeteria Services, Inc., B-290085.2, June 17, 2002 |
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HSG
Philipp Holzmann Technischer Service GmbH, B-289607, March
22, 2002 (PDF
Version) |
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Duke
Engineering & Services, Inc., B-284605, May 17, 2000 |
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MG
Industries, B-283010.3, January 24, 2000 (pdf) |
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Industrial
Builders, Inc., B-283749, December 29, 1999 |
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Red
River Service Corporation, B-282634; B-282634.2, July 15,
1999 |
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J&D
Maintenance and Service, B-282249, June 18, 1999 |
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Joppa
Maintenance Company, Inc., B-281579; B-281579.2, March 2,
1999 |
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U.
S. Court of Federal Claims - Key Excerpts |
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The first query in this review is to determine if the bid was mathematically unbalanced;
i.e., a bid based upon prices that are significantly less than cost for some work and prices that are
significantly overstated in relation to cost for other work. Anderson Columbia Envtl., 43 Fed.
Cl.at 700. This does not close the matter, however, because an agency may award a contract based
upon a bid that is mathematically unbalanced if it does not lead to unacceptable risk to the
government. Anderson Consulting v. United States, 959 F.2d 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Gracon
Corp. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 497, 498 (1984).
The Federal Circuit has held that the determination of whether a bid is materially
unbalanced is “something that is best known by the agency, for it is dependant on projected
ordering patterns, and we therefore give broad discretion to contracting officers in deciding
whether material imbalance is present or not in a proposal.” SMS Data Prod. Group, Inc. v.
United States, 900 F.2d 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting SMS Data, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,567, at
108,615). (Southgulf, Inc. v.
U.S., No. 00-352C, June 20, 2001)
J&D next argues that Ashe's bid required advance payments on
indefinite quantity line items as a condition of acceptance. That is, that
Ashe would receive advance payments for indefinite quantity items before
such items were performed. Bids that truly require advance payments are
to be rejected. 48 C.F.R. 32.405(b); Riverport Indus., Inc., 64 Comp. Gen.
441 (1985), 85-1 CPD ¶ 364, aff'd B-18656.2 (1985), 85-2 CPD ¶ 108;
Barnard-Slurry Walls, 97-1 CPD ¶ 23 (Low bid properly rejected as
materially unbalanced where lump sum price for preparatory work line item
was many multiples higher than reasonable value of work, such that bid
was grossly front-loaded, and unit price for work was significantly less than
government estimate and other bid prices).
J&D reasons that Ashe structured its bid so it would receive advance
payments. The Court does not find J&D's logic persuasive given the
structure of Ashe's bid. Ashe will not be prepaid for any non-FFP work
because all of the FFP costs are properly associated with the fixed
quantities. BFPE International, B-248783, 92-2 CPD ¶ 206 (1992).
Indeed, one of the reasons the Navy preferred Ashe's bid was a benefit [it
provided], which "justifies the fixed price." AR 1466. The Navy accepted
Ashe's pricing rationale. J&D has not shown the Navy's determination in
this regard was inappropriate. (J&D Maintenance and Services, v. U.S. and S. D. Ashe Landscaping and Services,
Inc., No. 99-484C, December 28, 1999) |
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U.
S. Court of Federal Claims - Listing of Decisions |
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For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
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Southgulf, Inc. v.
U.S., No. 00-352C, June 20, 2001 |
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CCL Service Corporation, v. U.S. and Federal Data
Corporation, No. 00-361C, October 24, 2000 |
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J&D Maintenance and Services, v. U.S. and S. D. Ashe Landscaping and Services,
Inc., No. 99-484C, December 28, 1999 |
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