The protester asserts that even though the contracting officer was aware that Colson had in fact addressed the bonding and audit requirements in its business proposal and took this information into consideration in making her award decision, her decision was nevertheless flawed in that it was based on a defective technical evaluation. Thus, we understand the protester to be arguing that although the contracting officer was aware that two of the weaknesses identified by the technical evaluation team were not in fact weaknesses and did not consider them in making her source selection decision, her determination was nonetheless flawed because it also took into consideration the rating of green under the technical approach factor assigned by the technical evaluators, which rating the evaluators had arrived at taking the two weaknesses into consideration. We disagree with the protester’s reasoning. It is clear from the contracting officer’s source selection decision that she considered the underlying basis for the evaluators’ rating of green, i.e., the strengths and weaknesses in Colson’s technical approach, and not simply the color rating assigned by the evaluators, in making her tradeoff determination; accordingly, we see no reasonable basis for the argument that her trade-off determination was flawed.  (Colson Services Corporation, B-310971; B-310971.2; B-310971.3, March 21, 2008) (pdf)

The best value tradeoff memorandum then adopted essentially verbatim the language in the TET’s final evaluation report regarding Nortel’s staffing levels. The memorandum also characterized Nortel’s overall staffing levels as one of the areas in which Nortel’s proposal offered a significant technical advantage over AT&T’s proposal. Id., Tab 33, Final Technical Evaluation Report, at 20, 23. The memorandum did not address the TET’s finding that Nortel’s continued staffing of managers, trainers, field engineers, and other personnel associated with the TSRP system’s implementation beyond the deployment schedule was an ineffective and uneconomical use of resources.  AT&T argues that both the TET’s final technical evaluation report and the best value tradeoff memorandum are inconsistent with the evaluators’ findings regarding Nortel’s staffing levels. The protester argues that while the evaluators found that Nortel had proposed excessive staffing levels throughout the entire contract period--too many management and operations personnel in the implementation period and too many implementation personnel in the steady state period--the agency ignored these findings and instead, without explanation, characterized Nortel’s staffing levels as an unconditional strength. Protest, Sept. 20, 2007, at 27, 57-58.  The agency does not dispute the TET’s determination that Nortel’s final proposal contained “some overstaffing,” nor deny that the best value tradeoff memorandum considered Nortel’s higher staffing levels to be an unqualified strength. Rather, SSA argues that under the RFP’s best value evaluation scheme here, the agency set forth its preference for a low risk technical solution and thus, could properly conclude that a proposal that reduced risk by exceeding the staffing requirements, even when there is a price premium, will better satisfy the agency’s needs. AR, Oct. 1, 2007, at 13.

While source selection officials may reasonably disagree with the evaluation ratings and results of lower-level evaluators, Verify, Inc., B-244401.2, Jan. 24, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 107 at 6-8, they are nonetheless bound by the fundamental requirement that their independent judgments be reasonable, consistent with the stated evaluation factors, and adequately documented. AIU N. Am., Inc., B-283743.2, Feb. 16, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 39 at 8-9 (protest sustained because selection official did not document the basis for concluding that proposals were technically equal, after the evaluation panel concluded that one proposal was superior to the other).  As shown above, SSA’s best value tradeoff determination reached conclusions regarding Nortel’s staffing levels that were inconsistent with the underlying evaluation findings. Further, the best value tradeoff memorandum provides no explanation for its conclusion that Nortel’s higher staffing levels represented an unqualified strength of significant benefit to the agency, in contrast to the evaluators’ determination that certain aspects of Nortel’s staffing plan appeared to be an ineffective and uneconomical use of resources. In fact, the best value tradeoff memorandum does not indicate that the contracting officer, who prepared the memorandum, considered or was even aware of the TET’s finding of no apparent benefit in Nortel’s decision to continue implementation staffing levels beyond the deployment schedule. The record also reflects that this conclusion regarding the benefits of Nortel’s staffing levels was material to the agency’s source selection determination. We recognize that an agency may properly conclude that a proposal with higher staffing levels may reduce the offeror’s risk of performance. The fact that a proposal has higher staffing levels does not automatically mean reduced risk, however, and there has been no showing or explanation offered here as to how Nortel’s continuation of its implementation staffing personnel during the managed services years would reduce the risk of performance here. In sum, we cannot find SSA’s evaluation of Nortel’s management approach to be reasonable when the agency reached a conclusion regarding the offeror’s staffing plan that was inconsistent with the underlying evaluation findings and provided no explanation for this inconsistency, and then relied on this conclusion as a material part of its best value tradeoff determination.  AT&T Corp., B-299542.3; B-299542.4, November 16, 2007) (pdf)

Karrar argues that the agency performed an unreasonable best value determination. According to Karrar, its proposal was substantially superior to BANC3’s under the most important technical factor, while BANC3’s proposal was only slightly superior to Karrar’s under the less important management factor. Karrar concludes that, in selecting BANC3 for award, the agency improperly gave more weight to the management factor than to the more important technical factor. SSOs have broad discretion in determining the manner and extent to which they will make use of the technical and price evaluation results; their judgments are governed only by the tests of rationality and consistency with the stated evaluation criteria. Chemical Demilitarization Assocs., B-277700, Nov. 13, 1997, 98-1 CPD para. 171 at 6. The propriety of a tradeoff depends not on the mere difference in technical scores or ratings, but on the reasonableness of the SSO’s judgment concerning the significance of the difference. Digital Sys. Group, Inc., B-286931, B-286931.2, Mar. 7, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 50 at 7. Here, while the SSO noted that the Aberdeen Proving Ground management subfactor was the most important subfactor, and that BANC3’s proposal was rated good under this subfactor, SSD at 6, there is no basis to conclude that she gave the management factor greater weight than the technical factor. Rather, as discussed above, the SSO reviewed the relative weights of the evaluation factors, the adjectival ratings for each subfactor, and the underlying strengths and weaknesses on which those ratings were based. The SSO’s resulting conclusion that Karrar’s proposal was slightly superior to BANC3’s under the technical factor, but that BANC3’s proposal was superior to Karrar’s under the management factor, formed the non-price side of the tradeoff equation. Balanced against those considerations was Karrar’s $7.9 million (31 percent) higher price. In weighing the two, the SSO concluded that any relative benefit offered by Karrar’s proposal was not sufficient to offset its significantly higher price. Id. There was nothing unreasonable in the agency’s methodology or conclusion.  (Karrar Systems Corporation, B-310661.3; B-310661.4, March 3, 2008) (pdf)

Finally, the protester contends that the selection decision here cannot withstand scrutiny because of certain factual errors in the document that have been acknowledged by the CO. We disagree.  As discussed above, the CO acknowledges that the selection decision erroneously states that the record considered when selecting JVP for award included evaluations by TEB and PEB evaluators. Decl. of CO, Nov. 7, 2007, at 1. As the record shows, the Navy used a TEB or PEB to evaluate offerors’ proposals for the initial award in 2006, but did not use these teams in its reevaluation of proposals in 2007. Instead, all of the 2007 reevaluations were conducted by the SSB. The CO explains that the misstatements in the selection decision were due to Navy personnel who assisted in the drafting of the document using an outdated model document. Id. The CO further states that he relied solely on the SSB reports produced during the recompetition, and that he “did not rely . . . upon any reports other than the SSB [reports] to reach my evaluation and award decisions.” Id.  The CO’s clarification is consistent with the record. Although the selection decision refers to “recommendations reported by the TEB and Price Evaluator,” AR exh. 15, SSD, at 1, the source of the information relied upon in the tradeoff determination clearly comes from the SSB report. First, the technical ratings for JVP reflect the SSB’s reevaluation of that offeror’s proposal that were conducted in February 2007, following the Navy’s decision to take corrective action in response to JVP’s COFC protest. See AR, BCM, Feb. 26, 2007. The record shows that the TEB, in contrast, had no input as to technical evaluations after its final August 2006 report.  Next, the prices cited in the selection decision are clearly those from the offerors’ final proposals, submitted during the 2007 recompetition. Both JVP’s and BOS’s revised prices, and the differences between them, are cited in the selection decision and reflect the 2007 proposals, rather than the initial proposals which were evaluated by the PEB in 2006.  In sum, all of the information cited by or relied upon in the selection decision for the award determination is clearly based on the August 16, 2007, SSB report; conversely, none of the information cited is based on the outdated TEB or PEB evaluations. In our view this essentially cosmetic error--misidentifying the source of the final assessments when the record clearly shows that the assessments were drawn from different sources (which were provided to protester’s counsel during the course of this protest)--does not provide a basis to challenge the reasonableness of the selection decision here.  (Team BOS/Naples--Gemmo S.p.A./DelJen, B-298865.3, December 28, 2007) (pdf)

With respect to UTT’s challenge to the SSA’s tradeoff decision, we think selection officials have considerable discretion in making price/technical tradeoffs. Their judgments in these tradeoffs are by their nature subjective; nevertheless, the exercise of these judgments must be reasonable and must bear a rational relationship to the announced criteria upon which competing offers are to be selected. Award may be made to a firm that submitted a lower-rated, lower-priced proposal where the decision is consistent with the evaluation criteria and the agency reasonably determines that the premium involved in awarding to the offeror with the higher-rated, higher-priced proposal is not justified. Computer Tech. Servs., Inc., B-271435, June 20, 1996, 96-1 CPD ¶ 283 at 5.  Here, the SSA recognized UTT’s slight delivery advantage with respect to the six FOB Destination trailers and concluded that the advantage was not worth the price premium. In making this decision, the SSA appropriately recognized the relative importance of the solicitation’s evaluation factors, in particular that the delivery factor was more important than the price factor. AR, Tab 17, Source Selection Decision at 4. Although UTT believes that its shorter delivery schedule for the six FOB Destination trailers should have resulted in an award to UTT, the protester’s disagreement with the SSA’s business judgment does not show that that judgment is unreasonable. See ACS State Healthcare, LLC et al., B-292981 et al., Jan. 9, 2004, 2004 CPD ¶ 57 at 44. Rather, we find that the decision reflects a price/technical tradeoff assessment that is within the realm of discretion given selection officials on these matters.  (Utility Tool & Trailer, Inc. B-310535, January 3, 2008) (pdf)

The RFP here specifically informed offerors that award would be made under Phase II of the evaluation on a price/technical tradeoff basis, considering the evaluated advantages, disadvantages and risks of each proposal under the delivery, small business participation, and price factors. The RFP also advised that offerors’ proposed delivery schedules for FOB origin and FOB destination would be considered under the delivery evaluation factor. RFP sect. M.2.2. Moreover, the RFP advised that the delivery factor was the most important evaluation factor.  Based on our review of the record--and contrary to the protester’s contention that had it known the importance of the delivery factor in the evaluation of proposals, it would have adjusted its delivery dates accordingly--the record shows that the protester proposed delivery dates that were significantly below the government’s stated objectives. In this regard, the protester’s proposal, on its face, suggests that the protester understood that the agency needed these items sooner than later, and understood the importance of an expedited delivery schedule. The record shows that CKP simply did not propose a delivery schedule that was as favorable as the delivery schedule proposed by Polaris.

CKP also challenges the SSA’s price/technical tradeoff determination that Polaris’ offer of a shorter delivery schedule was worth the $5.5 million price premium associated with Polaris’ higher-priced proposal. In our view, selection officials have considerable discretion in making price/technical decisions. Their judgments in these tradeoffs are by their nature subjective; nevertheless, the exercise of these judgments must be reasonable and must bear a rational relationship to the announced criteria upon which competing offers are to be selected. Award may be made to a firm that submitted a higher-rated, higher-price proposal where the decision is consistent with the evaluation criteria and the agency reasonably determines that the technical superiority of the higher-priced offer outweighs the price difference. ACS State Healthcare, LLC et al., B-292981 et al., Jan. 9, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 57 at 44. Here, the SSA recognized CKP’s price advantage, but concluded that Polaris’ shorter delivery schedule was worth the price premium. In making this decision, the SSA appropriately recognized the relative importance of the solicitation’s evaluation factors, in particular that the delivery factor was more important than the price factor. AR, Tab 17, Source Selection Decision, at 4. The SSA noted that there was an urgent need for these items and indicated that she was willing to pay the price premium for faster deliveries with lower risk. Although CKP does not believe that Polaris’ faster delivery schedule was worth an additional $5.5 million, CKP’s disagreement with the SSA’s business judgment does not show that that judgment is unreasonable. See ACS State Healthcare, LLC et al., supra, at 45. Rather, we find that the decision reflects a price/technical tradeoff assessment that is within the realm of discretion given selection officials on these matters.  (Charles Kendall & Partners, Ltd., B-310093, November 26, 2007) (pdf)

In a best-value procurement such as this, award may be made based upon a higher-priced proposal where the award decision is consistent with the evaluation criteria and the agency reasonably determines that the technical superiority of the higher-priced proposal outweighs the price difference. American Material Handling, B‑297536, Jan. 30, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 28 at 4. The record demonstrates that the agency did undertake a detailed comparison of the View One and Eggs & Bacon proposals, from which it reasonably concluded that View One had a significantly better technical proposal than Eggs & Bacon that was worth the associated price premium and overcame Eggs & Bacon’s price advantage. Agency Report, Tab 10, SSEB Report; Tab 11, Source Selection Decision Document. Specifically, the SSA adopted View One’s proposal’s excellent ratings under all of the evaluation factors. The SSA found that View One possessed extensive experience organizing SOA events and other similar productions, proposed personnel with extensive experience, had an “immense pool of talent that would benefit this production,” had a technical proposal that contained precise information that addressed all aspects of the performance work statement (PWS), and had excellent past performance reference evaluations. Agency Report, Tab 11, Source Selection Decision Document, at 3-4. While Eggs & Bacon also had excellent past performance reference evaluations, its proposal was otherwise rated inferior to View One’s. Eggs & Bacon’s prior experience, rated good, involved similar type of productions but was based largely on trade shows of short duration. Eggs & Bacon proposed experienced personnel, but did not explain exactly how they would be organized for this effort and there were indications that the proposed personnel had not worked together as a group, and thus its proposal was considered only acceptable under this factor. Eggs & Bacon’s proposal was rated marginal under the technical capability factor because there was insufficient detail and clarity as to how and with what equipment the PWS requirements would be met, including such requirements as local editing facilities and certain specialized requirements, such as wide angle resolution, digital imaging and the use of rear projection of at least 1,300 square feet. Id. at 2-3. Our review of the record, including the proposals, provides us with no basis to question the reasonableness of this evaluation, or the decision to select View One’s higher-rated, higher-price proposal over Eggs & Bacon’s lower-rated, lower-priced proposal since this result was permitted by the evaluation scheme, particularly given price’s lesser weight in the evaluation scheme. In fact, Eggs & Bacon does not specifically question the agency’s evaluation of its proposal despite having had access to this part of the record.  (Eggs & Bacon, Inc., B-310066, November 20, 2007) (pdf)

The BVAC’s findings and recommendation were reported to the source selection authority (SSA), who also received oral briefings from the TERP and CAP chairs regarding their respective findings. The SSA noted that the BVAC had found that Earl’s “slight technical advantage” was attributable to “several predominantly minor strengths” in Earl’s proposal that were not found in MTJV’s proposal. In this regard, the SSA stated that the BVAC’s report documented “that all of the offerors met the requirements of the solicitation.” The SSA selected MTJV’s proposal as reflecting the best value to the agency because “the slight technical advantage inherent in [Earl’s proposal]” did not warrant the payment of a [Deleted]-percent premium associated with Earl’s higher evaluated cost. AR, Tab 18, Source Selection Decision, at 1. Award was made to MTJV, and this protest followed. Earl first complains that the Navy did not reasonably assess the relative technical merit of its and MTJV’s proposals. In this regard, Earl argues that the SSA’s conclusion in his selection decision that Earl’s proposal reflected only a “slight technical advantage” over MTJV’s proposal was not consistent with the TERP’s evaluation and the solicitation evaluation criteria.

(Section deleted.)

Here, the RFP provided for a comparative assessment of the offerors’ management capability, resource capabilities, and past performance. See RFP sect. M, at 178. With respect to the resource capabilities factor, offerors were instructed to identify resources committed to the work effort. See RFP sect. L, at 159. The TERP found that Earl provided “the strongest proposal to this solicitation in all areas because of their well thought out plan and their strong current and past performance, especially in the area of Resource Capabilities.” AR, Tab 15, TERP Report, at 2. With respect to Earl’s proposed resource capabilities, the TERP noted as a major proposal strength under the resource capabilities factor that

Team Earl’s proposal clearly demonstrates that they have the facilities and manning to execute the requirements of the FFG7 . . . contract. Team Earl’s available resources are unmatched in the Southeast region. Three team members--Earl Industries and Atlantic Marine have significant facilities located on Mayport Naval Station. They previously provided significant industrial base support for the Navy in Mayport for many years. Combined, they have almost six acres of land and approximately 120,000 square feet of fully certified facilities dedicated to the Navy. These facilities have completed the overwhelming majority of maintenance on over twenty surface ships and an aircraft carrier at Mayport Naval Station. Team Earl has more than adequate resources and manning to conduct multiple FFG7 availabilities concurrently.

Id., encl. 3, Earl Evaluation, at 2.

MTJV’s final revised proposal, on the other hand, was found by the TERP to be only satisfactory under the management capability, resource capabilities, and past performance factors. AR, Tab 15, TERP Report, at 3. As noted above, with respect to the awardee’s resource capabilities, the TERP assessed MTJV’s initial proposal as being “weak” because the firm had not identified adequate resources to perform the contract, and assigned a “marginal” rating to MTJV’s proposal under this factor. In discussions, MTJV admitted that the “overwhelming majority” of MTJV’s current resources were located in Norfolk, Virginia, and not in Mayport, Florida. MTJV promised to augment its existing Mayport facilities and resources with “new local resources as required” and to solicit all local “master ship repair agreement” and “agreement for boat repair” contractors (such as Earl, Atlantic Marine, and QED) to execute various tasks. See AR, Tab 3, MTJV Discussions Reponses, at 11; Tab 15, TERP Report, encl. 4, MTJV Evaluation, at 3. In addition, MTJV promised to provide the Navy with MTJV’s “Shipyard in a Box,” which reflected shipyard resources that MTJV stated could be shipped to Mayport, as required. Id. at 12. With little explanation, the TERP changed MTJV’s rating for the resource capabilities factor from marginal to satisfactory based upon these promises. As noted above, the TERP concluded that Earl had provided a superior proposal to that of MTJV, particularly in the area of resource capabilities, under which the TERP documented a major strength. The BVAC and SSA concluded, however, that Earl’s higher technical ratings were attributable to “several predominantly minor strengths” and that Earl’s technical advantage was “slight.”  Although source selection officials may reasonably disagree with the ratings and recommendations of evaluators, they are nonetheless bound by the fundamental requirement that their independent judgments be reasonable, consistent with the stated evaluation scheme and adequately documented. DynCorp Int’l LLC, B-289863, B-289863.2, May 13, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 83 at 4. Here, the SSA’s conclusion with respect to Earl’s technical advantage is unsupported by any meaningful explanation in either the contemporaneous record or in response to the protest. That is, we have been provided with no explanation supporting the BVAC’s and SSA’s judgment that Earl’s proposal of significant resources in Mayport (which the TERP termed “unmatched in the Southeast region”), as compared to MTJV’s promise to obtain resources as necessary, represented only a slight technical advantage, where the RFP provided for a comparative evaluation of the offerors’ respective resource capabilities. In this regard, there is no explanation for the SSA’s and BVAC’s conclusion that Earl’s superior technical ratings were attributable to minor strengths. Based upon this record, we do not find that the SSA reasonably assessed, in accordance with the solicitation’s evaluation criteria, the relative technical merit associated with Earl’s and MTJV’s proposals in his decision to select MTJV’s proposal on the basis of its lower evaluated costs. Earl’s protest is sustained on this basis.  (Earl Industries, LLC, B-309996; B-309996.4, November 5, 2007) (pdf)

An SSA may select a lower-priced, lower technically rated proposal if he or she decides that the price premium involved in selecting the higher-rated, higher-priced offer is not justified given the acceptable level of technical competence available at the lower cost. The determining element is not the difference in technical merit, per se, but the contracting agency’s judgment concerning the significance of the difference. In making this determination, the SSA has broad discretion, and the extent to which technical merit may be sacrificed for cost, or vice versa, is limited only by the requirement that the tradeoff decision be reasonable in light of the established evaluation and source selection criteria. CVB Co., B-278478.4, Sept. 21, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 109 at 8. As detailed above, the record shows that the SSA was provided with a comprehensive briefing of the offerors’ proposals, which highlighted for the SSA significant strengths, weaknesses, and discriminators in each proposal. Agency Hearing Book, exhs. C-F, SSA Final Briefing Materials; Tr. at 17, 56. During the briefing, the SSA “probed” behind the briefing materials and asked questions of the expert evaluators and “users.” Tr. at 18-21, 29. In reviewing the materials, the SSA did not just “put blinders on,” but instead “went through [the briefing chart] meticulously to find out if there was value in those attributes above and beyond what’s listed on that chart.” Tr. at 119. From this briefing, the SSA fully understood the relative differences in capability between the EADS and AWI proposals in terms of the mission and did not “trivialize” AWI’s proposal strengths, as asserted by AWI. Tr. at 37-38, 227. In fact, given the detailed, voluminous record in this case and the complexities in this procurement, the SSA reasonably relied on the expertise of the factor leads, LUH “users,” SSEB, and SSAC to advise him of the value of exceeding, or failing to meet, attributes relative to the mission.[50] Although it is true that the SSA did not separately quantify the value for each element, Tr. at 68, 180-81, this was not required and does not mean that the SSA failed to perform any analysis of value as AWI appears to argue. See FAR sect. 15.308 (SSA’s “documentation need not quantify the tradeoffs that led to the decision”). Contrary to AWI’s arguments, the SSA considered essentially all of the areas where AWI’s aircraft capability exceeded EADS’s, including those elements where both offers received the same rating.[51] He considered the offerors’ proposed capabilities under the technical elements “individually” and then “cumulatively” to determine whether AWI’s technical superiority in the “totality” was worth the additional cost. Tr. at 67, 117, 122-23. Although the SSA did not discuss each and every element in the SSDD as AWI would have liked, the record shows that the relative differences between the proposals under each of these elements were thoroughly documented in a well‑reasoned and rational SSEB report, and a detailed summary of these findings was briefed to the SSA and considered in his decision. Agency Hearing Book, exhs. C-F, SSA Final Briefing Materials; Tr. at 17-21, 204. The SSDD highlighted the key discriminators among offerors’ proposals, albeit not all of the elements that AWI would have liked the SSA to agree were discriminators, and illustrates a well‑reasoned and sufficiently detailed selection decision that clearly credits AWI’s strengths and technical superiority, but explains why its proposal was not worth $800 million over EADS’s highly rated $3.9 billion proposal. (MD Helicopters, Inc.; AgustaWestland, Inc., B-298502; B-298502.2; B-298502.3; B-298502.4; B-298502.5, October 23, 2006) (pdf)

We conclude that the agency’s evaluation of offerors’ proposals was unreasonable because of the contradiction between the cost evaluation and technical evaluation. See Honeywell Tech. Solutions, Inc.; Wyle Labs., Inc., B-292354, B-292388, Sept. 2, 2003, 2005 CPD para. 107 at 7-8 (evaluation was unreasonable where agency found that awardee was rated as “appropriate” under technical evaluation, yet also concluded that awardee had proposed insufficient staffing under cost realism analysis). The agency argues that the technical evaluations were reasonable because the evaluators relied upon numerous strengths in concluding that each offeror warranted high technical scores. The technical evaluation and source selection decision, however, conclude that each offeror was “technically superior,” in part because of each offerors’ “more than adequate” proposed staff. The SSD makes no attempt to reconcile the clearly opposing views of the technical evaluation and the cost evaluation. We conclude that the agency’s evaluation that both offerors’ proposals were “technically superior,” with near-perfect technical scores, is unsupported in light of the patent contradiction in the record, as discussed above. (Information Ventures, Inc., B-297276.2; B-297276.3; B-297276.4, March 1, 2006) (pdf)

Based on our review, the source selection official could not reasonably accept Badger’s proposed delivery schedule as the basis for award. As indicated above, the “required” delivery schedule, as specified by the RFP if FAT was waived, was delivery of 3,000 units in 90 days (not the 150 days proposed by Badger) with deliveries at 3,000 units per month until completion (not the 1,800 units per month proposed by Badger). While, as noted above, the RFP indicated that “earlier shipments of smaller quantities, phased out longer may be accepted,” RFP at 2, this provision had no applicability to Badger’s noncompliant delivery proposal, which did not offer “earlier shipments.” Indeed, while Badger’s proposed initial delivery of 3,000 units in 150 days was somewhat better than the RFP-required delivery of 165 days if FAT was not waived--which was the delivery proposed by Novex--Badger’s 1,800-unit monthly rate of delivery for the rest of the contract was significantly less advantageous than the RFP-required 3,000-unit monthly rate, which was proposed by Novex. This means that, except for the initial quantity, Novex’s proposed delivery schedule, which would be completed in 315 days (initial delivery in 165 days and five deliveries at 3,000-unit rate every 30 days), was significantly better than Badger’s, which would not be completed until 390 days (initial delivery in 150 days and eight deliveries at 1,800-unit rate every 30 days). There is no evidence in the award selection documentation that the agency recognized Novex’s superiority with regard to delivery of the bulk of the units, and the source selection official did not reasonably explain why gaining earlier delivery of only 15 days for the initial delivery was worth the additional cost, considering that the rest of Badger’s proposed delivery was significantly less advantageous than Novex’s. Cf. American Material Handling, B‑297536, Jan. 30, 2006, 2006 CPD para. __ at 4 (agency reasonably focused on early initial delivery as award discriminator where the delivery evaluation factor in the solicitation expressly stated that such credit would be given). While the award selection documentation indicates that up to 75 days would be needed to obtain and approve FAT before production could begin, Novex’s proposal committed to supply the total initial quantity in 165 days from date of award, including FAT, which is only 15 days longer than the 150 days proposed for delivery by Badger. The agency did not indicate that Novex’s proposed delivery schedule was unrealistic. Instead, in a supplemental agency submission made after the attorney from our Office, in response to an agency request for alternate dispute resolution, advised the agency of the reasons (set forth in this decision) that our Office believed the award selection was unreasonable, the agency for the first time argued that the source selection official was actually considering the risk that Novex might fail its FAT in determining that Badger offered superior delivery because FAT had been waived for it and therefore its offer represented the best value. However, the contemporaneous documentation does not mention that any such risk was considered. We give little weight to this argument because it was made in the heat of litigation. See Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support, B-277263.2, B‑277263.3, Sept. 29, 1997, 97‑2 CPD para. 91 at 15. (Novex Enterprises, B-297660; B-297660.2, March 6, 2006) (pdf)

TruLogic first argues that the SSA failed to act with “impartiality.”[12] It asserts that the SSA unreasonably ignored the SSET majority view, instead relying on the minority view, and “manipulated” the evaluation to support his selection of CTI for award. TruLogic further contends that the SSA either ignored or only mentioned in a cursory way TruLogic’s proposal strengths, while dedicating several paragraphs of the SSD to emphasize CTI’s proposal strengths. The record, however, shows a well-documented, reasoned evaluation and award decision without evidence of bias. Despite TruLogic’s insistence that the SSA should have adopted the majority view, source selection officials are not bound by the evaluation judgments of lower level evaluators; they may come to their own reasonable evaluation conclusions. MW-All Star Joint Venture, B-291170.4, Aug. 4, 2003, 2004 CPD para. 98 at 3 n.3. Here, we find that the SSA reasonably concluded that the minority view was a more accurate assessment of CTI’s proposal. The record confirms that CTI’s EN responses and final proposal revision adequately address the functionality requirements at issue, and supports the minority SSET report and the SSA’s conclusion that CTI’s proposal met the functionality requirements of the RFP.[14] The SSA did not “manipulate” the evaluation, as alleged, but documented in detail his disagreement with the majority of the SSET. To the extent that TruLogic complains that the SSD contains more paragraphs discussing CTI’s proposal than TruLogic’s, the agency explains that this was because the SSA was explaining his disagreement with the majority of the SSET, not because the SSA was ignoring the benefits of TruLogic’s approach or over-emphasizing CTI’s proposal strengths. In sum, our review of the record reveals that the SSD fairly considered the benefits and drawbacks of both TruLogic’s and CTI’s proposal features, and reasonably concluded that CTI’s proposal provided the better value. (TruLogic, Inc., B-297252.3, January 30, 2006) (pdf)

AMH complains that TACOM unreasonably viewed JLG’s offer of a shorter delivery schedule for the minimum quantity to be a discriminator in the SSA’s price/technical tradeoff award selection decision. In AMH’s view, the RFP only provided that offerors’ proposals would be evaluated to determine whether the proposed schedule was credible and would “beat or meet the 180 day delivery objective.” AMH argues that, because both it and JLG offered an accelerated delivery schedule, the two firms’ proposals should have received the same evaluation rating for this factor. We disagree with AMH’s view that the solicitation did not allow TACOM to consider a shorter, credible delivery schedule to be a proposal advantage. Here, the RFP specifically informed offerors that award would be made on a price/technical tradeoff basis, considering the evaluated advantages, disadvantages and risks of each proposal under the delivery, small business participation, and price factors, and the delivery factor specifically stated that the offeror’s proposed “single date for completion of delivery of the minimum guaranteed quantity” would be considered. RFP at 68. We have found that where, as here, a solicitation provides for award on a best-value basis, an agency may reasonably assess as a proposal advantage the manner in which a proposal exceeds the minimum requirements of the solicitation. See, e.g., Preferred Sys. Solutions, B-291750, Feb. 24, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 56 at 3-4; F2M-WSCI, B‑278281, Jan. 14, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 16 at 7-8. AMH also challenges the SSA’s price/technical tradeoff determination that JLG’s offer of a 29-day shorter delivery schedule was worth the $286,873 price premium associated with JLG’s higher-priced proposal. In this regard, AMH argues that JLG’s accelerated delivery schedule was for only the minimum guaranteed quantity and that the agency has not explained why an earlier delivery schedule for the minimum quantity “is better for the Iraq mission.” Protester’s Comments at 2. Selection officials have considerable discretion in making price/technical tradeoff decisions. Their judgments in these tradeoffs are by their nature subjective; nevertheless, the exercise of these judgments must be reasonable and must bear a rational relationship to the announced criteria upon which competing offers are to be selected. Award may be made to a firm that submitted a higher-rated, higher‑priced proposal where the decision is consistent with the evaluation criteria and the agency reasonably determines that the technical superiority of the higher‑priced offer outweighs the price difference. ACS State Healthcare, LLC et al., B-292981 et al., Jan. 9, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 57 at 44. Here, the SSA recognized AMH’s price advantage, but concluded that JLG’s shorter delivery schedule was worth the price premium. In making this decision, the SSA appropiately recognized the relative importance of the solicitation’s evalutation factors, in particular that the delivery factor (that focused on the guaranteed minimum quantity) was more important than the price factor. AR, Tab 17, Source Selection Decision, at 2. The SSA found that JLG’s shorter delivery schedule for the guaranteed minimum quantity provided a real benefit to the government, given that “early delivery of this tactical forklift is critical to provide Iraqi troops with the capability to off-load supplies from containers.” Id. at 5. Although AMH does not believe that the 29-day shorter delivery schedule was worth the additional $286,873, AMH’s disagreement with the SSA’s business judgment does not show that that judgment is unreasonable. See ACS State Healthcare, LLC et al., supra, at 45. Rather, we find that the decision reflects a reasonable price/technical tradeoff assessment. (American Material Handling, Inc., B-297536, January 30, 2006) (pdf)

We conclude that, on this record, YORK was competitively prejudiced by the errors. Of particular significance, the record shows that YORK’s proposal was scored higher than Obsi1’s proposal on the most important evaluation factor, technical approach. The SSO’s reliance on total scores (which themselves did not reflect the RFP’s relative weighting of the factors) indicates that her selection decision did not consider the significance of YORK’s apparent technical advantage under the most important technical evaluation factor. (YORK Building Services, Inc., B-296948.2; B-296948.3; B-296948.4, November 3, 2005) (pdf)

The agency unfairly and unreasonably evaluated the proposals on the feature of field control of inventory. Both offerors proposed a capability that would permit field locations to have full control of all types of inventory. Agency Report, Tab 26, ReserveAmerica’s Final Revised Proposal, at 915-17; Tab 39, Spherix’s Final Revised Proposal, at 1809‑12, 1969-70. The agency stated that Spherix’s proposed inventory management capability focused on campground inventory and did not address tours and ticketing. Agency Report, Tab 16, Source Selection Decision, at 474. That statement is inconsistent with the terms of Spherix’s proposal, which states that its inventory management capability applies to both recreation facilities and recreation activities. Agency Report, Tab 39, Spherix’s Final Revised Proposal, at 1809. The agency also stated that Spherix did not quantify how much control would be granted to field sites. Agency Report, Tab 16, Source Selection Decision, at 474. This also is inconsistent with the terms of Spherix’s proposal, which stated [DELETED].[5] Agency Report, Tab 39, Spherix’s Final Revised Proposal, at 1969-70. These misstatements formed the basis for inventory control being one of the discriminators in the SSA’s tradeoff analysis. Agency Report, Tab 16, Source Selection Decision, at 474.  (Spherix, Inc., October 20, 2005, B-294572.3; B-294572.4) (pdf)

In reviewing a protest against an agency’s evaluation of proposals and award, including tradeoff determinations, we examine the record to determine whether the agency’s judgment was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation’s evaluation criteria and applicable statutes and regulations. Ostrom Painting & Sandblasting, Inc., B-285244, July 18, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 132 at 4. An agency may properly select a lower-rated, lower-priced proposal where it reasonably concludes that the price premium involved in selecting a higher-rated proposal is not justified in light of the acceptable level of technical competence available at a lower price. Bella Vista Landscaping, Inc., B-291310, Dec. 16, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 217 at 4. In its comments on the agency report, which included the full evaluation record and source selection decision documentation, the protester does not persuasively refute the noted strengths in the evaluation record of the awardee’s past performance, the reasonableness of the SSA’s consideration of the two past performance proposals as being essentially equal, or the SSA’s concerns about the protester’s limited joint venture and government contract experience (and the limited supporting commentary for high past performance ratings). Rather, the firm generally alleges that because the RFP provided that past performance is the most important factor for award, and because it received a higher past performance adjectival rating, it should have been selected for award. We disagree. A protester’s mere disagreement with the agency’s determinations as to the relative merit of competing proposals and its judgment as to which proposal offers the best value to the agency, does not establish that the evaluation or source selection was unreasonable. Weber Cafeteria Servs., Inc., B-290085.2, June 17, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 99 at 4. Our review of the record here supports the reasonableness of the agency’s comparative review of the merits of the proposals, its price/past performance tradeoff, and the award decision. It is well-established that adjectival ratings are merely guides to intelligent decisionmaking; they do not mandate automatic selection of a particular proposal. See Calspan Corp., B-255268, Feb. 22, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 136 at 10. Rather, selection officials must decide whether the different ratings show technical superiority and what that difference may mean in terms of contract performance in determining whether a price premium associated with that superiority is warranted. See Computer Tech. Servs., Inc., B-271435, June 20, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 283. Here, as discussed above, the SSA performed a comprehensive integrated assessment of the proposals and concluded that in terms of performance risk, based on a comparative review of the offerors’ past performance, the proposals were essentially equal, making price the determinative factor for award. Neither the protester, nor our review of the record, provides a basis to question the reasonableness of that determination. As set forth above, while the protester’s past performance had noted strengths, the SSA also noted its related weaknesses and the agency’s concerns about the offeror’s limited relevant experience as a joint venture and government contractor. Conversely, while the awardee’s past performance was rated as very good, rather than exceptional, the SSA noted the strengths of the firm’s past performance and its direct relevance to the current SABER contract. Moreover, the protester provides no basis to challenge the reasonableness of the SSA’s determination that, given NASCENT’s lower price, and the acceptable level of technical competence and the high probability of successful performance by this experienced SABER contractor, any technical superiority that might be associated with the slightly higher adjectival rating received by the protester does not justify the payment of the price premium associated with an award to that offeror. Therefore, whether the SSA viewed the proposals as essentially technically equal, making price the proper basis of selection, or concluded that the adjectival ratings of the proposals did not warrant paying the price premium associated with the Brewbaker White Sands proposal, we find nothing improper in the SSA’s selection decision.Id. (Brewbaker White Sands JV, B-295582.4,October 5, 2005) (pdf)

The protester argues that the source selection authority’s price/technical tradeoff determination was [deleted] because it took into account only the advantages in Coastal’s proposal that resulted in quantifiable cost savings to the government. In a best-value procurement, it is the function of the source selection authority to perform a price/non-price factor(s) tradeoff, that is, to determine whether one proposal’s superiority under the non-price factor or factors is worth a higher price. A.G. Cullen Constr., Inc., B-284049.2, Feb. 22, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 45 at 4. We will review the selection decision to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the evaluation scheme set forth in the solicitation. Id. Based on our review of the record here, we agree with the protester that the SSA’s tradeoff analysis was unreasonable. The SSA concluded that Coastal’s proposal was not worth the cost differential of approximately [deleted] that separated it from MTCE’s proposal based on information furnished to her by the program manager regarding the [deleted] identified in Coastal’s technical proposal. The SSA mischaracterizes the information furnished to her by the program manager, however. Contrary to the SSA’s statement in the Negotiation Summary Memorandum at 14, quoted above, the program manager’s analysis did not indicate that only some of the [deleted] identified by the technical evaluators “would be worth an additional cost to the government”; instead, he identified those [deleted] that would result in a cost benefit (i.e., cost savings) to the government. The distinction is far more than a semantic one, since an advantage in an offeror’s technical proposal need not result in cost savings to the government to be of value to the government. In our view, the SSA had an obligation to consider all of the advantages of Coastal’s proposal in her tradeoff determination, and not simply those that would effectively reduce the cost of Coastal’s proposal. That is, the SSA had an obligation to consider whether the [deleted] advantages that, according to the Program Manager, would not result in cost savings to the government nonetheless furnished sufficient additional value to the government to make Coastal’s proposal a better value overall than MTCE’s, despite [deleted]. Because the SSA failed to perform such an analysis, we think that her determination lacked a reasonable basis. The SSA’s analysis was further unreasonable in that it failed to take into account the difference in the ratings of the two proposals with regard to performance risk, instead, as noted above, focusing exclusively on the [deleted]. Where a price/technical tradeoff is made, the source selection decision must be documented, and the documentation must include the rationale for any tradeoffs made. FAR sect. 15.308; Blue Rock Structures, Inc., B-293134, Feb. 6, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 63 at 5. A tradeoff determination in favor of a lower-rated, lower-priced proposal that fails to acknowledge significant strengths of the higher-rated proposal and furnish an explanation as to why they are not worth a price premium is not, in our view, a sufficiently documented tradeoff determination. See Blue Rock Structures, Inc., supra, at 6. (Coastal Maritime Stevedoring, LLC, B-296627, September 22, 2005) (pdf)

With respect to the senior IQ personnel that the project officers identified as lacking in experience, AR, Tab 72, at 2-3, the selection official expressed concerns that the project officers appeared to be judging IQ's proposed personnel against requirements not found in the RFP. In addition, and as indicated above, the selection official noted that the experience of key personnel had been reviewed and assessed by the evaluation panel, and that the proposals of both URC and IQ had received fairly high, and essentially equal ratings in this area. In our view, there was nothing unreasonable in the selection official's decision to look to the evaluators' assessment in this area as the more reliable indicator of whether the personnel proposed by URC and IQ had sufficient backgrounds to meet the requirements of the solicitation. Moreover, the HHS regulations lend support to the selection official's judgment about which of the two panels to look to for an informed assessment about the qualifications of proposed personnel. Specifically, our review of the regulations leads us to conclude that they do not anticipate that project officers will undertake the job of reviewing the backgrounds of proposed key personnel.  Finally, we recognize that URC apparently views the project officers' memorandum in this record as an attempt by agency managers most familiar with the requirements of this effort to ensure that this evaluation fairly assessed the capabilities of these two offerors to perform this work. On the other hand, this memorandum's unusual timing, its unusual scope, its unusual level of detail, and the unusually high level of the agency officials involved in ensuring its consideration, lend support to other views. Specifically, evidence in this record supports a view that this memorandum represents an effort by agency officials resistant to installing a new contractor in the place of a long-time incumbent, with a good performance history. Tr. at 20-21, 23-27, 29, 34-37, 59-60, 100, 101. Looking at the context of this procurement and the facts in the record, we conclude that the selection official dealt reasonably with the recommendations of the HHS project officers. (University Research Company, LLC, B-294358.6; B-294358.7, April 20, 2005) (pdf)

At the end of the past performance evaluation memorandum, the contracting officer prepared a three-page narrative summary of her evaluation findings. Although the contracting officer found that both Dismas's and Keeton's past performance warranted a good overall adjectival rating, the summary identified only the firms' respective average CEF point scores (4.24 for Dismas and 4.03 for Keeton (out of a possible 5 points)), as well as the adjectival ratings on the BOP contracts considered in the evaluation. Also in the summary, the contracting officer identified numerous strengths but no weaknesses for Dismas, whereas for Keeton the contracting officer identified a few strengths and many weaknesses. Agency Report, Tab 17, Contracting Officer's Past Performance Evaluation Memorandum, at 29-31. The contracting officer testified that although she relied upon the individual adjectival ratings for each contract derived from the firms' CEFs to determine that Dismas had better overall past performance, she prepared the narrative summary of the firms' strengths and weaknesses to justify the adjectival past performance ratings. Tr. at 25354. In this regard, she testified that she only identified strengths for Dismas and few strengths and almost only weaknesses for Keeton because she believed that this would point out the areas in which Dismas was superior. Tr. at 255. The SSA testified that he relied upon this summary of the firms' past performance and did not independently assess the firms' past performance in making his source selection decision. Tr.at3536. In this regard, the SSA further testified that he did not know whether this summary accurately reflected the contracting officer's past performance evaluation. Tr. at 54. While the contracting officer testified that the past performance evaluation summary she prepared was drafted to highlight Dismas's superiority in past performance, this explanation was not provided to the SSA or SSEP chairperson; instead, the summary was presented and appeared as a significant part of the basis for the source selection without the SSA being apprised of, and considering, that there were actually numerous weaknesses in Dismas's past performance and numerous strengths in Keeton's past performance. Thus, we conclude that the source selection decision was based upon a misapprehension of the offerors' past performance evaluation and therefore the decision lacks a reasonable basis. See Ashland Sales and Serv. Co. , supra , at 8-10. (Keeton Corrections, Inc., B-293348, March 4, 2005) (pdf)

Moreover, the propriety of a cost/technical tradeoff turns not on the difference in technical score, per se , but on whether the contracting agency's judgment concerning the significance of that difference was reasonable in light of the solicitation's evaluation scheme. Where cost is secondary to technical considerations under a solicitation's evaluation scheme, as here, the selection of a lower-priced proposal over a proposal with a higher technical rating requires an adequate justification, i.e., one showing the agency reasonably concluded that notwithstanding the point or adjectival differential between the two proposals, they were essentially equal in technical merit, or that the differential in the evaluation ratings between the proposals was not worth the cost premium associated with selection of the higher technically rated proposal. Where there is inadequate supporting rationale in the record for a decision to select a lower-priced proposal with a lower technical ranking, notwithstanding a solicitation's emphasis on technical factors, we cannot conclude that the agency had a reasonable basis for its decision. Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc. , supra , at 7; MCR Fed., Inc. , B-280969, Dec.14, 1998, 991 CPD 8 at 5. As noted above, the rationale stated in the source selection decision for selecting McNeil's proposal as the best value was the SSA's conclusion that all of the competitive range proposals were technically substantially equal. In making this decision, the SSA discussed certain aspects of the proposals, in particular the evaluation of SOS's proposal under the personnel and security plan subfactors and the past performance factor, and the evaluation of McNeil's proposal under the personnel subfactor. Although the SSA's analysis documents the rationale for adjusting the adjectival scores under these subfactors and factor, she does not discuss or acknowledge SOS's evaluated advantage under the other two technical evaluation factors, quality control plan and transition plan, where SOS's proposal was assigned "outstanding" ratings and McNeil's proposal received only "highly satisfactory" ratings. The record shows that the TEP provided detailed reasons for the proposals' respective ratings under these subfactors. Agency Report, Tab 8, Final Consensus Evaluation, McNeil's Evaluation, at10, 15; Final Consensus Evaluation, SOS's Evaluation, at 10, 15; Initial Consensus Evaluation, McNeil's Evaluation, at 8, 12; Initial Consensus Evaluation, SOS's Evaluation at 8, 12. Because of SOS's proposal's documented superiority under these factors and the SSA's failure to consider this evaluated superiority in her source selection decision, the SSA's statement that the proposals were technically substantially equal is not reasonably supported by the contemporaneous documentation. At the hearing, the SSA also essentially repudiated her finding that McNeil's and SOS's proposals were substantially technically equal, and testified that she considered both the proposals to be technically acceptable, rather than technically equal, and that in reviewing the two proposals "[she] did not see anything that was basically that superior to warrant paying [DELETED] extra in costs." Tr. at 63-64. In our view, the inadequately supported source selection decision and testimony of the SSA suggest that the agency may have improperly converted the source selection to one based upon technical acceptability and low price, instead of one that emphasized relative technical superiority, as was contemplated by the RFP's evaluation scheme here. An agency does not have the discretion to announce in the solicitation that it will use one evaluation plan, and then follow another; once offerors are informed of the criteria against which their proposals will be evaluated, the agency must adhere to those criteria in evaluating proposals and making its award decision, or inform all offerors of any significant changes made in the evaluation scheme. See Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc. , supra , at 10. (SOS Interpreting, LTD., B-293026; B-293026.2; B-293026.3, January 20, 2004) (pdf)

We find the agency's assessment of ReserveAmerica's offer of dedicated staff problematic in a number of regards. First, the SSA apparently believed that Spherix did not propose the "dedicated" support that ReserveAmerica proposed. In this regard, in the hearing conducted by our Office in this matter, the SSA testified that he understood from the SSET's briefing that Spherix's proposal had not committed to provide the level of effort needed to provide the call center services. [13] Tr. at97100. Both Spherix and ReserveAmerica addressed staffing in their proposals. ReserveAmerica's proposal identified "[DELETED] dedicated to serving the needs of the NRRS" that would include [DELETED] agencyspecific program managers and [DELETED] contact center agents. AR, Tab 92, ReserveAmerica Final Proposal Revision, at 1491, 1500, 1526, 1541-42. As noted above, this offer was assessed as a proposal strength for ReserveAmerica. Spherix's proposal stated that Spherix would deliver [DELETED] call center seats and "a dedicated staff of Reservation Specialists and Customer Service Representatives" with experienced management, and specifically proposed key personnel that included [DELETED] dedicated to each major stakeholder Agency." AR, Tab 112, Spherix Final Proposal Revision, at 2522, 2583. This aspect of Spherix's proposal was not discussed in the SSET final consensus evaluation. See AR, Supplemental Documents, Final Consensus Evaluation Worksheets for Spherix, 2995-96, 3003-04. From our review of the record, we find no reasonable support for the agency's conclusion that ReserveAmerica's promise of dedicated staff represented a significant proposal advantage over Spherix's similar offer. As noted above, both firms indicated in their proposals that dedicated staff would be provided. Although it is true that Spherix's proposal did not specifically identify the number of dedicated staff, as ReserveAmerica's proposal did, this specific information was neither requested by the RFP nor sought by the agency during discussions. Moreover, the record does not show that the SSA otherwise fairly considered Spherix's offer of dedicated staff. The SSA stated that he had not reviewed Spherix's proposal and the SSET's briefing left him with the understanding that Spherix's proposal had not committed to provide the level of effort needed to provide the call center services. Tr. at 97-100. This was neither a reasonable evaluation of Spherix's proposal, nor a reasonable assessment of the difference between ReserveAmerica's and Spherix's proposals. (Spherix, Inc., B-294572; B-294572.2, December 1, 2004) (pdf)

FAR 15.308 requires documentation of source selection decisions, and recognizes that while the selection official may rely on reports and analyses prepared by others, the ultimate decision reflects the selection official's independent judgment. The independence granted selection officials, however, does not equate to a grant of authority to ignore, without explanation, those who advise them on selection decisions. See , e.g. , DynCorp Intl LLC , B-289863, B-289863.2, May 13, 2002, 2002 CPD 83 at 6-7 (protest sustained where selection official failed to document the basis for rejecting the evaluation panels conclusion that it was not possible to determine whether the proposal included all required costs); AIU North America, Inc. , supra , at 8-9 (protest sustained, in part, because selection official did not document the basis for concluding that proposals were technically equal, after the evaluation panel concluded that one proposal was superior to the other). In response to the agency's arguments about the requirements in its regulations, we recognize that there is no express requirement in the HHSAR for selection officials to document their reasons for rejecting the evaluation input received from project officers. On the other hand, our review of the HHSAR requirements reveals that the agency has anticipated the possibility that project officers will provide significant input, especially in the area of evaluated costs. See 48 C.F.R. 315.305(a)(1). While the permissive language of the regulation does not require this input in every procurement, there is no dispute that it was received here, it was detailed, and it was mischaracterized by the CO in the Source Selection Determination document. Given that HHS has elected to supplement the FAR with a process for receiving input from agency project officers, and given the detailed nature of the input provided in this procurement and the importance all participants attached to it, we think the CO here was required to document the existence of these different views, and state her rational basis for either accepting or rejecting those views. Even leaving aside a Source Selection Determination document that misstates the input of agency officials with a prescribed role in reviewing proposals, there is still no statement in the record from the CO regarding her rationale for rejecting the input of the project officers. Without such a statement, the areas where the project officers disagree with the technical evaluation panel have been elevated to our Office for review, without having been first resolved by the agency. (University Research Company, LLC, B-294358; B-294358.2; B-294358.3; B-294358.4; B-294358.5, October 28, 2004) (pdf)

As an initial matter, we note that many of the allegations share a common challenge to the specific ratings that the agency assigned a given proposal. These allegations identify various terms of a given proposal and assert that the corresponding rating assigned by the agency should have been higher or lower, as the case may be. However, it is well established that ratings, be they numerical or adjectival, are merely guides for intelligent decision-making in the procurement process. Citywide Managing Servs. of Port Washington, Inc. , B281287.12, B281287.13, Nov. 15, 2000, 2001 CPD 6 at11. Where a source selection decision reasonably considers the underlying bases for the ratings, including advantages and disadvantages associated with the specific content of competing proposals, in a manner that is fair and equitable, and consistent with the terms of the solicitation, the protesters' disagreement over the actual adjectival ratings is essentially inconsequential, in that it does not affect the reasonableness of the judgments made in the source selection decision. See id. ; National Steel and Shipbuilding Co. , B281142, B281142.2, Jan. 4, 1999, 99-2 CPD 95 at 15. As the remainder of our discussion of the evaluation shows, rather than resting upon a superficial comparison of ratings, the agency, as indicated by the source selection decision, reasonably considered the specific content of the proposals in weighing the relative merits of competing proposals and determining which proposal represented the best value. (Mechanical Equipment Company, Inc.; Highland Engineering, Inc.; Etnyre International, Ltd.; Kara Aerospace, Inc., B-292789.2; B-292789.3; B-292789.4; B-292789.5; B-292789.6; B-292789.7, December 15, 2003) (pdf)

In any case, even where price is the least important evaluation factor, an agency may properly select a lower-priced, lower-rated proposal if it decides that the price premium involved in selecting a higher-rated, higher-priced proposal is not justified. NAPA Supply of Grand Forks, Inc., B-280996.2, May 13, 1999, 99-1 CPD ¶ 94 at 5. Based on our review of the record, we find that the Air Force reasonably concluded that the [REDACTED] percent price differential in price did not justify award to SSL. As noted above, the agency found the differences between the two firms’ past performance ratings to be “marginal.” The grounds for that finding were, in our view, reasonable: ATS’s lower past performance ratings were due to limited, rather than negative, past performance information; favorable customer ratings suggested to the agency that ATS could satisfactorily perform; and SSL had only limited performance information available concerning its performance as a subcontractor on semi-relevant contracts, which caused the agency to have “some doubt” as to SSL’s ability to successfully perform as a prime contractor on this contract. Although SSL disagrees with the agency’s judgment that the past performance distinctions were “marginal,” it has not shown this judgment to be unreasonable. UNICCO Gov’t Servs., Inc., B‑277658, Nov. 7, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 134 at 7. (Specific Systems, Ltd., B-292087.3, February 20, 2004) (pdf)

In a negotiated procurement, where the solicitation does not provide for award on the basis of the lowest cost, technically acceptable proposal, an agency has the discretion to make an award to an offeror with a higher technical rating and a higher cost where it reasonably determines that the cost premium is justified and the result is consistent with the evaluation criteria. ACC Constr. Co., Inc., B‑288934, Nov. 21, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 190 at 5-6. Here, the RFP stated that the mission capability, proposal risk, and past performance evaluation factors, when combined, were significantly more important than the cost evaluation factor in determining the proposal representing the best value to the government. The RFP also stated that the agency reserved the right to award to an offeror that submitted a higher technically rated, higher cost proposal. The record shows that in making his best value determination, the SSA was aware that Raytheon’s evaluated cost was higher (by approximately 11 percent) than Northrop’s evaluated cost and that both Raytheon and Northrop received the same significant confidence ratings for past performance (thereby neutralizing past performance in terms of the best value determination). However, and as more completely set forth above, the SSA concluded that Raytheon’s proposed technical approach reflected a more open architecture than Northrop’s proposed technical approach in terms of accommodating modifications, growth, and system upgrades in a plug-and-play fashion. The SSA believed that Raytheon’s exceptional, low risk architecture and design approach would “best enable [his] customer to streamline information flow so that operational decisions are made logically and rapidly[,] providing the best value to the Government, and it is well worth the premium.” AR, Vol. 131, Tab 16C, SSD, supra, at 10. In this respect, at the hearing, the SSA testified that by awarding to Raytheon, the agency “was going to get an architecture that the warfighter could fight with, that streamlines information flow so the decision is made logically, quickly and rapidly and, based on [his] lessons [learned] from [Operation Iraqi Freedom], it was an important component. This is why [he] chose [Raytheon].” Tr. at 382. The SSA continued by stating that “the architectural approach that Raytheon was offering was an opportunity to ensure the maximum combat capability.” Id. at 394. While Northrop disagrees with the SSA’s decision to pay a premium to Raytheon for its technically superior approach, Northrop has failed to show that the SSA’s best value determination was unreasonable or otherwise not in accordance with the terms of the RFP. (Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, B-293036.5; B-293036.6; B-293036.7, June 4, 2004) (pdf)

In our view, the SSA has failed to furnish an adequate rationale for his tradeoff determination here, and thus we are unable to conclude that the determination was reasonable. As the excerpt from his selection decision quoted above shows, the SSA simply concludes, without any mention of the technical advantages of Blue Rock’s higher-rated proposal or a finding that despite its higher rating, Blue Rock’s proposal was essentially equal to those of Virtexco and C Construction in technical merit, that the latter two proposals represent better value than the protester’s because they are significantly lower in price. A tradeoff analysis that fails to furnish any explanation as to why a higher-rated proposal does not in fact offer technical advantages or why those technical advantages are not worth a price premium does not satisfy the requirement for a documented tradeoff rationale, particularly where, as here, price is secondary to technical considerations under the RFP’s evaluation scheme. See Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc., B-292322 et al., Aug. 25, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 166. In addition to failing to furnish an adequate rationale for his selection of Virtexco and C Construction for award, the SSA failed to furnish an adequate rationale for his selection of Shaw Beneco. The SSA justified his selection of Shaw on the grounds that it had “a technical rating of Good+ and low competitive pricing.” SSA Memorandum for the File, Sept. 25, 2003, at 1. Shaw’s technical rating of Good Plus resulted from the SSB’s technical score adjustment scheme, however; i.e., Shaw’s original technical rating (of Good) was raised one step as credit for its low price. Accordingly, the SSA in essence gave Shaw double credit for its low price by considering both its adjusted rating and its price. Since Shaw’s technical rating, as unadjusted, was lower than the technical ratings of both Blue Rock and Sauer, and its price was higher than the prices of Virtexco and C Construction, we think that it was unreasonable for him to select Shaw for award without comparing its combination of technical merit and price to those of the other four offerors. (Blue Rock Structures, Inc., B-293134, February 6, 2004) (pdf)

In evaluating the revised CIS proposal, four of the five evaluators again prepared only cursory narrative materials. In terms of scoring, three of these four evaluators raised CIS’s score by [deleted] points; the agency’s final consensus technical evaluation report states that two of the three evaluators increased their scores based on their conclusion that the CIS proposal now met the personnel experience requirements, and that the third increased his score based on CIS’s providing “additional information” in its revised proposal. AR, exh. 7, at 5-6. Among these four evaluators, two assigned a final overall technical score of [deleted] points and two assigned a score of [deleted] points. Id. at 7. The fifth evaluator scored CIS’s revised proposal dramatically differently, reducing CIS’s score from [deleted] total points initially to [deleted] points on reevaluation. Unlike the other four evaluators, he prepared extensive narrative materials during his rescoring of the proposal, AR, exh. 4, at 25-26, and his unedited comments were ultimately incorporated into the final consensus technical evaluation report, along with a summary of the other evaluators’ limited comments. AR, exh. 7, at 5. The agency’s source selection decision document, AR, exh. 18, does not reflect any critical or independent analysis or evaluation of the proposals by the source selection official (SSO); instead, it relies entirely upon the numeric scores for purposes of the agency’s source selection decision. This being the case, the comments of the fifth evaluator regarding deficiencies in CIS’s proposal represent the sole support in the evaluation record for the relatively low ranking of CIS’s revised proposal. This is problematic for the agency because we find that the conclusions expressed by the fifth evaluator are unreasonable. (Computer Information Specialist, Inc., B-293049; B-293049.2, January 23, 2004)  (pdf)

As indicated, the agency also considered the underlying basis for the scores. While LSA’s proposal had 36 identified strengths and BGS’s 26, the TEP identified four risks posed by LSA’s proposal and only one risk and two weaknesses posed by BGS’s. The TEP considered these different strengths, weaknesses, and risks in making its best value recommendation, and concluded that, as the scores had indicated, the proposals were technically equivalent. SSRR at 3-4, 9-10. Having made this determination, and after finding no technical differences that would justify the higher costs associated with other award scenarios, the TEP concluded that an award under the lowest-priced of the technically equivalent scenarios--BGS alone (scenario 12)--represented the best value. While LSA asserts that its proposal offered real benefits to the agency over BGS’s at a minimal price premium, it does not identify any of those alleged benefits but, rather, points only to the TEP’s description of its proposal as “innovative,” “excellent,” “outstanding,” and “comprehensive.” LSA Comments at 10. Having failed to identify any particular benefit for which it did not receive credit or that would call into question the agency’s determination of technical equivalence, LSA’s assertions amount to mere disagreement with the agency’s conclusions, which is not sufficient to establish that the best value determination was unreasonable. UNICCO Gov’t Servs., Inc., B‑277658, Nov. 7, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 134 at 7.  (Language Service Associates, Inc., B-293041, December 22, 2003)  (pdf)

More specifically, in making her revised past performance/price tradeoff, the record shows that the source selection authority ignored, contrary to statute and regulation, as cited above, Beautify’s significantly lower price vis-à-vis Southway’s higher past performance rating, as well as the fact that Beautify, which received a very good/significant confidence rating, submitted the lowest price among all competitors. There is nothing in the source selection document that suggests that the source selection authority believed that Beautify’s significantly lower price in this fixed‑price, commercial item acquisition reflected any lack of understanding by Beautify of the RFP requirements or that Beautify was otherwise incapable of performing the requirements. On this record, we conclude that the source selection authority’s revised tradeoff decision was materially flawed because she inexplicably gave no consideration to Beautify’s low price in relation to Southway’s higher past performance rating (which was only one rating category higher than Beautify’s rating) and, as a result, she failed to document why it was worth paying a 25-percent price premium to Southway.  (Beautify Professional Services Corporation, B-291954.3, October 6, 2003)  (pdf)

Moreover, the propriety of a cost/technical tradeoff turns not on the difference in technical score, per se, but on whether the contracting agency’s judgment concerning the significance of that difference was reasonable in light of the solicitation’s evaluation scheme. Where cost is secondary to technical considerations under a solicitation’s evaluation scheme, as here, the selection of a lower-priced proposal over a proposal with a higher technical rating requires an adequate justification, i.e., one showing the agency reasonably concluded that notwithstanding the point or adjectival differential between the two proposals, they were essentially equal in technical merit, or that the differential in the evaluation ratings between the proposals was not worth the cost premium associated with selection of the higher technically rated proposal. Where there is inadequate supporting rationale in the record for a decision to select a lower-priced proposal with a lower technical ranking notwithstanding a solicitation’s emphasis on technical factors, we cannot conclude that the agency had a reasonable basis for its decision. MCR Fed., Inc., B-280969, Dec. 14, 1998, 99-1 CPD ¶ 8 at 5.  Here, as noted above, the SSA’s and SSAC’s source selection documents reflecting the agency’s best-value analysis did not include any meaningful analysis of the differentiating features of the two proposals upon which the SSA based the cost/technical tradeoff. Although the SSA and SSAC acknowledged PSS’s proposal’s technical superiority under the task order competence factor, there was no analysis as to why the well-documented technical superiority of PSS’s proposal with its attendant advantages was not worth the associated cost/price premium. Instead, the source selection document simply concluded that the proposals had “nearly equivalent ratings in non-cost areas,” with no analysis discussing the SSEB report justifying PSS’s proposal’s superior technical rating. The general statements in the SSAC’s and SSA’s source selection documents as to why PSS’s technical superiority did not offset the price/cost premium fall far short of the requirement to justify cost/technical tradeoff decisions. See Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., supra, at 7.  (Preferred Systems Solutions, Inc., B-292322; B-292322.2; B-292322.3, August 25, 2003) (pdf)

Contrary to the source selection decision, nowhere in CBD's proposal does it offer to provide an [DELETED] to develop a custom approach to address technological weaknesses in the current database to meet the current and future requirements, nor does CBD agree that it would seek input from USAFWS instructors for this purpose. In our view, a fairer reading of CBD's proposal to engage an [DELETED] is that CBD recognized that it had no knowledge of the USAFWS's current academic database and LAN, and that [DELETED] was only to assist the [DELETED] CBD to “meet the contract requirements.” We find no support for the SSA's conclusion that CBD offered a “custom approach to address technological weaknesses in the current database.” In fact, CBD's approach (quoted above) for the most part either acknowledges, restates, or generically responds to the SOW requirements with no discussion or promise of a customized approach to satisfying these requirements, except for some reference to employing [DELETED] software.  (SDS International, Inc., B-291183; B-291183.2, December 2, 2002)  (pdf)

JWH asserts that it was improper for the source selection authority (SSA) to serve as head of the price evaluation team, since Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 15.308 provides that “the source selection decision shall represent the SSA's independent judgment.” This argument is clearly without merit. While FAR § 15.308 requires the source selection decision to be based on the SSA's exercise of independent judgment, it does not expressly preclude the SSA from participating in the evaluation process, and we see nothing in an SSA's doing so that is inherently inconsistent with the exercise of independent judgment. We are aware of no other applicable prohibition in this regard. (J W Holding Group & Associates, Inc., B-285882.3; B-285882.6, July 2, 2001)  (pdf)

Thus, when viewed in the overall scope of the procurement, the SSA found the technical risk associated with the baseline antenna approach to be narrow, isolated from the critical path, and not of great concern to the overall cost and success of the contract. Tr. at 172-76, 202-03, 217-19, 241-46, 259-60; Agency Report, Tab 5B, Source Selection Decision, at 4. Considering that antenna design was but one aspect of the architecture and system performance subfactor, the developmental nature of this procurement, and the fact that the SSA's rationale for changing the risk evaluation is apparent in the source selection decision, we find this rating change to be within the discretion of the SSA and reasonable. See KPMG Consulting LLP, supra, at 13-14. As indicated above, this type of analysis by the SSA, giving due consideration to the evaluation conclusions of the lower-level evaluators, was entirely appropriate and reasonable. See GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co., Inc., B-276487.2, June, 30, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 21 at 18-19. (Raytheon Company, B-291449, January 7, 2003)  (pdf)  (txt version)

Thus, the record is clear that the SSA's tradeoff decision was based on incorrect information concerning the relative timing of Ashland's and Valley's delinquencies and a misstatement that a contract was extended due to inexcusable rather than excusable delay.  Because of this, the decision's conclusion that Valley had a superior timely record was unsupported by the record.  Moreover, the decision cast Ashland's proposal in a more negative light than would be the case if the facts were correctly stated, so that the evaluated advantage of Ashland should be greater than what the SSA believed to be the case when making the price/technical tradeoff.  Since the SSA's price/technical tradeoff decision favoring Valley's small price advantage over Ashland's narrow technical advantage was extremely close, correction of these errors could quite possibly tip the tradeoff in favor of Ashland's higher-rated proposal.  In this regard, we note that as between Offeror A and Valley that the SSA found a difference under the experience/past performance factor that warranted payment of an even larger price premium than existed between the proposals of Ashland and Valley.  (Ashland Sales and Service Company, B-291206, December 5, 2002) (pdf)  (txt version) 

While adjectival ratings, like scores, may be useful as guides to intelligent decision-making, they are not binding on the SSA, who has discretion to determine the weight to accord them in making an award decision. Porter/Novelli, B-258831, Feb. 21, 1995, 95-1 CPD ¶ 101 at 5.  Of concern to our Office is whether the record as a whole supports the reasonableness of the evaluation results and the source selection decision. Orbital Techs. Corp., B-281453 et al., 99-1 CPD ¶ 59 at 9.  Here, as discussed above, the record demonstrates the reasonableness of the agency's evaluation of Campbell's proposal, and that the SSA, in making the source selection, was aware of the TEB's findings with regard to Campbell's proposal, the ratings Campbell's proposal received under each of the evaluation factors, and that the proposal was considered deficient with regard to Campbell's approach to safety, quality control, and experience of key personnel. As such, it is of little or no significance whether the agency's overall rating of Campbell's proposal as marginal was reasonable.  (R. L. Campbell Roofing Company, Inc., B-289868, May 10, 2002) (pdf)  (txt version)

In a negotiated procurement with a "best value" evaluation plan where selection officials reasonably regard proposals as being essentially equal technically, price can become the determining factor in making award, notwithstanding that the evaluation criteria assigned price less importance than technical factors.  M-Cubed Info. Sys., Inc., B 284445; B-284445.2, Apr. 19, 2000,  2000 CPD P: 74 at 8.  Here, the RFP evaluation scheme explicitly provides that price would increase in importance as the technical proposals become close to equal, and that price may be the deciding factor between highly rated proposals.  At best, Vantage's technical proposal was evaluated as equal to Raytheon's; in fact, the record reflects that the agency consistently evaluated the Raytheon proposal as technically superior, notwithstanding that the same *outstanding* ratings were given to both proposals.  Accordingly, Vantage's objection that the agency improperly considered price to be determinative is without merit because the agency's decision to use low price as the determining factor between two equally highly rated technical proposals was fully consistent with the RFP award criteria.  (Vantage Associates, Inc., B-290802.2, February 3, 2003)  (txt version)

Here, there was no technical or price evaluation factor providing for the evaluation of the offerors' understanding of the requirements.  The price evaluation factor provided only for the evaluation of the “reasonableness” of the proposed price (that is, whether the price was unreasonably high) and for whether the price proposal was unbalanced, which is not contended here.  See RFP amend. 2, at 27-28.  Moreover, the RFP did not request cost or pricing information or any other information that would allow the agency to determine that a low proposed price reflected a lack of understanding of the contract requirements.  The agency's apprehension that CSE's price was too low would appear to concern the firm's responsibility, that is, whether CSE could satisfactorily perform at its proposed price, Possehn Consulting, supra, at 4, or whether CSE may have made a mistake in its proposed price.  Since CSE is a small business concern, if the agency believed that CSE could not satisfactorily perform the contract at its proposed price, the Corps was required to refer this finding of non-responsibility to the Small Business Administration (SBA) for that agency's review under its certificate of competency procedures.  Id.  If the agency believed CSE had made a mistake in its proposed price, it was required to request that CSE verify its price.  FAR § 15.306(b)(3)(i), which incorporates the bid mistake rules of FAR § 14.407-3 (contracting officer should obtain sufficient information to be reasonably assured that the bid confirmed is without error).  As noted above, the agency did not request verification here.  In any case, here, the record establishes that CSE's proposal was not considered for award by the SSA based primarily upon her judgment that CSE's proposed price was unreasonably low and reflected a lack of understanding of the contract requirements.  See Agency Report, Tab 9, Source Selection Decision, at 2.  That is, although CSE was considered to be the “second best qualified offeror,” CSE was not selected because of its two marginal ratings and “unreasonably low” price.  Id.  In performing the price/technical tradeoff required by the RFP, the SSA did not consider CSE's significantly lower price to be an advantage to be weighed against the awardee's higher technical rating.  We think that if CSE's price advantage had been properly weighed in the agency's price/technical tradoff analysis, it would have had a reasonable possibility of being selected for award.  Accordingly, we sustain CSE's protest on this basis.  (CSE Construction, B-291268.2, December 16, 2002)

Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, the SSA's determination that the responses for