Rod Robertson
next focuses on the agency's past performance evaluation of the
contract that it performed with the U.S. Marshal's Service--a
contract for which it received an overall unsatisfactory rating.
Rod Robertson argues that the agency's evaluation of its past
performance in this instance constituted "adverse information,"
which the protester should have received an opportunity to
address. However, where, as here, discussions are not conducted
under an acquisition, an agency is not required to communicate
with offerors regarding questions about adverse past
performance, unless there is a clear reason to question the
validity of the past performance information. Universal Fidelity
Corp., B-294797.2, Feb. 7, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 88 at 6;
contrast Daun-Ray Casuals, Inc., B-255217.3; B‑255217.4, July 6,
1994, 94-2 CPD para. 42 (discussions were conducted, but the
protester was not given an opportunity to address adverse past
performance information); see also Federal Acquisition
Regulation sect. 15.306(d)(3) (where discussions are conducted,
an agency must discuss "adverse past performance information to
which the offeror has not yet had an opportunity to respond.")
(Rod Robertson Enterprises, Inc.,
B-404476, January 31, 2011) (pdf)
LMSI does not
deny that, as is evident from the facts recited above, the Air
Force advised the firm of the agency’s concerns with its
performance on the VH-71 contract. Rather, LMSI asserts that it
thereafter was misled by the Air Force into believing that the
agency was satisfied with its response to the agency’s
evaluation notice and, as a result, was deprived of a meaningful
opportunity to further respond to the perceived VH-71
performance problems. Specifically, LMSI notes that, in the
agency’s subsequent interim (pre-FPR) evaluation briefings in
March, July, and September, LMSI was advised that its proposal
had received a satisfactory confidence rating for past
performance. It is clear from the record, however, that not only
should LMSI have been on notice that the agency’s concerns with
its VH-71 performance had not been fully resolved by LMSI’s
explanation, but that, in any case, LMSI had a further
opportunity to respond to the adverse past performance
information that furnished the basis for the protester’s final
past performance rating of little confidence. In this regard, in
each of the three pre-FPR briefings, the Air Force noted that
there had been “VH‑71 difficulties.” LMSI CSAR-X Initial
Evaluation Briefing at 43; LMSI CSAR-X Interim Evaluation Brief
at 58; LMSI CSAR-X Final Proposal Revision Brief at 55. In
addition, in the March briefing, the agency noted that LMSI’s
[DELETED] and, in the July and September briefings, referred to
its “[c]oncerns with [LMSI’s] VH-71 contract performance.” LMSI
CSAR-X Initial Evaluation Briefing at 43; LMSI CSAR-X Interim
Evaluation Brief at 55; LMSI CSAR-X Final Proposal Revision
Brief at 52. Moreover, the SSA noted in his source selection
decision (as had the agency evaluators in their recommendation
to the SSA) that LMSI’s final past performance rating of little
confidence was based on a negative October 5 Contractor
Performance Assessment Report (CPAR) for the VH-71 contract
which, although it was first furnished to the Air Force by the
Navy on October 12 (after the September 18 closing date for
receipt of FPRs), had been previously furnished to LMSI for
comment on or about July 10, and commented on by LMSI on October
2. SSD at 7; CSAR-X Final Evaluation Brief, Oct. 21, 2006, at
114, 116-17. As discussed in more detail below, the Navy CPAR
rated LMSI’s VH-71 performance [DELETED]. Given the Air Force’s
continuing expressions of concern over LMSI’s VH-71 performance,
and the very unfavorable Navy CPAR that was furnished to LMSI in
July, LMSI clearly was on notice of the need to further account
for its VH-71 performance. We note, moreover, that LMSI in fact
included an explanation of its VH-71 performance in its response
to the CPAR--the agency considered this response in its final
evaluation--and that LMSI could have provided an explanation in
its FPR response as well, had it chosen to do so. We thus find
no basis for concluding that LMSI was deprived of an opportunity
to respond to the adverse past performance information on which
the little confidence evaluation rating was based. (Sikorsky
Aircraft Company; Lockheed Martin Systems, B-299145.4, March
29, 2007) (pdf)
Regarding communications concerning adverse past performance
information to which the vendor has not previously had an
opportunity to respond, we think that for the exercise of
discretion to be reasonable, the agency must give the offeror an
opportunity to respond where there clearly is a reason to
question the validity of the past performance information, for
example, where there are obvious inconsistencies between a
reference's narrative comments and the actual ratings the
reference gives the offeror. In the absence of such a clear
basis to question the past performance information, we think
that, short of acting in bad faith, the agency reasonably may
decide not to ask for clarifications. NMS Mgmt., Inc., supra.
Applying this standard here, we conclude that the agency
reasonably exercised its discretion in deciding not to
communicate with GD-OTS regarding the delays under the LRIP
contract, since the information was based on first-hand
knowledge of Navy personnel who evaluated the protester's past
performance; thus, there was no reason for the Navy to have
questioned the validity of its own conclusions. While the
protester clearly disagrees with the Navy's conclusions about
the LRIP delays and may have wished to respond to the
information, that fact does not render the agency's decision to
make award without holding discussions or clarifications
unreasonable, given the permissive language of FAR Section
15.306(a)(2). Id. The protester's argument that offerors were
treated unequally is similarly unavailing. According to GD-OTS,
when the Navy raised its concerns with Alliant regarding its
subcontracting plan, and afforded Alliant the opportunity to
revise its plan as directed by the agency, the Navy effectively
held discussions with Alliant, and thereby triggered a
requirement for the agency to hold discussions with GD-OTS as
well. (General Dynamics-Ordnance &
Tactical Systems, B-295987; B-295987.2, May 20, 2005) (pdf)
As a preliminary matter, to the extent that the protester
contends that it was improper for the agency to consider the
adverse past performance information included in its RYG 1
records without providing the protester with a further
opportunity prior to award to explain the information, Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 15.306(a)(2), which addresses
clarifications and award without discussions, states in relevant
part that where award will be made without conducting
discussions, "offerors may be given the opportunity to clarify
certain aspects of proposals ( e.g. , the relevance of an
offeror's past performance information and adverse past
performance information to which the offeror has not previously
had an opportunity to respond) or to resolve minor or clerical
errors." As the agency points out, and as discussed further
below, Hanley has had ample opportunity to comment on the
adverse past performance information in its RYG records. Given
the permissive language of FAR 15.306(a)(2), and the fact that
Hanley has been given ample opportunity to comment upon the past
performance information, the fact that Hanley now wishes to
provide further comments on the information in its RYG records
does not give rise to a requirement for the agency to provide an
opportunity to do so. See TLT Constr. Corp. , B-286226, Nov. 7,
2000, 2000 CPD 179 at 7-8; A.G. Cullen Constr., Inc. ,
B-284049.2, Feb. 22, 2000, 2000 CPD 45 at 5-6.
———————
1 The Red/Yellow/Green (RYG)
Program is a Navy/Air Force automated system that classifies
the performance risk associated with a particular contractor
by assigning a color rating to the vendor's quality and
delivery performance history; a green rating signifies low
risk, yellow signifies moderate risk, red signifies high risk,
and a neutral rating applies to contractors lacking recent or
relevant past performance information. All offerors were
advised that the past performance evaluations would be based
upon the offerors' quality and delivery records reported under
the RYG Program.
(Hanley
Industries, Inc., B-295318, February 2, 2005) (pdf)
GTA additionally argues that it was not given an adequate
opportunity to address the negative TACOM contract past
performance information during discussions. The record shows,
however, that GTA was explicitly told during discussions that
the agency had received negative information regarding the
performance of its 210,000 gallon fuel bladder contract.
Specifically, GTA was told that 210k gallon fuel bladder: The
respondent indicated you were experiencing some problems with
the First Article. AR, Tab 10B, GTA EN G-PR-2, at 1. GTA was
also provided a summary that stated performed first article test
3 times and rejected all three. AR, Tab 10B, GTA Briefing
Slides, at 2. When conducting discussions, an agency must advise
offerors of deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse
past performance information to which the offeror has not yet
had an opportunity to respond, and must afford offerors an
opportunity to revise their proposals to fully satisfy the
agencys requirements. Federal Acquisition Regulation
15.306(d)(3). Clearly, based on the discussion here, GTA was
aware that the agency had received negative past performance
information concerning the TACOM contract and that the
information received by the agency was characterized as a FAT
failure. GTA, in fact, responded with a discussion of its
performance on the TACOM contract, explaining difficulties in
performing the FAT requirements and its efforts to correct the
various problems. AR, Tab 10B, GTA EN Response G-PR-2, at 1-2.
Based on this record, we find that the agency conducted
meaningful discussions. (Cooley/Engineered
Membranes; GTA Containers, Inc., B-294896.2; B-294896.3;
B-294896.4, January 21, 2005) (pdf)
FRS
also objects to the TEB's reliance on adverse past performance
information from another source. As noted above, the TEB
learned of certain past performance information adverse to FRS,
and considered the information credible because it was a
statement against the interest of its author--another offeror
who had been FRS's partner in a predecessor company. An
agency is not limited to the "four corners" of an
offeror's proposal in the evaluation of proposals, and may use
other information known by its own evaluators. Arctic
Slope World Servs., Inc., B-284481, B-284481.2, Apr. 27,
2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 75 at 7. While the Forest Service could
have given FRS the opportunity to respond to this adverse past
performance information, see FAR § 15.306(a)(2), we
see no basis to conclude that it was unreasonable for the agency
not to do so. See NMS Mgmt., Inc., B-286335,
Nov. 24, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 197 at 3 (in the absence of a clear
basis to question adverse past performance information, agency
reasonably may decide not to ask for clarification). In
any event, FRS's focus on the agency's reliance on this
information ignores the basic problem with its proposal.
Quite simply, it was the responsibility of FRS to demonstrate in
its proposal past performance relevant to the instant
procurement; it was not the agency's obligation during the
evaluation process to fill in the gaps. Since FRS had the
burden of submitting an adequately written proposal, yet failed
to do so, we have no basis to question the reasonableness of the
agency's evaluation. G&M Indus., B-290354, July
17, 2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 125 at 4. (Forest
Regeneration Services LLC, B-290998, October 30, 2002)
(pdf)
With regard specifically to
clarifications concerning adverse past performance information
to which the offeror has not previously had an opportunity to
respond, we think that, for the exercise of discretion to be
reasonable, the contracting officer must give the offeror an
opportunity to respond where there clearly is a reason to
question the validity of the past performance information, for
example, where there are obvious inconsistencies between a
reference's narrative comments and the actual ratings the
reference gives the offeror. In the absence of such a clear
basis to question the past performance information, we think
that, short of acting in bad faith, the contracting officer
reasonably may decide not to ask for clarifications.
Applying this standard here, we think that the contracting
officer reasonably exercised his discretion in deciding not to
communicate with Cullen regarding the adverse past performance
information received from one of Cullen's references. (A.
G. Cullen Construction, Inc., B-284049.2, February 22, 2000)
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