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FAR
15.305 (a)(3): Proposal Evaluation - Evaluator's scoring |
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Comptroller
General - Key Excerpts |
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The solicitation sought proposals to develop and provide MAST
units, which are intended to allow users to simulate threats
posed by man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), i.e.,
shoulder-launched surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles. The MAST
units will be used to train aircrews to respond to MANPADS
threats. The solicitation statement of work (SOW) explained that
"[t]he abundance of MANPADS, particularly among terrorist
organizations, has emerged as an increasing threat to both
civilian and military aircraft operating in support of Overseas
Contingency Operations." RFP, SOW, at 1. The SOW identified
"Russian-made MANPADS such as the SA-7, SA‑14, SA-16, and SA-18"
as popular models that pose a threat to aircraft. Id. The
proposed MAST units will be required to integrate an existing
technology used to simulate MANPADS threats, known as the
multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES), as well as
provide additional simulation capabilities.
(sections
deleted)
DRS challenges the
Army's evaluation of its technical proposal, and the agency's
evaluation of offerors' prices. As discussed below, we conclude
that the Army's evaluation of DRS's proposal had numerous
prejudicial errors under the first two non-price evaluation
factors--technical approach, and path forward for system
performance and schedule. We conclude that the protester's
challenge to the agency's evaluation offerors' proposed prices
is untimely.
The evaluation of an offeror's proposal is a matter within the
agency's discretion. IPlus, Inc., B‑298020, B-298020.2, June 5,
2006, 2006 CPD para. 90 at 7, 13. A protester's mere
disagreement with the agency's judgment in its determination of
the relative merit of competing proposals does not establish
that the evaluation was unreasonable. VT Griffin Servs., Inc.,
B-299869.2, Nov. 10, 2008, 2008 CPD para. 219 at 4. In reviewing
a protest against an agency's evaluation of proposals, our
Office will not reevaluate proposals but instead will examine
the record to determine whether the agency's judgment was
reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria
and applicable procurement statutes and regulations. See
Shumaker Trucking & Excavating Contractors, Inc., B-290732,
Sept. 25, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 169 at 3. While we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the agency, we will question
the agency's conclusions where they are inconsistent with the
solicitation criteria, undocumented, or not reasonably based.
Public Communications Servs., Inc., B-400058, B-400058.3, July
18, 2008, 2009 CPD para. 154 at 17.
This decision is based, in part, upon testimony the Army SSEB
Chair and SSA provided during a hearing conducted by our Office
on August 21, 2010. In reviewing an agency's evaluation of
offerors' proposals, we do not limit our consideration to
contemporaneously-documented evidence, but instead consider all
the information provided, including the parties' arguments,
explanations, and any hearing testimony. Navistar Def., LLC; BAE
Sys., Tactical Vehicle Sys. LP, B‑401865 et al., Dec. 14, 2009,
2009 CPD para. 258 at 6. While we generally give little or no
weight to reevaluations and judgments prepared in the heat of
the adversarial process, Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support,
B-277263.2, B-277263.3, Sept. 29, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 91 at 15,
post-protest explanations that provide a detailed rationale for
contemporaneous conclusions, and simply fill in previously
unrecorded details, will generally be considered in our review
of the rationality of selection decisions--so long as those
explanations are credible and consistent with the
contemporaneous record. NWT, Inc.; PharmChem Labs., Inc.,
B-280988, B-280988.2, Dec. 17, 1998, 98‑2 CPD para. 158 at 16.
(section
deleted)
A. Technical
Approach Factor Evaluation
The protester raises several challenges to the evaluation of its
proposal as marginal under the technology insertion and open
architecture subfactor, and the target sensitive subfactor of
the technical evaluation subfactor. As discussed below, we find
that there were errors in five of the weaknesses identified by
the agency in DRS's proposal under these two subfactors.
1. USB ports
DRS argues that
the agency unreasonably assessed a weakness in its proposal
under the technology insertion and open architecture subfactor,
based on the protester's proposed use of USB ports.
In the RFP performance specification, the "Data Transfer
Interface" requirement required offerors to provide an
input/output interface for uploading and downloading data. RFP,
Performance Specification, sect. 3.7.1.2. The relevant provision
is as follows: "Note: Due to Information Assurance requirements
all MAST related USB ports, if part of the MAST design, shall
preclude the use of commercial standard USB physical connections
through keying or some other physical means." Id.
As relevant here, keying is a hardware-based means of
encryption, which is considered among the most advanced forms of
security for USB devices. See Tr. at 196:19-22. DRS's proposal
stated in several places that it would use "keyed External USB
ports" for data transfer. See AR, Tab 7A, DRS Technical
Proposal, at 6-7, 14, 23.
In the revised evaluation report, the agency identified a
weakness in DRS's proposal because "[t]he offeror does not
provide a methodology to satisfy the [information assurance] USB
requirement or an alternate solution of transferring data." AR,
Tab 18, Revised Evaluation Report, at 19. The selection decision
also stated that "no methodology is provided to satisfy the
[information assurance] USB requirement." AR, Tab 22, SSD, at 6.
The agency contends that the plain language of the solicitation
prohibited the use of any USB ports. AR at 63-64. The SSEB Chair
testified that the intent of the provision was to prohibit the
use of USB connections of any kind. Tr. at 197:5-12. In this
regard, the agency argues that the word "preclude" refers to all
USB ports, and the phrase "through keying or some other physical
means" refers to clarifying examples of what kinds of USB ports
are prohibited. AR at 64.
We think that the plain language of the solicitation provision
does not support the agency's interpretation that all USB ports
are prohibited. The first part of the provision states that "all
MAST related USB ports, if part of the MAST design. . ." RFP,
Performance Specification, sect. 3.7.1.2. We think this phrase
plainly indicates that MAST related USB ports are allowed. The
next part of the provision states that the USB ports that are
part of the MAST design "shall preclude the use of commercial
standard physical USB connections through keying or some other
physical means." Id. We think that the second phrase plainly
states that USB ports are permitted, provided that they
"preclude the use of commercial standard physical USB
connections" through the method specified, i.e., "keying or some
other physical means." Id.
Based on the plain language of the solicitation, we think that
the protester's interpretation of the RFP as permitting keyed
USB ports is reasonable, and that the agency's interpretation of
the RFP as barring use of all USB ports is unreasonable. Thus,
we think the agency's assessment of a weakness regarding DRS's
proposed use of USB ports was not reasonable under the technical
evaluation factor.
(section
deleted)
(DRS
ICAS, LLC, B-401852.4; B-401852.5, September 8, 2010)
(pdf)
On the record before us, we conclude that the VA unreasonably
evaluated DCFD's quotation with a "fail" rating for the
geographic coverage factor for lack of a plan to cover the
geographic area where the awardee's quotation did not include
any more specific information than DCFD's quotation, which was
assigned a "pass" rating under the geographic coverage factor.
See Kathryn Huddleston and Assocs., Ltd., B‑289453, Mar. 11,
2002, 2002 CPD para. 57 at 7. While it may be that the agency
believed that Metro West identified more resources than DCFD
that could be utilized to satisfy the geographic coverage
factor, this does not provide a basis for rating DCFD's
quotation as "fail" under this factor. As noted above, in order
to find DCFD to have "failed" under this factor, the agency was
required to conclude that based on DCFD's "qualifications and
experience, extreme doubt exists that the offeror will
successfully perform the required effort." RFQ at 62. On this
record, the agency has provided no basis for a determination
that "extreme doubt exists" that DCFD "could successfully
perform the required effort," particularly given that DCFD was
the incumbent for these services and indicated in its quotation
that it would continue to provide them, as in the past, over the
same required geographic coverage area. Furthermore, we note
that DCFD's quotation responded to this factor in a manner
similar to Metro West's response, which the agency found to be
acceptable. (Douglas County Fire
District #2, B-403228, October 4, 2010) (pdf)
Velos also protests the reasonableness of the contracting
officer assigning a performance risk to its proposal under
business experience/history for not providing a more current D&B
report than did Medidata.
This factor included evaluating "the overall viability of the
Offeror in performing for the term of the contract including
financial viability and organizational stability." RFP sect.
M.1. Item 3 of the agency's FPR request was for "financial
information to show current financial status" to include "your
most recently available D&B report." AR, Tab 12C, Request for
FPRs (Feb. 3, 2009), at 1-2. In response to item 3, Velos
provided its last D&B report dated August 2008; updated
financial information from that previously submitted, including
an updated income statement and balance sheet; and additional
explanations addressing its financial viability. AR, Tab 14B,
Velos FPR (Feb. 3, 2009) at 3-4, attachs.
The contracting officer has not expressed, nor does the record
establish, that the agency had a specific basis to challenge the
actual financial viability of Velos. Indeed, the contracting
officer explained that the only concern was based on the date of
the D&B report. Tr. at 79-83. Velos states that it furnished the
most current financial reports on its company in its FPR and
that the D&B report dated August 2008 provided by Velos was the
most recent report in its possession. In the absence of any
evidence that the contracting officer had any specific concerns
about the financial viability of Velos, it was not reasonable to
assign a performance risk solely on the basis of the date on
Velos's D&B report, particularly since the agency did not
request that Velos have its D&B report updated. Thus, this
discriminator between the proposals also lacks a reasonable
basis. (Velos, Inc., B-400500.8;
B-400500.9, December 14, 2009) (pdf)
Trusted Base complains that DOS misevaluated its proposal under
every evaluation factor. In reviewing protests of alleged
improper evaluations, it is not our role to reevaluate
proposals. Rather, our Office will examine the record to
determine whether the agency’s judgment was reasonable and in
accord with the stated evaluation criteria and applicable
procurement laws and regulations. Worldwide Language Res., Inc.,
B-297210 et al., Nov. 28, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 211 at 3. A
protester’s mere disagreement with the agency’s judgment does
not establish that an evaluation was unreasonable. UNICCO Gov’t
Servs., Inc., B-277658, Nov. 7, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 134 at 7.
We have reviewed all of Trusted Base’s arguments and find that
none has merit. We address some of Trusted Base’s arguments
below.
Trusted Base asserts that its proposal was impermissibly
downgraded under the understanding of the requirements and
technical approach evaluation factor. The protester complains
that it was penalized for failing to adequately address the
approach/knowledge of office administrative support evaluation
subfactor, even though this subfactor had been deleted from the
evaluation scheme. Protest at 5; Protester’s Comments at 5.
Although DOS agrees that this evaluation subfactor was
deleted--and acknowledges that despite its deletion the
subfactor remained on the previously-prepared evaluation
materials--it explains that its concern was that the protester,
unlike AGTech, did not propose any FTEs for the [deleted]
position, a staffing requirement set forth in the TOR’s “Service
Offering Estimate.” Thus, in the agency’s view, it was not
Trusted Base’s failure to discuss its general approach to, or
knowledge of, office administrative support that resulted in the
assessment of a weakness in Trusted Base’s proposal. Rather, it
was the omission of an important position. The agency notes in
this regard that this omission raised concerns about the firm’s
understanding of the comprehensive TOR staffing requirements.
Trusted Base argues that it was unreasonable for the agency to
assume that the firm’s proposed [deleted] FTEs for the base year
staff did not include the [deleted] function position. See
Protester’s Comments at 5. In fact, Trusted Base points out that
its proposal clearly indicated that it would satisfy this
requirement by using its [deleted] support to ESOC. Id.
While the record shows that Trusted Base’s proposal explained
that its [deleted] support, we do not think it was unreasonable
for the agency to be concerned about the proposal’s failure to
address the requirement for a [deleted]. In addition, this
position was specifically identified as a requirement in the TOR,
and in other areas the agency found that other aspects of
Trusted Base’s proposed staffing indicated a lack of
understanding of the TOR’s comprehensive requirements. To the
extent the protester believes that the information in its
proposal explaining how it would use its [deleted] (a position
not usually associated with [deleted]) should have addressed the
agency’s concerns, the protester is simply disagreeing with the
agency’s judgment; the protester’s disagreement does not make
the agency’s concerns unreasonable. See UNICCO Gov’t Servs.,
Inc., supra.
In any case, Trusted Base’s central arguments focus on the
agency’s judgment that the protester’s proposed staffing for the
base and option years was understated and created doubt as to
the company’s ability to successfully perform the TOR services.
The protester disagrees with this evaluation finding on the
basis that the data in the “Service Offering Estimate” was
simply an estimate of the staffing hours required. As such, the
protester asserts it could propose staffing hours that, in its
business judgment, would be sufficient to perform the required
services. Protester’s Comments at 2-5.
Again, while Trusted Base is correct that the staffing hours and
labor categories in the TOR were estimates, the protester’s
argument misses the point. Potential offerors were instructed to
use this information--which was based on historical workload
data and TOR requirements--in preparing their proposals. Thus,
this information provided a level-playing field for reviewing
how offerors would perform--and the relative differences in
their cost to perform--the time and materials effort at issue
here. When the protester elected to generate its own estimates
of the future workload, it assumed the risk that its fewer
proposed staffing hours would result in an evaluation finding
that the firm’s staffing plan was understated. Also again, the
protester’s disagreement with the agency’s evaluation judgment
does not render it unreasonable. Coastal Drilling, Inc.,
B-285085.3, July 20, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 130 at 4.
(Trusted Base, LLC, B-401670,
October 27, 2009) (pdf)
First, AINS objects to the agency's finding that its product
failed "to fully meet" critical requirement [deleted], which
requires the vendor to propose [deleted] RFQ, Att. D
(Requirements Matrix), at 24. The protester responded to this
requirement by noting in its self-assessment that this feature
was targeted for release in version 7.0 of its FOIAXpress
software, which was due out in July 2009. During discussions,
the agency noted that the requirement had to be met by the time
of user acceptance testing, and that AINS's proposed date of
July 2009 appeared to be well beyond the user acceptance testing
date. The agency also noted that the proposed solution would be
in an AINS product (version 7.0) that was not yet in existence.
Accordingly, the agency asked AINS to confirm whether it could
meet the requirement by the time of user acceptance testing and
to explain how it would do so and the state of development of
its software with regard to meeting the requirement.
AINS responded by stating that it would have critical
requirement [deleted] met by the time of user acceptance
testing. The protester explained that it would accomplish this
by enhancing the latest version of its FOIAXpress software to
include the ability to [deleted], and that after this had been
accomplished, a user with the appropriate permission would be
able to [deleted], which could then be [deleted]. The protester
furnished a detailed timeline for completing and testing the
enhancement.
While the contemporaneous record lacks detail as to the basis
for the evaluators' finding that AINS's response failed to
demonstrate full compliance with requirement [deleted], the
agency furnished the following explanation in its report:
although AINS's revised quotation had indicated that, once
enhanced, the protester's software would be able to [deleted],
and that these reports could then be exported into various
formats, "it [did] not address making the underlying [deleted],
which is what Section [deleted] specifically requires." AR at
16. The agency also noted that the protester's response made
clear that its software was in a developmental stage.
The protester argued in response that it had addressed the
requirement for saving the [deleted] in a format that would
allow it to be made available to the public by explaining in its
discussion question response that its upgraded software would
permit the [deleted]. The protester further argued that the
evaluators had treated the vendors unequally by failing to
identify Privasoft's response to the requirement as a weakness,
even though it also failed to address making the [deleted]
available to the public.[8] In its report on the protest, the
agency responded to the protester's allegation of unequal
treatment by conceding that Privasoft had not directly addressed
the requirement pertaining to [deleted]; DOJ maintained that it
reasonably had not questioned Privasoft's compliance, however,
because Privasoft had "elsewhere indicated unequivocally it
could meet the requirement." The agency noted in this connection
that Privasoft had represented in its self-assessment that the
capabilities required by [deleted] were "currently available" in
its software. Supp. AR at 16.
We fail to see a meaningful distinction between the two vendors'
responses to the requirement pertaining to [deleted], neither of
which specifically addressed the capability to make the data
available outside the context of a report.[9] Accordingly, we do
not think that the agency has demonstrated a reasonable basis
for finding that AINS, but not Privasoft, failed to "fully meet"
the above requirement. (AINS,
Inc., B-400760.2; B-400760.3, June 12, 2009) (pdf)
SBSS asserts that the technical evaluation of IST’s proposal was
inconsistent with the cost/price evaluation, in that the
technical proposal was not reevaluated in light of the staffing
adjustments made for purposes of the most probable cost
adjustment. According to the protester, an offeror “could
propose a technical approach which included staffing well in
excess of the Government’s optimal staffing levels (and thus
receive a higher technical rating) and not be penalized” in the
technical evaluation even where the agency assumed a lower
staffing level in evaluating cost. SBSS Comments at 2.
Where the cost and technical evaluation of a proposal reach
contradictory conclusions, the agency generally is required to
reconcile the evaluations. See Serco, Inc., B-298266, Aug. 9,
2006, 2006 CPD para. 120 at 7; Information Ventures, Inc.,
B-297276.2 et al., Mar. 1, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 45 at 6.
Here, there was an ultimate disparity between the technical
proposal staffing and the staffing level used in the cost
evaluation--based on its estimate of required FSA staffing, the
Air Force assumed lower FSA staffing for IST in the cost
evaluation than the level proposed in IST’s technical proposal,
resulting in a downward adjustment in IST’s cost/price. While,
on its face, this appears to present an evaluation
inconsistency, in fact, there is no indication that IST’s
proposal received a higher evaluation rating as a result of the
higher staffing level in its technical proposal; the record
indicates that IST’s proposal in fact received only an
acceptable rating, without any evaluated strengths, under the
technical approach/support subfactor of the mission capability
factor. Since IST received no evaluation benefit from its higher
proposed staffing level--there is no argument that IST’s
staffing should have been found less than acceptable--there is
no basis for us to object to this aspect of the evaluation of
IST’s proposal. (SelectTech
Bering Straits Solutions JV; Croop-LaFrance, Inc., B-400964;
B-400964.2; B-400964.3, April 6, 2009) (pdf)
As an initial
matter, we are aware of no statute or regulation that requires
an agency to create a consensus report in evaluating proposals,
nor is there any requirement that every individual evaluator’s
scoring sheet track the final evaluation report. See Andrulis
Corp., B-281002.2, June 2, 1999, 99-1 CPD para. 105 at 5 (a
consensus score need not be the same score as initially scored
by the individual evaluators). In short, these matters alone
will not lead our office to conclude that there was an
impropriety in the agency’s evaluation or a violation of
procurement law or regulation. (Smart
Innovative Solutions, B-400323.3, November 19, 2008) (pdf)
As an initial matter, we find the protester’s criticisms of the
SEB’s assignment of adjectival ratings and point scores and its
corresponding documentation of this process misplaced. In
Wackenhut’s view, the number of strengths and weaknesses found
for each offeror “has to be the most important basis for an
adjectival rating and score,” Protester’s Comments at 16, and,
given that the “significant strengths” were the chief
discriminator between the proposals, “if [Wackenhut’s] having
twice as many significant strengths as Coastal is not a
meaningful difference, then nothing in the SEB’s process can
be.” Id. at 18. Wackenhut also maintains that in those instances
where the SEB in fact gave some significant strengths more value
than others, it failed to create a record explaining its
rationale in this regard, thereby, in the protester’s view,
rendering the SEB’s exercise of its discretion “unreviewable”
and “illegal.” Id.
In a hearing conducted by our Office, during which we heard
testimony from the SSA and the SEB Chairperson, the SEB
Chairperson described the evaluation process and explained that
each proposal was evaluated independently against the criteria
set forth in the RFP, with the SEB reaching consensus on its
findings (the various strengths and weaknesses identified for
each proposal). Based upon these findings, the SEB assigned, on
a consensus basis, adjectival ratings, and then point scores. In
assigning ratings and scores, the SEB Chairperson explained
that, with respect to significant strengths, it was the content
of the offerors’ proposals, as reflected in the specific
findings, which was used to rate and score offerors. The SEB
Chairperson stated that the process of assigning ratings and
scores was not merely a “numbers game” driven by the mere number
of significant strengths identified in an offeror’s proposal.
Hearing Transcript (Hr. Tr.) at 82.
We find the agency’s evaluation process unobjectionable. At the
core, Wackenhut seeks a mathematical or mechanical consideration
of the number of significant strengths in determining the
evaluation ratings and attributing points to the offerors’
proposals. Adjectival ratings and point scores, however, are
mere tools in the evaluation and selection process and should
not be mechanically derived or applied. Rather, it is the
agency’s qualitative findings in connection with its evaluation
of proposals--in this case the documented written narratives
underlying and justifying the SEB’s findings of particular
significant strengths--that govern the reasonableness of an
agency’s assessment of offerors’ proposals. MCR Federal, Inc.,
B-280969, Dec. 14, 1998, 99-1 CPD para. 8 at 9.
Here, the offerors’ proposals were evaluated independently
against the RFP’s evaluation criteria and the evaluation ratings
and scores simply served as an expression of the agency’s
exercise of its discretion in making its qualitative findings.
As a consequence, there is nothing per se improper with Coastal
and Wackenhut receiving similar ratings and scores under the
mission suitability factor, and related subfactors,
notwithstanding the fact that Wackenhut’s proposal had more
significant strengths as compared to the proposal submitted by
Coastal. All Star Maintenance, Inc., B-271119, June 17, 1996,
96-1 CPD para. 278 at 4 (holding that agency’s evaluation of two
offers as essentially equal was not unreasonable notwithstanding
the fact that the protester had five strengths while the awardee
had only two strengths). Absent some basis for concluding that
the technical findings underlying the ratings and scores were
flawed, there is no basis for our Office to conclude that the
SEB’s ratings were unreasonable. Moreover, with respect to the
documentation issue, the relevant material is NASA’s underlying
technical findings, which have been amply documented by the SEB,
and it is those findings which are reflected in the SEB’s
qualitative findings and which formed the basis of the
adjectival ratings and point scores. (Wackenhut
Services, Inc., B-400240; B-400240.2, September 10, 2008) (pdf)
PHASE-IN
ManTech challenges NASA's evaluation of offerors' approaches to
phase-in at the start of the contract. In this regard, the RFP,
which included a 30-day phase-in period, provided that the
government would evaluate under the management plan subfactor
(under the mission suitability factor) each offeror’s phase-in
approach
for continuity and a smooth
transition with the incumbent Contractor during the 30-day
phase-in period. The Government will evaluate how clearly the
phase-in plan demonstrates an ability to assume full contract
responsibility on the effective date of the contract. The
Government will evaluate how the phase-in plan specifically
address[es] . . . the proposed . . staffing plan. . . .
RFP sect. M.3. ManTech asserts
that the agency failed to recognize its advantage as the
incumbent contractor.
Analex’s proposal was rated overall excellent under the
management plan subfactor. This rating was based in part on two
evaluated significant strengths, one for proposing (1) an
“extremely well-planned, comprehensive and detailed phase-in
plan that provides for a smooth transition and demonstrates a
superb ability to assume full contract responsibility,” and the
other one for a superior approach to using bonuses tied to the
award fees earned by Analex and other bonuses as an incentive to
maximize overall employee morale and performance. SSD at 4;
Integrated Evaluation Panel Revised Final Report at 41-53. In
addition, Analex’s proposal received four strengths under the
management plan subfactor, for (1) proposing a good system (its
online task order management system discussed above) to process
task orders and manage multiple ongoing tasks, (2) a good
approach for mitigating performance risks and for interfacing
with government personnel, (3) a robust fringe benefits package,
which would aid in recruiting and retaining employees, and (4) a
thorough, comprehensive Mission Assurance Plan which
demonstrated Analex’s knowledge of and compliance with GSFC’s
Mission Assurance Guidelines. Analex’s only evaluated weakness
under this subfactor was an inadequate location allowance and
severance pay policy. Integrated Evaluation Panel Revised Final
Report at 41-53.
ManTech’s proposal likewise was rated overall excellent under
the management plan subfactor. ManTech’s rating was based in
part on a single evaluated significant strength for a superior
approach to phase-in, involving no major changeover of
personnel, processes or procedures, which would significantly
reduce the risk of phase-in. In addition, ManTech’s proposal
received six strengths under the management plan subfactor, for
proposing (1) policies and incentives that have a high
probability of retaining employees, maintaining high morale and
increasing productivity in a union environment, (2) a good task
order and property management system, (3) a good approach to
managing workload variability, (4) desirable benefits for
part-time workers, (5) an Integrated Knowledge Environment
portal that demonstrated a good approach to managing contract
work, and (6) a robust total compensation plan. In addition,
ManTech’s proposal received a weakness on the basis that, in
contrast to Analex’s thorough, comprehensive mission assurance
plan, ManTech’s significantly less detailed mission assurance
plan was inadequate, failing to demonstrate compliance with
GSFC’s Mission Assurance Guidelines. SSD at 7; Integrated
Evaluation Panel Revised Final Report at 104-18. Thus, the
record indicates that NASA in fact recognized, and assigned
ManTech’s proposal a significant strength under the management
plan subfactor on account of its superior approach to phase-in.
NASA specifically recognized that, given ManTech’s policies and
incentives, reflected in a 95 percent employee retention rate
over the past 5 years, ManTech had a high probability of
maintaining its incumbent workforce, thereby significantly
reducing transition risk. Integrated Evaluation Panel Revised
Final Report at 104-06. However, NASA also recognized that
Analex had proposed an “exceptional strategy,” warranting a
significant strength, in support of its proposal to hire
[REDACTED] percent of the incumbent employees. In this regard,
the agency noted that Analex had proposed a very attractive
package for recruiting incumbent employees, including:
[REDACTED]. In addition, NASA concluded that Analex’s proposed
superior approach to bonuses (for which it earned a second
significant strength) would likewise increase the likelihood of
recruiting incumbent employees. In this regard, the agency noted
that Analex had proposed bonuses [REDACTED], in a total amount
of up to approximately [REDACTED] percent of salaries, with the
bonuses commencing when Analex earned an award fee of at least
[REDACTED] percent. (In contrast, in ManTech’s proposed approach
of offering bonuses tied to the earned award fee, Mantech
commenced the bonuses only when ManTech earned an award fee
above [REDACTED] percent, and it only encouraged, but did not
require, participation by its subcontractors.) NASA also
determined that Analex’s robust fringe benefits package would
aid in recruiting employees. Finally, the agency determined that
Analex’s plan for [REDACTED], would greatly improve the
likelihood of a successful transition. Integrated Evaluation
Panel Revised Final Report at 41-45; Agency Supplemental Report,
Mar. 17, 2008, at 4-11; ManTech FPR Mission Suitability Proposal
at 113, 118; Analex FPR Mission Suitability Proposal at C-26.
We conclude that NASA reasonably determined that Analex offered
an exceptional transition approach, with many incentives for
incumbent employee retention, which warranted a significant
strength under the management plan subfactor. Furthermore,
ManTech has not shown that, given Analex’s overall two
significant strengths and four strengths under the management
plan subfactor, it was unreasonable for the agency to rate
Analex’s proposal as excellent in this area. Certainly the fact
that ManTech was the incumbent contractor here did not
automatically entitle it to a higher rating under the management
plan subfactor. See Karrar Sys. Corp., B‑310661, B-310661.2,
Mar. 3, 2008, 2008 CPD para. 51 at 4-5. (ManTech
International Corporation, B-311074, April 15, 2008) (pdf)
The evaluation of proposals is a matter within the discretion of
the contracting agency, and in reviewing protests against
allegedly improper evaluations, it is not our role to reevaluate
proposals. Rather, our Office examines the record to determine
whether the agency’s judgment was reasonable, in accord with the
evaluation factors set forth in the RFP, and whether the agency
treated offerors equally in its evaluation of their respective
proposals and did not disparately evaluate proposals with
respect to the same requirements. Hanford Env’t. Health Found.,
B-292858.2, B-292858.5, Apr. 7, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 164 at 4;
Rockwell Elec. Commerce Corp., B-286201 et al., Dec. 14, 2000,
2001 CPD para. 65 at 5.
As stated above, the contemporaneous record does not evidence
any consideration, or even awareness, by the Army of the stated
“assumptions” in Fluor’s TEP that there would be a period
between TO award and NTP during which it would receive
incremental funding and could perform various tasks, such as
procuring material and deploying equipment. See Fluor TEP,
Scenario Approach, at 3, 33-34. The fact that the agency may
have been unaware of the assumptions on which Fluor’s TEP stated
it was predicated does not change the fact that Fluor’s
assumptions were not consistent with the terms of the scenario
that the other offerors, as well as the agency, treated as
mandatory. It is a fundamental principle of federal procurement
that a contracting agency must treat offerors equally, and the
agency’s acceptance of Fluor’s proposal stating that it was
predicated on the above-mentioned assumptions was improper and
unfair to the other offerors.[9] See Farmland National Beef,
B‑286607; B-286607.2, Jan. 24, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 31 at 8 (a
proposal that fails to conform to one or more of a
solicitation’s material terms is technically unacceptable and
cannot form the basis for an award); Loral Terracom; Marconi
Italiana, B-224908; B‑224908.2, Feb. 18, 1987, 87-1 CPD para.
182 at 9 (agency’s acceptance of a proposal based upon a
methodology different than that set forth in the solicitation
was improper where the agency did not inform all offerors that
the agency’s requirements were not as rigid as indicated in the
solicitation). Moreover, we cannot find the agency’s evaluation
of Fluor’s TEP under the technical evaluation subfactors
reasonable, given that it was based upon a misreading of Fluor’s
proposal with regard to the stated “assumptions.” The record
does not show that this is an instance where an agency noted
that a proposal was taking exception to a solicitation
requirement in some respect, but ultimately determined that the
proposed approach would meet the agency’s needs. Rather, the
contemporaneous record, as well as the agency’s arguments during
the course of these protests, evidence that the Army simply
misread or altogether overlooked the stated “assumptions” in
Fluor’s proposal regarding the period of time and availability
of funding for tasks to be performed between TO award and NTP.
(Contingency Management Group, LLC;
IAP Worldwide Services, Inc., B-309752; B-309752.2;
B-309752.3; B-309752.4; B-309752.5; B-309752.6; B-309752.7,
October 5, 2007) (pdf)
GAP asserts that the agency’s proposal scoring scheme was flawed
in that it essentially “negated” the technical distinctions
among the proposals. In this respect, the record shows that the
agency evaluated proposals by assigning numeric scores between 0
and 5 points for each of the 13 evaluation subfactors, and then
multiplied the raw score by the weight assigned to each of the
subfactors to arrive at weighted scores. According to the
protester, because all of the acceptable proposals (that is,
proposals that it describes as likely to have been included in
the competitive range) would in practice be assigned raw numeric
scores of either 3 or 4, the effect was to artificially narrow
the range of possible total scores, such that it would appear
from the numeric scores that all of the proposals were
technically equal. According to the protester, this effectively
left the source selection to be based on low price rather than
on technical considerations which were to have received
paramount consideration under the terms of the RFP. This
argument is without merit. It is well established that ratings,
be they numerical, adjectival, or color, are merely guides for
intelligent decision making in the procurement process. Business
Consulting Assocs., LLC, B-299758.2, Aug. 1, 2007, 2007 CPD
para.134 at 4. Where the evaluators and source selection
official reasonably consider the underlying bases for the
ratings, including advantages and disadvantages associated with
the specific content of competing proposals, in a manner that is
fair and equitable and consistent with the solicitation, a
protester’s disagreement over the actual adjectival or numeric
ratings assigned essentially is inconsequential in that it does
not affect the reasonableness of the judgments made in the
source selection decision. Id. The record here shows that the
agency performed an evaluation of the proposals consistent with
the RFP evaluation factors and prepared detailed narrative
materials reflecting the evaluators’ findings. AR exhs. D12,
D19. The record also shows that those findings were specifically
considered in detail by the agency’s source selection official
in making the agency’s award decision. Indeed, because the
scoring was so close among the four proposals, the source
selection official expressly queried the evaluators “to
determine if there was a proposal that contained technical
aspects that would clearly set it apart from any of the other
ones.” AR exh. G7, Source Selection Decision, at 8. The
technical panel concluded that no proposal had technical
advantages or discrepancies that would set it apart from the
other proposals and, as a result, the proposals were determined
to be technically equal. GAP does not challenge any of the
agency’s underlying substantive findings with respect to the
relative merits of the competing proposals. The protester does
not, for example, allege that the agency unreasonably failed to
identify strengths that were present in its proposal or
unreasonably identified weaknesses that were not present; nor
does it challenge the agency’s underlying findings with respect
to the other proposals in the competitive range, including the
awardee’s. Moreover, GAP also has not alleged or demonstrated
that it should have been assigned higher numeric scores, or that
the awardee should have been assigned lower numeric scores,
based upon the strengths or weaknesses identified by the agency
in its evaluation. In these circumstances, given the absence of
any substantive challenge to the agency’s detailed narrative
evaluation findings, we simply have no basis to question the
agency’s evaluation results. We therefore deny this aspect of
GAP’s protest. (Gap Solutions,
Inc., B-310564, January 4, 2008) (pdf)
To the extent that Sherrick argues that the selection decision
did not accurately tally the number of strengths and weakness
for each proposal, or that the selection decision focuses on
specific discriminators between the proposals instead of their
evaluation ratings, these arguments are unavailing. The
evaluation of proposals and the assignment of adjectival ratings
should generally not be based upon a simple count of strengths
and weaknesses, but upon a qualitative assessment of the
proposals consistent with the evaluation scheme. See Smiths
Detection, Inc., B-298838, B-298838.2, Dec. 22, 2006, 2007 CPD
para. 5 at 5-6. Moreover, it is well established that ratings,
be they numerical, adjectival, or color, are merely guides for
intelligent decision-making in the procurement process. Citywide
Managing Servs. of Port Washington, Inc., B-281287.12,
B-281287.13, Nov. 15, 2000, 2001 CPD para. 6 at 11. Where an
agency reasonably considers the underlying bases for the
ratings, including advantages and disadvantages associated with
the specific content of competing proposals, in a manner that is
fair and equitable and consistent with the terms of the
solicitation, the protesters’ disagreement over the actual
adjectival or color ratings is essentially inconsequential in
that it does not affect the reasonableness of the judgments made
in the source selection decision. See id.; National Steel &
Shipbuilding Co., B-281142, B-281142.2, Jan. 4, 1999, 99-2 CPD
para. 95 at 15. The record here shows that the agency had a
rational basis for its evaluations and source selection
determination. Although our decision does not address every
challenge raised by Sherrick regarding the number of strengths
and weaknesses or adjectival ratings assigned to each offeror’s
proposal, we have reviewed all of the issues raised and find
that none has merit. (Sherrick
Aerospace, B-310359.2, January 10, 2008) (pdf)
Pemco first challenges the agency’s assignment of “satisfactory”
confidence ratings to both Pemco’s and Boeing’s proposals under
the past performance factor. In this regard, Pemco complains
that the agency “unreasonably failed to rate Pemco higher than
Boeing,” and that the agency “was unreasonable in rating both
Boeing and Pemco equally.” Protest at 15, 17.
As our Office has frequently stated, adjectival ratings are only
guides to assist agencies in evaluating proposals; information
regarding particular strengths and weaknesses of proposals is
the type of information that source selection officials should
consider, in addition to ratings and point scores, to enable
them to determine whether and to what extent meaningful
differences exist between proposals. See, e.g., TPL, Inc.,
B-297136.10, B-297136.11, June 29, 2006, CPD para. 104 at 17. In
this regard, proposals with the same adjectival ratings are not
necessarily of equal quality, and an agency may properly
consider specific advantages that make one proposal higher
quality than another. See Pueblo Envtl. Solution, LLC, B-291487,
B‑291487.2, Dec. 16, 2002, 2003 CPD para. 14 at 10; Oceaneering
Int’l, Inc., B-287325, June 5, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 95 at 13.
Here, the record clearly establishes that the agency did not
evaluate Boeing’s and Pemco’s proposals as being equal with
regard to past performance; rather, Pemco’s proposal was found
superior to Boeing’s. Specifically, although both proposals
received overall ratings of “satisfactory” confidence, the
agency’s contemporaneous evaluation documents show that, after
considering multiple strengths and weaknesses in both offerors’
past performance record, Pemco’s overall past performance rating
was considered to be at “the high end of satisfactory” and
Boeing’s overall rating was considered to be [deleted]. PAR at
159; Email from SSA (Riechers) to SSAC Advisors, Aug. 5, 2007.
Similarly, the SSA unambiguously stated in his source selection
decision: “I consider Pemco to have a better past performance
record than Boeing.” SSDD at 22. Accordingly, there is no merit
to Pemco’s protest that the two proposals were evaluated
“equally” with regard to past performance; to the contrary, the
agency considered this aspect of Pemco’s proposal to be better
than Boeing’s. (Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.,
B-310372, December 27, 2007) (pdf)
Bio-Rad
finally argues that the agency’s evaluation of IDEXX’s proposal
as “satisfactory” under the small disadvantaged business
participation factor was unreasonable. The proposal preparation
instructions stated with regard to the small disadvantaged
business participation factor that offerors “[s]hall identify in
this section of the technical proposal specific large business,
small business, HUBZone small business, small disadvantaged
business, [WOSB], [VOSB], and HBCU/MI and Service Disabled
Veteran-owned small business subcontract participation in
contract performance.” RFP at 56. The RFP concluded here that
“[t]he proposed participation of subcontractors will be
evaluated based on the information submitted in the
Subcontractor Information Sheet,” a copy of which was provided
as an attachment to the solicitation. RFP at 57. The section of
IDEXX’s technical proposal addressing the small disadvantaged
business participation factor consists of one sentence, which
states that “[t]here is no subcontract participation in the
contract performance.”[15] AR, Tab 13, IDEXX’s Technical
Proposal, at 18. The Subcontractor Information Sheet attached to
IDEXX’s proposal contained a single notation of “‑NA‑.” Id. at
19. The agency evaluated IDEXX’s proposal under the small
disadvantaged business participation factor as follows:
[IDEXX] does not propose any subcontracting under this
contract and did not submit a subcontracting plan. Therefore,
the firm is technically neutral in this area and will receive
a “Satisfactory” rating.
AR, Tab 6, TEB Consensus Memorandum, at 11; Tab 7, BCM, at 23.
The Source Selection Memorandum provides some explanation as to
the reasoning behind this aspect of the agency’s evaluation,
stating:
The firm did not intend to subcontract any portion of the
subject contractor to large or small business entities if it
received award. Therefore, in accordance with the [FAR] and
the [SSP] I found the firm satisfactory in the area of small
business subcontracting.
AR, Tab 8, Source Selection Memorandum, at 4.
In responding to Bio-Rad’s protest, the agency does not defend
the propriety of its evaluation of IDEXX’s proposal under the
small disadvantaged business participation factor as
“satisfactory.” With that said, we note that contrary to the
apparent belief of the SSA, there is no provision in the FAR
that either requires or allows an agency, under the
circumstances here, to evaluate a proposal as “neutral” and thus
“satisfactory” under a factor designed to evaluate the
participation of small disadvantaged businesses and the other
types of small businesses, where the proposal expressly provides
that there will be no participation by such businesses if the
offeror is awarded the contract. Additionally, and contrary to
the view of the SSA, there is nothing in the SSP or RFP
providing or otherwise indicating that the evaluation of IDEXX’s
proposal as “satisfactory” under the circumstances here was
appropriate, particularly given that firm’s large business
status.[16] Accordingly, the agency’s evaluation of IDEXX’s
proposal under the small disadvantaged business participation
factor as “satisfactory” was not reasonably based. (Bio-Rad
Laboratories, Inc., B-297553, February 15, 2006) (pdf)
The record shows that, in calculating the number of hours
necessary for SCLINS 0002AAA and SCLIN 0003AA, the IGCE standard
apparently had included the staffing required for two other
SCLINS (SCLINS 004AAA and 0005AAA, the program management
functional area SCLINS for Hungary and Macedonia). Amended KTR
Program Management Document, May 27, 2005, at 1. The record
further shows that there were two variables that were considered
by the agency in making these changes, the number of hours per
year for FTEs and the number of FTEs overall for each functional
area. We find nothing objectionable in the agency’s
recalculation of the number of labor hours per FTE; because the
IGCE standard had used what was subsequently considered an
unreasonably high number of hours per FTE, the agency reasonably
averaged the offerors’ number of hours per FTE to arrive at a
revised figure for use in the LSA standard. Id. However, the
agency’s explanation for arriving at the number of FTEs required
to perform these functional areas is problematic. The record
shows that the agency used KBR’s proposed staffing approach as
the basis for arriving at the distribution of FTEs among the
various SCLINS. Specifically, the cognizant agency personnel
determined that, because KBR’s staffing approach was similar to
the IGCE staffing approach, they would use KBR’s proposed
staffing to arrive at the appropriate number of FTEs for the
various program management functional area SCLINS; they
concluded that this would provide a more realistic FTE and hour
count for the government standard. Amended KTR Program
Management Document, May 27, 2005, at 1. Both the agency and the
awardee maintain that there was nothing improper in the agency’s
actions because, by using KBR’s proposed staffing approach as
the basis for establishing the agency’s evaluation standard, the
agency actually reduced the FTEs under SCLINs 0002AAA and 0003AA
more than if ITT’s proposed staffing had been used. The agency’s
actions were improper. The agency’s use of an offeror’s staffing
approach to arrive at the government’s standard was not a
reasonable substitute for an agency-generated estimate based on
historical workload data and the PWS requirements. While the
agency’s estimate and the staffing approach proposed in the KBR
proposal could be similar, in the absence of an analysis from
the agency reconciling the two, there was no reasonable basis
for the agency to use the KBR staffing approach as its benchmark
for evaluation purposes. Using the KBR staffing approach without
such an analysis had the effect of possibly giving KBR an
improper competitive advantage since, obviously, KBR’s staffing
automatically would be deemed acceptable, while ITT’s would not.
We note as well that the agency performed this recalculation of
the government standard after receiving FPRs. Thus, in addition
to the standard being problematic in and of itself, ITT was not
afforded the opportunity to align its proposed staffing with the
revised LSA standard for program management. (ITT
Federal Services International Corporation, B-296783;
B-296783.3, October 11, 2005) (pdf)
KBR
asserts with regard to the contingency plan factor that the
agency overlooked a number of strengths, and assessed a number
of weaknesses that were unreasonable. The agency responded in
cursory fashion that KBR’s proposal was “more general” and
provided “limited details,” and contended that the protester’s
arguments reflect only “mere disagreement” with the agency. AR
at 17; SAR at 9. Our review of the record shows more than “mere
disagreement.” In its protest filing, KBR provided citations to
its proposal showing where in KBR’s proposal the firm addressed
each of the areas identified in the RFP for this factor, and
showing where it addressed items the agency stated were
weaknesses. KBR also made detailed arguments why its proposal
was deserving of strengths or significant strengths, including
pointing out where other offerors received similar strengths.
See, e.g., KBR’s Protest at 14-23. The agency has failed to
respond to these specific allegations. Moreover, the TEB report
contains only one short statement that “KBR’s only support for
their [contingency] response plan was to reference past projects
and provided a general overview of their plans for contingency
response,” and identified the following unelaborated weakness in
KBR’s proposal under the contingency plan factor:
Very limited detail provided on existing resources and how
these resources will be coordinated. Contractor mainly used
past contracts to show responses. Very limited detail provided
for subcontractor agreements, pre-positioned materials,
equipment or people. AR, Tab 21, TEB Report, at 74-75.
Our review of the record does not show that KBR’s contingency
plan is more limited or general than the awardees’ plans.
Although URS proposed a plan that was approximately twice as
long as the other offerors’, KBR, Fluor, and ACC all provided
contingency plans of similar length. From our review, it is not
apparent that the level of detail in any of the plans is
significantly different. Notwithstanding KBR’s specific protest
contentions, the agency has failed to provide any specific
examples of where the plans are dissimilar, and none are
apparent from the record. All offerors appear to have addressed
the requirements of the RFP and all offerors cited past projects
as examples to demonstrate how their plan would successfully be
implemented. Although KBR perhaps cited a few more examples than
the other offerors, the agency has not explained why this is a
weakness and not a strength, given that the examples appear to
demonstrate that the proposed contingency plan has been
implemented successfully. Given that the record does not, on its
face, support the agency’s ratings, and the agency has otherwise
failed to explain the difference in ratings, we sustain the
protest on this ground. (Kellogg
Brown & Root Services, Inc., B-298694; B-298694.2;
B-298694.3, November 16, 2006) (pdf)
Regarding Honeywell's proposed staffing, the SEB identified nine
"strengths" in Honeywell's proposal and one "weakness" in
evaluating Honeywell's proposal under the technical performance
subfactor paragraph relating to the staffing plans." Among the
strengths noted by the SEB were "Honeywell has provided
[DELETED]." AR, Tab 14, Honeywell's Proposal's Strengths and
Weaknesses, at 7. Additionally, the record reflects that, based
upon its review of two exhibits in Honeywell's proposal
pertaining to its proposed staffing plan (detailing Honeywell's
staffing by, among other things, PWS section, skill category,
number of personnel, and minimum qualification standards
proposed), the SEB found that one exhibit "demonstrates that
Honeywell has thought through the critical skill mix required to
operate the [centers]," and that the other exhibit "further
demonstrates a strong knowledge of the qualification standards
required by each permanent member of the [contract work team]."
Id. As mentioned previously, Honeywell's proposal received an
overall rating of "excellent" under the technical performance
subfactor. AR, Tab 14, SSA Initial Briefing, at 40. However,
during its cost realism evaluation of Honeywell's proposal, the
same SEB found that the proposal had "limited supporting
rationale for being 45 FTE's below the Government estimate from
day one." AR, Tab 43, Honeywell Cost Realism Rationale, at 1.
The contemporaneous documentation of the agency's cost realism
evaluation of Honeywell's proposal with regard to proposed
staffing is two pages long, with only one page actually
addressing the agency's "rationale" for the adjustments made. On
this page, the agency identified each of the specific skill
categories where adjustments were found to be necessary in the
proposed staffing, typically concluding in each case, with
little further elaboration, that Honeywell had not provided
"sufficient rationale" for its proposed staffing. This
evaluation resulted in a significant increase in the evaluated
most probable cost of Honeywell's proposal, as well as a
significant deduction from the proposal's mission suitability
score, such that Honeywell's proposal score fell from the
"excellent" range to the "very good" range. The contemporaneous
record, however, does not discuss or attempt to reconcile the
SEB's conclusions in the cost evaluation, where Honeywell's
staffing plan was deemed "inadequate" by 43 FTEs, with the
evaluation of the staffing plan under the technical performance
subfactor, where Honeywell's plan was found to contain
"strengths" and an "appropriate" number of proposed personnel.
Thus, the contemporaneous record provides no basis to conclude
whether the SEB's evaluation of Honeywell's proposed staffing
under the technical performance subfactor or with regard to cost
realism, or either, was reasonable. (Honeywell
Technology Solutions, Inc.; Wyle Laboratories, Inc.,
B-292354; B-292388, September 2, 2003) (pdf)
It is apparent from the foregoing that the TEB here re-rated
CMR's performance under the various projects using different
questions and a different rating scale than those used by the
evaluators who conducted the reference checks. Given the
difference between the rating scales used and the questions
asked, there is no way that we can be certain that the ratings
on the forms completed by the TEB here accurately reflect the
opinions expressed by the individuals contacted. For example,
there is no evidence that any of the references contacted
expressed an opinion as to whether CMR's performance conformed
to its quality control plan, yet the TEB rated CMR's performance
as having met the standard (but not exceeded it) with regard to
all four projects. Further, there is no evidence that it was
reasonable for the TEB to translate the references' original
ratings (of excellent/good/satisfactory/etc.) into virtually
across-the board ratings of "met the standard." In this regard,
the agency has furnished us with neither the original rating
sheets, nor with an explanation as to how it translated the
scores. For example, it has not been explained (and it is
unclear to us) whether ratings of "met the standard" reflect
original ratings of satisfactory (as would seem appropriate) or
original ratings of good (pursuant to the reasoning that "met
the standard" was the second highest rating under the original
scale, whereas "good" was the second highest under the scale
used by the TEB). Without such information, we have no basis
upon which to conclude that the agency's evaluation of the
protester's past performance was reasonable. Further, as noted
above, the record reveals that Pizzarotti's past performance was
initially rated using a different, more liberal rating scale
than either of those described above. According to the statement
of the individual who conducted Pizzarotti's reference checks
pursuant to an earlier solicitation, he explained to the
references whom he contacted that they were to rate Pizzarotti's
performance in accordance with the following scale: met or
exceeded the standard, close to the standard, departure from the
standard with increased risk, departure from the standard with
significant risk, unacceptable departure from the standard. This
scale differs from those used to rate CMR's past performance in
that it collapses the top two (in the case of the exceeded the
standard/met the standard/etc. scale) or possibly three ratings
(in the case of the excellent/good/satisfactory/marginal/poor
scale) into the single top category of met or exceeded the
standard. It would obviously have been easier for Pizzarotti to
attain top ratings under this scale than for CMR to attain top
ratings using either of the others. In our view, the use of
these different rating scales calls into question the
even-handedness of the evaluation of CMR and Pizzarotti's past
performance. (Cooperativa Muratori
Riuniti, B-294980; B-294980.2, January 21, 2005) (pdf)
Since an offeror is not bound to provide goods or perform
services that it has not offered to provide or perform, agencies
may properly evaluate proposals only on the basis of the
information and representations contained therein. See, e.g.,
Microcosm, Inc., B-277326 et al., Sept. 30, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 133
at 6-7. Here, as shown above, the agency credited ATK’s proposal
with meeting the required level of counter‑countermeasure
performance--even though ATK’s proposal did not address the
[deleted] necessary to achieve the specified level of
performance. Rather, the agency’s determination that ATK’s
proposal “include[d] a full description of design feature[s]
that enable stated performance” was based on an agency advisor’s
perception of the knowledge and capabilities of an ATK
subcontractor. Since ATK’s proposal did not address the
[deleted], it is not clear that all of the costs associated with
ATK’s proposed [deleted] were included in its proposal, nor that
ATK, or its subcontractor, is bound to provide the [deleted] the
agency assumed to be part of ATK’s proposal. Based on this
record, the agency’s evaluation of ATK’s proposal lacks a
reasonable basis. (Lockheed
Martin Corporation, B-293679; B-293679.2; B-293679.3, May
27, 2004) (pdf)
In sum, because the agency essentially ignored Locus’s revised
proposal and failed to consider price in the evaluation, we
sustain the protest. (Locus
Technology, Inc., B-293012, January 16, 2004) (pdf)
The task
of gathering data regarding the offerors' past performance was
assigned to a TEP coordinator . . . . He gathered past
performance evaluations from the offerors' contract references
and recorded the information onto worksheets . . . . The
worksheets identifies six separate aspects of past performance
to be evaluated . . . and utilizes six separate adjectival
ratings -- Outstanding, Excellent, Good, Fair, Poor and N/A [not
applicable]. The [TEP coordinator] recorded the references'
evaluations . . . [and] then transcribed this data to a summary
matrix, recording a score of “5” for each “Outstanding” rating,
a score of “4” for each “Excellent” rating, etc. . . . The
rating provided by two of Shaw's references . . . for “Overall
Performance” were incorrectly recorded on the summary matrix as
[deleted] rather than [deleted]. . . . The [TEP coordinator]
then utilized these incorrect scores to arrive at an average
score for Shaw's overall performance.
In addition to the evaluation
errors discussed above--correction of which would decrease the
margin of Shaw's total point score superiority from [deleted] to
[deleted]--ManTech's supplemental protest identifies other
apparent errors, including another apparent transcription error
relating to Shaw's rating under the most heavily weighted
evaluation factor, personnel. Specifically, ManTech points out
that the final evaluation record incorporates an evaluator's
rating of [deleted] for Shaw's proposed analytical
chemist/manager, but the contemporaneous evaluator worksheets
reflect a score of either [deleted] or [deleted]. Accordingly,
ManTech maintains that Shaw's evaluated advantage with regard to
proposed personnel was improperly inflated due to transcription
errors in much the same way the agency acknowledges occurred
with regard to Shaw's past performance rating. As discussed
above, it is clear that, even considering only the past
performance evaluation errors, which the agency acknowledges,
the initial cost/technical tradeoff, on which the source
selection decision was based, reflected consideration of a
technical point score superiority for Shaw that was more than
double the margin that existed following correction of the
agency errors. Correction of these errors, alone, eliminates
Shaw's evaluated advantage under the second most important
evaluation factor--past performance--which, in part, formed the
basis for the agency's conclusion that Shaw's technical
superiority outweighed ManTech's [deleted] cost advantage.
Further, as discussed above, the contemporaneous evaluation
record regarding the most important evaluation
factor--personnel--suggests that Shaw's slightly higher point
score under that factor may have been, similarly, inaccurately
recorded. In short, it appears that the evaluation record
supporting Shaw's evaluated technical superiority, including the
total point score ratings on which the initial source selection
decision appears to significantly rely, was materially flawed. (ManTech
Environmental Research Services Corporation, B-292602;
B-292602.2, October 21, 2003) (pdf)
As discussed, the record reflects numerous instances where the
agency either unreasonably reached conclusions relating to the
EDS offer in light of the language included in the proposal (for
example, in the areas of single sign-on access and the provision
of Oracle database software), or apparently failed to thoroughly
evaluate the proposals critically, and in a manner that would
have revealed inconsistencies or deficiencies in what was being
offered (for example, in the remote access, IMAC and small
business areas). We find the agency’s conclusions troubling in
light of its evaluation of the LMIS proposal. For example, one
of the discriminators relied on by the agency to make award to
EDS was its conclusion that the LMIS proposal did not actually
provide mainframe and distributed systems operating system or
database software. AR, exh. 30, at v, 36; AR, exh. 32, at 2. The
agency reached this finding based on the wording of the software
support core function narrative of the LMIS PWS, concluding that
the proposal was “carefully worded to exclude the actual
provision of software.” AR, exh. 30, at v. LMIS vigorously
contests the agency’s finding in this regard, maintaining that
other sections of its PWS, as well as the list of products
contained in its CWBS made clear that the firm had in fact
offered the software in question. We observe that, in reading
the two proposals, the record shows that the agency seems to
have applied a double standard. On the one hand, when reading
the EDS proposal, the agency tended to be expansive, resolving
doubt in favor of EDS (which, as we have found, led it to reach
conclusions not warranted by the actual language of the firm’s
offer). On the other hand, when reading the LMIS proposal, the
agency applied a more exacting standard, requiring an
affirmative representation within the four corners of each
section of the PWS before it was prepared to conclude that one
or another requirement was being met. We need not resolve which
standard should have been applied in the agency’s evaluation
but, to the extent that HUD essentially applied a more exacting
standard in reviewing one proposal than it did in reviewing the
other proposal, this was improper. (Lockheed
Martin Information Systems, B-292836; B-292836.2;
B-292836.3; B-292836.4, December 18, 2003) (pdf)
To argue that the agency's failure to meaningfully evaluate a
material part of Orenda's proposal is excusable on the basis
that the plan's “process itself is negotiable” and will be
considered and negotiated after award ignores the contracting by
negotiation process set forth in part 15 of the FAR. That
process generally provides that in negotiated acquisitions, an
agency is to evaluate proposals in accordance with the
evaluation factors set forth in the solicitation, document its
evaluation of proposals, if appropriate negotiate with offerors
through the conduct of discussions and allow offerors to revise
their proposals, and select a proposal for award based upon the
selection criteria set forth in the solicitation. FAR §§
15.304-15.308. The negotiated acquisition process as described
in the FAR and set forth in this RFP does not contemplate the
selection of an inadequately evaluated proposal for award with
the intent to negotiate the process by which the offeror will
accomplish the agency's requirements at some later point in
time. See Global Assocs. Ltd., B-271693, B‑271693.2, Aug. 2,
1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 100 at 5 (protest sustained where the awardee's
proposal was at best unclear as to its compliance with a
material requirement of the solicitation, and the agency's
post-award communications with the awardee to clarify the
awardee's proposal in this regard constituted improper post-best
and final offer discussions). Accordingly, we sustain
Sabreliner's protest on the basis that the agency's evaluation
of Orenda's proposal as acceptable under the transition
subfactor to the technical evaluation factor was not reasonably
based. (Sabreliner Corporation, B-290515; B-290515.2; B-290515.3,
August 21, 2002) (txt
version)
Failure of individual evaluators to
comment upon proposals under each evaluation factor in
evaluation worksheets does not render evaluation flawed--there
is no general requirement for such all-inclusive
comments--particularly where consensus evaluation sheet
contained references to proposal advantages and disadvantages,
as well as consensus scores. (North
State Resources, Inc., B-282140, June 7, 1999)
Specifically, the protester
complains that two original TEB members assigned its proposal
three points, the maximum possible score, while, without
explanation from the original or reconvened TEB, two others
assigned it zero points. This argument is without merit.
First, disparate scoring among evaluators by itself does not
suffice to establish an improper evaluation. Unisys Corp.,
B-232634, Jan. 25, 1989, 89-1 CPD para. 75 at 6. (General
Security Services Corporation, B-280388; B-280388.2,
September 25, 1998)
|
|
|
Comptroller
General - Listing of Decisions |
|
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
|
Trusted Base, LLC, B-401670,
October 27, 2009 (pdf) |
DRS ICAS, LLC, B-401852.4;
B-401852.5, September 8, 2010 (pdf) |
|
SelectTech Bering Straits Solutions
JV; Croop-LaFrance, Inc., B-400964; B-400964.2; B-400964.3,
April 6, 2009 (pdf) |
Douglas County Fire District #2,
B-403228, October 4, 2010 (pdf) |
|
Smart Innovative Solutions,
B-400323.3, November 19, 2008 (pdf) |
Velos, Inc., B-400500.8;
B-400500.9, December 14, 2009 (pdf) |
|
Wackenhut Services, Inc.,
B-400240; B-400240.2, September 10, 2008 (pdf) |
AINS, Inc., B-400760.2;
B-400760.3, June 12, 2009 (pdf) |
|
ManTech International Corporation,
B-311074, April 15, 2008 (pdf) |
Contingency Management Group, LLC; IAP
Worldwide Services, Inc., B-309752; B-309752.2; B-309752.3;
B-309752.4; B-309752.5; B-309752.6; B-309752.7, October 5, 2007
(pdf) |
|
Gap Solutions, Inc., B-310564,
January 4, 2008 (pdf) |
Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc.,
B-297553, February 15, 2006 (pdf) |
|
Sherrick Aerospace, B-310359.2,
January 10, 2008 (pdf) |
ITT Federal Services International
Corporation, B-296783; B-296783.3, October 11, 2005 (pdf) |
|
Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., B-310372,
December 27, 2007 (pdf) |
Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.,
B-298694; B-298694.2; B-298694.3, November 16, 2006 (pdf) |
|
Neeser
Construction, Inc./Allied Builders System,, B-285903,
October 25, 2000 |
Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc.;
Wyle Laboratories, Inc., B-292354; B-292388, September 2,
2003 (pdf) |
|
North
State Resources, Inc., B-282140, June 7, 1999 |
Cooperativa Muratori Riuniti,
B-294980; B-294980.2, January 21, 2005 (pdf) |
|
General
Security Services Corporation, B-280388; B-280388.2,
September 25, 1998 |
Lockheed Martin Corporation,
B-293679; B-293679.2; B-293679.3, May 27, 2004 (pdf) |
|
|
Locus Technology, Inc., B-293012,
January 16, 2004) (pdf) |
|
|
ManTech Environmental Research
Services Corporation, B-292602; B-292602.2, October 21, 2003
(pdf) |
|
|
Lockheed Martin Information Systems,
B-292836; B-292836.2; B-292836.3; B-292836.4, December 18, 2003
(pdf) |
|
|
Sabreliner Corporation, B-290515; B-290515.2; B-290515.3,
August 21, 2002 (txt
version) |
|
U.
S. Court of Federal Claims - Key Excerpts |
(i) The SSEB’s Best-Value Analysis Was
Irrational and Contrary to the RFP
While the decisions of procurement officials are entitled to
substantial
deference from a reviewing court, such deference is not
unlimited. Whenever a
procurement decision is without a rational basis or is based
upon a clear violation
of law, that decision must be set aside. For the reasons
discussed below, the court
concludes that the best-value analysis performed by the [source
selection evaluation board] SSEB was
both irrational
and inconsistent with the evaluation scheme set forth in the
RFP.
There is no dispute that the RFP contemplated the award of the
MCI contract
on a best-value basis, “price and other factors considered.” AR
at 139. The RFP
stated that Factors 2 through 6 were listed in descending order
of importance, and
further provided that those factors, when combined, were to be
evaluated as more
important than price. Id. at 140. However, the RFP also
explained that “as the
technical merits of competing offers approach equal, price will
become more
important in any trade-off decision.” Id. at 141.
The FirstLine proposal was technically superior to the proposal
submitted by
intervenor, and the differences between those two proposals were
far from
insignificant. For Factors 2 through 5, the proposals were rated
on a scale with
four levels. The difference between the ratings assigned to the
proposals was one
level for Factors 2 through 4 ([ ]) and two levels for Factor 5
([ ]), all in favor of
FirstLine. Id. at 1548. Furthermore, the adjectival ratings
assigned to the parties’
proposals do not fully capture the differences between those
proposals. With
respect to Factor 2, for example, the FirstLine proposal was
assigned [ ] identified
strengths. Id. at 1482-89. In contrast, the TET did not identify
[ ] in intervenor’s
proposal on that factor. Id. at 1493-95. In all, the FirstLine
proposal had thirtythree
strengths and not a single weakness, id. at 1482-92, while
intervenor’s
proposal had just one strength and one weakness, id. at 1493-96.
In its report, the SSEB minimized the
substantial differences between the
proposals, which had the effect of elevating the relative
importance of price in its
best-value tradeoff analysis. First, the SSEB downplayed the
difference in the
adjectival ratings assigned to the proposals. In addition, the
SSEB largely ignored
the chasm between the number of strengths assigned to the
proposals, and instead
focused its comparison almost exclusively on their respective
ratings. These errors
had the effect of converting the best-value procurement
contemplated under the
RFP into one based on low price and mere technical
acceptability. Because the
SSEB’s best-value analysis was inconsistent with the RFP, it was
irrational and
contrary to law. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.305(a) (“An agency shall
evaluate competitive
proposals and then assess their relative qualities solely on the
factors and
subfactors specified in the solicitation.”).
In Femme Comp, Inc. v. United States, 83
Fed. Cl. 704 (2008), this court set
aside the award of three contracts, in part because the
best-value tradeoff analysis
performed by the [source selection authority] SSA was arbitrary, capricious, and not in
accordance with law.
There, the court discerned a pattern or intent in the source
selection award
document to “inflate the technical portions of the low-price[d]
offerors’ proposals
and downplay the technical superiority of the higher-priced
offerors’ proposals.”
Id. at 768. Further, the consequence of those errors was to
elevate the importance
of the price factor in contravention of the solicitation, which
provided that the nonprice
factors would be evaluated as significantly more important than
price. In
other words, the court held that the government “essentially
convert[ed] the best
value procurement into a technically acceptable, low-price
procurement.” Id. at
758. The court concluded that the government’s attempt to
minimize the technical
differences between proposals was arbitrary, capricious, and not
in accordance
with law. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the
Femme Comp case and
the instant case have much in common.
Here, it is clear that the SSEB failed
to account for the significant
differences between the competing proposals with respect to
technical quality.
First, the court cannot fathom how the SSEB could have reached
the conclusion
that the FirstLine proposal was only “moderately better” than
the Akal proposal.
See AR at 1549. In that regard, the court observes one essential
and irrefutable fact
– with respect to the four most important technical evaluation
factors in the
tradeoff analysis (Management Approach, Screening Services,
Security Training,
and Pre-Transition / Transition), FirstLine scored at least one
full level above Akal in every factor. It is also even more
difficult to comprehend the SSEB’s
conclusion in light of the fact that the FirstLine proposal was
assigned thirty-three
strengths and not a single weakness, while intervenor’s proposal
received only one
strength and one weakness, particularly when [ ] of FirstLine’s
strengths were
related to the most important non-price factor considered in the
best-value tradeoff
analysis. In the absence of any explanation of why the
differences in the technical
ratings assigned to the proposals were less significant than the
ratings would
indicate, or why the many strengths assigned to the FirstLine
proposal were
entitled to scant weight in the analysis, the SSEB’s conclusion
that the FirstLine
proposal was only moderately better than the Akal proposal must
be termed as
arbitrary and capricious.
Next, the SSEB report states that the
proposal submitted by intervenor is
“fully sufficient in meeting the Government’s requirements.” Id.
While that
assessment may be accurate, it is also irrelevant because this
was not a lowest-price
technically acceptable procurement. In a best-value procurement,
the relevant
question is not whether the lowest-priced proposal will meet the
minimum
technical requirements set forth in the RFP; rather, the
government must determine
which proposal represents the best value to the government.
Compare 48 C.F.R.
§ 15.101-1 (stating that a tradeoff analysis requires the
government to balance the
price of proposals against non-price factors in accordance with
the solicitation),
with id. § 15.101-2(b)(1) (stating that in a lowest-price
technically acceptable
source selection, the government must award the contract “on the
basis of the
lowest evaluated price of proposals meeting or exceeding the
acceptability
standards for non-cost factors”). Both this court, see Femme
Comp, 83 Fed. Cl. at
757-70, and GAO have sustained bid protests for precisely this
reason.
In Preferred Systems Solutions, Inc.,
B-292322, B-292322.2, B-292322.3,
2003 CPD ¶ 166, 2003 WL 22242190, at *8 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 25,
2003), for
example, GAO sustained a bid protest where the evidence
indicated that the
“agency may have improperly converted the source selection to
one based upon
technical acceptability and low price, instead of one
emphasizing technical
superiority and skills as announced in the RFP evaluation
scheme.” In that case, as
in this case, the government selected a technically inferior
proposal and justified
that decision by stating that both offers were “acceptable” and
noting a “significant
difference in cost.” Id.
Similarly, in Johnson Controls World
Services Inc., B-289942, 2002 CPD
¶ 88, 2002 WL 1162912, at *5 (Comp. Gen. May 24, 2002), GAO
sustained a
protest for essentially the same reasons. There, as here, the
government awarded a
contract to a low-priced but technically inferior offeror. In
support of the decision,
the government argued that the winning proposal was “more than
adequate,”
“exceeded the work management requirements,” and “would get the
job done.” Id.
at *6. GAO held that these statements were an insufficient basis
for an award
decision in a best-value procurement, and noted that the
government had ignored
important differences between the proposals. These cases
demonstrate that the use
of criteria such as whether a proposal is “acceptable” or
“sufficient” has no place in
a best-value tradeoff analysis.
Finally, the SSEB report concludes that
the FirstLine proposal is not worth
the payment of a price premium because the proposal submitted by
intervenor
“also offered an acceptable level of technical competence.” AR
at 1549. In
addition to suffering from the problems discussed above, this
statement is
particularly misleading in that it suggests that both proposals
were assigned an
acceptable rating for each of the technical factors, which is
not the case. As noted
above, FirstLine was assigned superior ratings on Factors 2
through 5. The only
factor on which the FirstLine proposal was assigned a rating of
[ ] was Factor 6, for
which [ ]. Intervenor, in contrast, received across-the-board
ratings of [ ].
In addition to minimizing the
differences in the technical ratings assigned to
the two proposals, the SSEB further compressed the differences
between them by
focusing almost exclusively on those ratings instead of
comparing the strengths,
weaknesses, benefits, and disadvantages of the proposals. As
this court has noted,
“the FAR requires more detail.” Femme Comp, 83 Fed. Cl. at 768.
When the
government is required to perform a best-value tradeoff
analysis, it cannot limit its comparison of the proposals to the
ratings assigned to them by lower-level
evaluators.
In Femme Comp, this court held that the
comparison of proposals on the
basis of technical ratings alone is insufficient in a best-value
tradeoff analysis.
There, the government noted in its source selection decision
that two proposals had
received the same adjectival rating, but “did not document any
effort . . . to
determine whether, despite the identical ratings, one was
stronger than the
other . . . .” 83 Fed. Cl. at 767. It appeared to this court
that the government’s
“conclusions relied upon the Army’s assigned ratings instead of
the Army’s
underlying evaluations.” Id. at 768.
Here, the [source selection plan] SSP also required the SSEB to
“[i]dentify and fully document
proposal strengths, weaknesses, and clarifications as well as
provide an overall
assessment of each proposal . . . .” AR at 460. The SSEB report
does not
document the strengths and weaknesses received by each of the
competing
proposals. Instead, the report contains a selective presentation
of some of those
strengths and weaknesses, but does not identify them as such.
In this case, the government not only
ignored the dramatic difference in the
number of strengths assigned to the proposals; it also took
affirmative steps to
minimize or neutralize those differences in the SSEB report.
With respect to
Factor 4, for example, the FirstLine proposal received [ ]
strengths, while the Akal
proposal received [ ]. The SSEB attempted to minimize that
difference, noting that
the parties “[ ].” Id. at 1544. This statement obscures the fact
that the FirstLine
proposal was not only assigned a higher adjectival rating on
Factor 4, but was also
assigned [ ] strengths for that factor, while intervenor’s
proposal was assigned [ ].
While the SSEB’s careful use of parentheses might counter the
charge that it
misrepresented the number of strengths in the respective
proposals, it reinforces the
appearance of an intent to mask the real differences between
them. See Johnson
Controls, 2002 WL 1162912, at *7 (finding that the government
attempted to
minimize the differences between proposals by noting that both
of them had major
strengths, and thus “lump[ed] all of these major strengths
together as if they were
equivalent when they are not apparently so, and discard[ed] any
underlying
qualitative value they might represent with no supporting
justification”); cf. Femme
Comp, 83 Fed. Cl. at 769 (noting that the government in that
case “emphasized the
nature, quality, and extent of a proposal’s strengths when it benefitted a lower-priced
proposal but often ignored the nature, quality, and extent of a
proposal’s
strengths and relied instead on the adjectival/color ratings
when a higher-priced
proposal was found to be superior”).
The RFP stated that “[a]s the technical
merits of competing offers approach
equal, price will become more important in any trade-off
decision.” AR at 141.
Despite the fact that here, the technical merits of the
competing offers never
approached equal, the SSEB conducted its best-value analysis in
a manner that
minimized the real differences between the proposals and created
a false
impression of equivalence, thus allowing the SSEB to base its
decision largely on
price instead of on the non-price factors. Cf. Johnson Controls,
2002 WL
1162912, at *10 (“Where, as here, the evaluation record
evidences relative
differences in proposal merit, general statements of equivalency
are inadequate to
show equivalency; the agency must compare the relative merits of
the proposals in
a manner that reasonably supports a determination of
equivalency.”).
In minimizing the importance of the
non-price factors, and thus elevating the
relative importance of price, the SSEB deviated from the
requirements of the RFP,
which required a best-value procurement. Instead, the government
has essentially
conducted this procurement on a lowest-price technically
acceptable basis. For
that reason, the SSEB’s analysis and the subsequent award of the
[Kansas City International Airport] MCI contract to intervenor was arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with
law. See Femme
Comp, 83 Fed. Cl. at 770 (setting aside a contract award because
the government
converted a best-value procurement into a lowest-price
technically acceptable
procurement by minimizing or downplaying the technical
differences between the
proposals). (FirstLine
Transportation Security, Inc. v. U. S. and Akal Security, Inc.,
No. 11-375C, September 27, 2011) (pdf)
Failure to comply with Solicitation technical requirements
Red River claims that Sealift’s proposal did not comply with all
the technical
requirements of the Solicitation. As a result, it is asserted,
the agency’s award was
arbitrary and capricious. Red River also argues that by not
requiring full compliance
with the technical requirements, the agency improperly relaxed
the requirements for
Sealift, without affording the same to Red River, thereby
violating the Competition
in Contracting Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2305(a)(1)(A) (2000) (“CICA”).
The government argues that the minimum technical requirements
involved are contained only in Section C-3 and M-3.1.1, and
Sealift’s proposal covered all the required matters. The
government further argues that if any requirements were not
covered, the voids were filled by extrapolation or
interpretation of photographs and drawings submitted, and/or by
knowledge of what Sealift had done successfully in the past.
“MSC determined that Sealift’s proposal provided an adequate
level of detail by use of diagrams, photographs, narrative
descriptions, and written and verbal
responses to discussion questions.” (Dkt. 35 at 14.)
Specifically, the government in
its brief points to:
schematic diagrams showing the
cocoon system that was previously
offered and built on the Chapman. AR 1512-1514. Contrary to Red
River’s assertions, these schematic diagrams illustrate what
Sealift
proposed to provide, i.e., a system of the cocoons that MSC has
previously accepted as satisfying the requirements of a contract
that Red
River admits are identical to the cocoon requirements of the
present
solicitation. The schematic diagrams show the cocoon structures
on
both sides and on each of the four cross-sections of the vessel.
Id.
These diagrams, in conjunction with the photographs, narrative
description, and inclusion of Attachment F in Sealift’s proposal
enabled
MSC to reasonably conclude that Sealift’s proposal provided an
“adequate level of detail” as called for in Section L-7(a) and,
therefore,
it was equally reasonable for MSC to determine that Sealift
fully
satisfied the minimum technical requirements of the
solicitation.
(Dkt. 35 at 22.) Finally, the
government insists that any omission was minor and
waivable at the agency’s discretion.
The Solicitation required more
than Sealift submitted and the failure of the
agency staff to present the TEC with all the evaluation criteria
was arbitrary and
capricious and in violation of procurement standards.
The Solicitation cautioned that
the “Technical Volumes shall describe how the
vessel meets the requirements and capabilities. . . . [T]he
[specific and complete]
technical data, documentation and supporting rationale” shall
“demonstrate complete
understanding and compliance with each of the requirements and
how they will be
met . . . . The Government will determine if an Offeror’s
proposal is technically
acceptable based on the information submitted.” (AR 215.) This
language put
potential bidders on notice that description of “how the
technical requirements would
be met” was material and that technical compliance would be measured
by that
support and warns that technical acceptability will be
determined by the narrative of
how the vessel meets or will meet the requirements, not simply
that it will. Banknote Corp. of Am. v. United States, 56
Fed. Cl. 377, 382 (2003) (discussing language of
serious consequences for failure to comply).
As the court in Ashbritt, Inc. v.
United States explained in enjoining an agency
award for failure to follow the terms of the Solicitation:
It is a fundamental tenet of
procurement law that proposals must
be evaluated in accordance with the terms of the solicitation.
FAR §
15.305(a) provides that, “[a]n agency shall evaluate competitive
proposals and then assess their relative qualities solely on the
factors
and subfactors specified in the solicitation.” See also Hunt
Bldg. Co. v.
United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 243, 273 (2004) (“The agency’s
failure to
follow its own selection process embodied in the Solicitation is
. . . a
prejudicial violation of a procurement procedure established for
the
benefit of offerors.”); Banknote, 56 Fed. Cl. at 386 (“It is
hornbook law
that agencies must evaluate proposals and make awards based on
the
criteria stated in the solicitation.”); ITT Fed. Servs. Corp. v.
United
States, 45 Fed. Cl. 174, 194 (1999) (citations omitted) (“[A]
contract
award may not be upheld when the [source selection authority]
improperly departs from [the] stated evaluation criteria in a
solicitation.”).
No. 08-473C, 2009 WL 1872153, at
*27 (Fed. Cl. June 25, 2009).
The court in L-3 Communications Eotech, Inc. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl.
643, 653 (2008) similarly explained:
Technical evaluations should be
consistent with the factors, subfactors
and procedures outlined in the solicitation. See FAR 15.305(a),
48
C.F.R. § 15.305(a) (2007) (“An agency shall evaluate competitive
proposals and then assess their relative qualities solely on the
factors
and subfactors specified in the solicitation.”); see also
Dubinsky v.
United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 243, 267 n.56 (1999) (noting that FAR
15.305(a) “does not grant contracting officers carte blanche to
notify
offerors of one rating system in the RFP and to then apply a
different
system during the evaluation of proposals”) (citations omitted);
Kilgore
Corp., B-253672, B-253685, B-253686, 93-2 CPD ¶ 220 (Comp. Gen.
Oct. 13, 1993) (“While procuring agencies have broad discretion
in
determining the evaluation plan they will use, they do not have
the
discretion to announce in the solicitation that one plan will be
used and
then follow another in the actual evaluation.”) (citation
omitted); Arltec
Hotel Group, B-213788, 84-1 CPD ¶ 381, 1984 WL 44060 (Comp. Gen.
Apr. 4, 1984) (“Consequently, it is improper for an agency to
depart in
any material way from the evaluation plan described in the
solicitation
without informing the offerors and giving them an opportunity to
structure their proposals with the new evaluation scheme in
mind.”)
(citation omitted). When the evaluation of proposals materially
deviates
from the evaluation scheme described in the solicitation, the
agency’s
failure to follow the described plan may constitute evidence of
arbitrary
and capricious decision-making. See Dubinsky, 43 Fed. Cl. at 267
n.56
(noting that “[s]uch action is arbitrary and capricious and
provides
grounds for granting a protest if it prejudices unsuccessful
offerors”).
Minor irregularities alone, however, will not invalidate a
procurement
that is reasonable and otherwise not contrary to law. See
Grumman Data [Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1996)] (“‘De minimis errors are those that are so insignificant when
considered
against the solicitation as a whole that they can safely be
ignored and the
main purposes of the contemplated contract will not be affected
if they
are.’” (quoting Andersen Consulting [v. United States, 959 F.2d
929,
935 (Fed. Cir. 1992))
Proposals must be complete and
conform to the Solicitation. See Int'l Res.
Recovery, Inc. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 1, 6 (2004) (“[I]t
is well established that
all offerors, including incumbents, are expected to demonstrate
their capabilities in
their proposals.”) (citation omitted). In Software Engineering
Services, Inc. v. United
States, 85 Fed. Cl. 547 (2009), the court found the Air Force
acted reasonably in concluding the protestor’s submittal was
incomplete. Its incumbent status was no
substitute for submitting its ability to perform the
Solicitation tasks.
The Air Force, however, acted
reasonably in finding SES’s incumbent
status an insufficient substitute for demonstrating its ability
to perform
the three mission areas in its proposal. “[I]t is well
established that all
offerors, including incumbents, are expected to demonstrate
their
capabilities in their proposals.” Int’l Res. Recovery, 60 Fed.
Cl. at 6
(agency rejection of incumbent proposal was reasonable when
incumbent failed to submit a mobilization plan in accordance
with RFP,
claiming it already was mobilized as the incumbent) (citation
omitted);
see also PGBA, LLC v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 196, 209-10
(2004)
(record supported lowered rating for technical subfactor based
on the
incumbent’s “less-than-thorough proposal”), aff’d 389 F.3d 1219
(2004). Offerors are charged with preparing an adequately
written
proposal. Westech Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 272,
296
(2007) (citation omitted).
Thus, SES was required to demonstrate its capabilities within
the
proposal, and could not rely upon its incumbent contract
performance
as a substitute for information omitted from its proposal. See
Int’l Res.
Recovery, 60 Fed. Cl. at 6; PGBA, LLC, 60 Fed. Cl. at 209-10.
SES was
charged with adequately drafting its proposal to ensure
compliance with
the RFP.
85 Fed. Cl. at 555-56.
As a corollary of the principle
that proposals must meet the requirements of a
solicitation, blanket statements that an offeror will meet or
exceed them have been
found to be noncompliant. Int’l Outsourcing Servs., LLC v.
United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 40, 49 n.9 (2005) (“Agency decisions rejecting blanket
statements to the effect
that an offeror will meet or exceed certain contract
requirements or specifications
have been upheld in a variety of settings.”).
To justify its selection of
Sealift, the government cites the Declaration of Ms.
Juanita Broennimann, the TEC chairperson, attached to a March 6,
2009 Motion for
Summary Dismissal of the GAO protest. (AR 1494-98.) The
Broennimann Declaration explains why the TEC determined that
Sealift’s proposal met the
minimum technical requirements. “[I]t was clear that Sealift
understood the
requirements of the solicitation and provided information that
it was capable of
meeting said requirements. The team had no reason to question
the validity of
Sealift’s statements.” (AR 1497.) The TEC relied upon Sealift
having previously had
a cocoon on one of its vessels, the Bennett, offered for similar
purposes and its
history of providing similar vessels to MSC with accordion style
cocoons. (Id.) The
March 6, 200927/ Declaration concluded that evaluators “had
evidence” that supported
their belief in Sealift’s compliance, to wit: (1) its cover
letter that said “it previously
had a cocoon on the vessel offered for similar purposes as those
required under the
subject solicitation” and “anticipated constructing a similar
system” under the
proposal; and (2) it had provided similar vessels to MSC with
accordion style
cocoons. (AR 1497.) Knowledge of field representative George
Pearson, “who has
been involved with the loading of all Air Force ammunition
ships, [that] TSGT
JOHN A. CHAPMAN had an accordion style cocoon when the vessel
was under the
previous charter” was also cited. (Id.)
The government has not pointed to
these observations elsewhere in the AR and
Mr. Pearson was not on the evaluation team. (AR 84 (TEC
consisted of Juanita
Broennimann (Chair), Timothy McLaughlin and James Hicks (both
Marine
Transportation Specialists), together with another “TBN” [to be
named?] as
evaluators and Elizabeth Bogart (Intern and Observer). The final
evaluator was Lt.
Col. Stephen Williams. (AR 1252-55, 1276-81, 1341, 1372-73.)
Whether or not the evaluation team
had any reason to doubt that Sealift could
or would comply with what they understood to be the technical
requirements is not
the correct inquiry. Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the
AR contains requisite
support for a determination that Sealift’s proposal complied
with all technical
requirements of the Solicitation. The government has not pointed
to support in the
pre-award AR. See Axiom Resource Mgmt., 564 F.3d at 1381 (holding
review is
limited to agency record unless insufficient to “permit
meaningful review consistent
with the APA”). Furthermore, any consideration of Sealift’s
performance in other contracts would have run counter to the TEP
which prohibited undocumented
personal opinion.
For the foregoing reasons, the
court concludes, on the record evidence, that
Sealift’s proposal was not evaluated on, and did not conform to,
all the material
technical requirements of the Solicitation and any determination
to the contrary is
arbitrary and capricious.
Sealift’s proposal did not detail
how its vessel’s climate and humidity control
system was going to meet the temperature and humidity
specifications, did not
describe the components of its security and communications
systems, its maintenance
plans or the cocoons, and how any of these met the RFP.
Turning to the second ground, it
is asserted the relaxation of the RFP
specifications violated the Competition in Contracting Act.
The CICA, 10 U.S.C. §
2305(a)(1)(A) (2000), requires solicitations for
competitive proposals to include “all significant factors and
significant subfactors
which the head of the agency reasonably expects to consider in
evaluating . . .
competitive proposals . . . and the relative importance assigned
to those factors and subfactors.” 10 U.S.C. § 2305(a)(2)(A)(I)
(2000); see also, FAR 15.304(d). Agencies
“shall evaluate . . . competitive proposals . . . based solely
on the factors specified in
the solicitation.” 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(1); 41 U.S.C. § 253b(a)
(1994); see also
Banknote Corp. of Am. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 377, 386-87
(2003), aff’d, 365
F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Dubinsky v. United States, 43 Fed.
Cl. 243, 266 (1999);
Analytical & Research Tech., Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl.
34, 44 (1997); 48
C.F.R. § 15.305(a) (“An agency shall evaluate competitive
proposals and then assess
their relative qualities solely on the factors and subfactors
specified in the
solicitation.”).
Any relaxation of the terms of the
Solicitation must be extended to all.
(a) When, either before or after
receipt of proposals, the Government changes its requirements or
terms and conditions, the [CO] shall amend the solicitation.
. . .
(d) If a proposal of interest to the Government involves a
departure
from the stated requirements, the [CO] shall amend the
solicitation,
provided this can be done without revealing to the other offerors the
alternate solution proposed or any other information that is
entitled to
protection.
48 C.F.R. § 15.206(a) & (d) (parenthetical reference omitted).
Red River cites Alfa Laval
Separation, Inc. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1365
(Fed. Cir. 1999) in support of its alternative position that the
result of MSC’s
truncated technical review was a relaxation of the Solicitation
standards for Sealift,
which was not extended to Red River. In Alfa Laval, the awardee’s proposal to
supply oil purifiers did not meet the exact testing standards of
the Solicitation, but a
“‘colossal price difference’” was proposed which apparently
sweetened the offer.
Like here, the Solicitation was for a lowest cost, technically
acceptable proposal.
Noting that the awardee’s proposal did not meet all the
technical requirements, the
Federal Circuit applied the ruling in Data General Corp. v.
United States, 78 F.3d
1556 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and reversed the trial court’s conclusion
that the protestor – Alfa Laval – the only other offeror – was
not prejudiced because of the huge price
difference.
As the trial court held,
“regardless of the [technical review] panel’s view
of the appropriateness of the standard [set out in the RFP], the
Navy is
strictly bound by its terms,” and in waiving a portion of the
standard for
[the awardee], the Navy violated a clearly applicable
procurement
statute and regulation, 40 Fed. Cl. at 230; see also 10 U.S.C. §
2305(b)(1) (1994) (“The head of an agency shall evaluate sealed
bids
and competitive proposals and make an award based solely on the
factors specified in the solicitation.”); 48 C.F.R. § 15.606(a),
(c) (1996)
(requiring the government to issue a written amendment to a
solicitation
when it “changes, relaxes, increases, or otherwise modifies its
requirements,” and to provide an opportunity for competitors to
submit
new or amended proposals when it prefers a proposal involving “a
departure from the stated requirements”).
175 F.3d at 1367-68.
For reasons that are not readily
apparent, the proposals were evaluated under
criteria of an evaluation plan that did not encompass all the
requirements of the
Solicitation. The award to Sealift was based on relaxed
standards not extended to
Red River, in violation of the CICA.
Red River prevailing under either
or both asserted theories, however, does not
end the court’s inquiry.
(sections deleted)
The government alleges this
procurement involves matters of national security
because the vessel transports vital equipment and supplies to
designated areas in
support of combat operations worldwide. At the beginning of this
Solicitation, on
August 6, 2008, Air Force Major General Robert H. McMahon signed
a statement of
requirements for the United States Air Force’s (“USAF”)
Prepositioned Ship
Munitions program to replace the MV Fisher (“Fisher”)30/ which
is under lease that
expires on September 14, 2009. (AR 41-42.) “[W]e must ensure an
adequate
replacement vessel is identified to continue USAF Afloat
Prepositioned Fleet (APF)
mission. . . . [The] [r]eplacement vessel must be on lease
approximately 90-days prior
to the [Fisher] lease expiration between 08 and 18 Jun 2009. . .
[and] should be at
[Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, North Carolina] and ready
to accept cargo
[no later than] 18 Jun 2009.” (AR 41-42.) Sealift’s delivery
date has been pushed
back to July 15th.
(sections deleted)
The court concludes that national security concerns militate
against equitable
relief with immediate impact. However, given the long term
nature of the options in
the contract awarded, it is concluded that the interests
involved can best be balanced
if the contract award to Sealift is limited to the initial
performance period and one
option. The initial approximately 3.5 month contract period and
the first one year
option may proceed if the government so desires. Limiting the
award to this
performance period recognizes the present urgent defense needs
that must be
promptly met, but mandates a reprocurement to cure the award
deficiencies at the
earliest point feasible consistent with satisfying these present
needs. (Red River Holdings,
LLC, v. U. S., No. 09-185C, July 17, 2009) (pdf)
The court next addresses a dispute
concerning the authority of the offerors’ program managers. Systems Research, Wyle, Booz Allen, and L-3 Services
all described their respective program managers' on-site decision-making authority in their
proposals. Specifically, Systems Research indicated that its program manager was “[. . .].” Id.
at 8663. In addition, Wyle indicated that it would provide "[. . .]." Id. at 8824. Further, Booz Allen indicated that its “Officer-in-Charge” had the ability to “[. . .]” and that its
program manager would serve as the “[. . .].” Id. at 8488-89. Finally, L-3 Services indicated that
its “[. . .],” id. at 9586, and that [. . .] “[. . .],” id. at 9590. Yet, with respect to the on-site
decision-making authority of the program managers proposed by these four offerors, the Source Selection
Evaluation Board, when evaluating the proposals under the Technical/Management factor,
assigned a [. . .] strength to Systems Research, id. at 10184, Wyle, id. at 10296, and Booz
Allen, id. at 10352, but no strength at all to L-3 Services, id. at 10222-24.
L-3 Services argues that the Army’s failure to assign it a
strength for the on-site decisionmaking authority of its program managers prevented it from achieving
even higher technical superiority over Wyle and Booz Allen. L-3 Services Mot. 47-48.
Defendant counters that the Army’s evaluation was reasonable, asserting that L-3 Services
did not indicate in its proposal that its “[. . .].” Def.’s Mot. 63; accord Booz Allen Mot. 38.
Defendant’s position lacks merit. The court is unable to discern
a meaningful difference among the following phraseology: [. . .]. Because each of the
four offerors described similar onsite program manager decision-making authority and included its
description the proper section of its proposal, the Army should have assessed strengths of a
similar magnitude to each of these proposals. Because the Army evaluated the proposal of L-3
Services unequally, its evaluation lacked a rational basis.
(Femme Comp Inc.,
Technical and Project Engineering, LLC, L-3 Services, Inc., Data
Systems Analysts, Inc., and Bearingpoint, Inc., v. U. S. and
Savantage Financial Services, Inc., and Booz Allen Hamilton Inc.,
Nos. 08-409C, 08-419C, 08-432C, 08-454C, and 08-474C, September
30, 2008) (pdf)
Although minor irregularities or errors in the procurement process are not sufficient grounds to warrant judicial intrusion to overturn a procurement decision, Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the violation in this case was not minor. Rather, the violation described above deprived plaintiff of the opportunity to have its proposal considered fairly and honestly. Thus, the decision to have two evaluators circumvent the consensus and discussion requirements of the Technical Evaluation merits judicial intrusion.
(United International Investigative Services, Inc. v. U.S. and
MVM, Inc., No. 98-80C, July 7, 1998) |
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U.
S. Court of Federal Claims - Listing of Decisions
|
|
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
|
Dismas Charities, Inc., v. U. S. and
Bannum, Inc., No. 04-304C, July 14, 2004 (pdf) |
FirstLine Transportation Security,
Inc. v. U. S. and Akal Security, Inc., No. 11-375C,
September 27, 2011 (pdf) |
|
|
Red River Holdings, LLC, v. U. S.,
No. 09-185C, July 17, 2009 (pdf) |
|
|
Femme Comp Inc.,
Technical and Project Engineering, LLC, L-3 Services, Inc., Data
Systems Analysts, Inc., and Bearingpoint, Inc., v. U. S. and
Savantage Financial Services, Inc., and Booz Allen Hamilton Inc.,
Nos. 08-409C, 08-419C, 08-432C, 08-454C, and 08-474C, September
30, 2008 (pdf) |
|
|
United International Investigative Services, Inc. v. U.S. and
MVM, Inc., No. 98-80C, July 7, 1998 |
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