FLContracts

You're correct, I am establishing an IDIQ contract with specific labor categories and using the LOE as the contract maximum. The offeror's question about normalization gave me pause, as I want to ensure we are structuring the procurement appropriately and in accordance with applicable case law. That's why I wanted to tap into the collective wisdom of WIFCON to see if there were angles I hadn't considered or potential pitfalls to avoid. Information Ventures and the concept of improper normalization are complex topics, so I appreciate the chance to clarify my approach and get the group's input.

I appreciate your perspective. I think there's a critical distinction between a completion contract, where the government is buying a defined deliverable by a unique technical approach, and a LOE contract, where the government is purchasing a specified level of labor hours. In Information Ventures, the agency normalized costs by adjusting offerors' proposed hours to match a government estimate without considering their unique technical approaches for meeting a defined performance spec. At NAVWAR, we mostly do non-commercial software, and for the software development, we are using a LOE IDIQ contract where offerors must propose a specified level of hours over the ordering period. We're not buying a defined deliverable, but rather labor hours to perform tasks within a general scope of work. Given that, it's appropriate for us to specify the labor hours and mix in the RFP. We're not normalizing different technical approaches, but rather defining the very nature of the LOE IDIQ contract. Offerors still have flexibility to propose unique technical solutions within that LOE framework, which we will evaluate qualitatively under non-price factors. It's impossible to predict every scenario over a 5+ year contract. At NAVWAR, we routinely use this approach for non-commercial software development because our requirements and the cyber threat evolve rapidly. Specifying the LOE ensures we have a predictable level of resources to meet emergent needs. If we believe this process is normalization, than LOE IDIQ non-commercial software contracts at NAVWAR, will need to significantly change their ways.

@joel hoffman - Unfortunately we can't share a representative task order due to the classified/sensitive nature of the requirements.

@formerfed - You raise a good point about evaluating the true potential cost of performance. The challenge is that as an IDIQ, we can't precisely define all the work upfront - the specific requirements will be established through individual task orders. That's why we've set ceiling hours as a maximum capacity for the full IDIQ. This is a standard IDIQ structure that most of NAVWAR uses.

The source selection includes two primary technical factors: 1. Technical Understanding of SOW - where offerors must demonstrate their knowledge of the specialized Level 2/3 support requirements, cyber security framework, and classified systems integration 2. Organizational Experience - focused on demonstrating relevant experience with similar classified system support and security requirements Within the non-cost factors, Technical Understanding is most important, followed by Organizational Experience. Past Performance and Small Business Participation equal in importance but less important than the technical factors. Most importantly - the non-cost factors combined are significantly more important than cost. Going back to the original normalization question for a single-award CPFF LOE IDIQ: After reviewing the Information Ventures case and our structure, I believe providing labor hours/mix in this context isn't improper normalization because these are ceiling hours that represent maximum capacity over the contract period, not fixed requirements that must be used. The actual work will be defined through future task orders, where the contractor can propose efficient solutions using fewer hours. The technical approach is the most important evaluation factor - we're evaluating innovation and efficiency upfront. A contractor proposing AI/automation can receive higher technical ratings for innovation, execute task orders more efficiently, use fewer hours than ceiling, and be selected based on technical merit. Unlike Information Ventures where all proposals were forced to match a baseline, we're setting maximum qty of hours. The ceiling hours don't prevent selecting the best technical approach - they just establish maximum contract capacity to properly scope the IDIQ. Thoughts?

To clarify - this isn't a typical IT help desk. The requirement involves specialized Level 2/3 support for classified systems and secure facilities. This is why it's being procured under FAR Part 15 rather than Part 12. The specialized nature of the support, security requirements, and integration with government systems/processes makes this fundamentally different from commercial help desk services.

I'm working on an IT help desk procurement and have a question about CPFF (LOE) single-award IDIQ. The solicitation provides both estimated labor hours and required labor categories/mix that all offerors must use in their proposals. An industry partner has informally suggested this might constitute improper normalization under GAO case law, citing Information Ventures, Inc., B-297276.2 (Mar. 1, 2006). Here's a hypothetical example: Say Company A proposes an innovative solution using automated ticketing and AI-powered initial response that requires fewer staff members, while Company B proposes a traditional manual approach requiring more staff. If the RFP mandates a required LOE for all to propose, it makes cost realism much easier. They state they are at a disadvantage since they need to propose required hours and mix, even though their technical solution could accomplish the same work with less staff. My PCO has never seen this before. We are just setting a required max QTY and all work will be defined at the Task Order level. Thoughts? After reviewing Information Ventures Case and our single-award IDIQ structure, I believe our approach is distinguishable: The hours in our RFP represent ceiling capacity over the contract period, not a fixed requirement. Each task order will determine actual hours needed based on requirements. Most importantly, technical approach is the most important evaluation factor, with cost/price less important. The ceiling hours don't restrict innovative approaches.

I appreciate all the feedback on my original question. To clarify, this is a CPFF LOE SeaPort Task Order where all work is issued via Technical Instructions (TIs). The term "bid" comes from the Navy's one-bid tripwire guidance. We received one bid from the incumbent, and we negotiated the contract fee down. Regarding the estimated award date in Section L/M, it clearly states that it's an estimate. Things can change over a year, and if we had multiple bids, our SSEB report and BCM would have taken much longer. In this case, we were able to be ready to award well ahead of PALT. My original question was whether we can award a contract 90 days before the period of performance start date. Based on my research, there are no regulations prohibiting awarding a contract ahead of the commencement date of performance. However, funding considerations are crucial. The key factor is the type of funds being used, as outlined in the DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR). In our case, we're using no-year funds, which allows for more flexibility to cross FY if necessary. Advantages of early award include: Getting over the protest window earlier, reducing uncertainty (if competitive). Allowing the contractor to prepare for the new contract period, including updating necessary documentation or systems, staff, etc. Enabling current TO to utilize any remaining funds on the current contract and minimize doing a De-Ob Providing more time for the contractor to plan for seamless continuity of services under the new contract terms. Beating PALT, which is a significant efficiency gain. These advantages contribute to a more efficient contract renewal and start of the new performance period. The early award doesn't change the period of performance; it simply allows for better preparation and utilization of time before the POP begins. My PCO and submitted this for managements! Lets see what they say!

Thank you for pointing out DFARS 215.371. However, that provision relates to only one offer being received, which is not the core issue I'm facing here. All required one bid/offer procedures were properly followed, and price reasonableness has been established. My question centers specifically on the timing of award versus the effective start date/period of performance. The core question is whether there is any regulatory prohibition against awarding the contract 3 months prior to the planned period of performance start date, which is an unusual timeframe separation. From my research, I could not find any FAR or DFARS restrictions that would prevent making an award well in advance of the required performance start date. Management's concern around ensuring there is a solid regulatory basis for separating the award and performance dates by 3 months is understandable, as that is likely an atypical timeframe gap in most procurements. However, absent any specific FAR/DFARS prohibitions, I don't see any regulatory issues with proceeding as planned - awarding early while still starting the period of performance when the incumbent contract expires. The alternative of just holding the award for 10 weeks until closer to the performance start date is certainly an option. But if there are no downsides to awarding earlier, that may help streamline the process.

Hi Vern! 1. Service 2. Severable 3. Service Cost Center funds -Unlike annual appropriations, these funds do not expire at the end of the fiscal year. They are "no-year" funds that carry over from one fiscal year to the next.

I think the disconnect is that management wants an FMR citation regarding lead in and generally accepted practices. I agree that nothing seems to prohibit it, however I was hoping some rule of financial management might ease their heartburn about. If no such reference exists, I’m comfortable making another argument for it.

I'm reaching out for some guidance on a situation I'm facing as a junior contract specialist. I'm working on a procurement where we received only one bid from the incumbent contractor. The projected award date stated in the solicitation was Apr 30th, and the current contract expires on May 1st. My PCO and I are considering awarding the contract on Feb 1st but with an effective date and period of performance starting on APR 30th. Essentially, we'd be making an early award with a delayed period of performance. Management is on board with this approach, but they want us to provide a reference that allows for this type of contract action. I've searched through the FAR, DFARS, tWifcon, and my co-worker suggested checking the FMR, but I haven't been able to find any clear guidance covering this scenario. Can anyone point me in the right direction or provide insights on the appropriate regulations or procedures for executing an early award with a delayed period of performance? Any guidance would be hugely appreciated as I navigate this situations. I inserted dummy dates because color of money and funds is not an issue here.

Fortunately, the prime contractor has an approved purchasing and accounting system, which provides some assurance of their processes. The concerning subs are all proposed for time and materials contracts. To conduct my cost analysis, I compiled hundreds of data points from invoiced rates across over 30 comparable contracts. This provided me with a solid baseline to evaluate the proposed subcontractor rates. Despite my in-depth analysis indicating excessive rates, I'm struggling to firmly determine fair and reasonable pricing with the limited data the subs have provided. The prime contractor provided cost and price analysis on the subcontractors via a salary.com. All rates are in the above 99% percentile and the KTR attempted negotiations before proposal submissions with no luck.

I understand that. Doing research via DAU, it stated multiple times that our contract is with the prime, not the subs. While the government can leverage its buying power in negotiations, we don't have privity of contract with subs and need to be careful not to overstep. The prime is responsible for managing subs. This is my issue. You negotiated directly?

As a young contract specialist, I recently had the opportunity to take the lead on negotiating my first major contract. With my contracting officer (CO) on extended leave, I knew this was my chance to really make an impression. The contract was a FAR Part 15 cost-plus-fixed-fee term contract to continue services a contractor had been providing to our agency for over 15 years. In hopes of encouraging competition, my tech code loosened some of the requirements. Despite this, we still only received one bid from the incumbent contractor. I dove into negotiations with the prime contractor and was able to get them to reduce some of their proposed rates, which will result in decent cost savings. We also had about 10 proposed subcontractors to review. The prime contractor was receptive and negotiated most of the subs down as well. However, there were still 3 subcontractors proposing extremely high fully burdened rates that I couldn't confidently determine fair and reasonable. My tech code agreed the rates seemed excessive. Despite pushing back, the prime contractor insisted the subs would not negotiate down further. To complicate matters, the subs fell under the cost and pricing data threshold. When I requested invoices to support the high rates, the subs had no relevant invoices to provide. I'm now facing a dilemma on how to proceed. Should the government try to negotiate directly with the subs even though the prime was unsuccessful? Or do I just move forward since the overall contract price came down considerably?