Vern Edwards

If no one asks and answers those questions the lawyers will take the entire process to court and kill it, the way Amazon killed JEDI. Or the way Boeing killed the first KC-X acquisition. There is no sense complaining because there are lawyers and you have to THINK. People who don't want to think should go fishing. It's the way our system works. But it might have been easier if the FAR Councils had earned their pay.

If the CO determines that the procurement is "outside" the U.S., then the relevant question becomes: Should we apply Part 19? It's discretionary. Is the discretion "unfettered", or must the CO have reasons? If the CO must have reasons, what kinds must they be?

Please note that the new rule does not tie the applicability of Part 19 to place of performance. It says that the CO "shall" apply Part 19 "in the United States and its outlying areas" and "may" apply it outside the United States and its outlying areas. The councils have not resolved the issue of what the phrases "in the United States" and "outside the United States" mean. What must be "in the United States"? Why didn't they say "when performance will be in the United States" or outside the United States? And why didn't they say what constitutes "performance"?

@ji20874Yes, when the personnel exercising a "flexibility" have been trained in how to do it properly, know and understand the "whys" of the underlying policies, know the principles of discretionary choice in a regulated activity, know right reasons for choice from wrong ones, can state their reasons in clear and persuasive terms, and know not to make such choices for the wrong reasons.

Inside the United States. Outside the United States. Another dumb rule from the FAR Councils. More work for the lawyers. $$$$$

That's not even close to describing most of what's wrong with government acquisition.

Oops! I edited while you posted. As for Monty Python, look out for that rabbit.

I responded the best I could by giving you the OMB House policies. I don't know how to find out what is "really done" with the info. What is "really done" about anything by government is rarely known by the general public. In the same way, we don't know how source selection decisions are really made or how prices are really negotiated or how disputes are really settled unless we participated.

From the Federal Register: And see this: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/

More on the topic of writing a contracts and contract content: Contract Drafting: Powerful Prose in Transactional Practice, 3d ed., by Espenschied (American Bar Assoc., 2019) A Manual of Style for Contract Drafting, 4th ed., by Adams (American Bar Assoc., 2017) Garner's Guidelines for Drafting & Editing Contracts, by Garner (West, 2019)

For a somewhat different take on agile, see this from the Harvard Business Review: "Have We Taken Agile Too Far?" https://hbr.org/2021/04/have-we-taken-agile-too-far and this from Forbes, "The End of Agile" https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/08/23/the-end-of-agile/?sh=729718472071 and this from TechBeacon, "8 Reasons To Ditch Agile" https://techbeacon.com/app-dev-testing/8-reasons-ditch-agile I could provide links to many more such articles. DoD is the darnedest behind-the-power-curve outfit in America. I know that if DAU is touting something, as in the article formerfed recalled, they are likely doing it uncritically, just to get on the bandwagon. I know that if an assistant secretary or any other political appointee is touting something, they'll leave office before it flops and fizzles out. Do you know the best way to a successful project or program? Hire smart, experienced, competent, wily, and relentless people, give them money, and get out of their way. That's what we did on the Manhattan Project, the Polaris Program, the SR-71, and the Apollo Program, which were great successes. But we haven't been able to repeat those successes reliably, probably because we have come to believe in full and open competition, essay-test "technical proposals," and "best value" source selection, which is how we got all the failed programs you have read about. Get rid of that stuff, hire good people following market research and rational competition (instead of "full and open"), and then get out of their way, and we'll have a better chance to do IT acquisition successfully.

I could see myself doing that just to get into the annual ADA report if I were mad about a government shutdown. It might prompt people to react they way you have. It also might make some of them ask their congressional representatives why appropriations were not enacted in time to prevent a shutdown. But I understand your point, and it's well-taken.

Could it be possible that the CPSC is sending a message to Congress about shutting down the government? The employee might be in on it.

I don't know. Not to me. Why don't you contact the offeror and ask for an explanation? That seems like the commonsense thing to do. I don't know if your procurement is sole source or competitive. If it's competitive, then follow applicable rules about communicating after receipt of proposals.

@GuardianOkay, here are four you might like. Tunnel Visions: The Rise and Fall of the Superconducting Super Collider, by Riordan, Hoddeson, and Kolb. (2015) It's about one of the great program disasters of the late 1980s - early 1990s, and its full of particle physics stuff. I was a consultant to that program and withdrew after realizing and predicting that it would fail. I was right. It failed about a year after I left. A big setback for American physics, due entirely to mismanagement. It would have taken a Leslie Groves to save it. The $5 Billion Misunderstanding: The Challenge of the Navy's A-12 Stealth Bomber Program, by James P. Stevenson (2001). About another failed program. The X-15 Rocket Plane: Flying the First Wings into Space, by Michelle Evans (2013). About a very successful program. The Linguistics Wars: Chomsky, Lakoff, and the Battle Over Deep Structure, 2d ed. by Randy Allen Harris (2021). A great study of a great science controversy. I have a feeling you would like it. I have the Oppenheimer book, but won't be able to get to it for a while. Glad to hear you liked it.

Then, in the words of Bob Dylan, your experience has been "limited and underfed." In my experience, everyone who has been appointed a COR has been from the requiring activity, and their job has been to make sure the requiring activity gets what it wants. Well, that's just ignorance on your part. Read the entry "and/or" in Garner's Modern English Usage, page 50. Surely, you own a copy. Also see the extended entry on "and/or" in Garner's Dictionary of Legal Usage, 3d ed., p.57-58. But I'm not going to waste words arguing with you about something you have convinced yourself about. I have stated my opinion. People can take it or leave it.

@GuardianI'm not sure I know anything that would be interesting to someone who reads about quantum mechanics. 😀 Let me think about it.

I don't think it makes sense to create a job series for COR. It is not a generalist position. A COR's primary responsibility is quality assurance. A COR must have specialized technical knowledge about whatever is being procured. The best source for a COR is the staff of the requiring activity. COR should be an other duty as assigned. Persons assigned to be CORs should receive special training. It could be provided by the appointing contracting office.

This is from the 1943 edition of the Army Ordnance Procurement Instructions. It addresses the role of the COR for an Army contract to operate a production plant. The concept of the COR dates back at least as far as World War II. The following is an excerpt from a 1943 Army ordnance procurement instruction: That was published in 1943. It's probably older than that. Questions about the role of the COR arose in the late 1980s as the government became increasingly dependent on service contractors to do the government's work. Before that, CORs were mainly professionals working in specialized organizations like the Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS). But now, with service contractors everywhere, it became an other duty as assigned to someone in the offices of the requiring activity. Professional education and training for CORs was, and has continued to be poor, like all acquisition education and training. The duties of a COR and the records that they must keep depend on the nature of the contract. Their principal responsibility is quality assurance, but they also serve as liaison between the agency and the contractor. A competent contracting officer should be able to explain in detail what they want a COR to do and what records they want a COR to keep. But COs receive poor education and training, too. It's the story of our times. DAU and FAI should be abolished. Congress should establish a national contracting academy with a campus at a university on the west coast, in the midwest, and on the east coast. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy should award 20-year contracts to three state or private colleges to establish and maintain a masters degree program in government contracting. Why? Because we have a contracted out government and we now obligate more than one-half trillion dollars each year. The work requires special education and training of high quality. DAU and FAI are dead institutions. Graduates should qualify for a GS-13 position. Every year, the Government should hire at least 100 graduates and assign them to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy for a six-month general orientation. They should then be made available to agencies for hire as contracting officers to work under specially-appointed managers for two years. Large agencies (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force, DHS, NASA) should be required to first provide them with a two-month mission field orientation before assigning them to an office. After two successful years they should assume supervisory responsibility. After two more successful years they should assume office management responsibility. Those are half-baked ideas. I made them up as I typed. It's a fantasy.

It's just you. If you're not sure you want to be a COR, don't be a COR. Anything else? Hiking where? What kind of animals? What kind of knowledge?

That paragraph should read: If a contractor, without providing the advance notice required by FAR 52.232-22(c), overruns the amount allotted under an incrementally funded cost-reimbursement contract containing the clause at FAR 52.232-22, then, under ordinary circumstances, the government is not obligated to reimburse the contractor for the overrun.

I don't understand what ji20874 wrote. If a contractor, without providing the advance notice required by FAR 52.232-22(c), overruns the amount allotted under an incrementally funded cost-reimbursement contract containing the clause at FAR 52.232-22, then, under ordinary circumstances, the government is not obligated to reimburse the contractor for the overrun and, yes, the contractor must . However, under some circumstances the Court of Federal Claims and the boards of contract appeals have excused the lack of advance notice when the overrun was unforeseeable or when the lack of notice was caused by the government. See Cibinic & Nash, Cost-Reimbursement Contracting, 3d ed., pp. 992-1008. See also Manos, Government Contract Costs & Pricing, § 85.7: Footnotes omitted. Those court and board decisions are long-standing and still good law. In short, the contracting officer in your case should investigate the reasons for the lack of notice before denying reimbursement. If you, or anyone else, are not familiar with the law, then read the references I have given you above. NO! Presumably, if the contract contains 52.232-22 it is cost-reimbursement. If you don't provide additional funds the contractor gets to quit. If you do provide additional funds then the contractor must be reimbursed for its costs, including the cost of the overrun. Read clause paragraph (i).

It didn't work and I can't fix it by edit due to the current major malfunction.

The maximum quantity of an IDIQ contract does not commit the government. It limits the contractor's obligation to perform. That being the case, there is a good argument that the maximum quantity is not a material term, and the case you have cited could be used in support of that argument. (I did not read the case.) There you go again using the word "ceiling" instead of the contractual term "maximum quantity." Why do you do that? Did you use that term in your solicitation? Why would that be the case? I do not understand your reluctance to call the offeror and ask it to revise its proposal to conform to the maximum stated in the solicitation.