Vern Edwards

But let's be completely honest: Part of the problem is the workforce itself. Many of them simply don't like school and a real challenge. In the seminar I'm conducting, prospective applicants were told that they would have to read about 500 pages of difficult material over the course of 50 days,; keep notes and share their notes with the other participants; write a position paper (as described in the Air Force Tongue and Quill publication) on each reading,, and share it with the other participants; and, actively actively participate (no wallflowers) in Socratic discussion about each reading. The number of participants was limited to 10. Prospective applicants had to apply in writing. Their three-star commander reviewed and approved the program, and the applicants knew it. The seminar was filled in a week. But that is at an elite acquisition organization with a very highly motivated and competitive workforce. I have found that many persons who attend demanding training don't work hard at it and don't get full benefit. Many, if told that they would have to write anything or pass a final exam, would avoid it or attend in a state of terror rather than excitement. The fact is that a goodly number of Americans hate school. In short, top notch training requires top notch trainees. So, yes, it's true that many agencies have not provided first rate professional education and training, but it's often true that people don't take advantage of it when it's offered.

Not true, as a general rule. Next week I'll begin conducting a 50-day advanced reading seminar for acquisition personnel at the USSF Space Systems Command, at no charge. There was competition for the openings. People contended for the ten spots. They'll work their tookuses off, all in the pursuit of mastery. It's all about the leadership, leadership, leadership.

@C Culham Thanks, Carl.

@Witty_Username Maybe, but while the government is but one of many buyers, when it buys it tends to buy big. Consider the JEDI acquisition, an information technology mega-project. The biggies fought so hard over the thing that they litigated it to death. They didn't seem to want to walk away from the onerous government terms and conditions.

See Cuneo & Crowell, Impossibility of Performance: Assumption of Risk or Act of Submission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 531 (Spring 1964), p. 548-9: Footnotes omitted. That was published in 1964. Written by two of the most highly prestigious government contract attorneys of my time. It's much, much worse today. All the yadda yadda yadda about "reform" and FAR "overhaul" is empty political rhetoric unless Congress takes action to end its 19th Century thinking and repeal its 19th Century statutes and bring us into the 21st. OFPP is a dead letter office and has been for years. The acquisition workforce (PMs and COs), which is obligating almost a trillion dollars per year, won't understand the above, or its importance to their work, until the government develops a decent professional education program.

Joel, the government is not a real estate firm and in its most important procurements it's not selling consumer goods and services and it's not selling insurance. I think it should be different! It should not write contracts of adhesion. Decades of unsatisfactory result for large projects, like the A-12 and Sentinel should make that clear. Gee, remember the Corps of Engineers "partnering" approach? https://www.publications.usace.army.mil/Portals/76/EP%2034-1-1_Partnering%20Playbook_10Sept2024.pdf Why not write complex contracts as if between partners?

The government enters into contracts with companies in order to acccomplish various ends. Some contracts are for simple, short-term transactions: Deliver 100 widgets to this place NLT this date for a price of $____________. Some contract are for complex, long-term undertakings, aka, "megaprojects", that will entail years of close coordination and interaction between the parties. Design and develop a new ICBM system, within a specified budget, if possible. Many legal experts think the terms of such contracts should reflect the nature of the contractual undertaking. What does the imposition of so many standard "the contractor shall" clauses suggest about the government's approach? What do SOWs and PWSs that focus on the contractor's responsibility for doing this or that suggest? And what do "negotiated" contract solicitations stating that any material departure from the government's terms will result in a determination of unacceptability and ineligibility for award, which will be made without discussions, suggest?

I take responsibility for asking a vague question: What I should have asked is: What do those numbers say about the government's approach to contracting? Is it transactional (command style) or is it relational, i.e., a partnering approach?

@KOiFish Very perceptive. Thank you.

A search of FAR Part 52, Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses, reveals that: "the contractor shall" appears 1,250 times; "the government shall" appears 165 times; "the contracting officer shall" appears 141 times; "the contractor may" appears 117 times; "the government may" appears 160 times; the contracting officer may" appears 213 times; "the contractor must" must appears 14 times; "the government must" appears 4 times; "the contracting officer must" appears 4 times; "the contractor should" appears 6 times; "the government should" appears 0 times; "the contracting officer should" appears 3 times; "the contractor will" appears 46 times; "the government will" appears 163 times; and the contracting officer will" appears 77 times. Check the FAR definitions of shall, may, must, should, and will. What if anything does that say about government contracts?

I found the following two posts in an online 1102 forum. Are the representative?: And another:

What is (are) the source(s) of those interpretations? Are they judicial, administrative (GAO or BCA), or just word of mouth? Also, there are several purposes of application, some pre-contractual, some contractual.

On the other hand... Free registration may have prompted entities that are not serious about pursuing government contracts to clutter up the system, uselessly, from the government's point of view. Free registration may have created a market and a database for "consultants" and scam artists who want to take advantage of the clueless. In my opinion, any company that would complain about $125/year is not serious about pursuing government contracts. I pay that much to register my pickup and trailer with the DMV for the state's own internal purposes. All I get is little stickers to put on my license plates.

Here is 15 year old legal commentary on the litigation as of 2010, from The Government Contractor, 52 NO. 45 Gov't Contractor ¶ 388. Feature Comment The A-12 Saga Continues (1).pdf It's good to remember these things when the government starts puffing its sails with "reform" talk.

In 2014, the Department of Justice posted the announcement of a settlement that ended 23 years of contract claims litigation: From the Department of Justice After five trials and three appeals over two decades of litigation, including an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the courts resolved most of the case. Litigation over one unresolved issue remained in the Court of Federal Claims. The issue being litigated: The Navy's termination for default of its contract with McDonnell Douglas (acquired by Boeing) and General Dynamics for the full-scale development of the A-12 Avenger II stealth aircraft. It was and still is the biggest termination for default in the history of U.S. procurement, and the litigation was the longest in U.S. procurement history. Here is a link to the announcement: Government and Contractors Seek to End Long-Running “A-12...The Boeing Company, General Dynamics Corporation, and the United States have formally asked the United States Court of Federal Claims to dismiss, as part of a settlement, their 23-year old dispute invIf you want to read about the fiasco, see HASC No. 102-29, A-12 ACQUISITION, Hearings Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, First Session, Hearings Held April 8, July 18, 28, and 24, 1991. Especially, read the section entitled, "Accountability for A- 12 Cost and Schedule Problems", pp. 121 - 209. Some of it shocked even an old cynic like me. Especially the part about what happened to the cost analysis who predicted the disaster, but was ignored, silenced, and sidelined. A pdf copy of the HASC report is attached below. The Navy fired the captain who "managed" the program, and the vice (three star) admiral who was his boss. An interesting and timely quote from the hearings, page : How would you answer that question? Think about it the context of the revolutionary FAR overhaul. A_12_Acquisition.pdf

Well said!!! But they won't fix it. Everybody loves IT and info gathering too much.

"Participate" how? By submitting quotes, bids, or proposals? " ... fewer people..." How many fewer? Do we know how much GSA would charge to register? Would, say, $150.00/year deter serious prospective quoters or offerors? It wouldn't deter me, and I'm a very small business. Would such a registration fee reduce competition? If so, what amount of fee would reduce what amount of competition? I realize, of course, that few if any of us could answer (as opposed to speculate about) those questions. I cannot. But maybe we should seek more info and then think the thing through. Because SAM costs money to maintain. Before the CBDnet went online in 1996, prospective bidders had to pay to subscribe to the Commerce Business Daily.

I don't understand that. Who are the people Federal procurement is supposed to serve? How will SAM registration fees wall those people off?

Good point.

I agree with KeithB18 that individuals are important. In order to have or create an aggressive, competent, success-driven culture you have to have the right people. They have to be aggressively motivated, well-trained, inventive, and driven. They cannot be self-satisfied and resentful of change or just hanging on. But in civilian government, leaders may not have much in the way of choice of people. They get whoever is there when they take over and some limited choices thereafter. Consider the following description of Jim Gavin's creation of the 505th PIR at the start of WWII. That regiment was expected to produce a new kind of soldier, one that would volunteer to land by parachute in the dark of night behind enemy lines, proceed, alone if necessary, to the objective, and fight alone if necessary until until his unit could regroup. Here is a description of the selection and training of WWII airborne volunteers, from a DTIC report: Airborne was (and still is) a selective voluntary service. You had to WANT it. You had to prefer death to elimination. That was the cultural foundation. See 505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (A Legacy of Lessons), DTIC ADA20962 (1989), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA209620. Of course, that was the military, and Gavin had freedom of choice and elimination. But we're not talking about elite military units. We're talking about civil service offices. Leaders in civilian government do not have such freedoms. So how do you motivate what may be disappointed, weary, hurt, stressed, and angry staffs—people who may not have been given quality professional education and training by their organizations? Can you do it through meetings and rah-rah talk? This is a complicated, difficult problem, and until you have answered those questions you haven't proposed useful ideas.

Be careful about overly broad generalizations about the nature of leadership based on organizational size. In today's world of business and government, new missions may require the creation of organizations with a particular culture in order to execute new strategies. On the other hand, an organization may be assigned a mission because of its culture. See Gibson, "How to Create a Culture of Strategy Execution" (2023), Harvard Business School Online, https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/creating-a-culture-of-strategy-execution. In an organization of 20, different persons may be doing different jobs. Think of Special Forces 12-man A Teams. https://www.americanspecialops.com/special-forces/odas/ Take your time. Don't overly generalize. Think it through. Get it right before you write.

See Joly, "Does Your Company's Culture Reinforce It's Strategy and Purpose?", Harvard Business Review, June 10, 2022. https://hbr.org/2022/06/does-your-companys-culture-reinforce-its-strategy-and-purpose See also, Nevin, The Idea of Marathon: Battle and Culture (Bloomsbury Academic, 2022). Many, many such articles and books.

@formerfed Thanks for responding. But I frankly think those descriptions and distinctions are too general and simplistic in light of the varieties of today's public and private organizations, work, and work environments. The most I think I would say is that all leaders should have clear and appropriate principles, ideas, and plans, communicate them clearly, and act upon them as consistently as circumstances permit. If I had time to think about it more I might add something.

How so?

From the article: "There is an old saying that, “Culture eats strategy for breakfast.” It persists because it is true." How old is that saying? Who said it? Explain what it means, then prove it. (Isn't strategy a product of culture?) "Curiosity is a superpower." How is curiosity's power made manifest? What is the source of its power? What does it produce? How does it work? Say it up front, then elaborate. Generally, I don't buy all of your thinking about the contribution of individuals to the creation of culture. I think the key driving force of culture is mimesis, so I think leadership is the key to the creation and maintenance of culture. To follow a leader is the copy them. For example, Major General James M. Gavin, who became the Army's youngest division commander during World War II, commanded the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment and then the 82d Airborne Division, and is credited with creating one of the most aggressive regimental and divisional cultures. He dressed like an ordinary infantryman. He carried an M-1 rifle like ordinary infantrymen and used it in battle. He made sure his men saw him in front. He dug his own foxhole in the center of the line. He told new officers, "In this outfit officers jump first and eat last," and "If you want a decision, go to the point of danger." Every paratrooper sought to emulate him and follow him. He showed the way by going first. Leaders set the tone and direction. If they are good, others follow and indoctrinate newbies. How did Gavin's leadership manifest itself? During the German offensive of the Battle of the Bulge an American tank destroyer crew came upon an infantryman with a bazooka and asked directions. The infantryman (a PFC Martin) responded, "If you're looking for a safe place, get behind me. I'm the 82d Airborne, and this is as far as the bastards are going." (Look it up on Google.) I think culture is created by leaders, and sustained and bolstered by followers they inspire. "If everyone is responsible then, leaders are accountable." ???