In 2014, the Department of Justice posted the announcement of a settlement that ended 23 years of contract claims litigation:

From the Department of Justice

After five trials and three appeals over two decades of litigation, including an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the courts resolved most of the case.  Litigation over one unresolved issue remained in the Court of Federal Claims. 

The issue being litigated: The Navy's termination for default of its contract with McDonnell Douglas (acquired by Boeing) and General Dynamics for the full-scale development of the A-12 Avenger II stealth aircraft. It was and still is the biggest termination for default in the history of U.S. procurement, and the litigation was the longest in U.S. procurement history.

Here is a link to the announcement:

Government and Contractors Seek to End Long-Running “A-12...

The Boeing Company, General Dynamics Corporation, and the United States have formally asked the United States Court of Federal Claims to dismiss, as part of a settlement, their 23-year old dispute inv

If you want to read about the fiasco, see HASC No. 102-29, A-12 ACQUISITION, Hearings Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, First Session, Hearings Held April 8, July 18, 28, and 24, 1991. Especially, read the section entitled, "Accountability for A- 12 Cost and Schedule Problems", pp. 121 - 209.

Some of it shocked even an old cynic like me. Especially the part about what happened to the cost analysis who predicted the disaster, but was ignored, silenced, and sidelined.

A pdf copy of the HASC report is attached below.

The Navy fired the captain who "managed" the program, and the vice (three star) admiral who was his boss.

An interesting and timely quote from the hearings, page :

Mr. Chairman, after all is said and done on the A-12, and after proper blame is affixed on some poor soul or souls, and we finally figure out how many billions of dollars this episode has cost the taxpayers, I think we still must answer the basic question. That is, how did this happen?

After years of legislation, regulations , commissions, studies, all with magic fixes, the question still remains: How could this happen?

How would you answer that question? Think about it the context of the revolutionary FAR overhaul.

A_12_Acquisition.pdf

Here is 15 year old legal commentary on the litigation as of 2010, from The Government Contractor, 52 NO. 45 Gov't Contractor ¶ 388.

Feature Comment The A-12 Saga Continues (1).pdf

It's good to remember these things when the government starts puffing its sails with "reform" talk.

3 hours ago, Vern Edwards said:

How would you answer that question? Think about it the context of the revolutionary FAR overhaul.

The old saying about “shoot the messenger” holds true. Disclosing information that brings bad news can be career ending not only here but with most projects.

The government often doesn’t disclose the best estimates of cost because projects may not get funded. Once underway both the contractor and program management don’t bring up potential problems because it reflects poorly for them and may potentially kill the program.

I don’t see changing regulations like the FAR overhaul having an impact. What needs done is better recognition of success stories along with comprehensive analysis of the reasons why they worked. Use those examples to share across the government.

The culture of “don’t bring bad news” needs reversed. In the case of the A-12 just about everybody involved knew the program was off track at various points but seemed unable to do anything to make it better.

Thought I would throw in this 1999 article which is one of my faves.

One lesson learned is that progress payments don't correlate to program progress; they correlate to the contractor's ability to spend funds. Which is why we now have Performance-Based Payments, which are supposed to tie payments to program progress.

I seem to recall a defense contractor CEO (Kresa?) talking about the "culture of hope" that permeated DoD acquisition. The contractor hoped that everything would work out perfectly. The government hoped that the contractor would perform. Everybody lived in hope but, at the same time, history told those same people that nothing every worked out perfectly, especially in development programs.

The legal analysis mentions a future Supreme Court hearing. The SC decision in this case can be found at 563 U.S. 478 (2011). The Court decided that because the state secrets privilege prevented the contractors from adequately pursuing their government superior knowledge defense, the remedy was to leave the parties in the same financial position they were on the day before suit was filed. That meant that the contractors could not recover the $1.2B T4C award made by the COFC and the government could not recover the $1.35B in progress payments it wanted. On a side note, somewhere in all this litigation, it was discovered that the government had never actually made a demand for return of unliquidated progress payments.

Let's hope history does not repeat.

https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/exclusive-navy-taps-four-aerospace-primes-to-design-autonomous-drone-wingmen/

WASHINGTON — The US Navy has awarded contracts to four major aerospace prime contractors — Anduril, Northrop Grumman, Boeing and General Atomics — for “conceptual designs” for a carrier-based autonomous combat drone, according to a Navy document obtained by Breaking Defense. 

Additionally, Lockheed Martin is under contract for the drone’s “common control,” according to a slide on Collaborative Combat Aircraft from the Navy’s program executive office for unmanned aviation and strike weapons, dated Aug. 20.

The contract awards, which previously were not publicly known, are the clearest sign that the Navy is moving forward with the concept of a “loyal wingman” aircraft that can operate from the deck of a carrier. Both the Navy and Air Force have pursued the concept of CCAs, but while the Air Force put its program in the spotlight, the sea service’s own efforts have been largely shrouded in secrecy.