This is a GSA issued BPA.

Help - I just want to make sure I inform customers correctly that they may not be able to use some of the last options on their call orders - as the base BPA has lapsed (7/2027) - but Im not sure if that is a correct statement.

Any FAR references or other guide is appreciated!

Thanks!

Let's say this is a FAR Part 12 commercial services contract. The Contract contains FAR 52.212-4. FAR Part 12 says that FAR Part 49 does not apply, but it can be taken as guidance. FAR Part 49 says to look to FAR Part 31 to figure out allowability of costs. FAR 31.205-32 says Pre-Contract Costs are allowable, but only when they are necessary to comply with the proposed contract delivery schedule (Precontract costs means costs incurred before the effective date of the contract directly pursuant to the negotiation and in anticipation of the contract award when such incurrence is necessary to comply with the proposed contract delivery schedule. These costs are allowable to the extent that they would have been allowable if incurred after the date of the contract). FAR 31.205-42 says Termination Costs includes Initial Costs, which includes Preparatory Costs for things like "management and personnel organization." However, if these are direct charges in the Settlement Proposal, "such costs shall not also be included in overhead." FAR 31.205-34 Recruitment Costs says that the costs of help-wanted advertising, costs of maintaining the HR office, travel costs for recruiting, etc, are allowable. FAR 31.205-13 Employee Morale Costs says that costs incurred on activities "designed to improve working conditions, employer-employee relations, employee morale" are allowable.

Let's say the Contractor wants to get compensated for the following: interviewing and hiring employees during the Bid Proposal Preparation Stage to work on the Contract if they win the Contract Award. Are these costs allowable?

Curious what tools (Microsoft Project, Paperless Contract File (PCF), Excel, etc.) are used out there for folks to internally track their active contracts. PoP, burn rate, contract performance, current value, total contract value, etc. And if used on classified networks. Thank you.

Here's the problem: in the draft RFP, they define the DAL as a repository of everything generated under the contract, and I mean literally everything, not just technical data. In at least 40-50 places in the SOW, where it tells the contractor to do something or generate something, it then says "deliver via the DAL." Reports, presentations, lists, briefings, administrative matters, etc.

I understand wanting everything in a repository so that the government can access anything it wants, but I think they have merged the two concepts - repository and DAL. I think the repository should be a separate SOW requirement - create it, host it, make an index, make it searchable, accessible, etc. Any references would then say "upload to/store in the data repository." The DAL should then be a CDRL and be a list of technical data and software, as described in the DID. Of course, the technical data and software should also go in the repository.

I've already heard that "this is the way they've always done it." Before I challenge it, I'd like to know where I stand. Is my understanding correct? Should the repository and the DAL be two separate things? Should the DAL be limited to technical data and software?

I appreciate any input and advice.

Through a quirk of our accounting system (and strong cash flow position), it would actually be beneficial to us from a financial management standpoint to bill for all of the fixed fee at the end of the PoP instead of incrementally billing throughout the contract based on percentage of work completed or cost incurred. 

Before we speak with the KO, are there any limitations on proposing this billing plan? I did not see anything in the FAR preventing it, though not sure if DCMA or DCAA has any internal guidance against this methodology. 

Thanks!

Does this clause preclude the contractor from submitting invoices for the work performed during the period? The language only expressly covers how the government will make payments once funding is available. It then goes on to state it supersedes other provisions dealing with payment or financing, but includes the Prompt Payment Act reference. This makes it seems contractors can invoice per the normal clause (details/cycles, etc.) those invoices would just sit and start to accrue interest from those submission dates until funds are available?

Is there other express language that I am missing that I can point to that states invoicing is not allowed (which would limit the time of any accrued interest under the Prompt Payment Act)?

"The Department of Defense has the authority to enter into this contractual action and to obligate the Government in advance of appropriations; however, appropriated funds are not currently available to make payments under this contract to liquidate this obligation. When appropriated funds become available, the Government will make payment in accordance with the terms of this contract, including the payment of interest where applicable under the Prompt Payment Act. This clause supersedes conflicting terms of any other provision in this contract dealing with contract payment or financing until funds are made available to the Contracting Officer for this contractual action."

I am hoping to gain some clarity as to when a contractors obligation to comply with the non conforming items clause ends. The clause requires the contractor to actively monitor the GIDEP reports in order to screen contractor delivered items for counterfeits or major non-conformances. The clause also places an affirmative requirement to notify the contracting officer when a counterfeit item or major non-conformance is identified.

Does the contractors obligation to screen for and subsequently notify the Government of counterfeit or non-conforming items that may were delivered under a contract end upon the contract's completion, or do they extend in perpetuity beyond final delivery? Specifically must the deliverable items that were made under contracts that have already been closed be screened against the GIDEP reports? Thoughts on this with are welcomed,. Thank you!

We are seeing the following verbiage:

"Appropriations provided under the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 (Public Law 119-4) expire at 11:59 pm tonight. On September 19, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5371, a clean continuing resolution (CR) that would fund the government through November 21. Unfortunately, Democrat Senators are blocking passage of H.R. 5371 in the Senate due to Democrats’ insane policy demands, which include $1 trillion in new spending."

Ethical? Congruent with the FAR? Would you sign the letter if you were the CO?

The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri has been awarded a maximum $41,801,543 modification (P00004) to an undefinitized delivery order (SPRPA1-24-F-0051) issued against a three-year requirements contract (SPRPA1-22-D-001U) to retroactively increase line items and establish additional funding to extend the existing undefinitized contract action. This was a sole-source acquisition using justification 10 U.S. Code 3204 (a)(1), as stated in Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1. Location of performance is Missouri, with a performance completion date of Sept. 16, 2027. The military services are Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2025 through 2026 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Aviation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

CONTRACTOR'S STATEMENT OF RELEASE

In consideration of the modification(s) agreed to herein as complete equitable adjustments for the Contractor's ________________ (describe) __________________ “proposal(s) for adjustment,” the Contractor hereby releases the Government from any and all liability under this contract for further equitable adjustments attributable to such facts or circumstances giving rise to the “proposal(s) for adjustment” (except for ____________________ ).

It says the consideration, or thing of value, that the contractor brings to a supplemental agreement containing an equitable adjustment as the result of a change order is a promise that it will not hold liable the government for further equitable adjustments. Isn't the consideration the promise to perform the contract as changed?

Contract Incentives Are Not Improving Production Outcomes

The F-35 program office uses various contract incentives aimed at improving program outcomes, including on-time deliveries. In the case of the F-35, engine and aircraft contractors can be compensated in multiple ways. First, contractors earn a base profit, which is calculated as a certain percentage of the cost of the engine or aircraft. Second, on top of the base profit, the contract can include the payment of additional fees to incentivize the contractors to identify opportunities to reduce the cost of developing and producing the engine or aircraft. Third, the contract may also include fees or penalties to incentivize the contractors to achieve various performance objectives, such as reducing the overall time it takes to build an engine or aircraft, or deliver them on time.

The F-35 program office compensated Lockheed Martin with hundreds of millions of dollars of performance incentive fees while the percentage of aircraft delivered late and the average days late grew.[33] For aircraft produced in lots 13 and 14, which were delivered between 2021 and 2024, the program included performance incentive fees to drive Lockheed Martin’s performance in certain areas, including delivering aircraft on time.[34] The lot 12-14 contract allows Lockheed Martin to earn a portion of the fees for aircraft delivered up to 60 days late, with the fee decreasing every day the aircraft is late.[35] Lockheed Martin earned a large percentage of the on-time delivery performance incentive fee for lots 13 and 14 although it delivered aircraft late, as shown in figure 6.

Figure 6: Lockheed Martin Earned Millions for On-Time Delivery of U.S. Aircraft, Even Though It Delivered Aircraft Late

Note: Percentage of incentive fee earned reflects the total on-time delivery incentive fee earned out of total on-time delivery incentive fee available for the entire production lot of aircraft delivered on time and late.

While the program originally targeted lot 15 incentives to on-time delivery, once officials knew the contractor would not be able to earn those incentives, the program repurposed the incentive fees. A portion of the lots 15-17 contract incentive fee was designed to incentivize on-time delivery. Defense Contract Management Agency officials projected that under the lots 15-17 contract incentive fee structure, Lockheed Martin would not earn the vast majority of the fee because of the TR-3 delays we described above. Withholding this fee altogether would have saved taxpayers millions of dollars; however, the program modified the contract, which allowed Lockheed Martin to earn some of the incentive fee that it would have otherwise not earned. The program repurposed the unearned on-time delivery incentive fee to target some of the issues that it believed were driving the late deliveries of aircraft in lots 15-17. For example:

·       The program redirected over a hundred million dollars of unearned incentive fees to Lockheed Martin to pay for improved software lab capacity, and

·       The program repurposed over a hundred million dollars of unearned incentive fees to pay Lockheed Martin to address repairs and hardware of TR-3, Next Generation Distributed Aperture System, and to fund TR-3 test stands—special tooling to improve production processes.

Pratt & Whitney also earned tens of millions of dollars in incentive fees even though it was partially penalized for delivering engines increasingly late.[36] The F-35 program negotiated an incentive fee structure for the engine that allowed the contractor to earn more money if engines passed specific quality tests and if it kept total assembly time down. This incentive fee structure is intended to encourage the contractor to improve engine quality while also reducing the hours its takes to build engines, keeping engine costs down and increasing the likelihood that engines are delivered on time. The incentive structure also included penalties that reduced the total amount of fee Pratt & Whitney could earn based on how late it delivered engines. Pratt & Whitney earned between 37 and 78 percent of the total incentive fee available for production lots 14 through 16, equating to tens of millions of dollars, because it performed well on both the quality tests and assembly time metrics. The total amount of incentive fee earned for engines delivered across those production lots was reduced by over $10 million because it delivered nearly all engines late. However, Pratt & Whitney earned tens of millions of dollars in incentive fees because the value of the fees it earned for keeping total assembly time down more than offset the penalties levied on it for delivering engines late. This incentive structure and late delivery penalty was not effective at improving on-time deliveries (see figure 7).

1. Are these independent authorities to modify the contract?

2. If so, does FAR 1.108(d) provide a unilateral right by the Contracting Officer to modify the contract?

3. If no, can the Contractor refuse to negotiate "appropriate consideration" and prevent a mutual agreement under 52.212-4(c)?

4. Since "appropriate consideration" is effectively a right to an REA, can the Contracting Officer determine that the appropriate consideration is $0.00 if the Contractor cannot actually establish any additional costs to imposing the new clauses under FAR 1.108(d)?

5. What other remedies might the Government have short of a negotiated resolution under the commercial changes clause, other than the Disputes Clause?

Thank you.

I'll preface by saying I will have reached a determination before this discussion is complete, and this thread is more to promote discussion.

I have a FFP price contract that is being Terminated for Convenience, and the customer is pressing for de-obligation of funds in excess of the estimated termination settlement costs. Here are some facts that may be helpful:

• I have the contractor's initial proposal. If funds in excess of that were de-obligated, there would be $50K freed up. I have no reason to believe we need funds in excess of the contractor's initial proposal.

• The total contract value is above the SAT - in case that becomes relevant.

• I'm aware of FAR 49.105-2, Release of Excess Funds. For convenience I'll include the text below. I have no further guidance at lower levels (DFARS, DAFFARS)

  • (a) The TCO shall estimate the funds required to settle the termination, and within 30 days after the receipt of the termination notice, recommend the release of excess funds to the contracting officer. The initial deobligation of excess funds should be accomplished in a timely manner by the contracting officer, or the TCO, if delegated the responsibility. The TCO shall not recommend the release of amounts under $1,000, unless requested by the contracting officer.

    (b) The TCO shall maintain continuous surveillance of required funds to permit timely release of any additional excess funds (a recommended format for release of excess funds is in 49.604). If previous releases of excess funds result in a shortage of the amount required for settlement, the TCO shall promptly inform the contracting officer, who shall reinstate the funds within 30 days.

• The contractor has received the notice of termination.

I will add that the customer has a very valid reason to want these funds; it is near the end of the fiscal year, and the mission is international.

I have never de-obligated funds prior to a termination settlement being reached, so this is also a learning moment.

Can this be done? Is it legal? Or is this an area where the de-obligation falls in a gray area, and this is just a risk acceptance thing?

And what if it’s our fault and say they were going to deliver on time and we wanted to reschedule for two weeks out because the people who need to be present are on travel or the room isn’t ready for them? I would think we would officially extend, right?

Looking forward to reading your thoughts

Question- does anyone know what is being taught in the 1102 circles the "unwritten" or written rule for the cost associated with executing a modification (SF30)?

One might ask: Why do a modification at all? Simply do not exercise option three when the time comes. This approach does not satisfy the DOGE cut drill as the total dollar value remains the same in FPDS and other data sources. DOGE requests the options be removed from the contract to enable reduction of the total contract value.

Thoughts?

1. Does this mean after a contract is closed, it must remain at the agency for 6 years after final payment before it can be archived, or does it mean a closed contract can be destroyed 6 years after final payment?

2. Assuming it means a closed contract can be destroyed 6 years after final payment, is there a specific period of time after closure that must pass before it can be archived (e.g., at the agency, in an electronic archiving capacity, or at the federal records center), or can it be archived any time after closure?

I have looked through the FAR, NARA's GRS 1.1, and 36 CFR § 1225.14(c), but can't seem to find a clear answer. I'm sure it's stated in a roundabout way but I'm not seeing the clarity.

Any insight is appreciated.