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  1. It was Friday, February 1, 1974, when out of the blue, my supervisor asked me: Do you have anything against going to Huntsville, Alabama for a week?  The person that asked that question was the one that I needed to file my paperwork for promotion.   I immediately said no and asked when do I go?  Monday was the answer.  Since it was Friday and I was in Washington, D.C, I had a couple of days to get going and hundreds of miles to drive.  Stunned, I left my office space amd began walking around the dismal GAO Building in a stupor.  Over the years, I found that the halls of the GAO building were a wonderful place to think.  The halls were dimly lit and neary devoid of people.

    The one week in Huntsville lasted for 3 months and I almost died there in the April 3, 1974 historic tornado outbeak.  I would be working on the above mentioned bid protest with our Atlanta staff in Huntsville, Alabama at the Marshall Space Flight Center.  Few people know it but this protest was the last time that GAO's General Counsel was stupid enough to involve GAO auditors in a bid protest.  They now do desk top reviews.  At the end of our work, GAO issued a 98 page bid protest decision.  To my knowledge, it remains the longest bid protest decision that GAO ever issued.  When I retired in 2003, I was the last person in GAO that had worked on that protest and I became a momentary celebrity in GAO's General Council.  It's nearly half a century since that protest and now, after giving it much thought over the years, I am writing about my experiences on that protest.  Many of my experiences are personal but many others are protest-related.  The only protest-related source material I am using is my memory  and the original protest decision.  Additionally, I am writing this entry in parts so that I don't end up with something so long that no one would even attempt to read it.  

    Monday, February 4, 1974, came quickly and it was time to go.  I told my friends and family where I was going, packed my 1971 Datsun 240Z with as much as is would hold, and headed southwest through Virginia.   

  2. Consider the following exchange between two people:

    Speaker 1 (asking Speaker 2): What type of car do you drive, foreign or domestic?

    Speaker 2: I drive a red car.

    Obviously, Speaker 2's answer is not responsive to Speaker 1's question. Speaker 1 wanted to know about a particular aspect of Speaker 2's car:  its origin. Speaker 2 described a different aspect of his car:  its color. While Speaker 2's statement about the color of his car may be true, it doesn't tell us anything about the origin of his car.

    Easy enough, right? Ok, let's try another one. Consider the following exchange between two contract specialists:

    Contract Specialist 1: Is Contract X a fixed-price or cost-reimbursement contract?

    Contract Specialist 2: Contract X is an indefinite delivery contract.

    Is Contract Specialist 2's answer responsive to Contract Specialist 1's question? No, the answer is no more responsive to the question than Speaker 2's answer was to the question of whether his car was foreign or domestic. Why? In this exchange, Contract Specialist 1 wanted to know about a particular aspect of Contract X:  ts compensation arrangement. Contract Specialist 2 described a different aspect of Contract X:  its delivery arrangement. While Contract Specialist 2's statement about the delivery arrangement of Contract X may be true, it doesn't tell us anything about the compensation arrangement of Contract X.

    Make sense? If so, see if you can spot anything wrong with the following passage of an article on contract types that recently appeared in the December 2010 issue of Contract Management (see Government Contract Types: The U.S. Government?s Use of Different Contract Vehicles to Acquire Goods, Services, and Construction by Brian A. Darst and Mark K. Roberts):

    FAR Subparts 16.2 through 16.6 describe 11 different permissible contract vehicles. These vehicles can be subdivided into three different families:
    • Fixed-price contracts,
    • Cost-reimbursement contracts, and
    • Other contract vehicles that can be used when the quantity of supplies or services cannot be determined at the time of award (i.e., indefinite delivery, time-and-materials (T&M), labor-hour (LH), and level-of-effort contracts) or where it is necessary for the contractor to begin performance before the terms and conditions of the contracts can be negotiated (i.e., letter contracts).

    Do you see anything wrong?  Notice that the first two "families" are categorized by compensation arrangement. However, the third family contains a mix of terms used to describe compensation arrangement (T&M/LH), delivery arrangement (indefinite delivery), the extent of contractor commitment (level-of-effort), and a unique term used to describe a contract that is not definitive (letter contract). The way this passage is written implies that an indefinite delivery contract, a level-of-effort contract, and a letter contract are necessarily different (belong to a different "family") from a fixed-price or cost reimbursement contract. However, an indefinite delivery contract or a level-of-effort contract will have a compensation arrangement. The compensation arrangement can be fixed-price, cost-reimbursement, T&M/LH, or some combination thereof. A letter contract may or may not have a compensation arrangement when it is issued. You could conceivably have a letter contract that had a cost-reimbursement compensation arrangement, an indefinite delivery arrangement, and that provided for level-of-effort orders. As such, the authors? categorization of contract types makes as much sense as categorizing cars into three families?foreign, domestic, and red.

    Incentive Contracts? Not What You Think They Are

    Consider the following simplified description of a compensation arrangement:

    The buyer agrees to pay the seller $100,000 to provide a specified quantity of medical transcription services. If the accuracy of the transcriptions exceeds 99%, the buyer agrees to pay the seller an additional $5,000.

    Does the preceding describe an incentive contract? Many would say yes, because the arrangement provides for an incentive--specifically, a performance incentive. However, that would be incorrect. Just because a contract contains an incentive does not mean that it is an incentive contract. FAR 16.202-1 contains the following statements in a description of firm-fixed-price contracts (similar statements pertaining to fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment can be found at FAR 16.203-1.

    The contracting officer may use a firm-fixed-price contract in conjunction with an award-fee incentive (see 16.404) and performance or delivery incentives (see 16.402-2 and 16.402-3) when the award fee or incentive is based solely on factors other than cost. The contract type remains firm-fixed-price when used with these incentives.

    [bold added].

    Further, FAR 16.402-1(a) states:

    Most incentive contracts include only cost incentives, which take the form of a profit or fee adjustment formula and are intended to motivate the contractor to effectively manage costs. No incentive contract may provide for other incentives without also providing a cost incentive (or constraint).

    Thus, it's not enough for a contract to contain an incentive to be an incentive contract. It must contain a cost incentive (or constraint).

    In the aforementioned Contract Management article, an endnote references FAR 37.601(3) and misinterprets this paragraph as--encouraging the use of incentive-type contracts where appropriate.  Here's what FAR 37.601(3) actually says:

    Performance-based contracts for services shall include-

    (3) Performance incentives where appropriate. When used, the performance incentives shall correspond to the performance standards set forth in the contract (see 16.402-2).

    The authors have made the mistake of assuming that a contract that contained a performance incentive was necessarily an incentive contract. In fact, when acquiring services FAR 37.102(a)(2) states the following order of precedence:

    (i) A firm-fixed price performance-based contract or task order.

    (ii) A performance-based contract or task order that is not firm-fixed price.

    (iii) A contract or task order that is not performance-based.

    As shown above, a firm-fixed-price contract would take precedence over an incentive contract.

    A Genuine Misunderstanding

    In a discussion of additional contract types and agreements, the Contract Management article contained the following statement (which caused me to stop reading and start writing):

    T&M and LH contracts are varieties of indefinite-delivery contracts and provide procuring agencies with the flexibility to acquire recurring services or when the amount of the effort required to deliver an end-item is uncertain.

    Huh? T&M/LH is a type of indefinite delivery contract? I'll let you readers ponder that one.

    The article concludes with a plug for the authors-two-day course in, you guessed it, types of contracts. I will pass.

  3. At the beginning of Fiscal Year 2008 John Krieger and John Pritchard, two professors at the Defense Systems Management College, Defense Acquisition University, were kicking around the topic of Acquisition Reform. They reflected on what Jim Nagle wrote in the Epilogue to A History of Government Contracting, "If someone were asked to devise a contracting system for the federal government, it is inconceivable that one reasonable person or a committee of reasonable people could come up with our current system.  That system is the result of thousands of decisions made by thousands of individuals, both in and out of government.  It reflects the collision and collaboration of special interests, the impact of innumerable scandals and successes, and the tensions imposed by conflicting ideologies and personalities."

    They reflected that those thousands of decisions were like putting bandages on the acquisition, contracting and procurement processes.  Every time a piece of legislation is passed to “fix” the acquisition process, it’s another bandage.  Every time a change is made to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), it’s another bandage.  Every time a change is made to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), it’s another bandage.  Every time a procurement or contracting policy memorandum is issued, it’s another bandage. 

    They joked about that being a great visual aid for the classroom. (Remember classrooms, the places you went to learn before COVID-19?) And the joking became reality. They started with a golf ball, and added a bandage for each new law, executive order, regulation, guide handbook, etc. And it would grow, and grow, and grow. “Acquisition Reform and the Golf Ball” was born that day.

    The story of the golf ball was chronicled each fiscal year, and reported in the National Contract Management Association’s Contract Management (CM) after the end of each fiscal year. That is each year up until the report on the results for Fiscal Year 2020, when CM declined the latest installment in the series. Although John and John sought publication elsewhere, there didn’t appear to be a good fit, which brings the latest iteration, “Acquisition Reform and the Golf Ball—A Baker’s Dozen,” to Wifcon.com. (See attachment.)


  4. GAO recently sustained a bid protest to a General Services Administration (GSA) acquisition for warehousing and deployment services at the strategic national stockpile–a literal “stockpile” of the nation’s largest supply of critical pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and supplies, and emergency supplies. GSA issued this solicitation and conducted this acquisition on behalf of the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR), an operating agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). But according to GAO, in evaluating offerors under its solicitation, here, GSA failed to provide offerors with the meaningful discussions required by the FAR. So, GAO sustained the protest and recommended that GSA: reopen the procurement to conduct meaningful discussions with offerors, accept and evaluate revised proposals after doing so, and make a new award decision on that basis.

    GAO’s decision in Life Science Logistics, LLC, B-421018.2 (Apr. 19, 2023), involved a solicitation issued by GSA, on behalf of the ASPR agency of the HHS, seeking a contractor to provide a fully-managed service solution to the strategic national stockpile. By way of brief background, the ASPR is the agency that “leads the nation’s medical and public health preparedness for response to, and recovery from, disasters and public health emergencies[.]” A key component of the ASPR’s mission is this strategic national stockpile, “which contains the nation’s largest supply of potentially life-saving pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, medical equipment, and emergency supplies[.]”

    GSA’s solicitation sought warehousing services and deployment services “for pharmaceutical products and disaster relief supplies and equipment intended to support government disaster relief and preparedness efforts.” Specifically, it sought a contractor to provide ASPR with “the necessary expertise with suitable storage, management of medical products, monitoring, logistics, reporting, and emergency staging for delivery of government-provided medical supplies for a national emergency at Site F.”

    GSA issued the solicitation under Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) parts 12 and 15, contemplating award of a contract with a five-year base performance period and five one-year option periods. The solicitation said award would be made using a best-value tradeoff based on three non-price factors, in descending order of importance: (1) technical approach; (2) management approach; and (3) past performance. And it said that all nonprice evaluation factors, when combined, would be considered significantly more important than price.

    The solicitation said a proposal receiving a rating of “not acceptable” for any factor would be ineligible for award, and that GSA would not evaluate any price proposals if the corresponding technical proposal failed to receive an overall technical rating of at least “acceptable.” The solicitation said that GSA’s intention was to make this award without conducting discussions but that GSA also “reserved the right to hold discussions if it determined during the evaluation of proposals that discussions were necessary.”

    GSA received two timely proposals for the solicitation. GSA conducted a conformance check of the two proposals, convened a Q&A session with each offeror, established a competitive range, and held discussions with both offerors. As relevant to the instant protest, GSA’s discussions with the protester only covered GSA’s “concerns regarding potential contamination of [protester]’s proposed site, schedule slippage related to possible excavation, and the rates for two labor categories.” After discussions, GSA reviewed the two offerors’ proposals and discussion question responses and assigned each offeror adjectival ratings.

    The protester was initially rated: Good for its technical approach; Excellent for its management approach; Acceptable for its past performance; and Good overall. Its evaluated price was $198,444,382. And the awardee was initially rated: Excellent for its technical approach; Excellent for its management approach; Excellent for its past performance; and Excellent overall. And its evaluated price was $236,437,623.

    Upon the filing of a timely protest at GAO, GSA took voluntary corrective action to amend the solicitation, solicit proposal revisions, conduct a new evaluation, and make a new award decision. So, the initial protest was dismissed accordingly. During its corrective action, GSA issued solicitation amendment 3, revising the solicitation’s statement of work, instructions, and evaluation criteria. Specifically, it “added a requirement to submit standard blueprints for the proposed facility on 24-inch by 36-inch paper, in color, sufficiently detailed to depict the solicitation requirements.” Amendment 3 was also issued with a cover letter stating that GSA was requiring the complete resubmission of all proposals–noting that any prior proposal submissions would not be reviewed as part of GSA’s reevaluation. It also stated that GSA again reserved the right to make award from the revised proposals without discussions.

    GSA received proposals from the same two initial offerors, and the protester’s revised proposal was not materially different than its initial proposal. GSA again performed a conformance check, evaluated the new proposals, and held virtual Q&A technical clarification sessions with each offeror. But this time around, GSA did not engage in discussions with either offeror.

    This time, the protester was rated: Not Acceptable for its technical approach; Excellent for its management approach; Acceptable for its past performance; and Not Acceptable overall. And its price was not evaluated based on the assigned ratings from the reevaluation. The awardee, this time around, was rated: Excellent for its technical approach; Excellent for its management approach; Acceptable for its past performance; and Excellent overall. And its evaluated price from the reevaluation was $238,674,507.

    For its technical approach, GSA assigned the protester’s proposal four significant weaknesses and two weaknesses based on: (1) the security drawings lacking the required specifications and details; (2) failure to provide the necessary access and egress points in the facility; (3) failure to provide multiple routes to the highway system; and (4) failure to provide sufficient accessibility to the parking lots. Specifically, GSA said the protester failed to show adequate understanding the facility space requirements, submitted drawings omitting critical details of the security requirements, and failed to “depict a posture of understanding the complexities of delivering the complex facility conditioning required of ASPR’s mission.” Because its technical approach was found unacceptable, the protester’s price was not evaluated, and GSA did not conduct a best-value tradeoff. Instead, GSA again made the award to the initial awardee.

    Upon GSA’s re-award of the solicitation to the awardee, the protester filed another timely protest at GAO challenging GSA’s re-evaluation and award decision. Specifically, the protester challenged GSA’s evaluation of its technical proposal, arguing that its initially-submitted and latter technical proposals were not materially different, and “because GSA failed to raise in discussions during the initial evaluation the significant weaknesses that resulted in its proposal being rated as not acceptable in the subsequent evaluation, it did not conduct meaningful discussions.”

    In response, GSA disputed the assertion that the protester’s latter proposal was “materially unchanged” from its initial proposal. GSA also argued that: it was not required to provide the protester with meaningful discussions because its corrective action evaluation was to be “de novo,” meaning it was to be a new evaluation or an evaluation “from the beginning”; and it had warned offerors via the cover letter to amendment 3 that GSA was not intending to conduct discussions.

    GAO began its discussion with some long-standing, more general rules regarding agency discussions, rooted in the FAR and GAO precedent, stating:

    To be meaningful, discussions must lead an offeror into those areas of its proposal that require modification, amplification, or explanation. At a minimum, the agency must discuss all deficiencies, significant weaknesses and adverse past performance information to which the offeror has not had an opportunity to respond.

    Then, turning to the facts of the instant protest, GAO covered what an agency is required to do in this regard when it requests and re-evaluates revised proposals after a corrective action (or similar agency action), stating:

    When an agency seeks revised proposals, its reevaluation may identify flaws in a materially-unchanged proposal that the agency would have been required to discuss with the offeror, had the flaws been identified when the proposal was initially evaluated. In that situation, the agency must reopen discussions in order to disclose its concerns, thereby giving all offerors similar opportunities to revise their proposals.

    GAO elaborated on this requirement, stating:

    In this context, the requirement to reopen discussions is predicated on the fact that the underlying evaluated concern should have been apparent to the agency when it initially evaluated proposals prior to conducting discussions. For example, we have sustained protests for failing to reopen discussions where the agency’s initial evaluation was inconsistent with evaluation criteria or otherwise inadequate.

    Then, applying these standards to the case at hand, GAO explained:

    Here, as discussed above, when GSA evaluated the protester’s [initial] proposal, the agency rated the proposal as good under the technical approach factor and did not assess any significant weaknesses. Then, when the agency evaluated [protester]’s (essentially unchanged) [latter] proposal, [GSA] assessed four significant weaknesses and rated the proposal as not acceptable under the technical approach factor. Despite GSA’s argument that the initial and latter proposals are materially different, it is undisputed that the content giving rise to the significant weaknesses was present in both proposals but overlooked in the prior evaluation.

    In support of these findings, GAO specifically noted GSA’s failure at the protest hearing to identify any material changes between protester’s initial and latter proposals in regard to several of the specifications. GAO also pointed out GSA’s response to the question of why the issues giving rise to the Not Acceptable rating in the latter proposal were not taken into account in evaluation of the initial proposal–to which GSA responded: “Because we realized that we said that we were going to evaluate it in a specific way, but we weren’t checking for all the details that we should have been.”

    As such, GAO noted there was no dispute of the fact that the drawings in the protester’s proposal that gave rise to the significant weaknesses were “materially the same in both proposals.” GSA, instead, argued that protester included in its latter proposal an aerial photograph of the site at issue that ultimately resulted in GSA assessing the three significant weaknesses. It was this aerial photo, according to GSA, that made the issues “apparent for the first time.”

    But GAO was not buying it. GAO explained that GSA had already acknowledged multiple times that the initial proposal drawings showed the same issues and same failures to meet the solicitation’s access/egress requirements. And thus, GAO said that the access/egress-based significant weakness raised by GSA in its reevaluation should have been “apparent without the addition of the aerial photo,” and GAO also said, “the same reasoning applies to the significant weaknesses that pertain to accessibility of the parking lot and the number of routes to the highway system from the site.”

    GAO then turned to GSA’s second argument–that it was not required to open new discussions after its corrective action “because the corrective action evaluation was a ‘de novo‘ evaluation[.]” In that regard, GAO found “the agency’s attempt to negate its obligation to provide meaningful discussions on this basis unavailing.” GAO further explained:

    While the agency may have intended to restart the competition entirely anew, this was not conveyed to the offerors. The agency only instructed offerors to submit new proposals and advised that prior proposal submissions would not be reviewed as part of the reevaluation. There was nothing about disregarding the initial round of discussions with [protester], which identified some areas of concern with [protester]’s proposed approach, but not others.

    As such, because the issues giving rise to the significant weaknesses in the protester’s proposal were apparent in both the initial and latter proposals–but GSA did not advise the protester of the significant weaknesses in its initial proposal–GAO found that GSA’s discussions were not meaningful. And it sustained the protest on that basis, recommending that GSA: reopen the procurement; conduct “appropriate and meaningful discussions” with both offerors; request and evaluate revised proposals; and make a new award decision.

    * * *

    Given the amount of discretion GAO typically affords contracting agencies regarding the methods and procedures they choose to utilize in any given evaluation, this GAO decision sets an important boundary on that discretion. Where an agency does decide to conduct discussions with offerors at any time during its evaluation or reevaluation, those discussions must be meaningful–(at a minimum) pointing offerors to any deficiencies, significant weaknesses, or adverse past performance information apparent to the agency at that time. Indeed, even an agency’s corrective action, solicitation of revised proposals, and/or purported “de novo” evaluation of such revised proposals does not relieve agencies of the requirement to make any discussions it conducts meaningful.

    Questions about this post? Or need help with a government contracting legal issue? Email us.

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    The post GAO Sustains Protest to GSA Strategic National Stockpile Acquisition Based on Agency’s Failure to Conduct Meaningful Discussions first appeared on SmallGovCon - Government Contracts Law Blog.

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  5. The ongoing debt ceiling negotiations are approaching the “X Date” with little certainty of a resolution. The X Date, the date on which the U.S. Government runs out of money to pay all of its bills, is estimated to be June 1. Failing to raise the debt ceiling by that date would be unprecedented and, by most accounts, would have dire consequences for the economy.

    The current brinkmanship related to the debt ceiling is reminiscent of prior talks leading up to government shutdowns. The scenarios are different, but the impacts (and preparations) for government contractors likely will be similar. Here’s a breakdown of the differences and how government contractors can prepare for the possibility of reaching the X Date without a resolution on the debt ceiling.

    Debt Ceiling v. Shutdown 

    A government shutdown results from a quirk of appropriations law—the government cannot spend money that Congress has not yet authorized/appropriated. The government still has the means to pay the commitments, but the commitments have not yet been authorized, so agencies have to go into a holding pattern. Without an approved budget, the government lacks the legal authority to spend money, resulting in a shutdown. Agencies cease operations except for essential activities to protect life and property and other specific exceptions. Contractors are issued stop work orders and/or have to give notice that they will stop work because their contracts are subject to limitation of funds or limitation of costs clauses.

    The debt ceiling is unrelated to appropriations. The government has authorized the commitments and the Government could legally pay them, but it cannot do so practically. It does not have sufficient funds and cannot borrow any additional money. But reaching the debt ceiling does not immediately result in a government shutdown. Agencies can still use money that they have (until it runs out), but there is uncertainty around how agencies will use that money and what happens after the funds are exhausted.

    Although the causes of the funding shortfall are different in the debt ceiling context, the result likely is the same. Contractors may need to be prepared to stop work and seek to recover any impacts from the disruption after the debt ceiling issue is resolved.  

    The Right to Stop Work

    Failing to raise the debt ceiling by the X Date may have limited immediate impact, particularly for contracts that are fully funded. In theory, the funds necessary to pay the contractor for the work were already authorized and appropriated and are allocated to the contract in the agency’s account. If those funds are sitting in the agency’s account, the debt ceiling should not prevent payment of funds that are already available. 

    Of course, the agency might decide to reallocate its funds (where possible) and move funding from one purpose to another. The agency would issue revised Funds schedules and/or stop work orders, and contractors’ ability to recover additional costs in that situation should be similar to any other stop work situation. But if the Government does not issue a stop work order, or simply runs out of money to pay its obligations, there are two potentially important considerations. 

    First, the contractor is not required to keep working without payment. The CBCA’s 2014 decision in Kiewit-Turner addresses this point. There, the agency was attempting to force the contractor to construct a building that was estimated to cost more than the amount that had been appropriated. The contractor repeatedly advised the agency of this fact and requested design changes to bring the cost in line with the available funding. The agency refused to adopt the design changes and the contractor stopped work. The CBCA upheld that decision because the contractor could not be forced to perform without any expectation of payment. The same rationale extends to the debt ceiling context. If an agency runs out of money (or diverts available funds to other causes), the contractor could (and probably should) stop work.

    The second important consideration is that a lack of funds is not an excuse to the Government’s payment obligation. That was the ruling in the Supreme Court’s decision in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter back in 2012. In that case, the agency had issued multiple support contracts and had enough money to cover any one contractor’s costs, but not enough to pay them all. The agency paid costs on a pro-rata basis and then argued it was excused from further payment when the funds were exhausted. The Court rejected that argument because contractors cannot be charged with knowing how the agency internally allocates the funds appropriated to it. If there is enough money in an appropriation to cover your contract, you are not required to monitor whether the agency is using those funds to pay someone else. This principle applies with equal force to the debt ceiling. The agency should not avoid paying for costs incurred by a contractor simply because money ran tight and the agency prioritized who to pay first. 

    Sovereign Acts

    Another consideration is whether the failure to raise the debt ceiling is a sovereign act that excuses the government’s failure to pay its obligations. Assessing that risk, particularly in light of the numerous new justices appointed to the Supreme Court, requires more than a blog article. But the Court previously held in United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996), that government agencies accept certain risks that they cannot control when they enter into contracts with private parties. There, the government sought to be relieved of its contractual obligations after Congress changed a regulatory scheme that impacted numerous government contracts. The Court held that the agencies assumed the risk of regulatory change and were not excused from their obligations:

    The mere fact that the Government’s contracting agencies . . . could not themselves preclude Congress from changing the regulatory rules does not, of course, stand in the way of concluding that those agencies assumed the risk of such change, for determining the consequences of legal change was the point of the agreements. It is, after all, not uncommon for a contracting party to assume the risk of an event he cannot control, even when that party is an agent of the Government.

     In the context of the debt ceiling, the rationale above would support the notion that the government agencies assumed the risk of the X Date and Congress’s failure to authorize additional borrowing should not be an excuse for contractors to go unpaid if they incur additional costs from the debt ceiling brinkmanship and resulting uncertainty.

    Further Reading:

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  6. Federal contractors must be registered on SAM.gov to be eligible for award of federal contracts.  Failure to do so can have significant consequences, as the recent U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC) decision in Myriddian, LLC v. United States, No. 23-443 makes clear. 

    In Myriddian, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) awarded a five-year, $11 million contract to Cloud Harbor Economics, LLC (Cloud) for coding support services.  Myriddian, an unsuccessful offeror, protested at the CFC, arguing Cloud was ineligible for award under FAR 52.204-7, which provides that an offeror must “be registered in SAM when submitting an offer or quotation, and shall continue to be registered until time of award.”  Although Cloud was registered in SAM at the time of proposal submission and at the time of contract award, Cloud’s registration had lapsed for three weeks during the proposal evaluation period.  The CFC sustained the protest, holding that FAR 52.204-7 unambiguously requires a contractor to maintain its SAM registration throughout the entire proposal and evaluation process, and that an agency lacks the authority to waive that requirement.  Because Cloud failed to “continue to be registered until time of award,” the CFC found Cloud ineligible for award and enjoined CMS from proceeding with the contract.  

    Myriddian comes on the heels of the CFC’s recent decision in Thalle/Nicholson Joint Venture v. United States, No. 22-755, upholding an agency’s elimination of a joint venture from competition where each of the joint venture members was individually registered in SAM at the time of proposal submission, but the joint venture itself was not.  These cases stand as cautionary tales reminding offerors to ensure active SAM registration at all times throughout the proposal process and not to wait until the last minute—especially given processing delays that contractors continue to experience with SAM registrations.

    • Key takeaway #1 – Register and renew/update early. Although we generally are seeing smoother registration processing recently, issues and delays remain. We advise clients to begin new registrations—and updates and renewals to existing registrations—as early as possible to get ahead of potential delays (e.g., with entity validation).
    • Key takeaway #2 – When in doubt, reach out. Our team is experienced in navigating SAM registration issues and can provide support at every juncture. Please do not hesitate to reach out.

    The post Check Your SAM Registration Early and Often appeared first on Government Contracts Legal Forum.

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  7. Late last year, the United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published a memorandum, M-22-18, that required federal agencies to comply with the guidelines regarding ensuring the safety and integrity of third-party software on federal information technology systems. This memorandum applied to the use of firmware, operating systems, applications, cloud-based software and general software.

    The memo requires federal agencies to comply with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidance, as detailed in President Biden’s cybersecurity Executive Order 14028, and stipulated that agencies “only use software provided by software producers who can attest to complying with the Government-specified secure software development practices, as described in the NIST Guidance.”

    The memo instructed agencies to collect a standardized self-attestation form from all software contractors before deploying their products. Initially, each agency will identify the software and collect the self-attestations forms.  The end goal is to create a government-wide central repository of all software-related information, to shore up any cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

    I wanted to provide you with a brief update on where the NIH Information Technology Acquisition and Assessment Center (NITAAC) is in the self-attestation process and make you aware of some key dates that will impact your company.

    NITAAC is working with the OMB to determine the formal agency posture on this matter. We also are working to finetune the process for our communications requirements, as it relates to collecting the self-attestation forms.

    In the meantime, contractors should be aware of the following key dates:

    • June 11, 2023: NITAAC deadline to collect self-attestation forms from critical software providers.
    • September 14, 2023: NITAAC deadline to collect the forms from all software providers on the NITAAC networks.
    • TBD: If needed, NITAAC will request a software bill of materials or other artifact(s) that demonstrate conformance with secure software development practices. 

    You will hear more from NITAAC as we get additional clarity, however, I wanted you to know you are not in this alone.  I understand that this request presents several challenges on your end, in terms of staffing and the additional labor required to conduct and submit the self-attestations.

    We face those same challenges at NITAAC. One of the biggest obstacles being faced on the federal level is that of time. The reality is that the government likely will not be able to produce and distribute the attestation forms in a timely manner.  Unfortunately, if we cannot do so, this administrative burden will fall upon our contract holders, as you will then need to develop your own forms.

    I can’t promise that this process will be smooth, as there are several variables at play, but what I can promise is that we will be as transparent as possible and will make it our business to provide you with timely and relevant updates.

    I value our partnership and look forward to attesting the safety, integrity and security of all the software our contract holders provide to the federal government.  This will become just one more example of the high-quality, best in class service agencies can expect from the NITAAC Contract Holders. 

    We will discuss this further on our next Contact Holders’ call.

    To read the Executive Order, visit https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-14028-improving-nations-cybersecurity. To learn more about the OMB Memo, visit https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/M-22-18.pdf.

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