(Sections deleted)

III. Discussion

Rowe’s Motion presents two justifications for sanctioning Ravens. It charges Ravens with making unverified and baseless accusations of improper conduct against Rowe and its President, Scott Rowe. The Motion also asserts that many of Ravens’ legal arguments were so deficient as to be frivolous and thus subject to Rule 11 sanctions.

A. The Rule 11 Legal Standard

Rule 11 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) is patterned after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Federal Circuit has held that its rulings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules are applicable to RCFC 11. Id. The Rule requires that every pleading filed by a party be signed by the party’s attorney. RCFC 11(a) (“Every pleading, motion, and other paper shall be signed by or for the attorney of record in the signing attorney’s own individual name . . . . ”). The attorney’s signature acts as a certification that the pleading is well-grounded in fact, has a basis in law, and is not filed for an improper purpose. View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., 208 F.3d 981, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also RCFC 11(b).

Rule 11 is aimed at curbing baseless filings by parties that burden the courts and cause needless expense and delay. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397-98 (1990). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 amendments to the Rule are instructive on this point: “The [R]ule [] require[s] litigants to ‘stop and think’ before initially making legal or factual contentions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (Notes of Advisory Committee on 1993 Amendments). The Rule therefore requires that parties make a reasonable inquiry of the applicable law and underlying facts to ensure that claims brought before the court are not frivolous. Persyn v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 708, 712 (1996). The reasonableness of a party’s pre-filing inquiry is measured by an objective standard. See id. A party’s good faith belief in the merits of an argument is not sufficient to avoid sanction. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 548-49 (1991).

Rule 11 authorizes the court to sanction an attorney for failure to comply with its requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c); RCFC 11(c). The court may sanction the attorney to the extent sufficient to deter the repetition of such conduct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); RCFC 11(c)(2). The sanction may consist of, or include, nonmonetary directives, an order to pay a penalty to the court, or an order directing payment to the movant of reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the Rule 11 violation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); RCFC 11(c)(2).

Count II

We believe that this language provides a legal basis for the argument set forth in Ravens’ Complaint. Although Ravens’ interpretation of this FAR clause may be strained, Rule 11 does not require that the legal contentions set forth in a pleading are correct, only that they have some basis in existing law. See Saladino v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 754, 757 (2005) (“A legal argument that ultimately is incorrect . . . does not necessarily equate to one that is not warranted by existing law or by a ‘nonfrivolous argument for its extension.’”) (quoting RCFC 11(b)(2)). We further note that Ravens’ attorney dropped this contention at oral argument. Rather than insist that exercise of the options was the functional equivalent of a “best value” contract award, Ravens’ attorney argued instead that his client relied on exercise of the options as evidence that award of the contract was no longer in contention. See Opinion at 11. We ultimately dismissed Count II for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Ravens’ attorney was unable to demonstrate how this alleged “reliance” altered his client’s circumstances or what prejudice it suffered. Id. (p. 16)

Count IV

We rejected Ravens’ argument as not being persuasive. Opinion at 12. However, the fact that Ravens’ claim was dismissed on the merits does not mean sanctions are warranted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (Notes of Advisory Committee on 1993 Amendments) (“The certification is that there is (or likely will be) ‘evidentiary support’ for the allegation, not that the party will prevail with respect to its contention regarding the fact . . . . [The rendering of] summary judgment . . . against a party does not necessarily mean . . . that [the party] had no evidentiary support for its position.”). As set forth in the Complaint, Count IV was poorly crafted and based on weak facts, but was not frivolous. Cf. Saladino, 63 Fed. Cl. at 757-58 (finding that the theory presented by the plaintiff was frivolous and “wholly without merit” because the theory had been discredited when another judge of the Court of Federal Claims ruled against the plaintiff in a separate, previously filed case and because binding precedent applicable to his claims had warned litigants that “pressing such claims would be sanctionable”). (p. 18)

We decline to impose sanctions on Ravens or its attorney. In doing so, we do not express our approval of Ravens’ performance in this Court. To the contrary, we note our frustration with Ravens’ inability to present its arguments logically. In the future, this Court will not tolerate the presentation of claims by Ravens or its attorney that are clearly outside the Court’s jurisdiction or which lack a firm factual or legal basis.  (The Ravens Group, Inc., v. U. S. and Rowe Contracting Services, Inc., No. 07-243C, Filed October 31, 2007)  (pdf)