In addition to establishing the CAP, section 1847 of title 18 includes a provision addressing administrative or judicial review of the agency’s actions. In this regard, section 1847(b)(10) states as follows:

There shall be no administrative or judicial review under section 1869, section 1878, or otherwise, of…(B) the awarding of contracts under this section.
See 42 U.S.C. sect. 1395w-3(b)(10).

The starting point of any analysis of the meaning of a statutory provision is the statutory language used by Congress. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.”) Where the language is clear on its face, its plain meaning will be given effect; that is, if the intent of Congress is clear, “that is the end of the matter.” SmithKline Beecham Pharm., B‑271845, Aug. 23, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 82 at 3, citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, (1984). Here, we find that the language in question is unambiguous. As stated, the language prohibits any judicial or administrative review of the awarding of contracts under section 1847. Based on this plain language, since the procurements here were conducted under section 1847, our Office is precluded from considering the protests of the awards.

Omnicare argues that section 1847(b)(10) does not preclude GAO’s review of its protest because the firm is not seeking review of the “awarding of contracts,” but rather is challenging the disqualification of its bid. We do not view this distinction as meaningful. The agency’s decision to reject the protester’s bid is a necessary aspect of determining which bidders are eligible for award under the solicitation. More specifically, in requesting that we find that its bid should not have been rejected, Omnicare necessarily is requesting that we find that it should have received an award. As such, we view the agency rejection of Omnicare’s bid as part of the process of the “awarding of contracts”; our review of its protest therefore is precluded by the statute. Omnicare also argues that the jurisdictional exemption in section 1847(b)(10) applies only to actions within the scope of the agency’s authority; since the agency’s allegedly improper actions here fall outside its statutory authority and required duties in administering a competitive bidding program as Congress intended, they are reviewable under this provision. Omnicare’s Comments, Mar. 31, 2008, at 3. We disagree. In prohibiting the reviewing of contract awards, section 1847(b)(10) makes no distinction based on whether the actions in question are “within the scope of the agency’s authority.” Again, therefore, we find that review by our Office is precluded. Finally, Dania, Chronic Care, and Wound Management argue that GAO is not precluded from reviewing their protests, since section 1847(b)(10) only pertains to administrative or judicial review. The protesters suggest that the term “administrative review” refers only to review by an executive branch entity; GAO, as a legislative branch agency, has a “legislative” not an administrative review role. Protesters’ Comments, Apr. 1, 2008, at 2. However, the protesters have provided no legal support for their narrow reading of the term “administrative” in the context of the statute here, and there is nothing in the statute itself or the legislative history that indicates Congress intended to exclude GAO review from the exempting language. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-391 (2003). This being the case, and because GAO is the principal federal agency with statutory authority to review bid protests, we think it is sufficiently clear that the exempting language was intended to preclude GAO review.  Accordingly, we reject the protesters’ interpretation here.  (Eastern Medical Equipment, Inc.; Omnicare, Inc.; Dania Medical Equipment & Supplies, Inc.; Chronic Care Pharmaceutical Services, LLC; Wound Management Technologies, Inc., B-311423; B-311423.2; B-311423.3; B-311423.4; B-311423.5, May 1, 2008)  (pdf)

The Presidio Trust, a wholly-owned government corporation, is not subject to the General Accounting Office's bid protest jurisdiction under the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), since the Trust is statutorily exempt from all federal procurement laws and regulations but for certain enumerated exceptions that do not include CICA. (Performance Excavators, Inc., B-291771, March 17, 2003)  (pdf)  (txt)

We conclude that UNICOR's disagreement with the Corps's determination that UNICOR's products are not comparable as to price or delivery to private sector products is subject to the board's binding authority.  Accordingly, our Office will not review the matter.  Mississippi State Dep't of Rehab. Servs., supra.  (Federal Prison Industries, Inc., B-290546, July 15, 2002)