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TITLE VIII--ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS

Public Law 108-136

House Conference Report 108-354

SEC. 802. QUALITY CONTROL IN PROCUREMENT OF AVIATION CRITICAL SAFETY ITEMS AND RELATED SERVICES.

    (a) QUALITY CONTROL POLICY- The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe in regulations a quality control policy for the procurement of aviation critical safety items and the procurement of modifications, repair, and overhaul of such items.

    (b) CONTENT OF REGULATIONS- The policy set forth in the regulations shall include the following requirements:

      (1) That the head of the design control activity for aviation critical safety items establish processes to identify and manage the procurement, modification, repair, and overhaul of aviation critical safety items.

      (2) That the head of the contracting activity for an aviation critical safety item enter into a contract for the procurement, modification, repair, or overhaul of such item only with a source approved by the design control activity in accordance with section 2319 of title 10, United States Code.

      (3) That the aviation critical safety items delivered, and the services performed with respect to aviation critical safety items, meet all technical and quality requirements specified by the design control activity.

    (c) DEFINITIONS- In this section, the terms `aviation critical safety item' and `design control activity' have the meanings given such terms in section 2319(g) of title 10, United States Code, as amended by subsection (d).

    (d) CONFORMING AMENDMENT TO TITLE 10- Section 2319 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--

      (1) in subsection (c)(3), by inserting after `the contracting officer' the following: `(or, in the case of a contract for the procurement of an aviation critical safety item, the head of the design control activity for such item)'; and

      (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

    (g) DEFINITIONS- In this section:

      (1) The term `aviation critical safety item' means a part, an assembly, installation equipment, launch equipment, recovery equipment, or support equipment for an aircraft or aviation weapon system if the part, assembly, or equipment contains a characteristic any failure, malfunction, or absence of which could cause a catastrophic or critical failure resulting in the loss of or serious damage to the aircraft or weapon system, an unacceptable risk of personal injury or loss of life, or an uncommanded engine shutdown that jeopardizes safety.

      (2) The term `design control activity', with respect to an aviation critical safety item, means the systems command of a military department that is specifically responsible for ensuring the airworthiness of an aviation system or equipment in which the item is to be used.

Quality control in procurement of aviation critical safety items and related services (sec. 802)

The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 805) that would require the establishment of a policy for quality control in the procurement of critical aircraft spare parts.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The House recedes with an amendment that would require the Secretary of Defense to prescribe in regulations a quality control policy for the procurement of aviation critical safety items and the procurement of modifications, repair, and overhaul of these items. An approved source may include a dealer, manufacturer, repair or overhaul facility, broker, or distributor who provides aviation critical safety items to the Department of Defense.

 

 

Senate Rpt.108-046

Quality control in procurement of aviation critical safety items and related services (sec. 805)

The committee recommends a provision that would require the establishment of a policy for quality control in the procurement of critical aircraft spare parts. Aviation critical safety items are those parts for which the risk of failure is unacceptable because of the potential catastrophic results.

Within the Department of the Navy, approximately two percent of aviation spare and repair parts are aviation critical safety items. Because of the extreme consequences of failure, rigorous evaluations are conducted on both the item design and potential suppliers' manufacturing processes to ensure safe and reliable flight safety parts can be repeatedly produced. Aviation critical safety items are typically evaluated during the development of a system to determine the specific circumstances that would cause a failure and the effects of such a failure on safety and performance. These evaluations help establish design and manufacturing requirements and life and operational limits. The process of validating the design and manufacturing details of aviation critical safety items, and subsequently confirming the manufacturing capability and controls of potential sources, is essential to ensure operational safety and effectiveness. The process is comparable to requirements established by the Federal Aviation Administration prior to issuing production certification or parts manufacturer approval for civil aircraft parts.

The Department of Defense's (DOD) logistics management practices centralize management and acquisition of spare and repair parts. As a result, aviation critical safety items are often purchased by a DOD organization other than the organization that understands the item's design intent, criticality, limitations, and manufacturing characteristics. DOD logistics management practices result in the procurement of flight safety critical aircraft parts from other than qualified sources, and without the knowledge or approval of the cognizant design control activity. The DOD Inspector General has reported that the Department lacks adequate staff to perform the audits and certifications required to properly maintain Qualified Manufacturer's Lists and Qualified Products Lists. As a result, almost half of the vendor manufacturing lines needing certification have not been properly audited, and some of the certifications were as much as 8 years overdue. The Inspector General also reported that inadequate staffing of the Department's quality control programs has resulted in as many as 1.4 million potentially nonconforming items in the inventory for the Navy alone.

The provision recommended by the committee would require the Department to ensure that parts essential for flight safety are procured only from sources approved by the design activity and in accordance with technical requirements established by the design activity.

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