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Craigmccaa

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  1. Is this question really about whether you can avoid synopsizing the award? From FAR 2.101 - “Electronic commerce” means electronic techniques for accomplishing business transactions including electronic mail or messaging, World Wide Web technology, electronic bulletin boards, purchase cards, electronic funds transfer, and electronic data interchange. Consider the following from GAO-15-253R: "However, according to officials, the Corps provides options outside of these procurement systems to enable vendors to submit bids electronically. In particular, the Corps can accept bid submissions on a compact disc or by e-mail if the bid does not exceed agency e-mail size limits and provision is made in the solicitation for such a method of submission." It would seem that GAO, in reviewing implementation of Section 850 of PL 105-85 (1997) in the above report, considers email to constitute electronic submission. I suggest you ask your contracting officer where his/her interpretation comes from.
  2. I believe the PPT guide was removed from the AFFARS in Air Force Acquisition Circular (AFAC) 2013-0327 (March 27, 2103). The same AFAC revised Mandatory Procedure (MP) 5315.3 to reflect the March 2011 DoD Source Selection Procedures. There are a number of policy memos related to the AFAC, but I've been unable to open them.
  3. Since the money went from one Government agency to another Government agency I would propose that you didn't receive a "grant" in the sense of 31 USC 6304 (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/6304). ... and that the "grant" rules don't apply to you. It looks like you've received funds that your organization will divide into PI salary (I'm assuming here that the PI is a Government employee) and a number of other actions to provide whatever support the PI needs. Those look to me like regular contract actions, that you'd execute in accordance with your agency's contracting procedures. For example, if your PI has a particular contractor in mind for a portion of the work, you'd have to justify that sole source action.
  4. Deaner - A couple of questions: Do you work for a Federal Government agency? How did the money in question come to your organization?
  5. OK, I'll give this one more try. I can't tell whether the above quote reflects your understanding of the applicable rules or just an overcautious approach to postgovernment employment, but ironically the approach both you and Vecchia (in post #8) descibe is far more restrictive than the rules require. As I said in my previous post: complicated rules requiring detailed fact analysis. Find your ethics counselor and provide him or her with the necessary facts. And although part of my job is as an ethics counselor, I'm more interested in your answers to Vern's questions.
  6. Joel asked if you have an ethics counselor. You DO have an ethics counselor. Find him or her before you do anything. Beyond the restrictions stemming from the Procurement Integrity Act that Vern pointed out, there are a number of criminal statutes that may restrict your activities while job hunting and after leaving the Government. The rules are complicated and the answers require detailed fact analysis. Having said all that, the applicable restrictions aren't draconian (unless they intersect with the one job in the whole world that you're set on) and won't require you to seek work as a barista.
  7. Although identified as FPIF in the original post, in application it's CPFF below the target cost and FFP above the target cost.
  8. I agree that the clause doesn't expressly indicate whether "applying" means to add or subtract. I used (2)(i) as the basis from which to extrapolate the meaning of "applying" to the other cases because (2)(i) involves numbers that are original elements of the agreement (target cost and target profit) and don't require intermediate calculations. The only reasonable way to apply the adjustment in that situation is by adding it to the final negotiated cost , because subtracting the adjustment would mean in the case of the initally posed scenario the contractor is reimbursed $53M on a contract where it incurred the target cost of $60M. The contractor loses the amount of the target profit as a reward for performing right at the target cost, a result that makes my concern about the "effective ceiling" and "who would agree to this arrangement?" seem trivial by comparison. And just to review the math operation, in post #35 Joel laid out the calculation for an overrun scenario with an incurred cost of $78M as: TP = 78 + (7 - (78 - 60)). = 85 - 18 = 67. In fact, the calculation is TP=78+(7-(78-60))=78+(7-18)=78+(-11)=78-11=67.
  9. Vern - I vote for your formula 2. Take a look at post #22. I think FAR 52.216-16(d)(2)(i) sets the stage for "applying to the total final negotiated cost an adjustment for profit or loss". The only way "applying" the "adjustment" can be interpreted from (2)(i) is by adding the adjustment to the final negotiated cost. In the examples I included in the clause text, that all works out to $67M. If the "adjustment" is a positive number (target profit greater than the overrun amount) the contractor has a profit which is reduced in this case (because of the 0/100 share ratio) dollar for dollar by the amount of the overrun. If the target profit is less than the overrun the adjustment is a negative number which when added to the final negotiated cost results in a loss. And I agree that we shouldn't say the ceiling doesn't matter. We should, however, be questioning why the CO would establish a ceiling that mathematically exceeds the amount the contractor could be paid under the formula. While the stated ceiling is $70M, the effective ceiling is $67M. If I were Government counsel during the appeal my best argument might be that the CO was incompetent ... but that doesn't mean the contractor receives more than $67M
  10. I don't think either navy or I started with a result and worked backwards. And calling it adding is OK with me. If the difference between final negotiated cost and target cost is less than the target profit you're adding a positive number (7 minus some number less than 7) to the final negotiated cost. If the difference is greater than the target profit you're adding a negative number (7 minus some number greater than 7) to the final negotiated cost. From 52.216-16(d)(2) -- (2) The total final price shall be established by applying to the total final negotiated cost an adjustment for profit or loss, as follows: (i) If the total final negotiated cost is equal to the total target cost, the adjustment is the total target profit. [ 60 + 7 = 67] (ii) If the total final negotiated cost is greater than the total target cost, the adjustment is the total target profit, less 100 percent of the amount by which the total final negotiated cost exceeds the total target cost. [From the original posted scenario ... 68 + (7 - 8) = 67; If the final negotiated cost was 65 the adjustment would show as 65 + (7- 5) = 67] (iii) If the final negotiated cost is less than the total target cost, the adjustment is the total target profit plus 0 percent of the amount by which the total final negotiated cost is less than the total target cost. [because of the 100/0 share, this results in adding 7 to whatever the final negotiated cost is] Because of the pretty unusual share ratio over the target cost (0/100), the adjustment is a 1 for 1 movement, which makes the result static at the target price, or essentially FFP. .... and yes, I can wait until we're done with this before moving to another question.
  11. Vern - I believe Navy's process/calculation is correct. The clause states that you make an adjustment to (not a deduction from) the final negotiated cost. So if the final cost was $ 61M, the adjustment would be the target profit of $ 7M less the percentage (in this case 100%) of the amount by which the final cost exceeded the target cost ($ 1M) which leaves $ 6M. The adjustment in that case adds $ 6M to the $ 61M final cost for a total of $ 67M. If the final cost exceeds the target cost by an amount that's more than the target profit (which is the OPs scenario) the adjustment becomes a deduction from the final cost. But I want to re-ask the question you posed in post#2 -- is this a real arrangement? Who negotiates a deal that is, in effect a firm fixed price over the target cost and CPFF below the target cost?
  12. No. Per paragraph (a) of FAR 52.219-9 - (a) This clause does not apply to small business concerns.
  13. In the original post, govt2310 included an assumption that the agency is sticking with its prerogative to make an award without discussion. Actually, the agency doesn’t have to evaluate the unacceptable proposal’s price even if the agency conducts discussions, provided the agency eliminates the unacceptable proposal from the competitive range because of its unacceptability. The cases excerpted by Vern in post #16 recognize the discretion available to the agency to eliminate technically unacceptable proposals from competition without evaluating price (or other factors). However, I offer a caution related to a comment by woops85 in post #2 and the JBlanco Enterprises case cited by Vern in post #16. In both instances cited, the agency stated that it would not evaluate further if some event occurred (failure of single pass/fail criterion and proposal technical unacceptability, respectively). I think that potentially in those instances and particularly if the solicitation follows with something like “and your proposal will be rejected” or “and your proposal will not be further considered for award” (proponents of such language typically rationalizing that there’s less work if you can just eliminate an “unacceptable” offeror early and not have to expend further resources completing the evaluation), elimination of the unacceptable proposal may be nondiscretionary, and the agency may be prevented (unnecessarily) from conducting discussions with a potentially correctable offeror .
  14. I believe the 2009 GAO letter (B-317636) stands for two propositions: 1) that neither 10 USC ?2410a or 41 USC ?253l limit agencies with no-year or multiple-year funds to a severable service performance period of one year; and 2) that the maximum period of performance for contracted severable services funded by other than annual appropriations is the period (actual start/end dates ? not number of years) of availability for obligation associated with those funds. By indicating that the cited statutes don?t apply to no-year or multiple-year funds, the GAO is suggesting traditional bona fide needs analysis which would treat as a bona fide need only those services performed while the funds were available for obligation. This limits the period of performance to a date no later than the end of the availability of those funds for obligation. In the case of no-year funds, arguably your contract could run indefinitely. In the case of the original poster?s FY 10 RDT&E funds I believe the poster is correct and September 30, 2011 is the outward bound on the performance period. Nothing in the GAO letter suggests that there?s authority separate from the cited statutes (which GAO concludes don?t apply to no-year or multiple-year funds) to fund performance of severable service for a period beyond their availability for appropriation.
  15. The issue that's always caused me to advise my clients that BAAs don't support a determination that adequate price competition exists is FAR 31.016(d): The statement that proposals submitted in response to a BAA are "not submitted in accordance with a common work statement" seems inconsistent with the adequate price competition standards in FAR 15.403-1©(1), where two of the three standards reference the Government's "expressed requirement" and the third references price analysis based on comparison with previous prices resulting from adequate price competition.
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