FSCO

I agree that it is permissible, but just to play the devil's advocate here, how would you evaluate offerors with no relevant past performance history? We're required to evaluate them neither favorably nor unfavorably, so how could that occur using just a go/no go decision? I think I know the answer (this isn't a comparative evaluation factor), but just want to flesh out the argument. Again, I agree that it's permissible.

Then you would negotiate the rates with the offeror for that IDIQ, unless for some reason you required all offerors to have FPRAs.

What rates are you talking about? Could you be a little more specific?

Nope, not a construction contract, though I'm familiar with that clause. This one is just a simple service contract.

Hi All, A fellow CO came to me with an interesting situation. We have a contractor who is requesting a modification to the contract in order to fill one of the key personnel slots with an employee of one of their subcontractors. Is this allowable? My initial thought is no, given that the Government would not be able to assert the right of refusal due to privity concerns. However, I have been unable to find a definitive prohibition in the FAR, our agency regs, or our agency policy. Thoughts?

The report has been out for close to two weeks. What are some of your thoughts on the recommendations that the Commission made? In particular, what are everyone's thoughts on how to implement the recommendation regarding elevating the role of contracting officials?

I don't know if it will stop it, which is why I asked the question in the first place. Maybe it could mitigate some of the risk. I agree that it's a crappy situation, but we shouldn't just sit idly by and let it occur without trying to fix it. Besides the obvious of pulling out of Afghanistan, what are some suggestions? Would legislation which limited subcontracting in contingency operations be viable?

Would the flowdown state that the subcontractor must get consent from the government? How would that play with the privity issue? Would you expand on why you think this is a program problem? I can see how, but would like to know your thinking.

The government has been having a bit of difficulty with regards to subcontracts in our contingency environments (Iraq and Afghanistan primarily). These issues particularly occur below the first-tier where we don't know who is receiving U.S. funds, visibility into costs become murky, and there are allegations that funds are being funneled to insurgents. I've been pondering ways to mitigate this issue and have been having difficulty. One idea I come up with was a prohibition on subcontracting below the first-tier (if mutually agreed to by the government and the prime), but enforcement would be burdensome and costs would likely soar, not to mention privity concerns. Does anyone have any thoughts or ideas on how to get at this problem? Here is an example of the issue: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/world/asia/01road.html

Vern, I believe you mean 53.216-1 and 53.236-1(d). I also suggest reviewing FAR Part 36.7 in conjunction with 36.101. If you follow the interpretation that a task order is a "contract" for policy purposes (i.e. for interpreting and applying the regulations), then you should be using the SF 1442 if the orders are above the SAT (you can use OF-347 if below the SAT). If you believe that a task order is not a "contract" for policy purposes, then you can use the OF-347.

Traipse, I agree in general with your answer to the original question. However, I think the analogy provided at the end gives the wrong impression. It implies that you can be great without knowing how to play the game or knowing the rules. In sports, this might be true, but in our field it's not. As contracting professionals, we do need to know the rules, or at least where to go look to find the rules and more importantly, how to interpret those rules. Only then can you know what flexibilities you have, which are many, to get the job done. Once you have this knowledge, then you can apply your judgment in order to make decisions which are in the best interests of the Government while also fair and equitable to the contractors. This doesn't exclude the fact that you need to take into account organizational politics or diplomacy when starting out, e.g. you can't just walk into your boss's office and say "You're wrong because you don't know the rules."

Brian, I've seen this done at several agencies I've now been a part of. I've asked the question becasue, like Vern, I'm concerned about the oversight issues. As for the specific agency you're thinking of, I was with them previously. The agency I'm currently with now does combine these requirements and the construction components do exceed $1 million.

Hello All, Several of my agency's contracts combine requirements for services with requirements for construction. For instance, we ask contractors to provide technical assistance to schools and also ask them to refurbish/build new classrooms for those schools. The overall goal being to improve educational outcomes. I have two questions for folks: 1. Is there a prohibition on combining these two different types of requirements? (I'm fairly certain the answer is no as there's no explicit language and FAR 36.101© implies it can be done; however, I would like the opinions of those much more experienced than I.) 2. In your opinion, is it prudent to combine these requirements? My main concerns center around safety, competency (a service contractor being required to do construction), and oversight. As always, everyone's thoughts are much appreciated.

Ah, I see. I did not read it that way. In the GAO decisions, they are looking for binding prices only in the context of the evaluation. This is to ensure that the evaluation of cost to the Government is reasonable. They haven't stated that the prices need to be binding on the entire IDIQ.

Bah, I can't remove that smiley face. The FAR cite is 16.505 b 3.