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REA'n Maker

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About REA'n Maker

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  1. On that note: What would the government have to gain by maintaining a draconian approach to Key Personnel? I'm convinced that there are Key Personnel provisions/clauses floating around out there that are probably illegal, as they read more like Mandates for Indentured Servitude than solicitation provisions. And are you really going to T4C someone because one of their people had the temerity to (gasp!) change jobs?? (Cutting off your nose to spite your face comes to mind.) As a contractor, wouldn't you out of normal business practice inform the government of a material change to your offering before award, such as an obsolete part# or model#? What responsible businessperson would propose a product or level of service they knew they couldn't provide? If Key Personnel are SO critical to success such that a change of name(s) would affect your evaluation, should you be in the R&D or Grants arena? The FAR isn't necessary to the formation of rational decisions on either side.
  2. It's akin to awarding an "FFP" contract whose SOW consists solely of the words "contractor must deliver 1880 hours". 1880 hours is a BOE, not a contract term. I'm not sure "disingenuous" is the word you're looking for here...I'm saying I'm 100% within my contract rights to invoice for the full FFP amount whether a particular FTE was in the office on a particular day or not; it's disingenuous of me to suggest that the 1880 hours used in the BOE have any bearing on that right, certainly. Remember: Per FAR 16.207-2, FFP-LOE is for R&D <$150K only. I would also maintain that the "FFP-LOE type" is redundant and unnecessary anyway: you're always measuring the suitability of the output in an FFP environment, based partially on your assessment of the inputs and achievements against goals, and on a common understanding regarding the LOE required. An R&D SOW would merely define those desired goals more abstractly than (for example) a program support SOW.
  3. You might try "the FFP contract is based on an 1,880 hour standard" shtick. Despite the glaring logical fallacy, it has always worked for me (I don't know whether to be pleased or horrified).
  4. IDIQ Decision

    "Shall" does not imply "choice": 15.403-4 Requiring certified cost or pricing data (10 U.S.C. 2306a and 41 U.S.C. chapter 35). (a)(1) The contracting officer shall obtain certified cost or pricing data only if the contracting officer concludes that none of the exceptions in 15.403-1(b) applies. Nor is it a 20-year-old "anecdote"; it is a 100% valid and relevant scenario to this day, particularly in DoD. The CO did make many, many judgement calls based on imperfect information, as was his job. I myself was very adept at explaining in a PNM how DCAA misinterpreted a specific cost treatment; I was the one having the ongoing negotiations after all, and DCAA had only one shot at it. But spit-balling is not an option when procuring a developmental item/major system. Perhaps you didn't understand the core point: the CO could do nothing about a contractor who pulled back a negotiated Part 15 proposal due to the fact that the contractor could not certify the C&P data (or even GAAP for that matter), i.e., they didn't have a priced proposal on the table. The fleet wasn't going to wait to deploy until the bean counters worked their magic, and negotiating with yourself is generally considered poor trade-craft... (PS - If any CO "relied like a crutch on DCAA", they'd spend their entire career hopping around on one leg. )
  5. Warning To Proposal Writers (and Agency Evaluators)

    It's pretty clear: they wanted the offerors to do the agency's job (impute meaning, define relevance, and quantify value). But heck; I'm going to follow the AF's lead, and state the eval criteria on my next RFQ as "quotations shall be IAW with the FAR and other applicable regulations, which will be evaluated on a 2-step, pass/fail basis".
  6. IDIQ Decision

    Touche'... One other legitimate UCA circumstance where "no one was at fault" was what we had to deal with in the 1990's: defense contractors constantly being bought/sold /merged, which caused havoc in the negotiation process. You could hardly crack a proposal open before it was pulled back because guys like GE Aerospace became Martin Marietta became Lockheed Martin over a time frame measured in months (test gear for the F-14 IRST in my case, i.e., not even terribly complicated). All of whose C&P data required some level of DCAA blessing before we could conclude negotiations. Hence, a UCA until the CAS issues were resolved. Adam Smith's fault I suppose? (I, for one, don't believe there is any relationship between UCAs and FY-end spending.)
  7. IDIQ Decision

    Wow. This thread has wandered so far off the Reservation that we can't even SEE the Reservation anymore.
  8. Maybe they need to be reminded of what the "F" and the "A" in "FAR" stand for? I suggest you tell them that they are free to ignore the FAR, but good luck getting their acquisition through the procurement shop. It's like building a train car and saying the gauge is the track guy's problem. 1.102-4(e) seems pretty clear on the specifics. Good luck.
  9. I used to know a professor who had the perfect rejoinder to the direction in which this discussion is headed: "Stop questioning the hypothetical!!!" It's market research, assuming they can abandon the trial at any time with no consequence to the agency, financial or otherwise.
  10. PTA above ceiling price — how big a deal, really?

    Yes; it was a tough read though considering that it brought in several obtuse concepts such as "debt concessions". Ignoring the extraneous offset calculations, it looks like the key data points supporting your position are in (g) and (h)? Specifically: $ 1,517,031 (30% of overrun) - $550,724 (Target Profit) = $966,307 (Total decrease to final cost) As a thought experiment, doesn't this approach allow the scenario whereby the profit offset is so high that allowable costs = 0? (not likely, but logically possible) That case looks incredibly complicated (a government claim; Chapter 11) , with the FPI calculation forming but a small part. One wonders if the vagaries of the calculation got lost in the noise.
  11. PP Neutral Rating

    Wouldn't you have to include an RFQ term to the effect that "offerors who have been determined to possess relevant past performance, but who fail to submit questionnaires, shall be smote accordingly" in order to address your hypothetical ? What is to stop them from simply not submitting a list of prior contracts? No list; no failure to distribute questionnaires. How a contracting agency would unilaterally determine that relevant PP exists, when the offeror fails to identify it on their own, is a question for another day.
  12. PTA above ceiling price — how big a deal, really?

    I have a hard time believing that you can penalize a contractor by zeroing out his profit, and then continue to use that same profit calculation to eat into his legitimate cost base. Is the way to look at it that "the PTA ceases to be an operative concept when it is greater than the ceiling?" If your total contract price is above the ceiling, the PTA is the least of your problems. To me, that is the teaching point in the OP's scenario.
  13. My diagnosis is that any pain you are feeling most likely results from all that torturing of basic contracting principles you have been engaging in. For example, you talk about a "TA ratio share agreement", and then say "The subK has the incentive to be more expensive". Which is it? Is there an agreement, or is the sub free to bill whatever their evil hearts desire? Then, you round the corner again by saying "the subK has little if any recourse" regarding their share, while simultaneously saying they can stick it to the prime in order to "maximize their share of the pie". Maybe I wasn't clear enough. I'll try and simplify my "revenue split" comment as much as humanly possible: At the proposal stage, prime signs a TA with a subcontractor to perform X% of work estimated at $Y FFP (as OP stated); After prime contract award for $Y', prime makes an FFP subcontract award for X% * $Y' , minus a 1% pass thru; The sub performs to the SLA in their contract (which involves monitoring service level performance, not "watching them like a hawk"); Prime disburses X% * ($Y'/12) of the monthly prime contract payment to the sub (minus the aforementioned pass thru). You'll note that the original poster stated on 7/23 exactly what I am saying above, so I 'm not sure how you got off on to that "manage by hours" tangent. Why you think "final rates" and "indirect expenses" have any relevance here is also quite incomprehensible, but I'm not going to even go there out of sheer lack of patience. So the gist of your argument is that LH vehicles encourage lower labor rates, thereby 'maximizing the number of labor hours' and reducing the burn rate, with the result being 'more funding available' ? Suffice to say, "on that note, I take leave of this conversation."
  14. PTA above ceiling price — how big a deal, really?

    Both of your scenarios are perfectly valid in addressing different risk profiles. As the buyer's assumption of overrun costs increase, the PTA drops, which makes perfect sense. Maybe the best way to state the question is whether a particular share scenario is appropriate for a particular situation, rather than whether a particular share scenario is a good thing in a purely objective sense.
  15. "You can drive a car with your feet if you want to; it don't mean it's a good [gosh darn] idea!" - Chris Rock