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Everything posted by MV2009

  1. Agreed. I assume the intent behind this paragraph was to address when the additional funds would be added to the existing line item on contract or to provide clarity in case the Government was silent. The inclusion of this paragraph in this clause is interesting as it gives the contractor the flexibility to work at risk with an option to get reimbursed. If the contractor wants to work at risk, that should be a business decision outside of the contract and I don't understand why the Government would want to discuss handling this in the clause. To me, it seems like the paragraph, encourages
  2. I'm on the government side of the equation and interpret the info SLIN the same way you do. On separately priced SLINs, the PoP should be considered direction from the Contracting Officer and thus would make costs incurred at risk prior to the start date of the new SLIN unallowable for that line item.
  3. I've seen agencies do either approach when performing incremental funding modifications on service contracts...the reason being the long lines of accounting are different. (I.e the initial funding was done in FY16 and the next increment will be done in FY17). I can provide further detail if my response is insufficient.
  4. I have been looking for the answer and am hoping someone here can explain the intent behind paragraph i of 52.232-22 as well as its purpose. As written, is this paragraph saying that if the contractor incurs cost that are in excess of the amount previously allotted by the Government those costs shall be allowable to the same extent as if incurred afterwards unless the Contracting Officer issues a termination or other notice and directs that the increase is solely to cover termination or other specified expenses? It appears the formatting is off in the clause, otherwise its not clear to
  5. Vern, to pull on this statement little: "However, the contractor may have an excuse for nonperformance if the government's refusal to accept the ECP leaves performance impossible or commercially impracticable." Isn't there ways that the contractor can eliminate or reduce this risk before it becomes impracticable? I know it is common practice in the auto industry for the major auto manufacturers to set up agreements to ensure their suppliers do not go end of life immediately. If a contractor is not doing that, doesnt the contractor have some of the blame in not reducing this risk? Indust
  6. H2H, Let's assume it is a FFP contract type and the contractor agreed to deliver the product. During the build, the contractor says it can no longer deliver because one of the parts it intended to use in the build for the system went end of life and can no longer purchased it. In this instance, are you saying the contractor is no longer contractually obligated to deliver the product it agreed to provide? While that may put the CTR in a tough spot in terms of meeting the requirement, the contractor agreed to the contractual relationship and should have done everything to reduce or el
  7. Related to this topic, is it normal for fixed price contracts to include language that would allow the contractor to receive an equitable adjustment to the contract price or targets if a redesign is required? To me, this language shifts the risk from the contractor to the Government and the Government has no way to mitigate this risk unless it takes on a role of overseeing the contractor's suppliers (which is something I am not advocating for). For procurements that will occur immediately after award, I have some concern that the contractor does not know whether it can build the system on a
  8. H2H, I agree and understand DMS is a much larger issue and this is just a small portion of it. I excluded monitoring DMS (i.e. determining the quantity, monitoring its BOM) because it is currently being done on a cost line item funded as a separate contract action on a term basis. I agree that the cost of re-engineering a system or sub-system far outweighs the cost of doing an end of life buy. Both parties understand this and the contractor likely uses this information in its pricing strategy for the end of life buy. That puts the Government at a disadvantage in negotiations and makes the
  9. H2H, Thank you for the response. My apologies for not providing sufficient details in my initial post and not responding in a more timely fashion. #1 - I`m interested in both industry and Government comments on this issue. #2 - FAR 15.402(a) requires supplies be purchased at fair and reasonable prices. I was not sure if anyone had any creative ideas to handle these issues as they are appearing frequently and causing issues negotiating fair and reasonable prices and could cause serious program impact if not order (i.e. redesign). I have seen where repairs were handled on a cost-r
  10. I am hoping to get some input as to how individuals are handling the procurement of end of life parts and see if there is a better way. Currently, we have been negotiating each end of life buy individually. For purposes of discussion, please assume the following factors: 1) A Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages Program is not in place. 2) The procurement of the end of life parts are required to support repairs of fielded systems On these low dollar value procurements, it can be difficult to assess the price being fair and reasonable without data from the fi
  11. Agreed, I read it. No matter what approach you use, common sense and knowing why they are doing it is key vs. people just looking at data and accepting the data without any understanding of it . The latter is where problems come into play.
  12. JMG, while the methodology of using average rates proposed is allowable, it might not be good business sense to rely soley on that techinque and may lead to issues in performance. Especially, in complex acquisitions that require a high skill set and if the average rates proposed were significantly lower than the median rates on the BLS. I would caution againist using the average rates proposed approach exclusively for realism
  13. H2H, CPARS is always a consideration. My main issue with it is there is no overall rating within the system (outside the question of whether you would or would not award to them). This non-compliance would likely be written up in the management or quality section. But if everything else is rated at very good or better, I would argue that this issue gets diminished. CPARS is a reactive tool during the period it is evaluating, the intent was to be proactive and have contractors propose better and put more focus on this so there is no issue in post award. I fully acknowledge that the CPARS should
  14. Thanks, that is what they are referencing on why it can not be done. All I am trying to do is ensure the contractor does comply with the contract. If there is another way I am all ears but often times these issues would never rise to the level of termination but something needs to be done to ensure more care is done on this. In terms of studying the subject, do you have any recommendations?
  15. Thanks for all the responses. Vern, I was talking in general sense when I stated terms and conditions of the contract. For purposes of discussion, let's assume there was a contract attachment that specified what guidelines the contractor must follow and it failed to follow those guidelines during performance. This is costly to the Government and consideration should be provided for this event. I agree that the Inspection clauses for Cost Reimbursement broadly state the intent of this clause and therefore, this special clause does not appear to violate the intent of the CPFF contract type as
  16. Anyone know of an online resource that shows all the changes to the FAR and its preceding regulations? I'm looking to see when and why the following at FAR 16.306(a) was incorporated: "The fixed fee does not vary with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a result of changes in work to be performed under the contract." The reason I am looking for this is because I'm having a discussion about including a special clause to a competitive source selection. This special clause works as a negative incentive where if the firm does not comply with the terms and conditions of the contract, this clause w
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