The below excerpt from the article jumped out at me:
"Whether it’s the F-35 or any other program, the goal for Pentagon managers is always the same, says one GAO auditor: 'Get a ‘go’ decision. Their careers are tied to that—putting a great new product out in the field. So their incentives,' he explains, 'are always to, first, present an estimate that is low enough that it doesn’t get pushed behind some other program; second, to present really cool, cutting-edge features; and, third, have little enough actual knowledge of what it will cost and whether the features are achievable that you’re not deliberately deceiving anyone. Once you get the project underway, it then becomes hard to stop.'"
This strikes me as one of the important sources of dysfunction on the defense acquisition system. DOD Military and government officials' career/performance incentives are tied to managing large defense programs. I recognize that many are well-run. Many, like the Missile Defense Agency, are doing their best to field technology on the leading edge of what is physically and technically possible in the face of emerging national security threats. They are forced to do R&D and field missile defense systems at the same time--not an optimal approach, but one that we accept due to the threats we face. Many other defense programs would no doubt characterize themselves the same way, from the F-35 to Army ground programs. All are pressing forward on acquisition fronts to maintain the capability edge over adversaries.
But there seems to be an inability and/or unwillingness to recognize risks and problems earlier in the acquisition cycle--probably stemming from a belief that once the program gets underway, it will take on a life of its own, and whatever funding is necessary to help the program across the finish line will be found somewhere. Then, as others in these forums have noted, no one is ever held to account for program/acquisition failures. Some suggest that this would be inconceivable in the private sector, but I'm not so sure ("golden parachutes," etc.) As Vern astutely pointed out, these are human condition problems.
That said, in light of the human condition, Palantir representatives would have been wise to throw on some business-casual attire and ratchet down the arrogance for meetings with government folks. The government people already know their processes, rules, and regulations are "Kafkaesque," and I would not be surprised of many of them were indeed idiots, but Palantir's condescension likely did not help its cause.
That said, if Palantir's product does have the capability the article suggests at the price tag cited, I hope our acquisition system can find a way to take a serious look at the company's offerings, despite the sunk costs on DCGS.