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InNeedofWisdom

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Everything posted by InNeedofWisdom

  1. H2H, Yes, it makes sense that the underlying purchases of the IOT performer would be subject to CPSR review. Here is a quote from the following blog: http://procurelinx.com/blogs/lessons-learned-eventually-successful-cpsr I wish there was a clear-cut rule from DCMA at the higher-level CPSR review to either 1) Exclude all lower-level IOTs, 2) Exclude all IOTs for non-commercial items, or 3) Include all IOTs.
  2. Do you know of any defense contractor(s) that have excluded any interorganizational transfers from the population submitted to DCMA for CPSR review? If so, did they go so far as to exclude interorganizational transfers at price for commercial items? Do you think it is reasonable for a defense contractor to interpret FAR 44.101 and FAR 44.303 to allow for exclusion of any (or all) interorganizational transfers (at price or cost)?
  3. It is probably a good thing they changed TINA to Truthful Cost or Pricing Data instead of Truthful Pricing or Cost Data. The first could have an acronym of TCOPD, but the second could have an acronym of TP-OCD. TINA was definitely easier to pronounce.
  4. I see your point that the price is not 'purely' fixed if the contractor can earn additional monetary incentives based on factors other than cost. Others may know why the FAR council wrote FAR 16.202-1 to allow for a FFP contract to include these kinds of incentives.
  5. Thank You, H2H. I think I found the thread at: https://www.linkedin.com/groups/DCAA-MRD-14-PPD-002-1842889.S.5849546339829977090?qid=52616461-2179-4eff-bf91-35ff7a52c660&trk=groups_items_see_more-0-b-ttl
  6. Is it because DCAA referenced FAR 42.703-2( c )(1) and FAR 42.705( c )(1) instead of referencing FAR 52.242-4( b ) and FAR 52.216-7(d)(6)?
  7. Thank You. I am learning. (At least, everyone who reads my basic questions probably hopes so!)
  8. Technical Question: How are you going to verify their rates (e.g. ask for employee pay stubs)?
  9. Right, it makes sense to me. Is there something more than logic that says contracting officers must include FAR 52.216-7 when even one CLIN is cost reimbursement?
  10. As a follow-up question, do you know if this has happened on FFP contracts that include CPFF CLIN's? I am trying to understand what triggers FAR 52.216-7 Allowable Cost and Payment to be included in the contract. If FAR 52.216-7 was included in an FFP contract because of a CPFF CLIN, it should only apply to the CPFF CLIN. But how does the contracting officer know whether or not FAR 52.216-7 must be included in a contract when most CLINs are FFP instead of CPFF? Is it more of a case-by-case situation where contracting officers use their judgment on each contract?
  11. Today was the first time I saw the following assertions made by DCAA at http://www.dcaa.mil/guidance.html. Likewise... and... Do you agree with DCAA's guidance? Do you know anyone who is trying to follow DCAA's guidance? If so, are they succeeding?
  12. If I understand correctly, you are asking if certain parts of a company are subject to DFARS 252.242-7005 versus specific contracts. Like you say, DFARS 252.242-7005 only applies to CAS-covered contracts. DFARS 252.242-7005 should have an impact on the business systems of a company which deal with its CAS-covered contracts that have this clause incorporated into them. IF IHO or Corporate HQ play a role in a business system that impacts a contract with DFARS 252.242-7005, then IHO or Corporate HQ should be affected by this clause.
  13. Thank You, Vern. I wish Mr. Kendall would see and respond to your questions. I hope he is looking for challenging responses.
  14. Excerpts from the Testimony of Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense AT&L, on April 30, 2014 http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kendall_04-30-14.pdf Page 2: “The hard part of bringing change to the Pentagon is not announcing new policies; it is following up to ensure that those policies are actually implemented, understanding their impact, and making any needed adjustments. Time and constancy of purpose are essential if this process is to be successful.” Page 4: “The ability to perform strategic analysis on major defense acquisition programs, set target cost goals, and execute accordingly – without fear of being punished for not spending the money – makes huge dividends for the Department.” Page 6: “…LPTA should be used with professional judgment about its applicability. This technique works well when only minimal performance is desired and contracted services or products are objectively defined.” Page 7: “…I am finding that bureaucratic tendencies tend to grow and to generate products for use within the bureaucracy itself, together with the comfortable habits of years and even decades are hard to break.” Page 8: “Competition works…Simply put, I want every defense contract to be worried that a competitor may take his work for DoD away at some point in the future.” Page 11: “It is not enough to know acquisition best practices; acquisition professionals must understand the “why” behind the best practices—that is, the underlying principles at play.” Page 13: “We need to make decisions and track our performance via data and robust analysis, not anecdote or opinion. It isn’t always easy to look in the mirror, and some government institutions or industry firms may not like what the report reveals, but the road to improvement has to begin with an understanding of where the problems lie.” Page 15: “We are in the process of losing 10s of thousands of engineers and skilled production workers from our industrial base.” Page 16: “…one fact became strikingly apparent to me: our system, over time, has accumulated levels of unnecessary statutory and regulatory complexity that is imposed on our program managers and other professionals.” Page 17: "I believe the evidence supports the assertion that we are making progress. Equally clearly, however, there is still ample room for improvement and much more hard work for us all to do."
  15. Right, sometimes the rules seem arbitrary. The 50 mile radius for TDY is another example. When employees are told they are entitled to something, but then restrictions are put in place to limit the entitlement, it does not seem like an entitlement anymore. On behalf of the taxpayer, "THANK YOU."
  16. Of Course! I am not sure if there are generally accepted standards besides the definition for "added value" from FAR 52.215-23(a). It looks like the writers of this clause intentionally gave examples that some might otherwise question. If a contractor cannot qualify for at least one of the examples below, it seems like they could have a hard time persuading the contracting officer of "added value."
  17. I agree with you. When you say, "...always reimburses employees at per diem..." that means (for CAS covered contracts) that the defense contractor follows its disclosure statement and (for all contracts) its company policy. In the hypothetical example, a fraud alert was given to investigators.
  18. Good Morning, Experts like Vern, Don, and H2H will be able to answer your question about the Christian Doctrine. I would have a statement ready about the value added by the subcontractor, but I would not submit it to the contracting officer unless requested to do so. Here is a similar topic thread that you may find useful: http://www.wifcon.com/discussion/index.php?/topic/1433-limitations-on-pass-through-charges/?hl=%2Bpass+%2Bthrough
  19. You are right. It is just improper when the defense contractor says (by disclosure statement and company policy) that it will reimburse employees at the lower of actual cost or per diem, but then bills the government for per diem (even when actual cost paid by the employee is 50-75% lower).
  20. Thank You, H2H. I am learning about CAS. What you say makes sense. It might be defective pricing if the defense contractor did not let the customer know how much its actual costs were expected to be, but it should not be a CAS 401 non-compliance. Actual cost is allowed to be estimated at per diem. I am with you in thinking that the situation doesn't "smell right." You might be amazed with what happens OCONUS (v. CONUS). When defense contractor employees get to pocket the difference between actual lodging cost and per diem lodging cost, they find very creative ways to maximize their return. In the above hypothetical example, the defense contractor had a history of allowing its employees to pocket the difference between actual cost and per diem. After the disclosure statement inconsistency was identified, they started billing the government for only actual cost (or per diem, if lower).
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