jwomack

Ever worked in a small contracting office with limited COs who work for someone who is not a CO and doesn't understand federal contracting? Typical scenario - Office needs a CO to buy basic supplies via placing GSA orders. A GS-7 in some random career field is given minimal training so they can receive a warrant and place orders as a collateral duty. The office who needs the CO convinces the warrant-issuing office to give the newly trained person a warrant. A more competent CO in the office who normally handles more difficult acquisitions leaves. The office is now down to one CO...the one who barely knows how to place GSA orders. There's still a need to make the more complex (sometimes Part 15) acquisitions. Who do you think the CO's boss is going to assign the acquisition work to? The sole, incompetent CO in the office who has an unlimited warrant (because the warrant-issuing office didn't recognize the risk associated with giving this incompetent CO a warrant above his/her capabilities)? Or to another office with more competent COs?

Minimal risk is still risk. That being said, I agree a deep bench should be a significant consideration and that most(?) agencies are too stingy. I've seen this a couple times and, in both situations, the COs' ego was the driver, not the agency's needs.

What if the alternative means doesn't have the time/skillset/mission to award contracts? Maybe DCMA should close its doors?

I suppose my comment could be read as a negative thing. But I meant it as there’s no need for agencies to issue something like an unlimited warrant when a $100k warrant would get the job done. Issuing warrants above what’s necessary increases risk to the agency.

What’s a “real KO”? Just because someone’s warrant is low doesn’t mean they’re untrustworthy or lack judgment. Responsible agencies issue warrants on an “as needed” basis not an “as capable” basis. Who cares if a PCO of an IDIQ can’t administer their own contract? As long as the agency has alternative means, who cares? Just because it’s not customary doesn’t make it fake nor invalid.

The $1 warrant was obviously for illustration purposes only.

There could be security clearance requirements requiring compliance with all federal laws (for safety reasons). Maybe the contractor drives a government vehicle and local clauses prohibit drug use as a safety matter.

FAR 1.602-1(a) only restricts the amount the CO may bind the Government. The FAR 2.101 definition for “contract” implies that bind means the extent the Government is obligated to pay for something. In this scenario, that would be $1. Therefore, a CO with a $1 warrant (i.e., the precise amount required to create the binding contract) would not be restricted by FAR from entering into the $100M IDIQ contract. An agency’s intent when they issue warrants may be more restrictive. If there’s any doubt, clarity should be sought from the issuers of the warrant (as ji20874 mentioned). Every agency I’ve worked for has supplemental policy to address this type of thing. Not just for IDIQs but for contracts with options, mods, task/delivery orders, etc..

Article about private industry funding university research. It's a common practice. https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/04/public-universities-get-an-education-in-private-industry/521379/

You can modify a contract after its POP has expired. It’s not uncommon, nor improper, to do this for late invoices.

That's what class deviations are for.

yes

“we will leave a good impression”. If the proposal isn't at least decent it'll be remembered as the pretty one that wasted the CO/PM’s time causing negativity bias.

If you’re a small business you may want to ask your local SBA office for assistance on how to interpret federal solicitations. COs generally don’t have the time to teach the public elementary contracting.

Looking at your 2 questions as a whole, it appears you couldn’t fully extract what the solicitation was asking for. A non-response from the Government would indicate to me that a sufficient number of other prospective contractors didn’t have that same problem.

There are too many variables to factor. Like – Should the KO who is tasked to work with the poorest-performing program offices be required to work longer hours than their counterparts? Should a newly promoted GS-12 Step 1 be required to work longer than a GS-12 Step 10 whose being paid 30% more? Or would there be a calculation to ensure the Step 10 is assigned 30% more work so the Government actually gets what its paying for? Should the KO who just inherited a bunch of bad contracts be required to work longer hours? How do you quantify the KO working a large service contract to another KO working a number of small supply purchases? Or to yet another KO who is working a not-so-large service contract that happens to be more complex to administer?

Or not. So the over-performers complete their jobs and go home. The under-performers struggle (or don't care and don't struggle) and go home when they hit the 80 hours. What happens to the unfinished work?

This scenario sounds like an all-too-typical government solicitation asking for more than it should. There are more efficient means to evaluate prospects at this level like past performance and reviewing historical work products.

It sounds like you're under the impression you cannot make a purchase based on tradeoffs under SAP. That would be incorrect.

none of the above

Why is this your opinion? Why is this your understanding?

The steps you cited are correct. To your questions - 1. There is no guarantee/obligation on any party with a BPA. Of course even if you had a contract in place that's still not a guarantee they'll show up. While the contract may give the Government recourse after-the-fact, it still doesn't stop the leaking pipe in an urgent situation. For something like these emergency repairs, my guess is the response rate from a BPA holder vs someone with a contract would be nearly identical. 2. None that I can think of. The goal isn't to save steps on the front end. The goal is to get a vehicle in place so, when an emergency arises, the Government doesn't waste time in getting an available repairman to take action. Requiring a KO to be in the loop during an actual emergency is an unnecessary time waster. 3. I'd try to use no-year money if available. Otherwise, assuming annual funds, I'd cite FAR 37.106 and the GAO decision. And maybe FAR 1.102 (Guiding Principles). I don't know that the BPA route is any better than the contract options.

A BPA call would be the order. It would have an estimated quantity with details further definitized at the subordinate work order level. I like it when GAO isn't consistent. Contradictory decisions give me more tools to choose from.

See B-321296, specifically Digest paragraph 2 and the Court Reporting portion of the decision. As it would be relevant to funding a BPA call with an unknown but estimated quantity – “At the time each contract was executed, NLRB, as a matter of fact, did not know with certainty the total amount it would ultimately spend on court reporting services ordered under the contract. The amount of NLRB's liability depends on various factors such as the number of proceedings, the length of the transcripts delivered, and the number of ancillary materials such as exhibits. NLRB knows the amount of its liability with certainty only at the conclusion of the performance period, after it has ordered all the services under the contract. To determine the amount to obligate when each contract was executed, NLRB calculated an estimate, based on past practices and trends, of the total amount of court reporting services it would need under a particular contract. We have previously addressed the amount an agency should obligate when the amount of its obligation is uncertain. B-305484, June 2, 2006. In that case, the National Mediation Board (NMB) contracted for arbitrators, and incurred obligations, when it appointed an arbitrator to hear a specific case. However, the length of the arbitrator's appointment and, therefore, the amount of the obligation were uncertain at the time of appointment. We noted that "it is the amount of the commitment, not the commitment itself, that is uncertain." Id. We concluded that NMB should "record an obligation based on its best estimate of the costs of paying the arbitrator and adjust the obligation up or down as more information becomes available." Id. Similarly, in this case, the quantity of court reporting services that NLRB would ultimately order was uncertain at the time each contract was executed. NLRB properly obligated an amount based upon a reasonable estimate. As the performance period continues, NLRB should deobligate amounts if it realizes that it overestimated the quantity of services that it would order under the contracts. Conversely, if NLRB determines that it will need to order more services than initially estimated, it should obligate additional funds in accordance with a revised estimate. Because NLRB initially obligated only fiscal year 2010 funds for the contracts, any adjustments to the obligations must also be made against fiscal year 2010 funds.”

DC has a higher locality pay compared to most of the US. Retaining the same staff elsewhere would save costs via lower salaries, pensions, etc.. Also turnover should be lower. Travel costs back to DC should be minimal and normally only necessary for upper management. As an alternative to saving personnel costs, agencies could hire more staff and, theoretically, become better at the mission as a result. Being geographically dispersed also provides a less concentrated target.