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bob7947

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  1. bob7947
    Imagine quoting on a procurement in which you submitted the lowest-priced, technically acceptable quote. Instead of winning the award, you were told that your quote was unacceptable and ineligible for award because you did not possess the requisite facility clearance prior to award. Although you submitted your facility clearance information to the contracting officer on December 6, 2012, nearly two months later on February 1, 2013, little had been done on it.
    You protest to the U. S. Court of Federal Claims and everything seems to be going your way until you read the following quote from the opinion:
    Nonsense! Even the dictionary cannot tell me what propinquent means. However, the dictionary does define propinquity. My interpretation of the phrase that I italicized is "good enough for government work." That's not good enough for me. I disagree with the judge's ruling! In addition, I disagree with the judge's singling out one individual for a process issue.
    Now, let's look at the cause for the nearly 2-month delay in processing the facility clearance. I blocked out the individual's name because I want you to look at this as a process issue.

    I'm asking you to look at the above quote and the entire opinion to identify ways to improve the process in this procurement. I'm not looking for an answer here. Instead, how would you initiate the improvements? I'll point out a few items to give you a start.
    He was on personal leave for sixteen days during that time period.
    He halted the processing of DD Form 254 requests for a two-week period in January while the Defense Security Service was questioning whether a bona fide need existed for any facility clearances under SINs 132-54 and 132-55 under Schedule 70.
    The splitting of responsibilities in the Memorandum of Agreement between the Defense Information Systems Agency and the General Services Administration.

  2. bob7947
    In early 1977, Gordon Wade Rule (Rule) sat in a chair in a corner of a conference room at the Naval Material Command reading a document that I had prepared about his negotiations on the CGN-41, a nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser.  Days earlier, I was among a group that was briefed by a staff member of Admiral Hyman Rickover (Rickover), the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.  Although, the briefing was supposed to be about the CGN-41 negotiation, we were treated to a 3-hour lecture on how the Navy's shipbuilders were trying to "pin the rose" on Rickover. In this case, pinning the rose had nothing to do with the shipbuilders asking the Admiral to a prom.
    When I began writing this blog entry, I had planned to include only the work I had done decades ago for the Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services.  That work involved Rule's negotiation of Modification 31 to the contract that included the CGN-41, the eventual USS Arkansas. I wanted you to figure out if the modification that Rule signed was done in a manner that would allow it to survive a court test.  It took 2 courts to decide that question so it wasn't as easy as it sounded.  Unfortunately I read too much surrounding material and I realized that I was taking Rule's actions out of the context in which they happened back in the 1970s.  So, I added a bit more information.  You will see Rule as the contracting officer, Rickover as a program officer interfering with the contracting officer, Senator William Proxmire apparently acting for Rickover and himself, and Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr. (Clements) trying to resolve the shipbuilding claims problem in any manner he could.  You cannot choose sides on this one.  All characters, including government agencies and shipbuilders, were trying to manipulate and influence anyone that became involved with the CGN-41.  It seemed as if sides were drawn by identifying the enemy of an individual's enemy.  
    A Brief Introduction to the Shipbuilding Claims Era
    In the early 1970s, cost overruns and shipbuilders' claims had become a major problem.  By 1976, it had reached epidemic proportions with $1.9 billion in shipbuilder claims.  The shipbuilders, the Navy, the Department of Justice, and Rickover were in a war.  In the case of the CGN-41, Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company was the industry player.  
    Clements wanted to settle the ship claims problem with the use of P. L. 85-804.  A June 21, 1976, Business Week article explains his early effort.  The excerpt below is a quote from the article entitled:  The Shipbuilders Balk at 40 Cents on the Dollar.  The article explained that Clements had planned to settle $1.9 billion of shipbuilding claims against the Navy for "between $500 million and $700 million" but that plan fell fiat with the Navy's shipbuilders.  He explained that "the shipyards are giving me trouble."  The article further described:
    After failing to reach a settlement himself, Clements called Navy management to his office for a meeting of the status of shipbuilding claims.  Nothing had been accomplished by them either.  He then focused on the CGN-41.  The work on this ship had been stopped by Newport News because of issues it was having with the Navy.  The contract was in court and work had started again under the condition that the Navy negotiated in good faith with Newport News to resolve the issues.  The court's time limit for good faith negotiations was running out and something had to be done.  Since the CGN-41 contract was in court, the Department of Justice was required to play a part in the review of any settlement proposed to the court.  
    This is where our story begins.  I have added the dates on which the actions occurred so that you can follow.  All facts are based on documents that I had reviewed in the 1970s or documents that I recently reviewed.  I needed to limit the length of this entry so I added enough information to give you a flavor of the times.  Sometime in the future, I may write a larger article.  Rule was appointed as a special contracting officer on the CGN-41 to resolve the issues that the Navy and the Secretary of Defense could not accomplish.  Undoubtedly he knew he was heading into a mighty storm that might harm him.  
    Contract Modification P00031 To CGN-41:  Chronology of Events
    July 13, 1976:  Clements held a meeting to discuss Navy shipbuilding claims.  Among those in attendance were:
    Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements) Consultant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics) (ASN (I & L)) Chief of the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) Vice-Chief of the Naval Material Command  (NAVSEA) General Counsel of the Navy, and  Gordon Rule, Director, Procurement Control and Clearance Division, Naval Material Command. (Rule) In regard to the Newport News claims, a member of the meeting quoted Clements as saying that he was "irrevocably committed to solving this problem; unlike Admiral Rickover."  Clements then asked the Navy officials why they had not reformed the contract, indicating that if they would not, he would.  He then stated that he wanted to see four changes incorporated in the CGN-41 contract:  (1)  a new escalation clause; (2) a new "changes" clause; (3) a new ceiling price; and (4) a new delivery date.  (emphasis added)
    During the meeting it was agreed that Rule would become negotiator for the CGN-41.  He was to report directly to the Chief, NAVMAT and the Vice Chief, NAVMAT was to meet with Clements each day at 9:15 a.m to report on the progress of the negotiation.
    July 14, 1976:  Rule telephoned Newport News to explain that he had been assigned principal negotiator on the CGN-41 and requested a meeting.
    July 15, 1976:  Newport News was contacted by a consultant to Clements who explained Rule's authority. Rule and Newport News held their first meeting.
    July 16, 1976:  The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics) wrote to the Chief, NAVMAT informing him that the Chief would be responsible for the direct discussions between Rule and Newport News.  Rule would be the principal negotiator and Rule would be assisted by NAVSEA and the Navy General Counsel, as required.
    July 16, 1976:  Rule sent a memo to Clements describing his first meeting with Newport News.  As a note, he mentioned that he intentionally did not contact the Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuiliding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIPS), Newport News.
    July 19, 1976:   Rule sent a memo to the Deputy Commander for Contracts, NAVSEA asking for brief descriptions of what the Navy considered as key issues for negotiation and the Navy's negotiating position so he could develop his own negotiation position.
    July 28, 1976:  The Vice Chief, NAVMAT and a consultant to Clements held discussions with Newport News.  Areas discussed were: when the CGN 41 problems would be solved, ceiling price, and escalation provisions.
    August 10, 1976:  Rule telephoned Newport News and requested a meeting in Washington on August 12,1976.
    August 12, 1976:  During a meeting in Washington between Rule and Newport News, Newport News left a general outline for negotiations.
    August 12 and 13, 1976:  The Vice Chief, NAVMAT asked Rule about the August 12 meeting so he could inform Clements.  Rule explained that Newport News had delivered a proposal and he did not approve of it.
    August 17, 1976:  Rule telephoned Newport News and requested a negotiating session to be held on August 20, 1976.
    August 19, 1976:  The Deputy Chief of Naval Material (Procurement and Production) issued Rule an appointment as Contracting Officer with "unlimited authority with respect to negotiations with Newport News."
    August 20, 1976:  Negotiations were held between Rule and Newport News.
    August 23, 1976:  The Vice Chief, NAVMAT and Rule met with Clements to brief him on the August 20th negotiations.  According to Rule, Clements' comment on the negotiations was "fine."  After the meeting with Clements, Rule received a note from the Chief, NAVMAT to meet him in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics).  Among those attending were:
    Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics), Chief, NAVMAT,  Vice Chief, NAVMAT, Rule, Director, Procurement Control and Clearance Division, Naval Material Command, Commander, NAVSEA, Deputy Commander for Contracts, NAVSEA, At this meeting, the Chief, NAVMAT ordered Rule to describe the results of the August 20 negotiations.
    August 24, 1976:  Rickover wrote to the Chief, NAVMAT that he had heard a rumor of a settlement on the CGN-41 between Rule and Newport News.  Rickover commented point-by-point about the rumored settlement and said such a settlement "would show that the Government will not require Newport News to honor its contracts."  Rickover recommended that any
    August 24, 1976:  Senator William Proxmire wrote to the Attorney General, Department of Justice expressing concerns about Gordon Rule's views on the CGN-41 negotiations and telling the Attorney General:
    August 25, 1976:  Newport News telephoned Clements and read a prepared press release.  The consultant to Clements said he and Clements approved of the press release, an excerpt of which stated:  "The parties have agreed to sign a definitive contractual document embodying the negotiated agreement for the construction of the CGN-41."  Later that day, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installation and Logistics) telephoned Newport News, informed them that he was perturbed by the Newport News press release and stated that the Navy would issue its own press release stating that agreement had been reached in principle but that the matter was to be reviewed by higher authority.  On this same date the Navy issued a press release explaining an "agreement in principle" was being drafted for review and approval.  (Emphasis added)
    August 26, 1976:  The Chief, NAVMAT sent Rickover a response to his August 24, 2016 letter stating:  
    The Chief, NAVMAT further wrote:  For reasons such as this, you must stand apart from these negotiations unless the technical areas regarding naval nuclear reactors become involved.
    August 27, 1976:  Rickover responded to the Chief's, August 26, 1976 letter to him.   In response to the wide distribution he used for his letter of August 24, 1976, Rickover explained that: 
    He used the same distribution list for this 6-page letter as he did in his August 24, 1976 letter.
    August 30, 1976:  Newport News met with Rule in Washington and delivered the first draft of Modification P00031.
    The Chief, NAVMAT sent a letter to Rule explaining that, prior to a binding agreement on the CGN-41, the elements of the agreement must be submitted to the Chief, NAVMAT for review and approval.  The review was to be conducted by the Vice Chief, NAVMAT, the Deputy Chief, NAVMAT (Procurement and Production), the NAVSEA Deputy Commander for Contracts; and the General Counsel for the Navy.  Mr. Rule was to provide the proposed contract modification, the business clearance justifications, and other supporting papers for review prior to signature by the contracting officer.
    Gordon Rule forwarded a draft memorandum to the Chief, Naval Material that summarized his negotiations with Newport News.
    August 31, 1976:  The General Counsel of the Navy noted the Rule draft memorandum and told Rule of the General Counsel's responsibility to review the summary of negotiations.  Additionally, the General Counsel requested more information to support Rules' summary.
    September 1, 1976:  Rule sent a summary of his negotiations to the Chief, NAVMAT.
    September 3 1976:  In response to the August 31, 1976 memo from the Navy General Counsel, Rule sent him additional information supporting his summary of negotiations.  He also provided a copy of the first draft of Modification P00031.
    September 14, 1976:  Members of Rule's and Newport News negotiating teams and DCAA auditors met in Washington to discuss provisions in the first draft of Modification P00031.  DCAA was asked to review certain provisions of the proposed modification.
    September 16, 1976:  The Attorney General, Department of Justice, responded to Senator Proxmire's August 24th letter by writing:
    September 20, 1976:  NAVSEA's Deputy Commander for Contracts and a member of the "review team" submitted his analysis of the first draft to the Vice Chief, NAVMAT.  This analysis was not made available to Rule.
    September 24, 1976:  DCAA submitted its analysis of certain provisions of the first draft to a member of Rule's negotiating team.
    September 27, 1976:  Newport News delivered a second draft of the modification to Rule and Rule requested DCAA to review the draft.
    [September 28, 1976:  Clements wrote a letter to the Attorney General, Department of Justice, commenting on the August 24 letter of Senator Proxmire.  In regard to Rule, he wrote:
    In regard to the Department of Justice's review of the CGN-41 negotiation, he said:  "Let me assure you that we in DoD have no intention to by-pass or withhold from your department any information which you determine that your department needs in connection with legal proceedings under the court order."
    September 28, 1976:  DCAA submitted its analysis of the second draft to Rule.  
    October 4, 1976:  NAVSEA submitted its estimate of the cost of the draft modification.  Rule rejected the NAVSEA estimate.
    October 5, 1976:  Rule submitted a memorandum to the Chief, NAVMAT for his approval.  It included the estimated dollar impact of his negotiated settlement.  For those in contracting, it would be similar to a negotiator's memorandum.  The Navy General Counsel sent its analysis of the information supplied by Rule to the Attorney General.  In the memorandum, Rule noted that a member of his negotiating team could not complete an analysis he requested because of interference from Rickover and his staff.  However, he was able to devise a workaround to complete his cost estimate of the modification for the Chief's review and approval.
    October 7, 1976:  Newport News carried a third draft of the proposed modification to Rule.  The cover letter from Newport News attached to the modification said "I have executed the enclosed modification on behalf of the company and request you immediately return a fully executed copy."
    Rule took a copy of the cover letter to the Chief and Vice Chief, NAVMAT in the afternoon.  He returned to his office and received a letter from the Chief, NAVMAT telling him that neither he nor his review group had a copy of the proposed modification that accurately reflected the results of Rule's efforts.  Final review had not been completed and the proposed modification could not be consummated before the review was done.
    According to Rule, he thought about the CGN-41 negotiation effort all afternoon after he met with the Chief and Vice-Chief, NAVMAT.  He explained in a deposition that he:
    October 8, 1976:  The Vice Chief, NAVMAT called Rule into his office at 8:22 a. m.  He gave Rule a letter dated October 7, 1976 that explained that he did not have authority to sign the modification.  Rule explained he had signed it and the Vice Chief requested Rule to give him all signed copies.  Rule refused but said he would give them to Clements.  The Vice Chief then left for his 9:15 am meeting with Clements.  Rule returned to his office dictated a transmittal letter imposing two conditions upon the modification and gave Newport News a copy.  The Vice Chief, NAVMAT called Rule into his office and told him that the Undersecretary of the Navy would keep all executed copies of the modification but Rule told him that he already had signed it.  He returned to his office, signed the transmittal sheet, and handed it to Newport News at 10 A. M.  Shortly afterward at 11:50 a. m., Rule was notified that his appointment as contracting officer was rescinded.  
    March 8, 1977:  The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled that:
    February 27, 1978:  The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit ruled that
     
  3. bob7947
    It's not a religious thing; it's a contracting thing — G. L. Christian style. We've all heard of the "Christian Doctrine." Here is how one judge of the Court of Federal Claims applied it to Bay County, Florida v. U. S., No. 11-157C, August 14, 2013 — released today. You can read the entire 11-page opinion or you can read the excerpt below.
    "The government argues that Bay County waived its potential status as an independent regulatory body by including FAR § 54.241-8 in the Sewage Contract — ignoring the limitation of Subsection (a) on application, viz., “[t]his clause applies to the extent that services furnished hereunder are not subject to regulation by a regulatory body.” FAR § 52.241-8(a); see Hr’g Tr. 11:11 to 12:1. Pointing to the principle that this court must avoid contract interpretations that render the FAR or contract terms superfluous, the government contends that the only way to give meaning to the Sewage Contract is to treat Bay County as a non-independent regulatory body. Hr’g Tr. 11:13 to 15:3. In making this argument, the government implicitly urges that a contractual provision that is inapplicable by its own terms must take precedence over the FAR’s requirements. The court cannot accede to such a proposition.
    When a contract subject to the FAR incorporates improper terms of the FAR, the correct provisions of the FAR control. See S.J. Amoroso Const. Co. v. United States, 12 F.3d 1072, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1993); G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 426 (Ct. Cl.1963), mot. for rehearing and reargument denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1963). “Under the so called Christian doctrine, a mandatory contract clause that expresses a significant or deeply ingrained strand of procurement policy is considered to be included in a contract by operation of law.” S.J. Amoroso, 12 F.3d at 1075. In S.J. Amoroso, as here, an improper clause was substituted for a proper clause. Id. As S.J. Amoroso held, “[a]pplication of the Christian doctrine turns not on whether the clause was intentionally or inadvertently omitted, but on whether procurement policies are being ‘avoided or evaded (deliberately or negligently) by lesser officials.’” Id. (citing G.L. Christian & Assocs., 320 F.2d at 351). The proper clause was consequently given effect. Id. at 1077.
    In this instance, inclusion of the clause prescribed for unregulated utilities constitutes such an impermissible deviation. See FAR § 1.401 (“Deviation means . . . [t]he omission of any solicitation provision or contract clause when its prescription requires its use . . . [or] [t]he use of a solicitation provision or contract clause . . . if such use is inconsistent with the intent, principle, or substance of the prescription or related coverage on the subject matter in the FAR.”). The text of the FAR is unambiguous in its requirement for inclusion of the proper change of rate clause: “The contracting officer shall insert clauses substantially the same as the clauses listed below in solicitations and contracts under the prescribed conditions.” FAR § 41.501(d) (emphasis added). The prescribed condition for inclusion of FAR § 52.241-7 is that the utility services “are subject to a regulatory body.” Id. As established supra, Bay County qualifies as an independent regulatory body, and as such, FAR § 52.241-7 is a required term of the utility contract. Correspondingly, FAR § 52.241-8 is inappropriate. Although deviations may be authorized by the agency head for individual contract actions, such a deviation must be documented and justified in the contract file. FAR § 1.403. No such documentation or justification is present here.
    Accordingly, the Christian doctrine applies and binds the contracting parties to the mandatory contractual term. See G.L. Christian & Assocs., 312 F.2d at 426 (“We are not, and should not be, slow to find the standard [regulation-mandated] article incorporated, as a matter of law, into plaintiff’s contract if the [r]egulations can fairly be read as permitting that interpretation.”). “Such regulations are law, binding on the contract parties” when otherwise applicable to the contract, Dravo Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 1331, 1333 (Ct. Cl. 1973), and “need not be physically incorporated into the contract,” First Nat’l Bank of Louisa, Ky. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 241, 244 (1984) (citing Hills Transp. Co. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1394, 1396 (Ct. Cl. 1974)); see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 423 F.2d 300, 305 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (holding that the regulation need not be in effect when the contract was awarded so long as adoption of the regulation was remedial and intended to afford safeguards to the contractor). The court determines as a matter of law that the clause pertaining to independently regulated utilities, FAR § 52.241-7, is incorporated into the contract in place of the improper clause, FAR § 52.241-8, which is physically present."
  4. bob7947
    At the end of calendar year 2014, I analyzed the number of Federal Acquisition Circulars (FACs) issued by the FAR Council, by month, from 2014 through 2000.  I had mentally noticed that the Council had a penchant for issuing FACs in December so I wanted to see if the actual numbers matched what I thought was happening.  The numbers did!  My mind was still working.  So this year, I updated my 2014 analysis. Well, in 2016 and 2015, the Council was quite merry in December.  They issued 2 FACs during December in each of those years. Since the beginning of 2000, or for the past 17 years, there have been 133 FACs issued. They are grouped by the 12 months of the year below.  (By the way, in 2014 I typed the incorrect number.  I typed 188 when the actual number was 118.)
    January -- 11 FACs February -- 4 FACs March -- 16 FACs April -- 13 FACs May -- 10 FACs June -- 11 FACs July -- 14 FACs August -- 7 FACs September -- 9 FACs October -- 7 FACs November -- 11 FACs, and December -- 20 FACs. As you can see, the FAR Council celebrates the December holidays by issuing FACs. The largest number of FACs--20--have been issued in December. Additionally, the FAR Council has issued FACs in 14 of the 17 Decembers. The only years that they missed were 2011, 2008, and 2005. (I just noticed that the years they missed were three years apart.  Obviously, a government conspiracy.)  In those 3 years, only 6 FACs were issued--the lowest number of FACs issued in any year. Perhaps, they just ran out of gas in those years.
    Getting back to December, in 6 of the 17 years, including 2016 and 2015, the Council issued 2 FACs in December.  Again, that is the most for any month.  What can we conclude?  How about this.  Since the Council spreads holiday cheer in the only way it can during December by issuing FACs, they just love all of you.  And guess what.  There are still several business days left in 2016 and the Council has never issued 3 FAC's in any December, or for that matter, in any month.  If they feel extra cheery this year, maybe they will give you a third to ponder.
  5. bob7947
    GAO supplies us with its contracting rules in bid protest decisions. These rules are repeated and this is one of the reasons I provide key excerpts from bid protest decisions on Wifcon.com's Bid Protest pages. If you read these rules repeatedly, you will remember them. For example, here is a rule on what GAO reviews on a past performance issue.

    Think "consistent with the solicitation’s stated evaluation criteria" for this blog entry.
    Recently, GAO's decision in American Apparel, Inc., B-407399.2, Apr 30, 2013, drew my attention. We know a solicitation's terms are important because it is what bidders and offerors rely on to prepare their bids and offers. However, could GAO's own rule that states "consistent with the solicitation’s stated evaluation criteria" leave it with an oddly written decision. I believe that it did.
    In the American procurement, the solicitation stated that

    All of you probably have seen something similar to the above in a solicitation. It is not the solicitation language in this procurement; it is the events that interest me. The solicitation closed on September 22, 2010 but the contract wasn't awarded until January 18, 2013, over 2 years later. Things can happen in 2 years and in this procurement things did happen. American claimed that during this 2-year period, the successful offeror--Bluewater Defense--had performance deficiencies. However, in response to the protestor's claim GAO said

    My problem with using FR Countermeasures, Inc., in its decision as an example is that, in FR Countermeasures, there was a short period of time between the solicitation closing date and contract award. In the American decision, this time period was over 2 years. However, GAO happily states its rule without dealing with this 2-year period. That bugs me. Case closed, decision over, the protester loses. Maybe this caused some scratching of heads in GAO's bid protest unit too. I don't know but it left me wondering.
    A skilled writer can use sleight-of-pen to make it appear that it dealt with an issue without really dealing with it. In my opinion, that is what GAO did and dealt with the 2-year time period in its background section. GAO mentions that the source selection authority (SSA) made its selection decision on January 13 without adding which year. (The decision also includes 2 different solicitation closing dates so I assume that the missing year was an oversight.) However, the sequence of events leads me to assume that the date was January 13, 2011. GAO further explains, that the procurement record (probably the contract file) included a memorandum from the contracting officer dated November 1, 2012, about a briefing given to the SSA on the results of a "supplementary past performance review." The memorandum explains that this review was written due to the length of time that had passed between the solicitation closing date and the award decision. GAO included a blurb from that memorandum which explained

    Remember GAO did not discuss this memorandum in its "ruling" section of its decision. To complete its story, GAO wrote in the background section that

    In the end, GAO issued its decision using its rule on the solicitation's requirements, ignored the 2-year period in its ruling, but deals with the 2-year period in the background section. Would GAO have mentioned it in the ruling section, if during the 2-year period, there was a substantial decline in the winning offeror's past performance? Anyway, it had me wondering.
    There are 2 decisions you might want to read. They are FR Countermeasures, B-295375, February 10, 2005, mentioned in the decision, and International Business Systems, Inc., B-27554, March 3, 1997 for the "too close at hand" passage mentioned by the protester.
  6. bob7947
    ". . . in the current fiscal climate, agencies and businesses alike have been forced to make tough spending cuts. After carefully reviewing the projected spending and attendance for this year’s conference, GSA is suspending Expo for 2013 in an effort to use our resources responsibly and to deliver better value and savings for our government partners, our vendors, and the American people."
    See it at gsa.gov.
  7. bob7947
    In a letter to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Senator McCaskill, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight and Senators Shaheen, Coburn, Burr, Webb, Cornyn, Inhofe, and Blumenthal, questioned the significant delays between when a referral is made to the Army and when the Army takes action to keep the contractor from receiving additional government contracts. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reports that between June 2011 and June 2012, the Army's average time to process a debarment referral was a total of 323 days.
    See the letter at mccaskill.senate.gov.
  8. bob7947
    "According to the complaint, filed in this matter with the United States District Court, Southern District of California, case number 13MJ1269, Cervantes is charged specifically with violating Title 18, United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 201 ( B )(2), bribery. Cervantes allegedly used his position to extort bribes from businesses seeking to do business at Camp Pendleton and allegedly referred to himself as the Godfather at Camp Pendleton; Cervantes is currently a U.S. Department of Defense employee and a supervisor for Construction and Service Contracts, Inspection Branch, at Camp Pendleton."
    See it at fbi.gov.
  9. bob7947
    In 1972, the Commission on Government Procurement wrote that Congress should limit its acquisition legislation to fundamental acquisition matters and let the Executive Branch implement Congress's policies through specific acquisition regulation.  If Congress had listened, it would be passing less acquisition legislation, doing a better jub of fulfilling its oversight responsibility of acquisition activities, and the FAR Councils would be performing their regulatory duty to implement Congress's acquisition policies.
    Unfortunately, Congress didn't listen--to its own creation. Today, Congress doesn't deal with fundamental acquisition matters, it deals with acquisition minutiae and esoteric details--especially when it comes to the Department of Defense (DoD). Someone has an idea and before you know Congress is passing another section of acquisition legislation. No idea is too small for Congress to more on its acquisition legislation dump-truck.  For the most part, Congress meddles in the acquisition process through the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. These committees propose acquisition legislation in their annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) with much of it in Title VIII of the NDAAs. Title VIII is usually labeled: Acquisition Policy, Acquisition Management, and Related Matters.  You can run from it, you can stall it, but you cannot hide from it.
    In the past 17 NDAAs, Congress has passed 725 sections of legislation in Title VIII of the NDAAs.  Another 166 sections of acquisition legislation are included in other Titles of the 17 NDAAs.  That's at least 891 sections of acquisition legislation in the past 17 NDAAs.  What is worse, Congress is picking up its legislative pace and has passed more sections of acquisition legislation in the past 3 years than ever before. 
    If you have been a follower of Wifcon.com for the past 17 years, you would be familiar with the 17 NDAAs by viewing them here.  Take a look at the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 sections for Title VIII.  Do you see coherent acquisition policy?  No, you do not!  Its a lot of junk legislation patched onto a growing body of junk legislation that is called Title 10 of the U. S. Code. 
    Don't think you are safe if you are in a civilian agency.  Remember, the NDAA is an annual event and during debate on the Senate or House NDAA versions, any stray piece of legislation may attach itself to the NDAA.  It's kind of like a tick or leech latching onto you.  Take another look at the sticky bomb idea on another of my blog entries.  If you throw an amendment at the NDAA during the debate process, it might stick to the NDAA and become law.  See if you can identify the source of TITLE XVII that is included in this year's NDAA.
    I'm getting angry again just thinking about this so I better end here.  However, you should get angry too.  Your the ones who have to deal with it on a daily basis.  If you need some incentive to get angry, there are about 250 sections from the last 3 NDAAs waiting for the FAR Councils to deal with them.  
    I've posted an article with tables to the Analysis Page with the same name as this blog entry.  You can probably see my anger growing with sarcasm as I progress towards the end of that article--see the part on zombie legislation.
    Some of you are too young to remember the movie Network.  However, there is a part of the movie where the character Howard Beale decides he has had enough.  I looked at it again this morning. 
  10. bob7947
    "A bipartisan group of senators led by U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) are expressing continued concern and frustration over the Army's use of contractors that have potential ties to terrorist groups. The senators specifically referred to a longstanding backlog of 43 referrals pending before the Army's Suspension and Debarment Official that involve individuals or companies with links to groups including the Haqqani Network and Al Qaeda as reason for concern that underscores the Army's need to take swift action."
    See it at shaheen.senate.gov
  11. bob7947
    On June 20, 2015, Vern Edwards introduced us to F & F Laboratories, Inc., ASBCA 33007, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21207 (Sept. 14, 1988).
    In early 1986, the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) awarded a contract to F & F Laboratories, Inc. (F & F) for "starch jelly bars" as part of the military's abandon ship ration procurement. F & F offered its commercial jelly bar as part of its proposal and it was incorporated into the contract documents. Unfortunately, the commercial product didn't fit into the abandon ship ration package and F & F was terminated for default. In an Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) decision, the termination for default was converted into a termination for convenience because DPSC "was obligated to reject [F & F's] offer prior to award and that its failure to do so until [F & F] manufactured over half the supplies after award was a material breach of the contract."
    If life was simple and straightforward, we could end there.
    In 1985, DPSC's records showed that its last procurement for jelly bars was with the Chuckles Division of Nabisco in 1982. The Chuckles bar came in 5 pieces to a bar and one current image shows the bar is nearly 5 Inches long today. That is larger than the federal specification size from the ASBCA case. The F & F bar, in 1986, was over 6 inches with 5 pieces also. Since both firms were Illinois firms, I assume that the sizes of the commercial bars were about the same in the 1980s. That is a long way of concluding that the Chuckles Division probably produced a non-commercial jelly bar for DPSC's needs in 1982.
    Chuckles is now part of the Ferrara Candy Company which, in addition to Chuckles and other candies, makes "Atomic Fireball" candies. I may not have been a fan of Chuckles as a kid but I can remember those fireballs. F & F was in bankruptcy in 2010 and is now The Smith Brothers Co. You can track it down with Google Maps.
    So what's the punch-line here? That's the funny part. I never saw an F & F jelly candy bar--until a day or two ago. Read through the discussion on this site and pay special attention to the image of the "Jelly Bar." You can enlarge the size of the image. The Abandon Ship ration the fellow tested was probably made between 1986 and 1992. You will see that the jelly bar was made by Lucy Ellen Candies which, if you do a bit of research, was a division of F & F. We can assume that after the ASBCA decision F & F and DPSC worked things out and F & F produced a non-commercial jelly bar to federal specifications. For that brief period of time, Lucy Ellen may have found happiness at DPSC.
  12. bob7947

    Dear Editor: I am Eight Years Old

    By bob7947,


    Christmas
    That was how Virginia O'Hanlon began her letter to the Editor of The Sun in 1897.  The Editor's response to Virginia is the most read editorial that was ever written  That is not exactly what this entry is about.  However, four years ago I did some research on Virginia and found the room where Virginia wrote her letter.  You can read about it in the brief entry shown below.
    What caught my eye was the comment from Alan to my earlier entry.  The comment was written in 2021 and I first noticed it tonight.  Alan, thank you for the comment.  It added a bit of cheer to my Christmas in 2023.
  13. bob7947
    Searching for an item to post is time-consuming and frustrating. However, some times an item pops up from an unexpected place. In this case, it was the U. S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. The case is straightforward and easy to read and contains some excerpts that are noteworthy. Here is what the Board said:
    "Our view is in line with the contractor's. Although Drennon's technique for excavating the hillside may not have been ideal, due to the defects in the design of the project and significant differences between the geotechnical information provided and the actual soil composition, the hillside would have collapsed no matter what technique the contractor had used. Whether the contractor's design for the wall (which was approved by the agency) would have succeeded is irrelevant; the virtue of the design was not tested, since the project was truncated before the wall was built. We grant the appeal, excluding from the award only the contractor's profit on its suspension of work claim."
    See the entire case at Drennon Construction & Consulting, Inc. v. The Department of the Interior.
  14. bob7947
    Yesterday, Don Mansfield posted an article entitled Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession. After reading the digest of the article and bristling at some of the jargon used, I can report on what was written in simple language. It is: under some circumstances Army officers can accept a lie as truth. Why single out Army officers? I won't. The truth is that humans can accept a lie as truth. I've written about that before.
    The article made me remember an episode of 60 Minutes from the early to mid-1980s, possibly 1985. For some reason, the Army had agreed to a television test of the Division Air Defense Gun System (DIVAD). DIVAD's mission was to guard tanks on the battlefield from hostile fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and lightly armored ground vehicles. Yes, this is the legendary system that was claimed to have identified a latrine fan as an enemy. However, this blog entry is not about the system nor is it about the Army. It's about us. I have been unable to obtain a tape of the program from 60 Minutes so I will explain what I remember.
    The show began and DIVAD's representative (an Army officer) explained what was going to happen. There would be two types of tests--one stationary and several drones. Off in the distance was a white object--the apparent stationary target. DIVAD's turret whirred back and forth, locked onto the target, and began firing its cannons in anger. After the cloud of dust cleared, the target appeared--unharmed. Next was the drone test. From the left side of the television screen a slow moving aircraft appeared. DIVAD gave it a taste of shock and awe with its cannon and the drone disappeared to the right of the screen--unharmed. A second drone appeared on the left side of the screen. Once again, DIVAD's cannon unleashed a merciless barrage but the drone flew off--unharmed. Finally, a third drone appeared from the left of the screen and DIVAD gave it everything it had. I saw a slight hit on the wing of the drone as it flew off to the right of the screen. Shortly after the drone disappeared from view, there was an explosion. (Later it was reported that the third drone was detonated by a self-destruct device.)
    Now it was time to hear from DIVAD's representative about the test. I was young and naïve back then so I felt bad for the guy and wouldn't have blamed him a bit if he ran off and disappeared to the right of the television screen too. The person from 60 Minutes sheepishly approached the DIVAD guy not knowing what to say. However, the DIVAD guy jovially declared success for DIVAD. What did I miss? What did the entire audience miss? I don't know if the Secretary of Defense was watching but he cancelled the system after this episode of 60 minutes aired. Maybe the DIVAD representative had his fingers and toes crossed. Maybe he was conditioned to view the test as a success. All I know is I sat in front of the television stunned.
    What's the moral of the story? Again it's simple: As humans, we all can lie. We even will lie about a lie. It isn't restricted to any organization nor is it restricted to any national border. Its universal. Try this. If you're going to a business meeting today, tell your boss that his/her stupid idea is stupid. Maybe you're going to a party this weekend. Tell everyone what you really think about them and see how that works for you. Remember those little white lies our Mothers told us about after we told a whopper. An online dictionary defines them as: an often trivial, diplomatic or well-intentioned untruth. It's not a lie; its an untruth. Maybe that is a fib. One of my most used lines when I was a kid was: she did it! She being my sister. We all can lie--we're human! We may call it a social grace, more than likely, its a survival tactic. Just don't be surprised if the person on the other side of the negotiation table is telling you an untruth. Its part of our life experience. Besides, I'd never lie to you.
  15. bob7947
    Many years ago, as a teen, I noticed a magazine on a barbershop table with an incredible black airplane on the cover. Huge engines on each side of a delta wing and a long thin fuselage with a cockpit near the front. I never forgot that airplane, it was an SR-71 Blackbird. Fifty-five years later, I wrote a brief article about the first Blackbird -- the A-12. It's the fastest and highest flying jet airplane that was ever built. Everything about the A-12 was incredible. A requirement was developed to:
    make an airplane so fast that nothing could catch it, make it fly so high that nothing could reach it, and make it nearly invisible. Add to that the fact that no one knew how to do it, the materials didn't exist and it had to be done quickly.  Groom Lake and Area 51 were built for the U-2 and then used for the A-12, Clarence "Kelly" Johnson and his Skunk Works built the U-2 and then built the A-12.  The A-12 was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spy plane just as the U-2 was originally. 
    ----------------------------------------------------
    In September 2020, I finished this 20 page article on the A-12 and placed it on the Analysis Page.  I never thought to post it to the Wifcon Blog.  I'm doing that now.  The article took a long time to write because the building of the A-12 was incredible.  Much of the material used to write this article was from 60 years ago and many potential sources confused the SR-71 story with that of the A-12 story.    Others were flat out wrong.  I used sources from people who worked on or flew the A-12.  Fortunately, the CIA finally declassified some documents on the A-12 sometime after 2000--maybe 2007 or 2013--and made it available to the public.  There wasn't much of it but it filled in some of the missing pieces.
    There are many facts and stories about the A-12 that are of interest.  One is that, in the A-12, the engines produced only about 20 percent of the power at crusing speeds.  Most of the power came from from the pointed cones sticking out of the nacelles.  Also, the A-12 ran its afterburners continuously.  Then there were the 2 Buick "nailhead" V-8s that were conected to each other to "spool-up" and start each A-12 engine.
    At the end of the article, I list the places you can still see an A-12 and added links to Google Maps.  If you look closely at the maps, you will find an image of an A-12.  I also list where the only YF-12A, a derivative of the A-12, is at.  Now, the YF-12A is another story.
    Please read:  Faster Than A Speeding Bullet, Three Times Higher Than The Tallest Mountain.
  16. bob7947
    You are a program officer with big "wants" but with little federal money. Your contracting officer is not familiar with hiding overruns in an FPI(F) contract--yet. Besides, you have never heard of it--yet. What to do? Well, this politician knows best. With a little luck and plenty of ignorance, you may see the "fixed price technical competition, under which all offerors compete solely on nonprice factors and the fixed award price is pre-announced in the solicitation."
    Let's think about this. Fixed price, fixed award price, the same thing. Nobody is saying anything against the FPI(F). So, get ready, low ball your fixed-price and let the offerors compete for it. If they want the business, they can promise you anything. What else can they do? In a few years, just before things fall apart, find another job.
    By the way, if you want to read about it start at the bottom of the "Discussion draft" to the right of the article. It is in Title V "Other Reforms." They should have called it "Afterthoughts."
    See it at fcw.com
  17. bob7947
    The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 requires the Government Accountability Office (GA0) to report to the U. S. Congress annually when government agencies fail to fully implement its bid protest recommendations. GAO has posted these reports on its website since fiscal year (FY) 1995. Initially, these reports provided little information but by FY 2004, GAO published its "Bid Protest Statistics" covering FY 2004 through 2001. I have added every one of these reports to the fiscal year numbers at the top of the bid protest statistics.
    Beginning in its report for FY 2013, GAO began listing its "most prevalent reasons for sustaining protests" during the FY. This has continued for FY 2014, FY 2015, and FY 2016. Although the information provided does not include cases where an agency took corrective action before a formal sustained decision was reached, it does provided information on 366 sustained decisions. In that sense, it may provide some help whether you are trying to prevent a protest or whether you may protest a procurement.
    For FY 2016, there were 139 sustained protests compared to the 227 protests for the previous 3 Fiscal Years. Since GAO does not provide the number of sustained protests by most prevalent causes, I have ranked the most prevalent causes considering the number of sustained protests during a year.  For example, I divided the number of protests in each of FY 2016, 2015, 2014, and 2013 by 1.  That resulted in the following factors:
    FY 2016 (139/100=1.39) FY 2015 (68/100=.68) FY 2014 (72/100=.72) FY 2013 (82/100=.82) I then multiplied each factor by each most prevalent reason in each Fiscal Year using GAO's ranking.  Then I added my raw rankings of individual reasons for each Fiscal Year to come up with my final numerical ranking.  Yes, it's somewhat crude but all that GAO provides is general information.  
    Below is my ranking of the most prevalent reasons for sustained protests listed by GAO for FY 2016 through FY 2013 with my numerical ranking:
    failure to follow the evaluation criteria (Numerical Ranking of 8.4 and it was listed 3rd in FY 2015 and 1st in FYs 2014 and 2013) unreasonable technical evaluation (Numerical Ranking of 8.28 and it was listed 5th in FY 2015, 3rd in FY 2014, and 1st in FY 2016) unreasonable cost or price evaluation (Numerical Ranking of 7.05 and it was listed 1st in FY 2015, 4th in FY 2013, and 3rd in FY 2016) and unreasonable past performance evaluation (Numerical Ranking of 6.89 and it was listed 2nd in FY 2015 and FY 2016) inadequate documentation of the record (Numerical Ranking of 3.97 and it was listed 4th in FY 2015 and 2nd in FY 2013) Anyway, that is my way of trying to quantify the reasons.  
    Other reasons for sustained protests GAO listed include
    flawed selection decision (Numerical Ranking of 2.75 and it was listed 2nd in FY 2014) unequal treatment of offerors (Numerical Ranking of 2.42 and it was listed 4th in FY 2014 and 3rd in FY 2013) In addition to listing the most prevalent reasons, GAO also gives 1 example decision for each of the most prevalent reasons it lists in a FY.  For example, under unreasonable technical evaluation which GAO placed first in FY 2015, GAO lists Deloitte Consulting, LLP, B-412125.2, B-412125.3, Apr. 7, 2016, 2016 CPD ¶ 119.
    To me, the most striking reason for GAO sustaining a protest is inadequate documentation. That can be prevented by a thorough review of what documents are provided in the evaluation and selection decision. If there is something missing, identify it and correct it. You can get more information on the documentation issue by looking at the Wifcon.com protest page FAR 15.305 (a)(3): Technical Evaluation - Documentation.
    Another striking reason for sustained protests is the first that I list--failure to follow the evaluation criteria. One time a friend of mine was sitting on an evaluation panel for a GAO procurement that I had no involvement in at all. He had something extra he wanted to include in his evaluation of proposals and he asked me about it. Although I was stunned at the question, I simply told him that he must follow the evaluation criteria in the solicitation and if he had any questions he should ask the contracting officer--not me.
    Before ending this entry, I will once again remind you that the information provided by GAO only includes sustained protests. These are decisions in which the agency digs in its heels and fights the protest to a final decision. As GAO explains, "agencies need not, and do not, report any of the myriad reasons they decide to take voluntary corrective action." What you see here may be the tip of the iceberg.
  18. bob7947
    At this time of year, newly introduced legislation often is introduced and then quickly enters oblivion. I checked this Senator's committee and subcommitee assignments and did not find any direct link to federal contracting. Maybe that explains it.
    "Sen. Toomey's bill would require the GAO to include the most common reasons bid protests are sustained. This additional information could help federal agencies identify needed improvements in the contracting process, reduce the number of protests overall and provide Congress with much-needed information about possible weaknesses in the federal contracting process to facilitate potential legislation."
    See it at toomey.senate.gov.
  19. bob7947
    "Under a Contractor Team Arrangement (CTA), two or more GSA Schedule contractors work together to meet ordering activity needs. By complementing each other's capabilities, the team offers a total solution to the ordering activity's requirement, providing a "win-win" situation for all parties."
    But what is a Prime/Subcontractor relationship and what is the difference from a CTA? Let GSA explain.
    See the information at gsa.gov.
  21. bob7947
    I was reading a decision of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) about a week ago and I found the following.
    Why read the ASBCA decision when I could go straight to the horse's mouth! So I searched the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) web site and I found the Sharp decision--and it was recent. Here is a brief description of the issue in the Sharp case.
    On September 18, 2001, the General Services Administration (GSA) awarded a multiple award schedule (MAS) contract to Sharp Electronics Corporation for office equipment. On December 1, 2005, the Army issued a delivery order "in accordance with and subject to terms and conditions" of Sharp's MAS contract. The order provided for a four-year lease of copier equipment, including one base year and three option years, with the last option year ending on December 1, 2009. Option years one and two were exercised in full. The Army partially exercised option year three for six months and subsequently extended the lease for three more months. The lease finally ended on August 31, 2009.
    Sharp filed a claim with the Army contracting officer (CO) citing the termination fee provisions of its schedule contract. The Army CO did not respond and did not refer Sharp's claim to GSA's CO who was responsible for Sharp's MAS contract. After 60 days, Sharp appealed to the ASBCA which determined that it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Sharp then filed an appeal with the CAFC.
    What should an agency CO do with a dispute on an order? What should an agency CO do if there is a question of contract interpretation with the MAS contract and that interpretation affects the interpretation of the agency order? Well, in a majority decision, the CAFC tells us this.
    It is easy for the CAFC but is it that easy for you? There was a minority opinion in this CAFC case too which looked at it differently.
    Anyway, the CAFC case is Sharp Electronics Corporation v. John McHugh, Secretary of the Army, No. 2012-1299, February 22, 2013. The ASBCA decision is Impact Associates Inc.
  22. bob7947
    "What you’re looking at is a cell in the midst of dividing into two identical copies—a process called mitosis. Here, the chromosomes (in blue) are aligned at the cell’s equator. Microtubules (red) from opposite poles of the cell attach to the chromosomes using the kinetochores (green) and pull them to opposite ends of the cell, which then splits in half. But sometimes cells do not divide properly—a common problem in cancer. Understanding the mechanics of cell division could help us correct this process when it goes wrong."
    See it at directorsblog.nih.gov.
  23. bob7947
    " . . . was on the take. At the New Mexico Department of Corrections she was responsible for selecting the best contractors to perform maintenance work for the State. Instead and bypassing any public bidding process, she awarded about $4 million in contracts to . . . over the course of three years -- receiving about $237,000 in return from . . . , [the contractor's] owner."
    See the judgment at ca10.uscourts.gov (pdf).
  24. bob7947
    It was Friday, February 1, 1974, when out of the blue, my supervisor asked me: Do you have anything against going to Huntsville, Alabama for a week?  The person that asked that question was the one that I needed to file my paperwork for promotion.   I immediately said no and asked when do I go?  Monday was the answer.  Since it was Friday and I was in Washington, D.C, I had a couple of days to get going and hundreds of miles to drive.  Stunned, I left my office space amd began walking around the dismal GAO Building in a stupor.  Over the years, I found that the halls of the GAO building were a wonderful place to think.  The halls were dimly lit and neary devoid of people.
    The one week in Huntsville lasted for 3 months and I almost died there in the April 3, 1974 historic tornado outbeak.  I would be working on the above mentioned bid protest with our Atlanta staff in Huntsville, Alabama at the Marshall Space Flight Center.  Few people know it but this protest was the last time that GAO's General Counsel was stupid enough to involve GAO auditors in a bid protest.  They now do desk top reviews.  At the end of our work, GAO issued a 98 page bid protest decision.  To my knowledge, it remains the longest bid protest decision that GAO ever issued.  When I retired in 2003, I was the last person in GAO that had worked on that protest and I became a momentary celebrity in GAO's General Council.  It's nearly half a century since that protest and now, after giving it much thought over the years, I am writing about my experiences on that protest.  Many of my experiences are personal but many others are protest-related.  The only protest-related source material I am using is my memory  and the original protest decision.  Additionally, I am writing this entry in parts so that I don't end up with something so long that no one would even attempt to read it.  
    Monday, February 4, 1974, came quickly and it was time to go.  I told my friends and family where I was going, packed my 1971 Datsun 240Z with as much as is would hold, and headed southwest through Virginia.   
  25. bob7947
    My road to Huntsville was simple enough, drive through Tennessee, pass into Alabama, and find the Tourway Inn on Memorial Parkway.  Those were the exact directions given to me.  "Find the Tourway on Memorial Parkway."  I had a paper fold-up map to find Memorial Parkway.  So it was drive up and down Memorial Parkway to find the Tourway.  There, I would meet our staff from the Atlanta Regional Office and they would fill me in on our work.  This was my first trip into the deep south, and with my Philadelphia accent, it was as if I had an arrow pointing at me with the words "yankee here" as soon as I opened my mouth.
    We met outside of the Tourway at 7 AM and drove to Marshall Space Flight Center's Building 4200.  Inside the cafeteria, we picked a large table for the 5 or 6 of us.  I was told, we were there to audit the Source Evaluation Board's (SEB) evaluation of the Lockheed Propulsion Company's and Thiokol Corporation's proposals for the Solid Rocket Motors that would be developed and used to send the Space Shuttle into orbit. Thiokol Corporation had been awarded the contract and the Lockheed Propulsion Company had protested it to the General Accounting Office (GAO).  Remember, this was 1974, ten years before the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Competition in Contracting Act.  The Federal Procurement Regulation was in effect for Civilian agencies and the Armed Servies Procurement Regulation (ASPR) was in effect for DoD agencies.
    Specifically, a GAO audit team was there because a powerful contingent of Senators and Congressmen asked (told) GAO to evaluate NASA's decision to award the contract to Thiokol. The Space Program had come to a standstill waiting for us to get done.  NASA didn't want us there and I didn't want to be there.  There I was, a 25 year-old auditor, away from home, working with strangers as part of a team, who were holding up the Space Program. It was early February and we would hold up the Space Program until the end of June. Wifcon.com was more than 20 years in my future.
    After watching my new colleagues slurp up their grits while I ate my chocolate covered donut, we walked to the Source Evaluation Board (SEB) Building.  There had been over 200 members of the SEB so they needed a building and several of them were still working in the building.  Then I was shown the Proposal Room where the proposals were stored.  It was a large room with rows of 3-prong thick binders.  The Proposal Room held the proposals from the four competitors:  Thiokol Corporation, Lockheed Propulsion Corporation, Aerojet Solid Propulsion Company and United Technology Center.  Fortunately, we only looked at the proposals from Thiokol and Lockheed.
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