Jump to content
The Wifcon Forums and Blogs

Sign in to follow this  
  • entries
  • comments
  • views

Entries in this blog

Koprince Law LLC

Will they or won’t they? That is the question looming today, which is the deadline to temporarily halt a partial shutdown of the government. While we keep our eyes on news from Washington, we have other noteworthy news and commentary in this edition of SmallGovCon Week In Review.

This week, we have stories about the implementation of the so-called “Amazon Amendment,” a new bill aims to improve transparency surrounding change orders, a large business pays $1.7 million to settle allegations of overcharges on a GSA Schedule contract, and more.

  • The General Services Administration and the Office of Management and Budget hosted an Industry Day on Section 846 of the 2018 NDAA–the so-called “Amazon Amendment.” [Federal News Radio]
  • A Nebraska Congressman has introduced the “Change Order Transparency for Federal Contractors Act,” which would require agencies to release change order information to bidders on new contracts. [The Ripon Advance]
  • A Chinese mobile phone maker is facing a ban that would prevent its phones and equipment from being used by the U.S. government. [Silicon Angle]
  • The GSA has reopened a “new and improved” Schedule 75, and has added a new enhanced Special Item Number for Office Products & Services. [U.S. General Services Administration]
  • The GSA plans to officialize regulations on how contractors should handle and protect sensitive information for federal clients. [fedscoop]
  • The GO Topeka program is connecting Kansas small businesses with government contracts. If you’re in Kansas, like we are, you owe it to yourself to connect with the Kansas PTAC. [Topeka Capital Journal]
  • Accenture Federal Services LLC has agreed to pay more than $1.7 million to resolve allegations that it overcharged the government under a GSA Schedule contract. [U.S. Department of Justice]
  • Government contracts guru Mark Amtower describes five steps to stand out from the crowd in 2018 to help your business get more government contracting dollars. [Washington Technology]

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

When we write about bid protest decisions on SmallGovCon, odds are that we’re writing about a GAO decision. For good reason: GAO is the most common forum protesters bring bid protests.

But SmallGovCon readers also know there’s another possible forum for protests: the Court of Federal Claims.

The GAO publishes an annual bid protest report with statistics about the number and effectiveness rate of protests, among other things. But until very recently, we didn’t have much hard data about the frequency and efficacy of COFC protests. The recently-released RAND bid protest report changed that, by including a deep dive on DoD bid protests at COFC.

Let’s take a look.

RAND’s report answers several major questions relating to COFC protests.

How many protests are filed at COFC? From the beginning of 2008 through mid-2017, there were approximately 950 bid protests filed at the Court. These protests were split fairly evenly between DoD protests and non-DoD protests. Although this seems like a lot, the report shows that, based on the total number of acquisitions over this same time period, the frequency of protests at COFC is similar to that at GAO: less than 0.025% of contracts are actually protested. Or, as the report put it, “very few procurements are protested at COFC.”

Who is filing these protests? It would be logical to assume that large businesses are more likely to incur the expense of filing a COFC protest. Not so: the top 11 DoD contractors (by revenue) filed just ten protests between 2008 and 2016—and seven of these were filed by one company. Given this dearth, RAND concludes that “protests at COFC are not part of standard business practice at these firms.” Instead, RAND found that 58% of COFC protests are filed by small businesses.

Which agencies are protested the most? Of DoD agencies, the Army was most frequently protested at the COFC (about 41 percent of all DoD protests at the COFC). The Defense Logistics Agency was the least-protested (only about 9 percent of DoD protests at the COFC).

Which procurements are being protested? Only the largest solicitations out there, right? Surprisingly not. Although the size of contracts protested varies greatly, the average value of protested procurements is only about $1.1 million. A surprisingly large number of COFC protests, moreover, were for contracts valued less than $100,000—about 3.5%.

How long do COFC protests take? Unlike GAO, the Court doesn’t have a hard deadline to resolve protests. Even still, the majority are resolved very quickly: according to RAND, about 75% of COFC protests are resolved within 150 days. The average resolution took 133 days, while the median was 87 days. RAND was quick to caution, however, that some protests may take “considerably longer” depending on the issues involved and whether the Court’s decision is appealed.

Are COFC protests effective? Unfortunately for potential protesters, the RAND report has some discouraging information: out of 459 DoD protests analyzed, only 9% were sustained by the Court. Disappointed protesters appealed the Court’s decisions in about 12% of these protests and, of those, roughly one-fifth eventually earned a sustain.

Does this data suggest that the COFC is hostile to bid protests, or that protesting to the Court isn’t worth it? Absolutely not. Just like with GAO protests, the Court will sustain a protest if it determines the agency made a prejudicial error in its evaluation.

In my opinion, this comparatively-low sustain rate instead confirms the need for better communication between offerors and agencies, including more-thorough debriefings. It’s no secret that providing more information to offerors will reduce protests—including protests before the Court. In fact, we often talk to disappointed offerors who are considering protests mainly because the agency hasn’t adequately explained its evaluation decisions.

It’s also worth noting that many COFC protests are filed after the protester has lost at GAO. (The reverse isn’t true: a losing protester at the Court cannot turn around and file at GAO). This means that some of the protests on the Court’s docket have already been reviewed and rejected by GAO—and thus, the overall strength of the COFC protest pool may be weaker than at GAO.

Finally, as we’ve pointed out various times here at SmallGovCon, the key metric from a protester’s perspective isn’t the sustain rate, but the effectiveness rate—that is, the combination of “sustain” decisions plus voluntary agency corrective actions. At GAO, the effectiveness rate of protests has been above 40% for years, even though the sustain rate is much lower (17%, for example, in Fiscal Year 2017). Corrective actions happen at the COFC too, but the RAND Corporation didn’t have data on how often. As with the GAO, it would be a mistake to evaluate the effectiveness of COFC protests based solely on the sustain rate.

* * *

RAND’s report provides interesting—and surprising—information relating to COFC protests. In the right circumstances, these protests can be an important tool for government contractors (including small businesses) to earn a contract award.

If you’re considering a bid protest, give us a call to discuss your options.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

The VA has proposed expanding its definition of the “good character” required to own or control an SDVOSB or VOSB.

The VA’s proposed rule would exclude many people convicted of felonies (including felonies unrelated to business integrity), which may raise questions about the rule’s fairness.  And I have to wonder–is the VA’s proposal consistent with the Congressional directive requiring the VA to use the SBA’s SDVOSB eligibility rules?

As I wrote earlier this week, the VA recently issued a proposed rule to eliminate its SDVOSB and VOSB ownership and control rules.  Instead, as directed by Congress in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, the VA would defer to the SBA’s regulatory criteria when it comes to small business size, ownership, and control.

Well, mostly.

The VA’s proposed rule doesn’t seem to eliminate every SDVOSB and VOSB eligibility requirement.  Instead, when it comes to two unique VA requirements, regarding “good character” and federal financial obligations, the VA’s proposed rule would actually expand the list of veterans ineligible for VA SDVOSB/VOSB verification, even though many of those same veterans would be able to self-certify their SDVOSBs under the SBA’s rules.  Today, I want to focus on the good character piece of the proposal.

Under current VA law, SDVOSB and VOSB owners must have good character.  The regulation, 38 C.F.R. 74.2(b), says:

(b) Good character. Veterans, service-disabled veterans, and surviving spouses with ownership interests in VetBiz verified businesses must have good character. Debarred or suspended concerns or concerns owned or controlled by debarred or suspended persons are ineligible for VetBiz VIP Verification.

Clearly, the existing rule prohibits debarred or suspended individuals from owning or controlling verified SDVOSBs and VOSBs.  Fair enough.  The existing rule doesn’t provide any additional guidance on what “good character” means.

The VA’s proposed rule, though, would significantly expand the current definition of good character.  Here’s what the VA proposes:

(b) Good character and exclusions in System for Award Management (SAM). Individuals having an ownership or control interest in verified businesses must have good character. Debarred or suspended concerns or concerns owned or controlled by debarred or suspended persons are ineligible for VIP Verification. Concerns owned or controlled by a person(s) who is currently incarcerated, or on parole or probation (pursuant to a pre-trial diversion or following conviction for a felony or any crime involving business integrity) are ineligible for VIP Verification. Concerns owned or controlled by a person(s) who is formally convicted of a crime set forth in 48 C.F.R. 9.406-2(b)(3) are ineligible for VIP Verification during the pendency of any subsequent legal proceedings. If, after verifying a participant’s eligibility, the person(s) controlling the participant is found to lack good character, CVE will immediately remove the participant from the VIP database, notwithstanding the provisions of § 74.22 of this part.

It’s worth noting that the VA’s proposal goes beyond the FAR’s responsibility-related certifications.  FAR 52.209-5 (Certification Regarding Responsibility Matters) and FAR 52.209-7 (Information Regarding Responsibility Matters) don’t require a contractor’s “principal” to disclose all crimes, but rather those directly related to government contracts, or those that are directly relevant to business integrity–such as embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, and tax evasion.  In contrast, the VA’s proposal would seem to apply to all felonies, regardless of the nature or circumstances.

The SBA also has a “good character” component in the 8(a) Program.  But the SBA doesn’t apply a one-size-fits-all test.  Instead, the SBA’s regulations say that the SBA will “consider the nature and severity of the violation in making an eligibility determination.”  The VA’s proposal doesn’t seem to allow for consideration of the nature and severity of the violation (other than considering whether it was a felony).

Speaking of the SBA, I also wonder whether the VA’s proposal complies with the 2017 NDAA, which says that the VA must apply the SBA’s SDVOSB/VOSB eligibility rules.  Specifically, the 2017 NDAA says that the VA must verify SDVOSBs and VOSBs using Sections 632(q)(2) and (3) of the Small Business Act, which don’t say a darn thing about good character (and still won’t following the ultimate insertion of the 2017 NDAA’s amended language into the statute).  The 2017 NDAA directs the VA to apply the SBA’s regulations implementing the Small Business Act, and then says that the VA “may not issue regulations related to the status of a concern as a small business concern and the ownership and control of such small business concern.”

Now, it’s true that this prohibition isn’t supposed to take effect until the VA and SBA issue their consolidated regulation, which of course hasn’t happened yet.  But as I read the VA’s proposal, it intends its new good character restriction to apply after the joint rule is issued.  After all, the main point of the VA’s proposed rule is to pave the way for the consolidation of the two programs’ eligibility requirements by deleting most of the VA’s language relating to SDVOSB ownership and control.  It appears, then, that the VA doesn’t think that its new good character proposal is contrary to the Small Business Act’s definitions or the restrictions placed on the VA in the 2017 NDAA.


I’m curious to see how the VA supports its restriction in light of the Small Business Act’s definitions of SDVOSB and VOSB.  Beyond that, I’ll be interested to see how the VA explains its power to issue the regulation.  In its decisions, the Supreme Court has written that “the key phrase ‘related to’ expresses a ‘broad pre-emptive purpose.'”  Here, the VA is proposing a rule to restrict who can own or control a verified SDVOSB or VOSB.  From my vantage point, it certainly seems like the VA is proposing a rule “related to . . . the ownership and control” of SDVOSBs and VOSBs, which would be contrary to the “broad pre-emptive purpose” set forth in the 2017 NDAA.

Congress’s goal was to require the VA and SBA to apply uniform, government-wide SDVOSB/VOSB eligibility criteria.  (I’m not making a wild guess here–Section 1832 of the 2017 NDAA is titled “Uniformity in Service-Disabled Veteran Definitions.”)  But if the VA proposal becomes law, we could be right back in a world of “separate programs, separate requirements.”  Under the VA’s proposal, a veteran with (for example) a felony DUI on his or her record couldn’t own or control a VA-verified SDVOSB.  However, because the current SBA SDVOSB rules don’t impose a good character requirement, that same individual would be able to self-certify the company as SDVOSB for non-VA purposes.  Such a result doesn’t seem to reflect Congress’s intent.

No one wants unscrupulous felons to take advantage of government contracting set-aside programs.  That said, it’s an open question in my mind whether the VA has legal authority to adopt the restriction it’s proposing.  Moving forward, I hope the VA takes a close look at whether its proposed rule complies with the 2017 NDAA.  And if it decides that the proposal is compliant, I hope the VA will consider a more nuanced, case-by-case approach to evaluating good character, like the one that’s been used in the 8(a) program for many years.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

The VA has formally proposed to eliminate its SDVOSB and VOSB ownership and control regulations.

Once the proposed change is finalized, the VA will use the SBA’s regulations to evaluate SDVOSB and VOSB eligibility, as required by the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act.

As regular SmallGovCon readers know, the differences between the government’s two SDVOSB programs have caused major headaches for veterans.  As demonstrated in the recent Veterans Contracting Group saga, the SBA and VA have different SDVOSB eligibility requirements.  That means, as was the case in Veterans Contracting Group, that a company can be a valid SDVOSB for VA contracts but not for non-VA contracts, or vice versa.

In 2016, Congress addressed the problem.  As part of the 2017 NDAA, Congress directed the VA to verify SDVOSBs and VOSBs using the SBA’s regulatory definitions regarding small business status, ownership, and control.  Congress told the SBA and VA to work together to develop joint regulations governing SDVOSB and VOSB eligibility.  However, a proposed consolidated regulation has yet to be published.

Now the VA has proposed to eliminate its separate SDVOSB and VOSB ownership and control requirements, which are found primarily in 38 C.F.R. 74.1,  38 C.F.R. 74.3 and 38 C.F.R. 74.4.  In a proposed rule published in the Federal Register last week, the VA notes that “regulations relating to and clarifying ownership and control are no longer the responsibility of VA.”  The proposed rule wouldn’t entirely repeal the VA’s existing regulations, but, with respect to the eligibility requirements for size, ownership and control, those regulations would simply refer to the SBA’s rules in 13 C.F.R. part 125.

The VA is accepting public comments on the proposal until March 12, 2018.  The VA doesn’t say when it expects the rule to become final, but if it follows the ordinary rulemaking process, it will likely be summer at the very earliest.

My biggest concern is whether the VA intends to finalize this rule before the consolidated SBA/VA eligibility rules take effect.  If that happens, verified SDVOSBs and VOSBs will be stuck with the current SBA ownership and control regulations.  And, as we recently saw in Veterans Contracting Group, those rules aren’t always veteran-friendly.

In Veterans Contracting Group, a VA-verified SDVOSB wasn’t eligible for a non-VA contract because the company’s governing documents allowed the company to repurchase the veteran’s shares in the event of the veteran’s death, incapacity, or insolvency.  This provision was just fine with the VA, which verified the company.  But the SBA found that this restriction interfered with “unconditional ownership” under the SBA’s separate SDVOSB regulations.  Although the Court of Federal Claims memorably called the SBA’s harsh interpretation “draconian and perverse,” the Court held that the SBA was within its legal rights to impose such strict eligibility requirements.

If the VA’s rule “goes final” before a consolidated SBA/VA rule takes effect, every firm in the VA’s VIP database will be subjected to these strict SBA requirements, even when bidding on VA contracts.  Undoubtedly, many companies with provisions like those at issue in Veterans Contracting Group have been verified by the VA and rely on their verifications to bid VA work.  These companies could be vulnerable to successful SDVOSB status protests if they don’t update their governing documents to reflect the SBA’s stricter rules.

Of course, there’s no guarantee that the consolidated SBA/VA rule will fix the problem.  The consolidated rule (which, again, has yet to be proposed) could be every bit as strict as the current SBA interpretation of “unconditional ownership.”  It’s anybody’s guess what the consolidated rule ultimately will say.  But if the VA eliminates its ownership and control requirements before the consolidated rule is finalized, no guesswork is needed: a lot of verified SDVOSBs and VOSBs will suddenly become ineligible for VA set-aside contracts.

Stay tuned.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

The FAR mandates that agencies use the AbilityOne program to award contracts for items on the AbilityOne procurement list to qualified nonprofits. The purpose of the program is to increase employment and training opportunities for persons who are blind or have other severe disabilities.

With rare exceptions, when an item is on the AbilityOne procurement list, an agency has no choice–it must purchase through AbilityOne, even where the AbilityOne items are included in the procurement of larger services.  The GAO recently sustained a protest where the GSA awarded a courthouse lease without requiring that the associated custodial services be procured from an AbilityOne nonprofit.

In Goodwill Industries of the Valleys, B-415137 (November 29, 2017), GAO considered whether GSA must use the AbilityOne mandatory source for the custodial service requirements at a courthouse in Charlottesville, Virginia.

The courthouse’s custodial services had been added to the AbilityOne procurement list in 2004. Since that time, Goodwill Industries of the Valleys, or a predecessor AbilityOne nonprofit, had performed the services. The courthouse was owned by VVP, LLC, which had leased the building to GSA for several years. During that time, GSA had separately contracted with Goodwill for the custodial services.

In 2016, Goodwill learned that GSA intended to issue a new, “full service” lease to VVP, which would include the custodial services. Goodwill filed a GAO bid protest, contending that the inclusion of the custodial services in VVP’s lease violated the Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act (JWOD Act) and the AbilityOne program because Goodwill is the mandatory source of custodial services in the courthouse.

The AbilityOne program implements the JWOD Act, whose goal is to “‘increase employment and training opportunities for persons who are blind or have other severe disabilities’ through authorization of the noncompetitive acquisition of specified products and services from qualified nonprofit agencies (NPAs) that employ persons with such disabilities.”  The U.S. AbilityOne Commission maintains the procurement list for required purchases under the JWOD Act.

The JWOD Act states that agencies “shall procure” products and services from an NPA if the product or service is on the list. The list, published in the Federal Register, provides the specific services (in this case, custodial services at the Charlottesville courthouse) and a specific NPA to provide them (in this case, Goodwill).

At GAO, GSA tried a number of arguments to overcome the fact that it had not complied with AbilityOne requirements.

Among those arguments, it contended that only the AbilityOne commission can investigate and address violations of the AbilityOne program under a regulation stating that “violations of the JWOD Act or these regulations . . . shall be investigated by the [AbilityOne Commission].”  GAO disagreed, noting that its bid protest jurisdiction, as found in the Competition in Contracting Act, allows for GAO to decide any “alleged violation of a procurement statute or regulation.”

GSA also asserted that the AbilityOne rules don’t apply to real property leases. GAO answered that a real property lease is a contract, so the procurement statutes, including AbilityOne rules, still apply. Additionally, “the plain language of the JWOD Act and its implementing regulations provides no exception for leases.” Rather, “the language of the Act broadly applies to all procurements that are conducted by ‘an entity of the Federal Government'”, with the only statutory exception “being applicable to acquisitions from Federal Prison Industries, Inc.”

GAO wrote that: (1) the custodial services were on the AbilityOne Commission’s procurement list; (2) the JWOD Act requires purchasing from the designated organization if the service is on the list; and (3) Goodwill was the organization on the list.

GAO then explained that bundling AbilityOne products or services into a larger procurement does not allow an agency to evade the mandatory AbilityOne requirements:

[T]he Act and its implementing regulations expressly provide that, when services on the AbilityOne procurement list are included in the procurement of larger services, the contracting activity “shall require” the contractor for the larger services to procure the AbilityOne services from the organization designated by the AbilityOne Commission. In short, GSA is leasing a building that requires custodial services and, rather than procuring those services through the mandatory source that has been designated pursuant to the JWOD Act (or directing the lessor to do so), GSA has bundled the janitorial services into the lease without regard to the Act.

GAO sustained the protest and recommended that GSA contract the custodial services separately with Goodwill or direct VVP to subcontract with Goodwill for the custodial services. GAO also ordered GSA to reimburse Goodwill’s costs in bringing the protest.

As the Goodwill Industries decision demonstrates, the AbilityOne preferences are powerful. Agencies cannot evade them by bundling goods or services on the AbilityOne procurement list into larger acquisitions.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

It’s been a big week here at Koprince Law LLC: we published the first volume in our new series of GovCon Handbooks called Government Contracts Joint Ventures.  After briefly reaching #1 on Amazon’s Best Sellers list (okay, in a wonky legal sub-sub-subcategory, but still!), we are pleased to know that the Handbook is being so well received. If you’re an active Koprince Law client, you’ll be getting a free copy in the mail soon. If not, you can get a copy on Amazon, for just $9.99 in paperback or $6.99 in Kindle form.

While you wait for your copy of Government Contracts Joint Ventures, why not get up to speed on the latest government contracts news? In this edition of SmallGovCon Week In Review, we take a look at changes to the SBA’s Surety Bond Guarantee Program, two key defense acquisition positions are set to be filled, Alliant 2 protestors are trying their hand in the Court of Federal Claims, Bloomberg Government takes a big-picture look at government spending, and much more. 

  • The SBA’s Surety Bond Guarantee Program is trying to increase the chances of winning government contracts for small-scale contractors. [Multi Briefs]
  • The 2018 NDAA rules governing the acquisition of commercial items should give those making relatively small purchases more choices, and small businesses more hope for getting a piece of the pie. [Federal News Radio]
  • The White House has announced nominations for two key defense acquisition positions at the DoD and Air Force. [Defense Systems]
  • While the coming year looks promising for federal contracting, there are reasons for concern. [The Washington Post]
  • There are many findings in the Rand Corp.’s bid protest study but two things are clear: the bid protest process is not necessarily broken but contract debriefings certainly are. [Washington Technology] (and see my take here).
  • The battle for the next great IT services governmentwide acquisition contract took a bit of an unusual turn when a protest of the Alliant 2 awards was filed in the Court of Federal Claims. [Federal News Radio]
  • A government watchdog says that the Pentagon task force on Afghanistan reconstruction wasted millions of dollars of taxpayer money. [The Washington Times]
  • Bloomberg Government takes a look at contract spending by the federal government and how it has changed over the past five years. [Bloomberg Government]
  • Industry leaders told the GSA that the Pentagon’s e-commerce platform should balance efficiency with oversight. [Nextgov]
  • The GSA has plans to formalize cyber rules for contractors and will be accepting public comments about the regulations later this year. [Nextgov]

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

In a best value acquisition, the final decision is typically made by a Source Selection Authority. But what happens when the SSA disagrees with the ratings assigned by the evaluators, such as a Source Selection Evaluation Board?

The SSA has a good deal of discretion, but that discretion isn’t unlimited. In a recent decision, GAO sustained a protest where the SSA’s disagreements with the SSEB didn’t appear to be reasonable. 

Immersion Consulting, LLC, B-415155 et al. (Dec. 4, 2017) involved the procurement of program management support services by the Department of Defense’s Defense Human Resources Activity. Proposals were to be evaluated on three factors: technical, past performance, and price. Technical approach was the most important factor, followed by past performance, then price. Award was to be made on a best value basis.

Immersion and NetImpact Strategies, Inc. were the only offerors to timely submit proposals in response to the Solicitation.

In accordance with the Solicitation’s evaluation plan, each company’s proposal was first evaluated by an SSEB. The SSEB awarded Immersion’s proposal three strengths, resulting in an overall technical score of Outstanding. NetImpact’s proposal received two strengths and one weakness, resulting in an overall rating of Acceptable under the technical factor. Immersion and NetImpact’s proposals were evaluated as equal under the past performance factor, and NetImpact offered a lower price.

The SSEB’s report was then passed off to the SSA, who was to make the final award decision. After reviewing the SSEB’s findings, the SSA determined strengths and weaknesses should be allocated differently.

With respect to Immersion’s Proposal, the SSA agreed with only one of the SSEB’s three assessed strengths. He removed the other two. Similarly, with regard to NetImpact’s proposal, the SSA did not agree with one of the strengths or the weakness identified by the SSEB. These scores were also eliminated. After the SSA’s reevalation, both proposals were scored as Acceptable under the technical factor.

Since both Immersion and NetImpact’s proposals were determined to be equal with regard to the technical and past performance factors, price became the determining factor. Because NetImpact proposed a lower price, it was named the awardee.

Following the award announcement, Immersion filed a protest with GAO, arguing that the SSA’s independent analysis was flawed. The DoD countered that the SSA had properly documented his revaluation and that the award was proper.

In resolving the protest, GAO noted that “[a]lthough source selection officials may reasonably disagree with the ratings and recommendations of lower-level evaluators, they are nonetheless bound by the fundamental requirement that their independent judgments must be reasonable, consistent with the provisions of the solicitation, and adequately documented.” According to GAO, the SSA did not meet that burden.

GAO first concluded that the record didn’t support the SSA’s removal of the weakness from NetImpact’s evaluation. The SSA removed the weakness because he “was not convinced” the errors in the NetImpact’s proposal would negatively impact its performance. GAO was unable to determine what the SSA relied on in making this determination. Indeed, GAO found “[t]here is nothing in the contemporaneous record or the agency’s filings documenting what, if anything, the SSA reviewed to support the SSA’s conclusion[.]” Further, there was no evidence that “the SSA discussed the SSEB’s concern with the SSEB.” Without any contemporaneous justification, it was unreasonable for the SSA to remove the weakness.

GAO similarly found the SSA’s removal of one of Immersion’s strengths to be unreasonable. According to the SSA, it felt the SSEB’s comments awarding the strength to Immersion were “too general and did not specify how the approach exceeded the [solicitation] requirements.” In GAO’s opinion, however, “the SSEB’s comments were specific and identified the impact of the approach on the quotation, as well as how the approach benefited the government.” As such, GAO found the removal of the strength from Immersion’s proposal to be unreasonable.

Finally, since the SSA’s changes to each company’s technical ratings had technically leveled proposals leaving only price to be the determining factor, GAO concluded that the underlying best value source selection decision was flawed. Accordingly, GAO recommended the agency reevaluate proposals and make a new award decision.

As GAO’s decision in Immersion Consulting demonstrates, SSA officials may not unilaterally take it upon themselves to rewrite evaluations without appropriate justification. While GAO’s decision does not alter the fact that SSAs enjoy considerable discretion, it does demonstrate that the SSA’s discretion isn’t unlimited.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

I am excited to announce the publication of Government Contracts Joint Ventures, the first in a new series of new government contracting guides we’re calling “Koprince Law LLC GovCon Handbooks.”  Packed with easy-to-understand examples and written in plain English, Government Contracts Joint Ventures should help you maximize your understanding of this important option for pursuing federal contracts.

What does the Handbook contain?  I’m glad you asked.

Inside Government Contracts Joint Ventures, you’ll find:

  • Joint Ventures 101.  A big-picture overview of government contracts joint ventures, including a comparison with prime/subcontractor teams.
  • Joint Venture Eligibility.  Is a joint venture possible?  The Handbook covers small business size eligibility, socioeconomic eligibility, and other factors influencing whether a joint venture can bid.
  • Joint Venture Formation.  If you’ve decided how to form a joint venture, how do you do it right?  The Handbook covers the requirements for joint venture agreements, SAM registration, SBA approval, and more.
  • Joint Venture Performance.  Once a joint venture wins a contract, there are other rules to follow.  The Handbook discusses work share requirements, SBA certifications, and other performance-related items.

Government Contracts Joint Ventures is available on Amazon, and is priced at just $9.99 in paperback and $6.99 in Kindle electronic form.  To buy a copy (or heck, several copies–they make great gifts for those special joint venturers in your life!) just visit this link for paperback or this link for Kindle.

If you’re an active Koprince Law LLC client in good standing, check your inbox: we’re offering you a free copy.  Just reply to the email to let us know to send you one.

On behalf of my co-author Candace Shields, and all of my colleagues here at Koprince Law, I hope you enjoy Government Contracts Joint Ventures.  And stay tuned–we’ll be publishing more GovCon Handbooks on other important contracting topics in the months to come.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

Only a very small percentage of DoD contracts–0.3 percent, to be precise–are protested, according to a comprehensive and fascinating new report on bid protests issued by the RAND Corporation.

The detailed report, which was prepared at the behest of Congress, concludes that DoD bid protests are “exceedingly uncommon,” and typically aren’t frivolous.  RAND’s analysts urge policymakers to carefully consider the data when evaluating whether reforms to the bid protest process are necessary–and to “avoid drawing overall conclusions or assumptions about trends from one case when it comes to the efficacy of the bid protest system.”

Amen to that.

Bid protest “reform” has been a subject of much recent discussion in the government contracting community.  In 2016 and again in 2017, the Senate introduced deeply flawed measures aimed at curtailing bid protests.  Although most of these proposals didn’t become law, Congress dramatically scaled back the GAO’s jurisdiction over DoD task and delivery order protests, raising the threshold from $10 million to a whopping $25 million.

As I wrote late last year, the push to curtail bid protests seems driven by the complaints of some agency officials, who suggest that bid protests are prevalent and frequently frivolous.  Sometimes, the media has contributed to these perceptions by writing articles with titles like “Drowning in Protests: Can Agencies Stem the Rising Tide?”

But I’ve urged caution, arguing that protests don’t appear to be either prevalent or frequently frivolous. On the prevalence side, according to former OFPP director Dan Gordon, protests occur on less than one percent of acquisitions. And as far as frivolity goes, if protests are typically frivolous, why do protesters succeed nearly half the time?

In negotiations over the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, the conferees elected to remove most of the Senate’s major protest “reform” language.  Instead, Congress commissioned a study to determine whether bid protests are having a significant adverse effect on DoD acquisitions.  This was a wise approach: before developing a major protest solution, it’s a good idea to determine whether there’s a protest problem in need of solving.

Ordinarily, the GAO would conduct a study like the one commissioned by the 2017 NDAA.  But the GAO is the forum for most bid protests.  Perhaps unfairly (the GAO, after all, is a very professional organization), any bid protest study originating at the GAO could face questions about conflicts of interest–and ultimately, the credibility of the study itself.  Enter the RAND Corporation, which was retained to prepare an independent report.

That independent report is now here, and it’s comprehensive–clocking in at 114 pages.  The study offers a great deal of data and analysis about bid protests, some of which my colleagues and I will discuss in detail in future posts.  But for now, let’s cut to the chase.  What are RAND’s big-picture findings?

First, RAND finds that government and industry have very different perceptions of the bid protest system.

DoD personnel “expressed a general dissatisfaction” with the system, believing that protests are filed too frequently, often include “an excessive number of ‘weak’ allegations,” and unduly delay awards.  DoD personnel were especially concerned that losing incumbents are motivated to protest by the possibility of obtaining bridge contracts.

Industry, on the other hand “views bid protests as a healthy component of a transparent acquisition process, because these protests hold the government accountable and provide information on how the contract award or source selection was made.”  If protests were disallowed or curtailed, “companies would likely make fewer bids.”

Additionally, industry is concerned with the quality of post-award debriefings.  “The worst debriefings were characterized as skimpy, adversarial, evasive, or failing to provide required responses to relevant questions,” RAND reports.  RAND concludes,” t became clear over the course of our study that too little information or debriefings that are evasive or adversarial may lead to a bid protest.”

Unfortunately, “there is a lack of trust on each side” (government and industry) when it comes to bid protests.

Next, RAND turns to the prevalence question.  Are DoD bid protests common, as some acquisition personnel and media have suggested?

RAND notes that bid protests did, in fact, increase significantly between Fiscal Years 2008 and 2016.  (The study didn’t include Fiscal Year 2017, in which GAO bid protests declined 7%).  But these increases were little more than drops in the DoD acquisition bucket: “the overall percentage of contracts protested is very small–less than 0.3 percent.”  RAND concludes: “[t]hese small protest rates per contract imply that bid protests are exceeding uncommon for DoD procurements.”

RAND then makes several recommendations for policymakers.  Perhaps most importantly, “policymakers should avoid drawing overall conclusions or assumptions about trends from one case when it comes to the efficacy of the bid protest system.”  It’s a very good point.  Sure, if you’re the contracting officer on the receiving end of a “weak” protest, it will feel like every acquisition is being frivolously protested.  But public policy should be made on the basis of facts, not anecdotes.

RAND also, unsurprisingly, recommends that the government improve the quality of post-award debriefings.  RAND points to certain Army and Air Force initiatives, as well as the “enhanced debriefings” portion of the 2018 NDAA, as potential models.

RAND cautions policymakers against reducing GAO’s bid protest timeline (currently at 100 days), noting that “protests are more frequently filed at the end of the fiscal year” and that “complex cases that go to decision usually take 90-100 days.”

RAND also urges caution when it comes to further reducing protest options for task and delivery order protests.  “Task-order protests have a slightly higher effectiveness rate than the rest of the protest population,” RAND notes.  “The higher rate suggests that there may be more challenges with these awards and that task-order protests fill an important role in improving the fairness of DoD procurements.”

Look, this is our firm’s blog, so I’m occasionally entitled to an “I told you so.”  The RAND study essentially says what I’ve been up on my soapbox saying for the last few years: that contrary to common misconception, bid protests aren’t common, nor are they typically frivolous.  And, as RAND concludes, better communication between government and industry (particularly in debriefings), is likely to reduce protests, not increase them.

Of course, the RAND study includes some things my little soapbox rants have omitted, like statistical analysis, interviews with key officials and decision-makers, colorful graphs, and the imprimatur of Congress.  (Then again, RAND somehow failed to include my references to Chicken Little and Nathaniel Hawthorne).

Congress commissioned a comprehensive study on DoD bid protests, and now that study is here.  Let’s hope that policymakers take RAND’s analysis and recommendations to heart.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

Happy New Year!  For those currently being impacted by the “bomb cyclone” I hope you are safe and warm and that there is sunshine in your near future.  While we haven’t had much snow here in Kansas, we have seen some below-zero temperatures.  I’m staying warm and cozy in the office with a “venti” cup of hot coffee, my Koprince Law LLC fleece and the new RAND Corporation report on bid protests (more on that report later today!)

It’s Friday, which means that it’s time for the SmallGovCon Week In Review.  This week, we take a look at why a government shutdown could be bad for WOSBs, tips for contractors attempting to comply with the DoD’s new cybersecurity mandates, the RAND Corporation releases that major bid protest study, and much more.

  • A look at the financial strain a government shutdown could cause WOSBs. [Bustle]
  • The battle over the $50 billion Alliant 2 IT contract is moving to the judicial arena, as those who missed out evidently are trying another avenue to gain a place on this key vehicle. [Washington Technology]
  • The Department of Defense issued a final rule amending the DFARS to incorporate revised thresholds for application of the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement and the Free Trade Agreements. [Federal Register]
  • ‘That’s the Worst!’: Acquisition regulations we love to hate. [Federal Times]
  • Here are “five golden rules” for contractors to meet the DoD’s new cybersecurity requirements. [Federal News Radio]
  • A major new independent report appears to validate what some of us (ahem) have been saying for awhile: protests are not an excessive burden on the Defense procurement system. [Federal News Radio]
  • Speaking of new reports, here’s one that may fly under the radar: the GAO has released an important study about how contracting officers assign NAICS codes–and how often those assignments are challenged. [U.S. Government Accountability Office]

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

In 2017, Congress placed limits on the utilization of Lowest-Price Technically-Acceptable procurement procedures in Department of Defense acquisitions.

The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act continues this trend by completely prohibiting the use of LPTA procedures for certain major defense acquisition programs.

As we covered last year, the 2017 NDAA included a presumption against the use of LPTA procedures for DoD procurements unless certain criteria were met. The 2017 NDAA also cautioned against the use of LPTA procedures in procurements for knowledge-based professional services, personal protective equipment acquisition, and knowledge based training services in contingency operations outside the United States.

Section 832 of the 2018 NDAA continues this trend by outright prohibiting the use of LPTA procedures for major Department of Defense engineering and development programs. Specifically, Section 832 provides the following instruction:

The Department of Defense shall not use a lowest price technically acceptable source selection process for the engineering and manufacturing development contract of a major defense acquisition program

This raises an important question: What constitutes an “engineering and manufacturing development contract of a major defense acquisition program?” To answer that, we need to look at two separate definitions.

First, the definition for “Engineering and Manufacturing Development Contract” is found in Section 832 of the 2018 NDAA, and refers to “a prime contract for the engineering and manufacturing development of a major defense acquisition program.”

Second, the definition for “major defense acquisition programs” is found in 10 U.S.C. § 2430(a) and refers to a procurement that is not classified and either has been designated a major defense acquisition by the Secretary of Defense; or the estimated total expenditure for R&D, testing, and evaluation will exceed $300 million; or the total program cost will exceed $1.8 billion.

Using these two definitions to read Section 832, LPTA procurement procedures may not be used for Department of Defense prime contracts for engineering and manufacturing development that are either flagged as major defense acquisition programs, or will exceed $300 million in development costs or $1.8 billion in total program costs.

The limitation in Section 832 is only triggered at high dollar thresholds, so the impact it will have on Department of Defense acquisitions is likely minimal. That being said, Section 832 is important because it clearly signals Congress’s desire to further limit the use of LPTA procedures in Department of Defense procurements. Unlike the 2017 NDAA, which merely created a presumption against LPTA procedures, the 2018 NDAA bans LPTA procedures completely for a category of acquisitions. We’ll be keeping an eye out to see whether Congress expands the list of “no LPTA” acquisitions in future years.

Section 832 goes into effect for Fiscal Year 2019.

It’s that time of year where families gather; friends celebrate the New Year; and SmallGovCon recaps interesting features of the new NDAA. We’re still trying to get that last one to catch on. Check back regularly as we continue to cover notable provisions in the 2018 NDAA.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

Readers of this blog will know that the GAO interprets its protest timeliness rules quite strictly. A recent GAO case provides us with an opportunity to review a nuanced piece of those timeliness rules. Specifically, how withdrawal of an agency-level protest affects the deadline to file a GAO protest, and what counts as a withdrawal of an agency-level protest versus an “initial adverse agency action.”

In this case, the protester lost its GAO protest rights by trying to pursue its agency-level protest with an inspector general’s office rather than with the contracting officer.

The GAO’s decision in Aurora Storage Products, Inc., B-415628 (Comp. Gen. Dec 1, 2017) involved a DOJ solicitation for high density file systems. The solicitation was issued as a competitive task order RFQ open to holders of a certain GSA Schedule.

Mid-Atlantic Filing Distributors submitted a quotation. The DOJ rejected it because Mid-Atlantic did not hold the underlying GSA Schedule contract.  However, according to Mid-Atlantic, it was the “authorized GSA dealer” for Aurora Storage Products, Inc.–which did hold the correct GSA Schedule. Aurora said that Mid-Atlantic had submitted the quotation on Aurora’s behalf.

Aurora was informed of the award to another company on October 10. Aurora filed a timely agency-level protest with the contracting officer on October 13.  (All the dates mentioned were in 2017). The CO acknowledged the protest on October 17. At this point, things were going alright, at least procedurally.

Then Aurora made a mistake. In response to the CO’s acknowledgment of the agency-level protest, Aurora sent an email stating “[t]hank you for your acknowledgment but I have forwarded basically the same request to the [Office of the Inspector General (OIG)].” The email responses also explained that Aurora was not withdrawing its protest, but rather that “[w]e are protesting through the Department of Justice OIG.  We do not expect a review from you personally but rather from your OIG.”

The CO wrote back to Aurora on October 24 to clarify that “OIG does not typically review and handle protests,” OIG “may decline to consider your allegations at all, and may or may not inform you of this decision,” and to “[p]lease confirm that you nevertheless still do not want a written decision from me but instead wish to pursue this through the OIG.” Aurora responded on October 25:  “we do not wish to withdraw our protest,” but also stated that “a review by the [c]ontracting [o]fficer, while advisable internally would be of little use to those protesting.  More directly, it is your actions and decisions that we are protesting.”

The GAO doesn’t mention what happened over the next few days, but apparently Aurora decided to file a formal bid protest while awaiting a potential response from the OIG. Aurora filed its GAO protest on October 30.

GAO timeliness rules mandate that

a protest based on other than alleged improprieties in a solicitation must be filed no later than 10 calendar days after the protester knew, or should have known, of the basis for protest, whichever is earlier.  4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(2). Where a protest first has been filed with a contracting activity, any subsequent protest to our Office, to be considered timely, must be filed within 10 calendar days of “actual or constructive knowledge of initial adverse agency action.”  4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(3).  The term “adverse agency action” means any action or inaction on the part of a contracting agency that is prejudicial to the position taken in a protest filed there.  4 C.F.R. § 21.0(e).

GAO wrote, as it often does, that its bid protest regulations “contain strict rules for the timely submission of protests.”  In this respect, the GAO’s rules “reflect the dual requirements of giving parties a fair opportunity to present their cases and resolving protests expeditiously without unduly disrupting or delaying the procurement process.”

GAO held that, since the protest was filed on October 30, it was untimely because this was 20 days after the protester knew of the award decision on October 10, well past the 10-day deadline.

But what of the agency-level protest Aurora filed? Normally, filing of an agency-level protest would stop the clock on the GAO protest deadlines until the “knowledge of initial adverse agency action,” as mentioned above.

Here, however, GAO held that Aurora had effectively “disavowed its protest by repeatedly stating that it was not seeking a decision from the contracting officer and instead wanted the OIG to review its allegations.  These statements clearly indicate that Aurora did not wish the agency to decide its protest in accordance with the procedures set forth in FAR § 33.103,” which indicates agency-level protests are handled by the contracting officer. “In our view,” GAO continued, “these disavowals constituted a constructive withdrawal of Aurora’s agency-level protest since the protester indicated it no longer wished for a decision under the auspices of FAR § 33.103.”

Furthermore, “the OIG’s review of, and investigation into, the allegations raised by Aurora is not a ‘protest’ as that term is understood under FAR § 33.103 and our Bid Protest Regulations. Thus, the ultimate action taken by the OIG, whether adverse to Aurora or not, will be separate and apart from the DOJ’s handling of Aurora’s agency-level protest.”

Finally, a withdrawal of an agency-level protest is not an adverse agency action because a withdrawal “is an action taken by the protester, not the agency, and therefore, even if the result is ultimately prejudicial to the protester’s position, it does not constitute an adverse agency action.”

Because there was no “adverse agency action,” Aurora never got its additional 10-day clock to file a GAO protest that would normally start running after the conclusion of the agency-level protest. Therefore, the 10-day clock started running from notice of the award, and Aurora missed this deadline.

GAO dismissed the protest as untimely.

As I mentioned earlier, my colleagues have discussed the GAO’s strict timeliness rules in a number of contexts, including when an electronic proposal is received by a government server, where an offeror failed to request a pre-award debriefing, and in determining when the 5:30 pm filing deadline actually ends. While a few of these decisions go the protester’s way, most do not. When the GAO says its timeliness rules are “strict,” it isn’t kidding.

This decision is another important twist on GAO timeliness rules, here in the context of a GAO protest filed after an agency-level protest. As Aurora Storage Products demonstrates, an agency-level protest is a protest filed with the contracting officer under the provisions of FAR 33.103, not a complaint filed with an inspector general, ombudsman, or some other official. There is no exception to the strict GAO timeliness rules based on complaints made to inspectors general and the like.

Further, when an agency-level protest is filed, if a bidder takes an action that seems like it is withdrawing the agency-level protest (even without explicitly using the word “withdraw”), the bidder can lose the additional window to file the GAO protest that normally runs after receiving an adverse agency action on the agency-level protest. Here, Aurora even explicitly stated that it didn’t wish to withdraw its protest–but contradicted itself by also stating that it didn’t want the contracting officer to issue a decision. That was enough to constitute a “deemed withdrawal.”

The GAO’s bid protest timeliness rules are complex and strict. Bidders should be aware of the interplay of the timing rules for agency-level and GAO protests and adhere to them closely.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

The VA Center for Verification and Evaluation unreasonably decertified an SDVOSB based on the results of an SBA SDVOSB decision.

According to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, it was improper for the VA to remove the SDVOSB from the VA’s database without evaluating whether the SBA’s determination was consistent with the VA’s separate SDVOSB requirements.

The Court’s decision in Veterans Contracting Group, Inc. v. United States, No. 17-1015C (2017) was the fourth in a series of battles between Veterans Contracting Group, Inc., a VA-verified SDVOSB, on the one hand, and the SBA and VA, on the other.  My colleague Shane McCall and I have previously written about each of the other three cases: the SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals decision, the Court’s first decision involving the VA, and the Court’s decision in a case challenging the SBA OHA ruling.

All four cases involved an Army Corps of Engineers IFB for the removal of hazardous materials and the demolition of buildings at the St. Albans Community Living Center in New York.  The Corps set aside the IFB for SDVOSBs under NAICS code 238910 (Site Preparation Contractors).

After opening bids, the Corps announced that Veterans Contracting Group, Inc. was the lowest bidder.  An unsuccessful competitor subsequently filed a protest challenging VCG’s SDVOSB eligibility.

DoD procurements fall under the SBA’s SDVOSB regulations, not the VA’s separate rules. (As I’ve discussed many times on this blog, contrary to common misconception the government currently runs two separate SDVOSB programs: one under SBA rules; the other under VA rules).  The protest was referred to the SBA’s Director of Government Contracting for resolution.

The SBA determined that Ronald Montano, a service-disabled veteran, owned a 51% interest in VCG.  A non-SDV owned the remaining 49%.

The SBA then evaluated VCG’s Shareholder’s Agreement.  The Shareholders Agreement provided that upon Mr. Montano’s death, incapacity, or insolvency, all of his shares would be purchased by VCG at a predetermined price.  The SBA determined that these provisions “deprived [Mr. Montano] of his ability to dispose of his shares as he sees fit, and at the full value of his ownership interest.”  The SBA found that these “significant restrictions” on Mr. Montano’s ability to transfer his shares undermined the SBA’s requirement that an SDVOSB be at least 51% “unconditionally owned” by service-disabled veterans.  The SBA issued a decision finding VCG to be ineligible for the Corps contract.

When the SBA issues an adverse SDVOSB decision, the SBA forwards its findings to the VA Center for Verification and Evaluation.  After receiving the SBA’s findings, the VA CVE decertified VCG from the VetBiz database.

The Court and OHA reached different conclusions.

As my colleague Shane McCall wrote in this post, the Court concluded that the VA should not have removed VCG from the VetBiz database. While the Court didn’t directly overrule the SBA, the Court wrote that the SBA’s application of the “unconditional ownership” requirements was flawed.

The Court cited with approval two cases dealing with the VA’s SDVOSB regulations, AmBuild Co., LLC v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 10 (2014) and Miles Construction, LLC v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 792 (2013), agreeing with these cases that a restriction on ownership that is not executory (meaning not taking effect until a future event occurs) does not result in unconditional ownership. The Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the VA to restore VCG to the VetBiz database, but reserved a final decision until further briefing in the case.

Things turned out far differently at OHA.  As I wrote in a September post, OHA held that the restrictions in VCG’s Shareholders Agreement prevented Mr. Montano from unconditionally controlling the company. OHA issued a decision upholding the SBA’s determination, and finding VCG ineligible for the Corps contract.

VCG challenged OHA’s decision at the Court.  In a strongly-worded opinion, the Court blasted the SBA’s interpretation of its regulations as “draconian and perverse,” but nonetheless held that the SBA was within its discretion to apply its rules in this harsh manner.  The Court upheld OHA’s decision finding VCG ineligible for the Corps contract.

That brings us (finally) to the fourth decision in the battle.  Here, the question was whether the VA had acted improperly by decertifying VCG from the VetBiz database.  As Shane McCall wrote earlier, the Court had already issued a preliminary injunction ordering the VA to restore VCG to the database; the question now was whether the Court would issue a final decision in VCG’s favor on the merits, and enter a permanent injunction.

The Court explained, in some detail, the background behind the separate SBA and VA SDVOSB programs.  The Court then wrote that the regulation at issue in this case was the VA’s regulation at 38 C.F.R. 74.2(e).  Under this regulation, “[a]ny firm registered in the VetBiz VIP database that is found to be ineligible due to an SBA protest decision or other negative finding will be immediately removed from the VetBiz VIP database” and ineligible to participate in the VA SDVOSB program until the SBA decision is overturned or overcome.

“This provision is not remarkable in isolation,” the Court wrote, “but due to the differences in the VA and SBA regulations . . . it can create anomalous results.” This is because “protest decisions by SBA, presumably applying SBA’s own regulations, could potentially displace VA’s cancellation and removal process without accounting for the differences between the two agencies’ underlying regulatory eligibility criteria.”

The Court held that it “disagrees with the government that Subsection 74.2(e) relieves CVE of any obligation to look beyond the fact that SBA has issued an adverse determination before removing an SDVOSB from the VetBiz VIP database.”  The Court continued:

[T]he eligibility requirements in the VA and SBA SDVOSB set-aside programs are similar in some respects but are materially divergent in others.  The differences are insignificant if and when the SBA protest giving rise to removal from the VIP database treats an area in which the regulations are the same or similar, e.g., the size of the business; if SBA determines that an SDVOSB is not small then it would be justifiably disqualified from both programs.  But in this case, an uncritical application of Subsection 74.2(e) would require an SDVOSB’s immediate removal from the VetBiz VIP database if the business fails to meet the SBA’s . . . definition of “unconditional” despite meeting the VA’s definition of the term . . ..

The Court wrote that it was “arbitrary for VA to mechanistically apply Subsection 74.2(e) without examining the basis for SBA’s ruling.”  Rather, “n light of the distinct definitions of ‘unconditional ownership’ in the two programs, CVE must look beyond the fact of a ruling by SBA, to determine whether it was based on grounds consistent with or contrary to VA’s eligibility regulations.”  Because VA failed to undertake such an analysis, “there was no rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, thus rendering CVE’s action arbitrary and capricious.”

The Court granted VCG’s motion for the judgment on this part of its appeal, and made the prior injunction permanent.  The Court essentially overturned CVE’s decision removing VCG from the VA VetBiz database.

In my last post on the Veterans Contracting Group saga, I got a few things off my chest regarding the mess the “two SDVOSB programs” system creates for well-meaning veterans like Mr. Montano.  I’ll spare you another soapbox moment, but I hate seeing small businesses (and particularly SDVOSBs) harmed by the legal complexities, interpretations and divergences seen in these cases.

Sometime in 2018, the SBA and VA should unveil their proposed joint regulation to consolidate the SDVOSB eligibility requirements.  As the Veterans Contracting Group cases make clear, a unified set of rules is sorely needed.  Stay tuned.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has generated lots of headlines regarding the so-called “Amazon amendment” and the Act’s prohibition on the Russian IT company Kaspersky Labs products. But gone under reported is a huge change to how the government makes small purchases.

The 2018 NDAA, signed by President Donald Trump on December 12, increases the standard micro-purchase threshold applicable to civilian agencies from $3,000 to $10,000. Last year, the NDAA increased the Department of Defense (DoD) micro-purchase threshold to $5,000. This larger jump for civilian agencies is likely to have large impact on government purchasing.

A micro-purchase is one for goods or services that, due to its relatively low value, does not require the government to abide by many of its ordinary competitive procedures, including small business set asides. Because the contract is, theoretically, such a low amount, the contracting officer can pick virtually whatever company and product he or she wants to satisfy the procurement, so long as the price is reasonable.

Now the civilian micro-purchase threshold is increasing—a lot.

Specifically, Section 806 of the NDAA, titled “Requirements Related to the Micro-Purchase Threshold” states the following: “INCREASE IN THRESHOLD.—Section 1902(a)(1) of title 41, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘$3,000’ and inserting ‘$10,000’.”

Title 41 of the Code generally refers to public contracts between Federal civilian agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Education, the Department of State, the Department of Labor, and so on. Title 10, on the other hand, generally refers to the Department of Defense components, such as the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but also a number of smaller components such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Missile Defense Agency.

Following the change, Section 1902(a)(1) shall read: “Definition.–(1) Except as provided in sections 2338 and 2339 of title 10 . . . for purposes of this section, the micro-purchase threshold is $10,000.”

The NDAA therefore, specifically exempts (or at least does not change) the sections of Title 10 relating to the DoD micro-purchase threshold (sections 2338 and 2339) which will therefore hold steady at $5,000—for 2018 at least (more on that later).

Section 1902 specifies in paragraph (f) that the section shall be implemented by the FAR. The NDAA changes the U.S. Code, but it does not change the FAR. The FAR, meanwhile, currently sets the civilian micro-purchase threshold at $3,500, because it is occasionally adjusted to keep pace with inflation. Although the law has now officially been changed, it’s not clear that civilian contracting officers will begin using the new authority until the corresponding FAR provisions are amended.

Our guess is that, in practice, this change will take some time to implement. We believe most contracting officers will stick to what the FAR says until they are told otherwise. It is just a guess, but it is logical because unlike the U.S. Code, procurement officials rely on the FAR every day. Congress may have said that civilian procurement officials have the authority to treat anything below $10,000 as a micro-purchase, but contracting officers often wait until the FAR Council implements statutory authority before using that authority. As such, until the FAR, or the specific agency the procurement officials work for, recognize the change, our guess is that most COs will follow the FAR until it catches up with the U.S. Code.

Nevertheless, whether it happens today or a year from now, this change is likely to have a big impact on some federal procurements. The 233% increase in the threshold for civilian agencies (a 186% increase if you count from $3,500) will open the door for many more products to be purchased without competition: FAR 13.203 specifies that “[m]icro-purchases may be awarded without soliciting competitive quotations” so long as the contracting officer (or similar authority) considers the price to be reasonable. Just think about the different types of things you can buy with $10,000 as opposed to $3,000, or $3,500.

This change to the micro-purchase threshold, plus the “Amazon amendment” which sets up an online marketplace for sellers, and the fact that the FAR encourages the use of a Governmentwide commercial purchase card to make micro-purchases (FAR 13.301) means that procurement officials will simply be able to swipe, or click for relatively significant buys. Altogether, it could be bad news for some small businesses, particularly those that engage in a lot of “rule of two” set-aside simplified acquisitions under FAR 19.502-2(a). When this change is implemented, and presuming FAR Part 19 is updated accordingly, a chunk of those simplified acquisitions will no longer be reserved for small businesses.

With this change to the civilian threshold, it is hard not to wonder whether the DoD threshold will soon grow to meet it. DoD procurement officials sometimes enjoy greater freedom in purchasing than their civilian counterparts. It would not be shocking to hear DoD voices begin lobbying for the same change on their end soon.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

The SBA’s strict SDVOSB ownership rules can produce “draconian and perverse” results, but are nonetheless legal, according to a federal judge.

In a recent decision, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims condemned the SBA’s SDVOSB unconditional ownership requirements, while holding that the SBA was within its legal rights to impose those requirements on the company in question.

The Court’s decision emphasizes the important differences between the SBA and VA SDVOSB programs, because the Court held that although the company in question didn’t qualify as an SDVOSB under the SBA’s strict rules, it was eligible for VA SDVOSB verification under the VA’s separate eligibility rules.

The Court’s decision in Veterans Contracting Group, Inc. v. United States, No. 17-1188C (2017), is the third in a series of ongoing battles between the SBA and a self-certified SDVOSB.  The cases involved an Army Corps of Engineers IFB for the removal of hazardous materials and the demolition of buildings at the St. Albans Community Living Center in New York.  The Corps set aside the IFB for SDVOSBs under NAICS code 238910 (Site Preparation Contractors).

After opening bids, the Corps announced that Veterans Contracting Group, Inc. was the lowest bidder.  An unsuccessful competitor subsequently filed a protest challenging VCG’s SDVOSB eligibility.

DoD procurements fall under the SBA’s SDVOSB regulations, not the VA’s separate rules. (As I’ve discussed various times on this blog, and will again here, the government currently runs two separate SDVOSB programs: one by SBA; the other by VA).  The protest was referred to the SBA’s Director of Government Contracting for resolution.

The SBA determined that Ronald Montano, a service-disabled veteran, owned a 51% interest in VCG.  A non-SDV owned the remaining 49%.

The SBA then evaluated VCG’s Shareholder’s Agreement.  The Shareholders Agreement provided that upon Mr. Montano’s death, incapacity, or insolvency, all of his shares would be purchased by VCG at a predetermined price.  The SBA determined that these provisions “deprived [Mr. Montano] of his ability to dispose of his shares as he sees fit, and at the full value of his ownership interest.”  The SBA found that these “significant restrictions” on Mr. Montano’s ability to transfer his shares undermined the SBA’s requirement that an SDVOSB be at least 51% “unconditionally owned” by service-disabled veterans.  The SBA issued a decision finding VCG to be ineligible for the Corps contract.

When the SBA issues an adverse SDVOSB decision, the SBA forwards its findings to the VA Center for Verification and Evaluation.  After receiving the SBA’s findings, the VA CVE decertified VCG from the VetBiz database.

VCG then took two separate, but concurrent actions.  First, it filed an appeal with the SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals, arguing that the SBA’s decision was improper and that VCG was eligible for the Corps contract.  Again, because this was a non-VA job, the SBA’s SDVOSB rules applied to the Corps contract.  Second, VCG filed a bid protest with the Court of Federal Claims.  VCG’s bid protest didn’t challenge its eligibility for the Corps contract, but instead challenged the VA’s decision to remove VCG from the VetBiz database.

The Court and OHA reached different conclusions.

As my colleague Shane McCall wrote in this post, the Court concluded that the VA should not have removed VCG from the VetBiz database. While the Court didn’t directly overrule the SBA, the Court wrote that the SBA’s application of the “unconditional ownership” requirements was flawed.

The Court cited with approval two cases dealing with the VA’s SDVOSB regulations, AmBuild Co., LLC v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 10 (2014) and Miles Construction, LLC v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 792 (2013), agreeing with these cases that a restriction on ownership that is not executory (meaning not taking effect until a future event occurs) does not result in unconditional ownership. The Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the VA to restore VCG to the VetBiz database, but reserved a final decision until further briefing in the case.

Things turned out far differently at OHA.  As I wrote in a September post, OHA held that the restrictions in VCG’s Shareholders Agreement prevented Mr. Montano from unconditionally controlling the company. OHA issued a decision upholding the SBA’s determination, and finding VCG ineligible for the Corps contract.

That brings us to the Court’s recent SDVOSB decision, which involved VCG’s challenge to OHA’s eligibility determination.  Unlike the first Court case, the question before the Court in the new case was not whether the VA had properly removed VCG from the VetBiz database, but rather whether OHA had erred by upholding the finding that VCG was ineligible, under the SBA’s SDVOSB rules, for the Corps contract.

The Court began by writing that “[t]his post-award bid protest features interactions between complex and divergent regulatory frameworks, giving rise to a harsh, even perverse, result.”  The Court then walked through the statutory and regulatory framework, explaining in detail that the government operates two SDVOSB programs, each with its own eligibility rules.  The Court noted that Congress  has directed the SBA and VA to work together to consolidate their SDVOSB requirements, but to date, “[n]o such implementing regulations have been promulgated.”

In this case, the Court said, VCG’s “attempt to rely on this court’s decisions in AmBuild and Miles is misplaced because both cases interpret VA’s procurement regulations, not SBA’s.”  The court’s earlier decisions “are irrelevant to bid protests concerning solicitations from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and or other non-VA agencies,” which fall under the SBA’s SDVOSB rules.

VCG asked the Court to look, by way of analogy, at the SBA’s 8(a) and WOSB programs, both of which define unconditional ownership in a manner that “allows for the succession planning outlined in [VCG’s] shareholder agreement.”  In contrast, SBA’s SDVOSB regulations don’t define “unconditional ownership,” which has resulted in OHA applying a very strict definition of the term.

This argument didn’t sway the Court, which concluded that the SBA could have looked to its 8(a) and WOSB regulations for guidance in interpreting the SDVOSB “unconditional ownership” requirement, but that the SBA’s “choice not to do so has some basis in the regulations.”  The Court pointed out that the SBA’s rulemakers have been aware of OHA’s strict interpretation for more than ten years, but have chosen not to update the regulations in response.

The Court concluded:

SBA’s omission of a definition of unconditional ownership n the [SDVOSB] program produces draconian and perverse results in a case such as this one.  Nevertheless, without at least some indicia of SBA’s intent or inadvertence regarding that omission, the court cannot remake the regulations in reliance on SBA’s actions in the closely related contexts of the 8(a) and WOSB programs.  Therefore, OHA’s decision stands and [VCG] is ineligible to participate in SBA’s [SDVOSB] program, even though it is eligible to participate in VA’s correlative program.

The Court granted the government’s motion for judgment on the administrative record.

For SDVOSB advocates, the Court’s decision is very disappointing, although certainly understandable.  The Court’s role isn’t to make public policy, but to decide whether an agency is rationally applying the law.  Here, the Court was obviously very frustrated with how the SBA has chosen to interpret “unconditional ownership” in its SDVOSB regulations, but even a “draconian and perverse” rule isn’t necessarily illegal.

The Court rightly pinned the blame on the SBA. For years, OHA  has interpreted “unconditional ownership” very strictly, but the SBA’s rulemakers have failed to update the regulations to soften the requirement.  Veterans Contracting Group shows just how harsh that interpretation is: VCG supposedly wasn’t an SDVOSB in part because Mr. Montano couldn’t dispose of his shares as he saw fit upon his death.

Think about that for a second.  Not to be morbid, but this circumstance will only arise when Mr. Montano is dead.  At that point, unless ownership of the company passes to another service-disabled veteran, the company wouldn’t be an SDVOSB anymore anyway.

So how, exactly, does a provision regarding what happens when Mr. Montano dies impact the company’s eligibility for the Corps contract, at a time when Mr. Montano (presumably) was very much alive?  When Mr. Montano passes on, he won’t exactly be in a position to dispose of his interest “as he sees fit,” or benefit from the “full value” of those shares.  Because he’ll be, you know, dead.  And yet, somehow, this provision about what happens when Mr. Montano dies undermined VCG’s SDVOSB eligibility while he was alive.  To me, that’s just crazy.

The purpose of the SBA’s rules is to ensure that service-disabled veterans own, control and benefit from the set-aside program.  That’s a noble goal: as a policy matter, no one wants pass-throughs or “rent-a-vets.”  The requirement for “unconditional ownership” sounds like a good way to implement this policy, and applied well, it can be.  For example, if VCG’s 49% owner had the right to buy 2% of Mr. Montano’s interest, at any time, for a pre-determined price, it would be fair to say that Mr. Montano didn’t unconditionally own 51%.

But cases like Veterans Contracting Group show that the SBA has taken things too far.  There’s no good policy reason to prohibit ordinary commercial and estate planning provisions like those at issue in this case.  To the contrary, unnecessarily strict rules like these simply discourage non-veterans from investing in SDVOSBs, to the detriment of the very veterans the SDVOSB program is intended to help.  And they penalize well-meaning veterans like Mr. Montano, who adopt paperwork that reasonably appears to them as providing for unconditional ownership.  Indeed, VCG was verified as an SDVOSB by the VA CVE, which presumably reviewed the same Shareholders Agreement and saw nothing amiss.  But even with that VA verification in his back pocket, Mr. Montano lost the Corps contract, and probably has some hefty legal bills to pay, too.  Is this really what the SDVOSB program was intended to do?

On this point, Veterans Contracting Group is a stark example of the divergence in the SBA and VA SDVOSB regulations.  In my experience, many (perhaps most!) veterans think that VA verification applies government-wide, and that if the company is VA-verified, it’s essentially bulletproof for non-VA SDVOSB jobs.  Clearly, that ain’t so.

The Court’s decision shows that the same company, operating under the same paperwork, can be a VA-verified SDVOSB, but ineligible for non-VA SDVOSB contracts.  No doubt, many VA-verified SDVOSBs have documents with commercially reasonable restrictions much like those at issue in Veterans Contracting Group.  If those companies plan to bid non-VA jobs, they better take a careful second look at those VA-approved corporate documents before submitting their next non-VA proposal.

Fortunately, change is on the way.  Sometime in 2018, the SBA and VA ought to unveil their proposed regulation to consolidate the SDVOSB eligibility requirements.  Once that regulation takes effect, the problem of the two programs’ divergence will at least be solved–although it may be 2019 before that happens.

But Veterans Contracting Group shows that consolidating the two SDVOSB regulations, while undoubtedly a good thing, isn’t enough.  The substance of the rules need to change, also, to protect service-disabled veterans while accommodating ordinary commercial and estate planning restrictions like the ones in VCG’s Shareholders’ Agreement.

SBA, if you’re reading, here’s a good rule of thumb: when a federal judge calls your rules “draconian and perverse,” it’s a wise idea to strongly consider changing those rules.  Here’s hoping the upcoming consolidated regulation does that.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

The U.S. Air Force cannot buy sporks, at least not in many situations.

One would think that the recently passed $700 billion defense bill would provide a little wiggle room for the military to buy paper plates and utensils for its civilian contractors, but, according to the GAO, that is not necessarily the case.

In Air Force Reserve Command-Disposable Plates and Utensils, B-329316, 2017 WL 5809101 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 29, 2017), GAO determined that disposable plates and utensils are, like food, a personal expense that must be born by the individual user.

The ruling begs the question: What does the Air Force and the Government Accountability Office have against sporks? The answer, apparently—and I swear I am not making this up—is that sporks do not advance the mission of the Air Force, therefore, taxpayer money ordinarily cannot buy them.

(I should note at this point, dear reader, that the GAO decision this blog is based on does not actually use the word “spork.”  Instead it talks about paper plates and “disposable utensils.”  But a “spork” is a disposable utensil and it lends an additional air of absurdity, so I am going to keep using it.)

How did the United States government come to this anti-spork conclusion, you might be asking. Unlike most of the GAO decisions we cover here at SmallGovCon, the ruling came about not due to a bid protest, but instead because the Air Force asked GAO to provide an advance ruling on the status of these products.

Just over a year ago, Grissom Air Reserve Base, located north of Kokomo, Indiana, announced that it had discovered there was too much lead and copper in the water on post to drink, and ordered that the faucet water could not be used for consumption, making coffee, or washing dishes.

The base operates 24 hours a day and employs both civilian and military personnel who work 12-hour shifts during which they may not leave the work area. They eat meals in a break room which has a sink, microwave, and toaster. Since discovering the tap water was undrinkable, the Air Force had been buying bottled water for workers. But without potable water, employees had to take their dishes home to wash.

In response, the base comptroller authorized the temporary purchase of disposable plates and utensils “to protect the building’s occupants from health related issues associated with unsafe lead and copper concentrations.” That sounds like a reasonable alternative to making Air Force employees wash their dished at home. But the Staff Judge Advocate, the command-level Judge Advocate, and the command-level Financial Management decided that while appropriated funds could be used to purchase drinking water, they could not be used to purchase disposable plates and utensils. They asked GAO to rule.

GAO said that the Air Force has a duty to provide drinking water for its employees, and “agencies may use their appropriations to provide bottled water to employees where no potable water is available.” But once the agency provides potable water, “the remaining flexibility lies with individual employees to make choices that suit their preferences.”

GAO continued: “employees may choose to 1) purchase and use their own disposable plates and utensils; 2) wash plates and utensils at home and transport them back to the office; or 3) wash plates and utensils using the water provided.”  Because employees had these options, “AFRC does not demonstrate a legal necessity to provide these items.”  GAO concluded: “ecause the purchase of disposable items is for the personal benefit of AFRC employees, appropriated funds are unavailable.”

In other words, sporks, legally speaking, did not advance the Air Force’s mission and were more valuable to the individual employees than it was to the government. Therefore, absent Congressional approval, or significantly differing circumstances, the government cannot use taxpayer dollars to provide them.

Since the Spork Act of 2018 seems unlikely, for the time being, the employees of Grissom will have to make do. Meanwhile, here at SmallGovCon, we’ll continue to keep you updated on government contracts legal developments in the new year–be they major Supreme Court rulings, or slightly less groundbreaking updates on the government’s spork policy.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

It’s hard to believe it, but Monday is Christmas. Hopefully you will be able to enjoy some time with family and friends this weekend and maybe even get that special gift you’ve been hoping for under your tree. Before we head off into the holiday weekend, we wouldn’t think of leaving you without the SmallGovCon Week In Review.

In this edition, two defense contractors will fork over $1.4 million (and spend some time in the pokey) as a result of a procurement fraud scheme, the GAO releases a study on DoD contracts awarded to minority-owned and women-owned businesses, a contractor will pay a whopping $63.7 million to settle False Claims Act allegations, and more.

SmallGovCon Week in Review will be off next week, but we’ll be back with more government contracts news and notes in 2018.  Happy holidays!

  • Two San Diego defense contractors will forfeit $1.4 million and serve jail time for their roles in conspiring to commit wire fraud and file false claims against the government. [Times of San Diego]
  • A contractor will pay $63.7 million to settle False Claims allegations relating to improper billing practices and unlawful financial inducements in violation of the Anti-Kickback Act. [United States Department of Justice]
  • A new DoD memorandum allows Contracting Officers, at their discretion, to eliminate cost or price as an evaluation factor when awarding certain multiple-award contracts. [Office of the Undersecretary of Defense]
  • GAO released a report on the number and types of contracts for the procurement of products or services that the DoD awarded to minority-owned and women-owned businesses. [Military Technologies]
  • The Defense Logistics agency wants to beef up its Business Decision Analytics decision tool to better help it better identify and combat procurement fraud. [GCN]

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

A recent SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals decision confirms that there is no exception for nonprofit organizations when it comes to affiliation issues.

In the case, SBA OHA found affiliation between a self-certified small business and a nonprofit organization based on close family members controlling both the business concern and ​the ​nonprofit.​ Adding in the receipts from the affiliated nonprofit made the business in question ineligible for small business status.

In Johnson Development, LLC, SBA No. SIZ-5863 (2017), OHA considered the case of a business (Johnson Development) that was awarded a VA contract for clinic leasing space under NAICS code 531190, Lessors of Other Real Estate Property, with a corresponding $38.5 million annual receipts size standard. While the procurement was unrestricted, small business offerors would receive credit under the evaluation.

In its evaluation of proposals, the VA assigned small business credit to Johnson Development under the solicitation’s evaluation scheme. The VA subsequently announced that it had awarded the contract to Johnson Development.

An unsuccessful competitor filed a size protest, alleging that Johnson Development was affiliated with several other entities. The SBA Area Office determined that it had jurisdiction over the protest, even though the solicitation was unrestricted, because small business status was beneficial to offerors.

The SBA Area Office determined that Johnson Development was owned by Johnson Healthcare Holdings, LLC (JHH), which in turn was owned by James Johnson and his wife, Sallie Johnson. Their children are Milton Johnson and Sumner Rives. The SBA Area Office found the four family members affiliated based on identity of interest and found Johnson Development affiliated with 31 other companies controlled by the family members, including JHH.

Apparently, though, these affiliations didn’t push Johnson Development over the $38.5 million size standard. The SBA Area Office then turned to potential affiliation with a nonprofit entity, the James Milton and Sallie R. Johnson Foundation. The SBA Area Office determined that Ms. Rives was the Foundation’s President, and Johnson family members were the only directors and contributors. The SBA Area Office concluded that Johnson Development was affiliated with the Foundation based on common management and familial identity of interest.

Johnson Development filed a size appeal with OHA. Johnson Development emphasized that it was a “non-profit, charitable organization.” Johnson Development contended that there was a clear line of fracture between Johnson Development and the Foundation for two reasons. First, because the Foundation’s assets were “contributions for the public benefit” and the Foundation paid no compensation or reimbursement of expenses to any Johnson family member. Second, because all donations contributed to the Foundation was irrevocable, the Foundation was in a “a completely different line of business from [Johnson Development],” and there were no business connections such as loans, customers, or shared facilities between the two.

OHA first addressed the big picture issue: can a nonprofit be an affiliate? Citing 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(a)(6), OHA wrote that it “has consistently found no difference between for profit and non-profit entities” under the SBA’s affiliation rules. OHA continued:

under the regulation and settled OHA precedent, non-profit concerns are treated no differently than for-profit concerns in determining the size of a challenged concern. They may be found affiliated under the same criteria as other concerns, whether one concern controls or has the power to control the other.13 C.F.R. § 121.103(a)(1). Therefore, the fact the Foundation is a legitimate non-profit organization does not exempt it from being found affiliated with Appellant, and from having its receipts included in the calculation of Appellant’s annual receipts.

Having concluded that the Foundation could be an affiliate, OHA then rejected the argument that there was a clear line of fracture between Johnson Development and the Foundation. OHA wrote that, under the SBA’s affiliation rules as they existed at the time, companies controlled by close family members are presumed to be affiliated. Although this presumption can be rebutted by showing a “clear line of fracture,” a clear line of fracture “is a fracture between the family members themselves,” not between the entities in question.

Here, “Johnson family members operate the for-profit entities together.” Therefore, “there is no clear fracture between them,” and the presumption of affiliation could not be rebutted.

OHA affirmed the SBA Area Office’s size determination and denied the size appeal.

This decision is an important reminder that a nonprofit is treated the same as any other entity for affiliation purposes. Contractors shouldn’t make the mistake of thinking that, because nonprofits are treated differently under some laws, they will be treated differently for affiliation purposes.

One final note regarding the identity of interest rule for companies owned by close family members. The solicitation in this case was issued in 2015, and proposals were due in April 2016. But in a rulemaking effective June 30, 2016, the SBA tinkered with the identity of interest rule–which arguably can now be read as requiring the entities in question to conduct business with each other for the presumption to apply. We’ll keep our eyes peeled for case law interpreting the updated rule to see how OHA interprets it.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

The GAO lacks jurisdiction to determine whether an offeror is a service-disabled veteran-owned small business.

In a recent bid protest decision, the GAO rejected the protester’s creative attempt to convince the GAO to take jurisdiction, and confirmed that, for non-VA acquisitions, the SBA has sole authority to determine whether an offeror is an SDVOSB.

The GAO’s decision in OBXtek, Inc., B-415258 (Dec. 12, 2017) involved a DHS RFQ for cybersecurity support services.  The RFQ was issued to holders of the GSA’s OASIS Small Business (Pool 1) IDIQ contract.  The DHS set aside the order for SDVOSBs.

After evaluating quotations, the DHS announced that it would make award to Analytic Strategies, LLC.  OBXtek, Inc., an unsuccessful competitor, subsequently filed a bid protest at the GAO.

OBXtek argued, in part, that Analytic Strategies had misrepresented its SDVOSB status in order to compete for the set-aside RFQ.  Specifically, OBXtek contended that Analytic Strategies had been acquired by another company in August 2016, and was not an eligible SDVOSB at the time it submitted its quotation in mid-2017.

OBXtek conceded that the GAO doesn’t have authority to determine whether a company is an SDVOSB.  However, OBXtek argued that Analytic Strategies’ SDVOSB eligibility wasn’t at issue.  Rather, OBXtek argued, it was asking the GAO to determine whether Analytic Strategies had made a material misrepresentation in its proposal by expressly certifying that it was an SDVOSB.  And, as OBXtek pointed out, the GAO ordinarily has the ability to determine whether an offeror made a material misrepresentation in its proposal.

It was a creative effort, but GAO didn’t buy it.  Under the Small Business Act, the GAO wrote, “the SBA is the designated authority for determining whether a firm is an eligible SDVOSB concern” for most non-VA acquisitions, and “it has established procedures for interested parties to challenge a firm’s status as a qualified SDVOSB concern.”  As a result, the GAO “will neither make nor review SDVOSB status determinations.”

Here, “[w]hile the protester may be correct in asserting that allegations of a vendor submitting a quotation with a material misrepresentation is within our Office’s jurisdiction, the issue as it is here, of whether a vendor is an SDVOSB (and eligible to compete under a set-aside) is a matter within the jurisdiction of the SBA.”  In other words, determining whether Analytic Strategies had made a material misrepresentation would require GAO to determine whether Analytic Strategies was (or was not) an SDVOSB–a determination that the GAO is not permitted to make.

The GAO dismissed this portion of OBXtek’s protest.

As I was reading the case, I kept wondering–why did OBXtek protest to the GAO in the first place?  Ordinarily, the answer would be simple: the company was confused by the nuanced jurisdictional rules of federal bid protests, and simply filed in the wrong place.  But OBXtek, by advancing its creative argument, seemed to understand that the SBA was the right place to file an SDVOSB protest.  So why not file there?

I can only speculate, but it’s possible that OBXtek didn’t think that it could file a viable SBA SDVOSB protest.  Under the SBA’s SDVOSB regulations, a company that qualifies as an SDVOSB at the time of initial offer on a multiple-award contract ordinarily is considered an SDVOSB for the life of that contract, including “for each order issued against the contract.”  There are exceptions to this rule, but if none of them applied, Analytic Strategies might not have been required to be an SDVOSB at the time of its quotation on the DHS order.  If my speculation is correct, OBXtek’s protest might have been an effort to circumvent this rule.

Regardless of the reasons why OBXtek took its case to GAO, the OBXtek, Inc. decision is an important reminder: the GAO cannot determine SDVOSB eligibility.  For most non-VA acquisitions, SDVOSB determinations must be left to the SBA.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

The GAO ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to consider a protest of a task or delivery order under a DoD multiple-award contract unless the value of the order exceeds $25 million.

In a recent bid protest decision, the DoD confirmed that the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act upped the jurisdictional threshold for DoD task orders from $10 million to $25 million.

The GAO’s decision in Erickson Helicopters, Inc., B-415176.3, B-415176.5 (Dec. 11, 2017) involved a solicitation under the U.S. Transportation Command’s Trans-Africa Airlift Support multiple-award IDIQ contract.  The agency sought to procure personnel recovery, casualty evaluation, and airdrop services in various parts of Africa.

In May 2017, the agency issued a task order RFP to all three IDIQ contract holders.  After evaluating proposals, the agency awarded the order to Berry Aviation, Inc.  AAR Airlift Group, Inc., an unsuccessful offeror, filed a protest challenging the award.

The agency directed Berry to suspend performance of the task order pending the outcome of AAR’s protest.  But in the interim, the agency issued a sole source order to Berry to provide the same services.

In August 2017, three days after the agency issued its sole source justification, Erickson Helicopters, Inc. filed a protest challenging the sole source award to Berry.  Erickson alleged, in part, that the award to Berry was flawed for various reasons, such as that Berry did not provide fair and reasonable pricing.

The GAO wrote that, under statutory authority modified by the 2017 NDAA, “our Office is authorized to hear protests of task orders that are issued under multiple-award contracts established within the Department of Defense (or protests of the solicitations for those task orders) where the task order is valued in excess of $25 million, or where the protester asserts that the task order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract.”

In this case, many of Erickson’s arguments did not allege that the task order increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying IDIQ.  After a detailed analysis, the GAO concluded that the total value of the task order would be “no more than $23,189,823.90.”  This amount, GAO said, “is less than the $25 million threshold necessary to establish the jurisdiction of our Office.”

GAO dismissed these portions of Erickson’s protest.

For many years, the GAO had jurisdiction over DoD task order protests valued in excess of $10 million. But in the 2017 NDAA, Congress upped the threshold to $25 million.  This significantly varies from the threshold for orders under civilian IDIQs, which remains at $10 million.

It’s easy for prospective protesters to get tripped up by these jurisdictional rules. Jurisdiction may not be the most exciting topic in the world, but anyone wishing to protest a task or delivery order at the GAO must consider whether the GAO has jurisdiction.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

As we reach the halfway point of December, we have managed to escape any real signs of winter weather here in Lawrence. Our chances for a white Christmas may also be dwindling as the long range forecast is predicting sunny skies and zero precipitation. But I’m not complaining: bring on the sun and (relative) warmth, I say.

As the holidays approach, there’s plenty happening in the world of government contracts. So if you’re an Eggnog fan (I’m not, but perhaps it’s an acquired taste), pour yourself a tall glass, sprinkle on some cinnamon, and enjoy this edition of the SmallGovCon Week in Review.  This week, the Pentagon has delayed a much-discussed January 1 deadline for contractors to meet the NIST 800-171 standards, a bribery scheme involving a contract at the Hoover Dam has led to the indictment of a longtime former official for the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation in Nevada, government contracts guru Larry Allen discusses how the recent emphasis on preventing sexual harassment may impact contractors, and much more.

  • After knowingly disclosing confidential information to private companies bidding on contracts at Scott Air Force Base the Chief of Project Management has plead guilty to one charge of government procurement fraud. [The Telegraph]
  • Larry Allen to discuss the recent rules regarding sexual harassment on Capitol Hill and takes a look at if contractors will be next to target sexual harassers. [Federal News Radio]
  • A Pennsylvania man has been indicted for conspiring to defraud the United States through repeated bribes and contractor kickbacks related to a U.S. Army renovation project. [Daily Record]
  • President Donald Trump signed a major government technology revamp into law Tuesday as part of the 2018 NDAA. [Nextgov]
  • The GSA cannot proceed with the $50 billion Alliant 2 Unrestricted contract for IT services until the resolution of several protests. [Washington Technology]
  • Ellen Lord, the DoD’s new undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics is requesting more “flexibility” to cut down the amount of cost and pricing data it requires companies to cough up when bidding on certain contracts. [Federal News Radio]
  • The DoD intents to award a cloud computing contract next year that could disrupt the entire federal market. [Nextgov]
  • The Pentagon will delay a January 1 deadline for all of its suppliers to meet a set of new regulations largely designed to better protect sensitive military data and weapons blueprints. [Nextgov]
  • An ex-official for the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation in Nevada has been indicted on federal charges for his alleged role in a bribery scheme involving a government contract at the Hoover Dam. [U.S.News]

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

Almost a year ago, we wrote of a memorandum from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy urging agencies to strengthen the debriefing process. OFPP’s rationale was simple: because effective debriefings tend to reduce the number of protests, agencies should be inclined to enhance the debriefing process.

Congress seems to have taken note: the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act requires the Department of Defense to make significant improvements to the debriefing process.  That said, those improvements are limited to large DoD acquisitions, leaving many small businesses stuck with the much more limited debriefing rights currently available under the FAR.

NDAA Section 818—entitled Enhanced Post-Award Debriefing Rights—imposes three significant changes of which contractors should be aware.

First, the NDAA bolsters the amount of information offerors will receive under DoD debriefings. For small business awards valued between $10 million and $100 million—and for any contract valued over $100 million, regardless of the awardee’s status—defense agencies must disclose the agency’s written source selection award determination (redacted as necessary to protect other offeror’s confidential information).

This is a significant increase in the amount of information disclosed as part of debriefings: currently, agencies need only disclose basic information about the awardee’s scores and a summary of the rationale for award.

Second, the NDAA also makes clear that written or oral debriefings will be required for all contract awards and task or delivery orders valued at $10 million or more.

This also represents a significant expansion of debriefing rights: now, the FAR only requires debriefings under negotiated procurements (FAR part 15) and for task and delivery orders valued over $5.5 million (FAR 16.505).

Third, the NDAA requires agencies to give offerors the ability to ask questions following receipt of the debriefing—specifically, within two business days after receiving the debriefing.

True, the FAR already requires agencies to allow offerors the ability to ask questions; but oftentimes, agencies require questions to be posed before the debriefing is received. I’ve always thought this requirement is nonsensical, as it’s tough for an offeror to know what questions to ask if it lacks any information about the evaluation. Congress apparently agrees and now wants to make clear that questions must be allowed after the debriefing is received.

Congress also seeks to improve the debriefing process by giving some teeth to the requirement that agencies accept questions. That is, although the FAR already contemplates that offerors be given the opportunity to ask questions, agencies sometimes ignore this mandate and close the debriefing before questions can be asked. The NDAA hits back at this practice: it says that a contractor’s bid protest clock does not start ticking until the government delivers its response to any questions posed by an offeror. In other words, the longer the agency waits to allow for and respond to questions, the more time a protester will have to develop potential protest arguments.


All told, the NDAA makes significant changes to the post-award debriefing process in DoD procurements. These changes are a big step in the right direction but not a perfect solution to the problem OFPP identified. The changes will apply only to DoD, not civilian agencies. And even for small businesses, enhanced debriefings will only be available for large acquisitions of $10 million or greater. As a result, many small businesses won’t be entitled to enhanced debriefings, even in DoD acquisitions.

Perhaps, though, the rollout of this enhanced debriefings process will prove that, contrary to a common agency perception, better post-award communication actually decreases protests. If so, agencies might begin offering enhanced debriefings even when they’re not required, which would be a real win for everyone in the contracting community.

President Trump signed the 2018 NDAA into law on December 12. It’s only a matter of time before these changes take effect.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

Recently, there’s been a lot of discussion about the fact that the GAO bid protest “effectiveness rate” was a sky-high 47% in FY 2017.

But, somewhat under the radar, contractors did even better at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.  According to the ASBCA’s annual report, contractors prevailed (in whole or in part) in 57.6% of FY 2017 ASBCA decisions.

The annual report reveals that the ASBCA decided 139 appeals on the merits in FY 2017.  Of those merit-based decisions, “57.6% of the decisions found merit in whole or in part.”

If 139 sounds like a low number, it is–many more appeals were resolved without a merits-based decision.  The report states that the ASBCA dismissed 539 appeals in FY 2017.  Although one might think that a contractor loses when the appeal is dismissed, that often isn’t the case.  As the ASBCA points out, “ in the majority of cases, a dismissal reflects that the parties have reached a settlement.”

The report doesn’t provide additional details, but in my experience, a settlement typically results in the contractor getting at least some of what it wants.  In other words, many of the dismissed appeals would likely be best classified as “wins” (or at least partial wins) for the appellants.

The FY 2017 numbers aren’t an outlier.  The ASBCA’s prior annual reports show a history of appellants prevailing more than half the time in merit-based decisions dating back at least ten years.

Unlike bid protests, the appeals process hasn’t been the subject of political scrutiny in recent years.  But, like bid protests, ASBCA appeals are surprisingly successful on a percentage basis.


View the full article


Koprince Law LLC

The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act put a new twist on potential costs a contractor may incur in filing a GAO bid protest.

While many federal contractors are familiar with the costs arising from a GAO protest, including their attorneys’ fees and consultant and expert witness fees, and some are lucky enough to recoup such costs upon GAO’s sustainment of a protest, under the 2018 NDAA, some large DoD contractors may also be required to reimburse DoD for costs incurred in defending protests denied by GAO.

Under Section 827 of the 2018 NDAA, Congress has instructed the Secretary of Defense to implement a pilot program whereby some large DoD contractors filing GAO bid protests between October 1, 2019 and September 30, 2022, will be required to reimburse the DoD for costs incurred by DoD in defending the protest, if the protest is denied. Specifically, Section 827 provides as follows:

The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a pilot program to determine the effectiveness of requiring contractors to reimburse the Department of Defense for costs incurred in processing covered protests…. In this section, the term ‘‘covered protest’’ means a bid protest that was— (1) denied in an opinion issued by the Government Accountability Office; (2) filed by a party with revenues in excess of $250,000,000 (based on fiscal year 2017 constant dollars) during the previous year; and (3) filed on or after October 1, 2019 and on or before September 30, 2022.

Notably, a “covered protest” only includes those protests filed with GAO challenging DoD procurements. It does not cover agency-level protests to DoD or protests filed with the Court of Federal Claims. It also does not cover protests filed in connection with acquisitions by civilian agencies.

Additionally, only large federal contractors (i.e. contractors with revenues in excess of $250,000,000) will be required to reimburse DoD for costs incurred in filing a protest denied by GAO. Consequently, small, medium, and even many large federal contractors need not worry about this pilot program–although if the program proves successful, Congress could adjust the thresholds in the future.

Finally, the pilot program is only set to run between October 1, 2019 and September 30, 2022. After this time, the Secretary of Defense is required to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services concerning the feasibility of making the program permanent.

Although the 2018 NDAA outlines the basics for DoD seeking reimbursement of costs incurred in defending a protest denied by GAO, many questions remain.

For one, what if GAO dismisses a protest based on a technicality (i.e. untimeliness) and not based on the merits? The language of the statute uses the word “denied,” which isn’t the same as a dismissal. But one of Congress’s goals is to discourage frivolous protests; one would think that dismissals would be covered, too.

What if GAO denies some grounds and not others? GAO decisions are often a mixed bag, with some allegations sustained and others dismissed or denied. Most protesters view a protest as successful if even one ground is sustained–but will such a result still require the payment costs?

Other questions abound: What costs will a contractor be required to reimburse the DoD? Will multiple unsuccessful protesters be required to split the costs, and in what manner? What if the protest involves both large and small protesters; will the large protester have to foot the bill for the entire protest? Will the DoD later expand this program to cover smaller businesses?

These details should come as the pilot program is implemented in regulation. Perhaps that is why Congress allotted two years for the DoD to implement the pilot program.

And, of course, it remains to be seen what effect, if any, this requirement will have on the number and nature of GAO protests filed by large defense contractors.  It’s doubtful that many contractors of $250 million or more would make a go/no go protest decision based on the potential to pay costs.  But will these contractors choose to turn to the Court of Federal Claims more often to avoid the cost requirement? Will they increasingly seek ways to resolve GAO protests, such as GAO’s outcome-predictive Alternative Dispute Resolution, that avoid decisions on the merits? Time will tell.

Stay tuned as we continue to follow this issue and delve into other matters surrounding the passage of the 2018 NDAA.

View the full article

Koprince Law LLC

In a recent post, I discussed the basics about SBA’s 8(a) Business Development Program. This follow-up posts discusses 8(a) eligibility requirements in greater detail.

To qualify for the 8(a) Program, a firm must be a small business that is unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially- and economically-disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of the United States and that demonstrates a potential for success.

What does this really mean? Here are five things you should know about 8(a) Program eligibility.

  1. Is your business small enough to become an 8(a) Participant?

The 8(a) Program is only open to businesses that are small under the size standard corresponding to their primary NAICS codes. And remember: SBA will not only consider your company’s size, but will also add to it the size of any affiliates. If there’s a question as to your business’s size, SBA may go so far as to request a formal size determination.

What is your primary NAICS code? While businesses have some leeway to select the code that fits best, the SBA may push back if the NAICS code you choose doesn’t seem to be the one in which your company does the most work. Before applying, it may be useful to review the SBA’s definition of “primary industry” at 13 C.F.R. 121.107.

One final note: some IRS tax returns already provide a spot for a primary NAICS code. For example, Form 1065, which is completed by many LLCs, asks for a primary NAICS in box A, “principal business activity.” Oftentimes, our clients are surprised to notice that an accountant or bookkeeper has identified a primary NAICS code on a tax return. Be aware that the SBA will ask for an explanation if that primary NAICS code isn’t the one the company has selected for 8(a) purposes.

  1. What is “social” disadvantage?

It’s not enough to be a small business to qualify for the 8(a) Program. The business’s owner also must demonstrate suffering from social disadvantage—or, as SBA defines it, “racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within American society because of their identities as members of groups and without regard to their individual qualities.”

Members of certain racial or ethnic groups are presumed by SBA to have suffered social disadvantage, including Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, and some Asian Americans. This presumption is not absolute (as it may be rebutted by credible evidence demonstrating the lack of social disadvantage) or controversy (as its constitutionality has been challenged, but recently upheld). For a full list of groups presumed socially disadvantaged, take a look at 13 C.F.R. 124.103(b).

But participation in the 8(a) Program isn’t limited to only the groups listed in the regulations. Any individual can try to establish social disadvantage by presenting evidence showing chronic disadvantage based on a characteristic or circumstance beyond that person’s control, which has impacted that person’s education, employment, or business histories. For example (and not by way of limitation), our firm has assisted companies owned by Caucasian women and disabled veterans in obtaining 8(a) certification.

  1. What is “economic” disadvantage?

In addition to social disadvantage, you still must show economic disadvantage to be eligible for the 8(a) Program. An economically-disadvantaged individual is one whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to other non-socially disadvantaged persons (in the same or similar line of business).

SBA will take a detailed look at an individual’s financial history to determine his or her economic disadvantage. Though there are caveats and exceptions to these requirements, here are a few numbers to keep in mind:

Net worth: For initial eligibility, the adjusted net worth of the person claiming economic disadvantage must be less than $250,000. The adjustment typically excludes: (1) funds invested in an IRA, 401(k), or other official retirement account; (2) income received from an S corporation, LLC or partnership, if that income was reinvested in the company or used to pay company taxes, (3) the equity interest in the applicant company, and (4) equity in the individual’s primary residence.

Fair market value of all assets: Notwithstanding a person’s net worth or personal income, an individual will not be considered economically-disadvantaged if the fair market value of his/her assets (including the value of the applicant company and the person’s primary residence) exceeds $4 million. But even this calculation excludes funds in traditional retirement accounts.

Personal income: If an individual’s adjusted gross income for the three years prior to the 8(a) application exceeds $250,000, there is a rebuttable presumption the individual isn’t economically disadvantaged. Income from an S Corporation or LLC will be excluded when the funds were reinvested in the company or used to pay company taxes.

Are there any other requirements?

Yes. Again, socially- and economically-disadvantaged individuals have to unconditionally own and control the company. This means disadvantaged individuals must directly own at least 51% of the company and oversee its strategic policy and day-to-day management and administration. Additionally, the individual must manage the company on a full-time basis while holding its highest officer position.

The company must also demonstrate potential for success. This assessment generally requires a holistic view of the company: not only must it have been generating revenues in its primary industry for at least two years, but SBA will also consider every aspect of its business operations (including access to capital and financing, technical and managerial experience of the company’s managers, its past performance, and licensing requirements) to determine if the company is likely to succeed in the 8(a) Program.

The company and its principals must have good character. For example, if the business owner has recently been convicted of a felony or any crime involving business integrity, the SBA may decline the application. The SBA will also examine federal financial obligations: unpaid back taxes and defaults on SBA business loans, for example, may lead to a rejection.

It’s important to note that while these are some of the most important requirements, it’s not an exhaustive list. 8(a) Program eligibility is rather complex.

  1. Do you have to maintain compliance with these eligibility requirements throughout your participation in the 8(a) Program?

Yes. Demonstrating eligibility isn’t a one-time thing; once a company is admitted to the 8(a) Program, SBA will review its eligibility compliance on an annual basis.

Some of the initial eligibility requirements are modified for continuing eligibility. For example, once admitted to the 8(a) Program, caps on net worth and personal income are raised (but not eliminated). But tread lightly: SBA imposes additional requirements on 8(a) Participants to remain eligible, such as limiting the number of withdrawals an individual can take from a Participant and restricting the number of 8(a) awards a Participant may receive.


If these eligibility requirements sound a bit ominous, it’s for good reason: they can be. But that’s not to scare you away from considering the 8(a) Program—as I mentioned in my initial post, the benefits to participating can be tremendous.

If you have questions about your company’s 8(a) Program eligibility, or would like help applying for the Program, please call me.

View the full article

Sign in to follow this