The Medical School of the University of California at Davis opened in 1968 with an entering class of 50 students.  In 1971, the size of the entering class increased to 100 students.  No admissions program for disadvantaged or minority students existed when the school opened, and the first class contained three Asians but no Blacks, no Mexican-Americans, and no American Indians.  Over the next two years, the faculty devised a special admissions program to increase the representation of "disadvantaged" students in each Medical School class.  The special program consisted of a separate admissions system operating in coordination with the regular admissions process.

Regular Admissions

As a result of the large number of applications received under the regular admissions procedure, the admissions committee screened each one to select candidates for further consideration.  Candidates whose overall undergraduate grade point averages fell below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were summarily rejected.  About one out of six applicants was invited for a personal interview.  Following the interviews, each candidate was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by his interviewers and four other members of the admissions committee.  The rating embraced the interviewers' summaries, the candidate's overall grade point average, grade point average in science courses, scores on the Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT), letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and other biographical data.  The ratings were added together to arrive at each candidate's "benchmark" score.  Since five committee members rated each candidate in 1973, a perfect score was 500 (100 possible points X 5 members).  In 1974, six members rated each candidate, so that a perfect score was 600.  The full committee then reviewed the file and scores of each applicant and made offers of admission on a "rolling" basis.  The chairman was responsible for placing names on the waiting list.  They were not placed in strict numerical order; instead, the chairman had discretion to include persons with "special skills."

Special Admissions

The special admissions program operated with a separate committee.  On the 1973 application form, candidates were asked to indicate whether they wished to be considered as "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" applicants; on the 1974 form the question was whether they wished to be considered as members of a "minority group," which the Medical School apparently viewed as "Blacks," "Chicanos," "Asians," and "American Indians.”  If these questions were answered affirmatively, the application was forwarded to the special admissions committee.  No formal definition of "disadvantaged" was ever produced, but the chairman of the special committee screened each application to see whether it reflected economic or educational deprivation.  Having passed this initial hurdle, the applications then were rated by the special committee in a fashion similar to that used by the general admissions committee, except that special candidates did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average cutoff applied to regular applicants.  About one-fifth of the total number of special applicants were invited for interviews in 1973 and 1974.  Following each interview, the special committee assigned each special applicant a benchmark score.  The special committee then presented its top choices to the general admissions committee.  The latter did not rate or compare the special candidates against the general applicants, but could reject recommended special candidates for failure to meet course requirements or other specific deficiencies.  The special committee continued to recommend special applicants until a number prescribed by faculty vote were admitted.  While the overall class size was still 50, the prescribed number was 8; in 1973 and 1974, when the class size had doubled to 100, the prescribed number of special admissions also doubled, to 16.

Results of Admissions

From the year of the increase in class size -- 1971 -- through 1974, the special program resulted in the admission of 21 Black students, 30 Mexican-Americans, and 12 Asians, for a total of 63 minority students.  Over the same period, the regular admissions program produced 1 Black, 6 Mexican-Americans,  and 37 Asians, for a total of 44 minority students.  Although disadvantaged whites applied to the special program in large numbers, none received an offer of admission through that process.  In 1974, the special committee explicitly considered only "disadvantaged" special applicants who were members of one of the designated minority groups

Application of the Admissions Programs

Allan Bakke, a white male, applied to the Davis Medical School in both 1973 and 1974.  In both years, Bakke's application was considered under the general admissions program, and he received an interview.  His 1973 interviewer considered Bakke "a very desirable applicant to [the] medical school."  Despite a strong benchmark score of 468 out of 500, Bakke was rejected.  His application had come late in the year, and no applicants in the general admissions process with scores below 470 were accepted after Bakke's application was completed.  There were four special admissions slots unfilled at that time, however, for which Bakke was not considered.  After his 1973 rejection, Bakke wrote to the Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions Committee, protesting that the special admissions program operated as a racial and ethnic quota.

Bakke's 1974 application was completed early in the year.  His student interviewer gave him an overall rating of 94, finding him "friendly, well tempered, conscientious and delightful to speak with."  His faculty interviewer was, by coincidence, the same Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions Committee to whom he had written in protest of the special admissions program.  The Associate Dean found Bakke "rather limited in his approach" to the problems of the medical profession, and found disturbing Bakke's "very definite opinions which were based more on his personal viewpoints than upon a study of the total problem."  The Associate Dean gave Bakke the lowest of his six ratings, an 86; his total was 549 out of 600.  Again, Bakke's application was rejected.  In neither year did the chairman of the admissions committee exercise his discretion to place Bakke on the waiting list.  In both years, applicants were admitted under the special program with grade point averages, MCT scores, and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's.

THE ISSUE

Did the special admissions program operate to exclude Bakke from the school on the basis of his race, in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Art. I, § 21, of the California Constitution, and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.  

THE JUDGMENT

1.  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause if employed by a State or its agencies.

2.  Racial and ethnic classifications of any sort are inherently suspect and call for the most exacting judicial scrutiny.  While the goal of achieving a diverse student body is sufficiently compelling to justify consideration of race in admissions decisions under some circumstances, petitioner's special admissions program, which forecloses consideration to persons like Bakke, is unnecessary to the achievement of this compelling goal, and therefore invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.

3.  Bakke must be admitted into the University.

OPINIONS

There are opinions by Justice Powell and two groups of justices.  Justice Powell and the group composed of justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun reviewed this case under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Burger, and justices Stewart and Rehnquist reviewed this case under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Additional individual opinions were submitted.  To reach the Court's judgment, the viewpoints of the three groups were pieced together.

Justice Powell 

Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court and provided an opinion.  Excerpts from his opinion follow.

Application of Standard of Scrutiny

The University and Bakke initially argued whether the special admissions program provided for a goal or a quota.  Justice Powell said

"This semantic distinction is beside the point: the special admissions program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background.  To the extent that there existed a pool of at least minimally qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants.  Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status."

Justice Powell explained that all "legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect."  However, that is "not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."  

Substantial or compelling interest

Justice Powell explained that "In order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment" of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.'"  

He then looked at the purposes behind the special admissions program to determine if any purposes of the special admissions program supported  the use of a suspect classification.  The purposes of the special admissions program were 

• reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession,
  
  
• countering the effects of societal discrimination, 
  
  
• increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved, and 
  
  
• obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body. 

Reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities

Justice Powell said that "Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake."  If the University's purpose is to assure a specified percentage of a racial or ethnic group, "such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial, but as facially invalid."

Countering the effects of societal discrimination

Justice Powell said that helping certain groups that the University viewed as victims of "societal discrimination" did not justify a classification that imposed disadvantages upon persons like Bakke, who bore no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered.

Although a state has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating or eliminating the effects of identified discrimination, in areas where the Court acted, it ordered states to remedy the wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination.  He explained "That goal was far more focused than the remedying of the effects of 'societal discrimination,' an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past."

Increasing the number of physicians in underserved communities

Justice Powell said that, "in some situations, a State's interest in facilitating the health care of its citizens is sufficiently compelling to support the use of a suspect classification."  However, the Court concluded that the University did not demonstrate that "it must prefer members of particular ethnic groups over all other individuals in order to promote better health care delivery to deprived citizens."

Attainment of a diverse student body

Justice Powell concluded that a diverse student body is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.  He explained that academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.  The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.  He then pointed to a prior case in which Chief Justice Frankfurter noted the four essential freedoms of a university as (1) to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, (2) to determine what may be taught, (3) to determine how it shall be taught, and (4) to determine who may be admitted to study.  

Justice Powell concluded that a diverse student body was a compelling interest.

Necessity of Racial Classification to promote the compelling interest

Justice Powell said that the reservation of a specified number of seats in each class for preferred groups may contribute to the attainment of ethnic diversity, but this is not the only means to insure diversity.  He noted that the diversity that furthers a compelling state interest includes one that encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics than just racial and ethnic origin.  He said that other university admissions programs, that took race into account in achieving educational diversity, demonstrated that the assignment of a fixed number of places to a minority group is not a necessary means toward that end.  These other university admissions programs included "race or ethnic background" as a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file but did not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.  

He concluded that the fatal flaw in the University's preferential program was its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  

Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun 

These Justices concurred with part of Justice Powell's opinion.

In opening their opinion, these justices said the 

"Court today . . . affirms the constitutional power of Federal and State Governments to act affirmatively to achieve equal opportunity for all.  The difficulty of the issue presented -- whether government may use race-conscious programs to redress the continuing effects of past discrimination -- and the mature consideration which each of our Brethren has brought to it have resulted in many opinions, no single one speaking for the Court.  But this should not and must not mask the central meaning of today's opinions: Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in this area."

These justices disagreed with Justice Powell and concluded that the University of California's special admission's program was constitutional.

Next, the justices gave their opinion on their role in reviewing state action that expressly classifies by race.  Then they found it necessary "to define with precision the meaning of that inexact term 'strict scrutiny.'"

They explained that "Unquestionably we have held that a government practice or statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' or which contains 'suspect classifications' is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny,' and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available."  

In explaining that the case should not be judged under the standard of strict scrutiny, they said that "no fundamental right is involved" in the case.  Further they said, "Nor do whites, as a class, have any of the traditional indicia of suspectness:  the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."

The justices also reject applying "the very loose rational basis standard of review that is the very least that is always applied in equal protection cases."  (emphasis added)

They then moved to a standard of review referred to as the "intermediate" standard and said that racial classifications "must serve important governmental objectives, and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."

They then explained "to justify such a classification, an important and articulated purpose for its use must be shown.  In addition, any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any group or that singles out those least well represented in the political process to bear the brunt of a benign program.  Thus, our review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict -- not 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact,' because it is stigma that causes fatality -- but strict and searching nonetheless."

Important Purpose

The justices concluded that the University's "articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past societal discrimination is, under our cases, sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious admissions programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of minorities to the Medical School."

To support that conclusion, the Court noted the following facts provided in the case:

• "In 1950, for example, while Negroes constituted 10% of the total population, Negro physicians constituted only 2.2% of the total number of physicians."
  
  
• "By 1970, the gap between the proportion of Negroes in medicine and their proportion in the population had widened: the number of Negroes employed in medicine remained frozen at 2.2% while the Negro population had increased to 11.1%."

Further, the justices noted that the University "had very good reason to believe that the national pattern of underrepresentation of minorities in medicine would be perpetuated if it retained a single admissions standard.  For example, the entering classes in 1968 and 1969, the years in which such a standard was used, included only 1 Chicano and 2 Negroes out of the 50 admittees for each year.  Nor is there any relief from this pattern of underrepresentation in the statistics for the regular admissions program in later years."

Remedy selected to meet objective

Next, the justices took up the second part of their test.  This was whether the University's program stigmatizes any discrete group or individual and whether race is reasonably used in light of the program's objectives.  Again, the justices concluded that the University's special admissions program was constitutionally acceptable.

The justices concluded that "Unlike discrimination against racial minorities, the use of racial preferences for remedial purposes does not inflict a pervasive injury upon individual whites in the sense that, wherever they go or whatever they do, there is a significant likelihood that they will be treated as second-class citizens because of their color." 

Additionally, the justices concluded that there was no evidence that the University's program discriminated intentionally or unintentionally against any minority group which it purported to benefit.  Finally, they said that the beneficiaries were not stigmatized by being in the special admissions program.

Justice Stevens, with Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist

These justices concurred with Justice Powell in part and dissented in part.

The justices restricted their review to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because they felt the University's special admissions program violated the law.  Since they concluded that the University's program violated the law, they concluded there was no need to decide whether the program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

They pointed out that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provides that 

"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."  

They concluded the University's special admissions program violated Title VI by excluding Bakke because of his race.  As a result, these justices felt it was their duty to affirm the judgment of the lower court that ordered Bakke admitted to the University.